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A Cross-Polity Survey

A Cross-Polity Survey

Arthur S. Banks

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THE M.I.T. PRESS
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

University of Florida
1853

Second Printing, December 1968

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 63-22602
Printed in the United States of America

Preface

THE publication of *A Cross-Polity Survey* is the result of a series of accidents. Banks had for some years intended to produce a book in comparative government that would embrace all of the independent polities of the world. Early in 1962, on a chance re-meeting of two ex-Cornellians, he learned of Textor's Pattern Search and Table Translation Technique. After reflection and experimentation, Banks decided that this technique would lend itself well to cross-polity analysis. Textor welcomed the opportunity to try out the technique on a corpus of data quite different from any to which it had previously been applied. The result, we feel, has been felicitous. The technique has, we believe, proved capable of handling cross-polity data effectively. And, in the process of applying the technique to these data, a number of previously unsuspected weaknesses have been discovered, and improvements made.

The bulk of the present work consists of carefully selected and edited computer printout. It was not our original intention to issue the printout as a separate publication. However, we were surprised by its length, richness, and complexity, which will make it necessary for Banks to devote far more time than had been first anticipated to the preparation of an interpretive monograph. In the meantime, a number of scholars who saw the printout in an earlier form suggested that an edited version be brought out immediately, so that they would not be delayed in proceeding with their own interpretations. Other scholars expressed interest in using the printout as a teaching device, as "raw material" for graduate seminars and research projects. We are thus happy to bring out the printout at this time as a tool for use by the profession.

As will soon become clear, many of the variables included in this study involve coding decisions of a "judgmental" rather than an "objective" nature. While we certainly would prefer wherever possible to use variables of the latter type, we also feel that it would have been improper to exclude important variables simply because social science has, so far at least, been unable to provide more objective criteria for coming to grips with them. Indeed, one might say that one function served by our judgmental codings is simply to make *explicit,* as best we can, a large number of judgments of the type normally left *implicit* in the literature on comparative government. We are quite aware that our decision to be explicit exposes us to criticism from area experts and others. This prospect does not alarm us unduly, provided only that the criticisms are of a nature that will be conducive to improvement of data quality and to progress in the field of comparative politics generally. For cross-national political analysis involves, as Karl W. Deutsch has

put it, "a constant interaction between man and data." And it is only by such interaction that there can be improvement both in the data themselves, and in man's understanding of them.

Banks assumes primary responsibility for the conceptualization and coding of the variables that appear in the printout. Textor is primarily responsible for the methodology.

For financial support during a year of intensive work devoted to the project, Banks wishes to thank the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research for two successive research grants. In addition, certain research expenses were met through an award to him from the Permanent Science Fund of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Under Public Health Service Research Grant No. M 05478, the National Institute of Mental Health provided support for Textor's methodological research in developing the Pattern Search and Table Translation Technique. This support is gratefully acknowledged.

Textor wishes to express his thanks to the Department of Anthropology and the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University, to the Southeast Asia Studies Program and Department of Anthropology at Yale University, and to the Department of Statistics at Harvard University for their support of his work over the past several years. At each university, he was generously accorded all facilities, including those of the computation center, and was encouraged and assisted by stimulating and interested colleagues.

For valuable consultation on methodology, we wish to express our sincere gratitude to Professors William G. Cochran, Robert M. Elashoff, J. E. Morton, James N. Mosél, and Frederick Mosteller.

Special thanks are due to Professor Miles Davis of Johns Hopkins University, who served as statistical consultant and programmer during the earlier phases of the development of the Pattern Search and Table Translation Technique. His place as programmer was later ably assumed by Byron A. Marshall, Jr.

Other persons who helped our work in one way or another, and to whom thanks are due, include Professors C. E. Black, Robert B. Dishman, Karl J. Pelzer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Lucian W. Pye, Fred W. Riggs, Lauriston Sharp, William J. Siffin, and Wayne E. Thompson.

We are indebted to the Computation Center at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where much of the computer work was done, and to Mr. Michael V. Solomita, its Operations Manager.

And finally, may we thank those innumerable area experts and other specialists, mainly in the Boston area, who were kind enough to respond with co-operation to our requests for help in coding decisions. We were thus enabled to enter more confident codings on matters as disparate as GNP in Guatemala, polyarchy in Pakistan, and religion in Rwanda.

A. S. B.
R. B. T.

Cambridge, Mass.
August 1, 1963

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1. Introduction

THIS book is intended as a research and reference tool in comparative politics. It summarizes a large amount of current information in a form that should enable the trained reader to discern new relationships among political phenomena.

We depart from tradition in that the bulk of the book consists of computer "printout." This is material printed by a 7090 computer in the form of grammatical English-language sentences, which are grouped by subject into paragraphs. We believe that this printout provides several advantages to the student of comparative politics, which may be summarized as follows:

1. The printout includes in its scope *all* of the world's currently independent polities.[1] This will, we hope, contribute toward making the study of comparative politics less parochial and more nearly general.

2. The sentences and paragraphs employ variables based on concepts considered analytically important by leading scholars in the field of comparative politics. A majority of these variables are of a directly "political" character, but a substantial minority of them are of an "environmental" character. Many more variables were considered for inclusion than actually appear in the present printout. Prominent among those excluded were a number of variables derived from recent literature, which we found impossible to "operationalize" on a world-wide cross-polity basis. (See pages 6 and 22.)

3. The sentences that appear in the printout have been rigorously and systematically selected by means of a new computer technique. The computer automatically "winnows out" the weaker, less important, and less interesting sentences. This "chaff" having been removed, the reader is left free to examine the solid kernels of important information. (See pages 27–28 and 36.)

4. Each sentence constitutes a rigorous "translation" of a statistical table. Such translations appear to be effective in stimulating the creative

[1] As of April 1, 1963.

imagination of the average reader, who is probably more "word-minded" than "number-minded." As an additional convenience to the reader, the statistical table that forms the basis of each sentence also appears in the printout as a "side-note." (See pages 37–40.)

5. The order in which the paragraphs are presented is identical with the order in which sentences appear within a paragraph. This makes it easy for the reader to find his way. Since this ordering is based on general usage, the reader becomes accustomed to it quickly. (See page 25.)

6. Experience to date suggests that when a trained reader scans a paragraph of the printout, he quickly develops a "feel" for the over-all patterning of the data. The degree of internal consistency within most paragraphs is gratifyingly high. (See pages 44–45 and 51–53.)

7. Experience to date also reveals that the trained reader, once having discerned a pattern from the reading of a paragraph, quite naturally finds himself developing more explicit insights and hypotheses as to trend, process, and cause. The reader will discover certain sentences that appear to indicate crucial relationships, and other sentences that, he suspects, indicate intervening variables. The printout is planned in such a way as to facilitate follow-up inquiry that will confirm or disconfirm such suspicions. (See pages 14–17.)

THE PATTERN SEARCH AND TABLE TRANSLATION TECHNIQUE

The Pattern Search and Table Translation Technique is the basic technique used in this book. By means of this technique, the computer performs the following operations: (1) It receives as input punched-card data about each polity, in the form of dichotomous variables. (See pages 25–27.) (2) It crosses each dichotomous variable with each other such variable. (See page 27.) (3) It "winnows out" those resulting two-by-two contingency tables, where the strength of association between the two variables is too low. (See pages 27–28.) (4) It takes the remaining "strong" tables and "translates" them, printing them out as grammatical English sentences. (See page 28.)

UNITS AND UNIVERSE OF ANALYSIS

The unit of analysis is the independent polity. This is the "object" that is classified, cross-classified, and cross-tabulated. The universe of analysis comprises all of the 115 independent polities in the world.[2] We have drawn a "total sample" of this universe. The problem of "sampling error"

[2] Two nations, while technically independent, are excluded: Nationalist China for jurisdictonal reasons and Western Samoa for reasons of self-imposed limitations on the exercise of sovereignty.

is thereby obviated.[3] In cross-tabulations, each of 115 polities in our universe is given equal weighting.[4]

Our decision to include all of the world's independent polities represents a deliberate departure from the older tradition in comparative government, which typically confined itself to the analysis of *Western* political forms. A more recent trend in the field has emphasized the study of *non*-Western polities. Studies resulting from this newer trend have, however, tended to be confined to limited portions of the non-Western world, such as a single geographic region, the Communist bloc, the "underdeveloped" nations, and so forth. The present work builds on this newer trend, but attempts to go further and include all of the world's independent polities within its scope. If it succeeds in nothing else than focusing more interest on the need for a global approach, we shall be satisfied.

THE CONCEPT OF PATTERN

A basic concept used in this book is that of "pattern," which we have borrowed and adapted from cultural anthropology. For present purposes, we define a pattern as "a concatenation of co-occurrences among attributes considered important by the observer."[5] A pattern so defined might be quite simple or highly complex. An example of a fairly complex pattern is the following quotation from a hypothetical book written in 1963 by a political scientist: "The pattern among the independent nations of Africa is that of sparse populations deriving their livelihood primarily from agriculture, suffering from low income and literacy, riven by religious and linguistic diversity, and governed by one-party systems with presidential-type chief executives and unicameral legislatures."

To be of value to the analyst of comparative politics, a pattern must state, or at least imply, some kind of *contrast* between classes of polities. To take a nonsense example, it would be of no analytical value to point out that all nations in Africa are characterized by the presence of some kind of religion, because the same is true of all nations located outside of Africa. In similar fashion, it would be of little value from most analytical points of view to learn that the populations of the countries of Africa are predominantly non-Buddhist, because the same is true of almost all of the non-African countries as well.

The illustrative pattern just quoted supplies contrasts between African

[3] This statement holds when certain assumptions are made with respect to a larger theoretical universe. This matter is discussed on pages 29–30.

[4] Equal weighting is also practiced in cross-cultural research, regardless of whether the number of members of a particular culture is counted in the hundreds or in the millions. For a brief discussion of the relevance of cross-cultural research to the present study, see page 4.

[5] In the present work, we use dichotomous (two-attribute) variables and perform two-way cross-classifications. It would, of course, be possible to use polychotomous variables and to perform cross-classifications that are more than two-way.

and non-African polities in every case. It tells us that African nations are inclined toward sparse populations, dependence on agriculture, and so forth. It also implies that non-African nations are by and large inclined toward denser populations, less dependence on agriculture, and so forth. As will become clear on pages 37–39, each such contrastive element in our illustrative pattern can be derived from a two-by-two table. Indeed, this particular pattern was derived from a number of such tables in the present printout.[6]

The tables, sentences, and paragraphs in the printout are designed to facilitate the *search* for patterns of political phenomena that might not otherwise be apparent to the reader. In no sense, however, does the printout actually *supply* such patterns. Only the intellect of the reader can do that.

THE CROSS-POLITY AND CROSS-CULTURAL METHODS

Our method of cross-polity analysis builds upon, and adapts from, the methodology of cross-cultural analysis. The use of statistical techniques in cross-cultural analysis dates back as far as 1889, when the British anthropologist Sir Edward Burnett Tylor first presented it to a learned audience. Since the 1930's, the cross-cultural method has been vastly improved by a group of cultural anthropologists centering around Yale University and the Human Relations Area Files, and led by George Peter Murdock.[7]

It is somewhat surprising to us that apparently no scholar has heretofore attempted to adapt the cross-cultural method to cross-polity analysis. Indeed, this method would seem to be *more* applicable to polities than to cultures, in at least two senses: (1) The unit that we count in the present study is the independent polity, which is considerably more discrete and rigorously definable than the unit used in cross-cultural research, namely, the individual culture. Moreover, (2) it is possible in cross-polity analysis to take a "complete sample" of the world's independent polities; this ideal cannot be reached in cross-cultural analysis because of the lack of ethnographic data for a large number of cultures.

VARIABLES USED

Each polity in our "total sample" of 115 has been coded on the basis of 57 variables, or, as we call them, "raw characteristics." Approximately

[6] The paragraph that contrasts polities located in Africa with those located elsewhere is Paragraph 10. This is identified in the printout by the number 10 in the upper-left corner. The statements (pairs of contrastive sentences) in Paragraph 10 on which the illustrative pattern is based are numbered 26, 30, 37, 46, 66, 69, 139, 170, and 178.

[7] Readers interested in the original Tylor paper, and in developments in the cross-cultural method since then, can consult Frank W. Moore, *Readings in Cross-Cultural Methodology*. Human Relations Area Files Press, 1961.

two-thirds of these raw characteristics are of direct political significance (for example, No. 27, "Governmental Stability"; No. 29, "Current Electoral System"; No. 54, "Political Participation by the Military"). The remaining one-third of the characteristics are political in a derivative or environmental sense (for example, No. 4, "Population Density"; No. 9, "Per Capita GNP"; No. 15, "Religious Configuration").

Subsumed under each raw characteristic are two or more specific "raw attributes." For some characteristics, the attributes constitute an ordinal continuum; for others, the attributes are in the form of a nominal typology.

A typical ordinal characteristic is Raw Characteristic 4, which deals with Population Density and exhibits the following raw attributes:

A. Very high (600/sq. mi. & above)
B. High (300–599/sq. mi.)
G. Medium (100–299/sq. mi.)
H. Low (below 100/sq. mi.)

A typical nominal-typological characteristic is Raw Characteristic 56 (Legal System) with raw attributes that include the following:

A. Civil law
G. Common law
K. Muslim law
Y. Communist law

After the initial codings had been completed, the raw characteristics, with appropriate reference to the frequency distribution of their subsumed attributes, were dichotomized in a variety of strategically promising ways. For example, one dichotomy contrasts "Polities where interest articulation by associational groups is significant" with "Polities where interest articulation by associational groups is moderate, limited, or negligible."

These dichotomized characteristics—194 in number—are called "finished characteristics." Each finished characteristic is subsequently cross-tabulated with each other such characteristic, by means of the 7090 computer. A considerable proportion of the resulting two-by-two tables, together with their English-language "translations," appear in the computer printout in this book. Details of our methodology are presented in the next chapter.

SELECTING AND REFINING THE RAW CHARACTERISTICS

Some of the raw characteristics used in this study have been established *ad hoc* in accordance with our own interests, though we have made no effort to be original simply for the sake of originality. Most of the raw

characteristics, however, have been drawn from published materials in comparative politics.[8] We have conscientiously canvassed the existing literature, and have attempted to select and adapt—experimentally at least—every possible raw characteristic that gave promise of being workable and analytically powerful. As will become increasingly clear in later pages, we found it necessary to reformulate most of the categories taken from the existing literature in order to render them wholly meaningful and operational for purposes of world-wide cross-polity comparison.

Some characteristics that we would like to have used were discarded for conceptual reasons, and others because adequate data for a sufficient number of polities proved unavailable. Ideally, we should have included characteristics on patterns of legitimacy, elite structure, political and social mobility, decision-making, and a host of other subjects of current interest for which conceptualization, on a global basis, at least, is still in its infancy. Tremendous analytical leverage would have resulted from the use of "Social Structure" as an "environmental" characteristic, particularly if this made possible the cross-tabulation of types of stratification along vertical axes with types of differentiation along horizontal axes.[9] But neither adequate data nor appropriate classificatory schemes are yet available, partly because sociologists have not yet attempted to study social structure on a comprehensive cross-national basis, and partly because anthropologists have tended to confine their attention to non-national ethnic groups.

It must be conceded that we have *not* employed as many "quantitative" indices as we might have. This is for a variety of reasons, four of which may be noted.

First, there is the fact that quantitative data for many of the world's polities are simply *unavailable,* especially for many of the newer nations.

Second, there is the problem of *reliability*. Statistics for many variables, especially where the newer nations are concerned, are notoriously suspect.

Third, there is the matter of redundance. In the economic and communications realms particularly, one may be confronted with a variety of indices, several of which yield information that, for purposes of political analysis, covers essentially the same ground. All else being equal, there is, for example, no particular value in supplementing newspaper circulation percentages with figures dealing with magazines, books, and so forth.

Fourth, there is the broader question of validity. Except in the relatively few instances where the quantitative index is political, *per se,* one must ask whether an assumed relationship between a particular measurable quantity

[8] Two particularly useful sources have been: Karl W. Deutsch, "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. LIV, No. 1, March, 1960; and Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas.* Princeton University Press, 1960. The latter is hereafter cited as *PDA.*

[9] For a limited attempt of this type for one country, see Leon D. Poullada, "Problems of Social Development," in *An Asia Society Paper: Afghanistan,* January, 1963.

and a given political phenomenon is genuine. It is true, for example, that "number of central government employees as percentage of total population" provides us with valid information as to "degree of political centralization"? The answer must depend, in part, on whether a sizable bureaucracy is required to meet the regime's objectives, or whether it is merely a reflection of pressures on the regime to provide jobs for the politically faithful. In the latter case, the "index" would presumably be far less valid than in the former.

It is our feeling that the stage has not yet been reached where a comprehensive analysis of political systems can fruitfully be undertaken by restricting oneself exclusively to purely quantitative indices. We employ ordinal variables (preferably based on metric scales) wherever we feel that this can validly be done. Otherwise, we rely on nominal variables—often of a "judgmental" type—which we consider to be valid, and we then cope with the reliability problem as best we can. Our position finds support in the writings of John W. Tukey, Professor of Mathematics at Princeton University, who says that "the most important maxim for data analysis to heed, and one which many statisticians seem to have shunned, is this: 'Far better an approximate answer to the *right* question, which is often vague, than an exact answer to the wrong question, which can always be made precise.' Data analysis must progress by approximate answers, at best, since its knowledge of what the problem really is will at best be approximate. It would be a mistake not to face up to this fact, for by denying it, we would deny ourselves the use of a great body of approximate knowledge, as well as failing to maintain alertness to the possible importance in each particular instance of particular ways in which our knowledge is incomplete."[10]

Some readers might point out that most of our raw characteristics have a "static" aspect to them—that they describe a situation as of a certain moment or period in time but offer little insight into the direction and rate of ongoing change. To this charge, we must plead largely guilty. Although we are strongly in favor of the proper use of "dynamic" variables, we have nonetheless found that for purposes of global analysis they are, at present, extremely difficult to devise and to code.[11] This applies to the *direction* of change, and even more strongly to the *rate* of change. Thus, despite considerable effort, we have been able to include only one purely "dynamic" variable: "Population Growth Rate" (Raw Characteristic 5).

[10] John W. Tukey, "The Future of Data Analysis," *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, Vol. 33, 1962, pp. 13–14. Emphasis his.

[11] As we see it, "dynamic" analyses are most easily carried out when the analyst has restricted himself to (1) relatively few *variables* for which highly accurate data are available, or (2) relatively few *polities* (whether dealt with on either a limited-variable or "configurative" basis) for which highly accurate data are likewise available. Neither situation obtains in the present study.

If this study were to be repeated every five years until, say, 1983, then it would be possible in the 1983 edition to analyze the data in all five editions by means of a stochastic process model.

Certain other raw characteristics have a distinctly dynamic coloration, and if a revised edition of the survey were to be prepared some years hence, their potentialities might be further explored. In such an event we would also wish to include any promising dynamic variables that might have been developed in the interim.

CODING CLASSES

It has been our concern to provide reasonably reliable information about particular *classes* of polities rather than, *necessarily*, about any given polity. This is a distinction that in the main causes little difficulty. For example, every polity whose per capita gross national product is coded as "high" will have a higher GNP per capita than every polity coded as "intermediate," "low," or "very low." Now and then, however, the abovementioned distinction can lead to difficulty unless it is clearly understood. Cases of this sort are normally those where the raw characteristic is composite in nature. Take, for example, Raw Characteristic 27, dealing with Governmental Stability. Its structure is as follows:

A. Government generally stable since World War I or major inter-war constitutional change
B. Government generally stable since World War II or major post-war constitutional change
G. Government moderately stable since World War II or major post-war constitutional change
H. Government unstable since World War II or major post-war constitutional change

In coding for this characteristic, Finland and Sa'udi Arabia are listed under "A" and Mongolia under "B." The reader might deduce from this that we regard Finland and Sa'udi Arabia as possessing "more stable" governments than that of Mongolia. This is not the case. Indeed, we might well regard the Mongolian regime as being the most stable of the three. What we *do* contend, however, is that Mongolia belongs to a *class* of governments that, by and large, are probably less stable than the class of governments to which Finland and Sa'udi Arabia belong. Similar examples could be cited with respect to specific codings from a number of other raw characteristics.

RELATIVISM IN CODING

Of necessity, the grouping of polities into classes is often a highly relativistic procedure. This is particularly true of those raw characteristics that are judgmental in nature. Take, for example, the raw characteristic,

"Ideological Orientation." Subsumed under this are the categories, "doctrinal," "developmental," "conventional," "traditional," and "situational." A polity that is "doctrinal" will tend to pursue doctrine, even at the expense of developmental activity, of conventional political values (in the Western sense), and of traditional values (largely in a non-Western sense). Similarly, a polity that is "developmental" will pursue development, even if it means departing from doctrine, or doing violence to conventional or traditional values. Thus in most cases it is possible to render a fairly confident judgment that Polity X tends to give primary emphasis to development *relative to* polities assigned to other classes. Such a coding, however, is clearly more a matter of judgment than of fact. One might almost say that the principal "fact" about such a coding is simply the fact that it has been judgmentally coded that way.

Unless the relativistic nature of many of our codings is clearly understood, we feel that some area specialists might seriously misunderstand the present work. An example will illustrate. Banks, who was primarily responsible for the codings, coded Thailand's ideological orientation as "traditional." Textor, with a background of five years of field research in Thailand, at first objected. He argued that all recent regimes in Thailand have evidenced considerable desire to "develop" that country economically, educationally, and in numerous other ways. He also pointed out that political behavior in Thailand has a strong "situational" emphasis. After some discussion, however, Textor agreed that, of the five available categories, Thailand more properly belongs, relativistically speaking, in the "traditional" category than in any other. Despite its developmental activities, Thailand does not really belong in the same class with such countries as Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Israel, the United Arab Republic, and Venezuela under Betancourt. Moreover, the present Thai regime's strong emphasis on traditional ritual and behavior would seem properly to bar Thailand from the "situational" class, which embraces such countries as El Salvador and Haiti. Admittedly, Thailand is more developmentally oriented than any of the other polities coded as being "traditional": Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Jordan, and Sa'udi Arabia. Nonetheless, Textor agreed that, viewing the matter in global and relativistic terms, this coding of Thailand was the one that made the most sense.

THE USE OF EXPERTS TO ENHANCE CODING RELIABILITY

We have made use of all readily available published materials by area experts. Indeed, the sheer volume of sources consulted prohibits the specific citation of each for the thousands of individual coding decisions. We have also consulted frequently with area experts in the Boston area. Unfortunately, funds did not permit direct and systematic consultation with area experts elsewhere in the United States or abroad.

Inadequacy of funds also prohibited a formal reliability check. Ideally, it would have been desirable to perform such a check on an areally stratified sample of polities and on a stratified or random sample of our raw characteristics, using area experts as coders. Coefficients of reliability could then have been computed.

Unquestionably, procedures such as the foregoing would have resulted in higher reliability. If a revision of the present survey should ever be undertaken, we hope that funds to support such procedures will be available. Meanwhile, we welcome communications from area experts and other readers concerning ways in which our codings might be improved. (For a discussion of the extent to which suspected coding unreliability might distort the tables and statements in the printout, see pages 42–44.)

COMBINING THE "HOLISTIC" AND "ATOMISTIC" APPROACHES

The Pattern Search Technique, in our opinion, enables the reader to employ both the "holistic" and the "atomistic" approaches to comparative analysis. The holistic approach emphasizes validity at the possible expense of reliability and results in essentially judgmental conclusions. Anthropology and psychoanalysis are among the professions exemplifying the holistic approach. By contrast, the atomistic approach emphasizes reliability at the possible expense of validity and results in relatively rigorous conclusions of limited scope. Sociology and experimental psychology are among the professions most clearly identified with the atomistic approach. The Pattern Search and Table Translation Technique described in Chapter 2 goes some distance toward the holistic approach, in that it provides a very large number of ordered statements generally characterized by a reassuring degree of internal consistency. These statements, when read and analyzed by a trained person, provide a wide-ranging context from which holistic judgments can sometimes be derived. The technique also goes some distance toward the atomistic approach, in that each of the statements in the printout is at least somewhat atomistic in character. We hope that the present technique possesses most of the advantages of both of these approaches, with few of the disadvantages of either. For the reader whose normal habits emphasize the holistic approach, we hope that the tables and statements will be suggestively stimulating, yet also provide a series of moorings that will discourage unduly reckless leaps of imagination. For the reader whose normal habits emphasize the atomistic approach, we hope that the tables and statements will supply rigorous, reliable, and hard information, yet at the same time provide enough over-all context to discourage unduly hasty or narrow conclusions based on co-occurrences among too limited a range of variables.

SOME QUESTIONS THAT MIGHT BE RAISED

Before concluding this chapter, we would like to deal specifically with some questions which many readers would doubtless wish to raise. One such question is: "Does the present survey have any theory?" Here the answer is No. The printout does not present any theory or any hypothesis. It is, instead, designed to stimulate the *generation* of hypotheses on the part of the professionally trained reader. To this end, the raw characteristics reflect, wherever possible, theoretical concepts and analytical categories current in the literature of political and social science.

A second question that might be raised is: "Does the printout permit the testing of hypotheses?" The printout, as we have chosen to use it, does not permit the acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis in the usual sense, because our 115 polities do not constitute a sample, but rather the total universe itself.[12] However, the printout *does* permit the reader to formulate a hypothesis and then to check whether or not there is a strong association between the variables involved (as distinct from testing the significance of the hypothesized relationship). Suppose one were to hypothesize that polities coded as low in per capita gross national product tend to be those coded as high for the variable "Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups." One need only turn to the appropriate place in the printout, Statement 36/119, in order to determine whether or not there is a strong association between these variables. A precise measure of strength of association is also provided, which the reader is free to evaluate as he pleases.

Finally there is the question: "Does the printout explain or predict political phenomena?" Here, again, the answer is No. Although we share with other social scientists the ultimate goals of explanation and prediction, these are not the immediate goals of the present survey. For the moment, we shall be satisfied if the printout succeeds in stimulating colleagues to discern patterns. Once this occurs, ideas and hypotheses relating to trend, process, and causation are likely to follow. It is in this indirect fashion that we hope the printout will serve the goals of explanation and prediction.

SUMMARY

Our survey is global in scope. The variables used are in general those that most colleagues would consider relevant and important. However, we have avoided variables that proved impossible to operationalize on a

[12] Some readers might wish to make other assumptions under which, it could be argued, significance testing would be possible. Such a set of assumptions would be that our "N" is fixed, and that the row and column totals for any particular table are fixed, but that the cell frequencies are not fixed. This problem is discussed on pages 29–30.

world-wide cross-polity basis. The printout includes *all* the important information produced by cross-tabulation, and nothing *but* important information.[13] All statistical information is "translated" into grammatical English sentences, which are presented in convenient order. From these, the reader is enabled to discern over-all patterns possessing high internal consistency. The final result, we hope, is that the reader is stimulated to generate, and enabled to check, hypotheses concerning process and cause. In essence, the computer has been utilized to do the "dirty work," and the trained reader is stimulated and enabled to engage in "inductive leaps" in the direction of a more rigorous and all-inclusive science of comparative politics.

[13] That is, it includes all information resulting from two-way cross-classification of dichotomous variables where the strength of association is high. See pages 27–28.

2. Methodology

THIS chapter will explain the basic technique used in this study, the "Pattern Search and Table Translation Technique."[1] The purpose of the technique is to assist the reader in discovering patterned co-occurrences and inter-relationships in political institutions, structures, and behavior. To facilitate this search for patterns, statistical tables are first constructed and are then "translated" into grammatical English. We believe that these translations are of some value, in that most social scientists tend to think more creatively in terms of words than of numbers.

THE TWO-BY-TWO MATRIX

The core of the present technique is the two-by-two matrix that results from the cross-classification and cross-tabulation of two dichotomous variables, or what we call "characteristics."

For purposes of illustration, let us take as *column* headings, "Polities that were formerly dependencies of Britain," as contrasted with "Polities that were formerly dependencies of France." Let us take as *row* headings, "Polities where the literacy rate is above ten percent," as contrasted with "Polities where the literacy rate is below ten percent." Initial coding reveals that there are 19 ex-British and 24 ex-French territories in the world today (excluding those that became independent before 1914). A separate coding operation results in our being able to classify 33 of these 43 polities as having literacy rates that are unambiguously either above or below ten percent. (The other 10 polities are excluded from our tabulations because we could not obtain sufficiently reliable data to permit their coding on the basis of the latter dichotomy.)

Thus we know, without the aid of any cross-tabulation, which countries are ex-British and which are ex-French. We also know which have literacy rates above ten percent, and which below. What we do *not* know is

[1] Since we are writing primarily for non-statisticians, we ask the indulgence of those readers who are statistically trained.

which ex-*British* areas are above ten percent and which below, and which ex-*French* areas are above and below the ten-percent figure. To obtain such information, we resort to cross-classification, as exemplified by Matrix 1.

MATRIX 1

	COUNTRIES FORMERLY UNDER BRITISH RULE			COUNTRIES FORMERLY UNDER FRENCH RULE		
LITERACY ABOVE TEN PERCENT	Burma India Jamaica Pakistan (total: 12)	Ceylon Iraq Malaya Trinidad	Cyprus Israel Nigeria UAR	Algeria (total: 3)	Cambodia	Malagasy R
LITERACY BELOW TEN PERCENT	Sierre Leo Uganda (total: 4)	Sudan	Tanganyika	Cameroun Congo (Bra) Guinea Mauritania Togo (total: 14)	Cen Afr Rep Dahomey Ivory Coast Niger Upper Volta	Chad Gabon Mali Senegal

Matrix 1 reveals clearly that three-quarters of the ex-British territories for which codings were available fall into the above-ten-percent category, while an even greater majority of the ex-French territories fall into the below-ten-percent category. Since it is generally assumed that literacy rates in most ex-British and ex-French dependencies were low at the time of colonial take-over, the initial conclusion of some analysts might be that the British exerted more effort in promoting literacy and achieved more success than did the French.

Proper analysis requires, however, that we persist further. We must ask: Is this matrix explainable *simply* in terms of differential skill and effort as between the British and the French? Or are there perhaps intervening variables that help explain the difference? One such variable might be whether religion in the ex-colony is predominantly literate, or whether it is predominantly or partially non-literate. It is reasonable to assume

that areas with literate religions at the time of colonial take-over would have had higher literacy rates at that time than would be true of areas where religion was largely or wholly non-literate. Moreover, as linguists would point out, if Country X has a literate religion and Country Y does not, the long-term odds would favor Country X over Country Y, even if the two countries had started from the same level of literacy. This would probably hold even where, as is often the case, the literate language of the religion of Country X is other than the day-to-day vernacular language of that country. In Matrix 2, the ex-British and ex-French areas with which we are concerned are cross-classified with the "literate religion" variable.

MATRIX 2

	COUNTRIES FORMERLY UNDER BRITISH RULE	COUNTRIES FORMERLY UNDER FRENCH RULE
RELIGION LITERATE	Burma, India, Jamaica, Trinidad, Ceylon, Iraq, Malaya, UAR, Cyprus, Israel, Pakistan (total: 11)	Algeria, Cambodia (total: 2)
RELIGION PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE	Nigeria, Tanganyika, Sierre Leo, Uganda, Sudan (total: 5)	Cameroun, Congo (Bra), Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Cen Afr Rep, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Togo, Chad, Gabon, Malagasy R, Niger, Upper Volta (total: 15)

Matrix 2 clearly suggests that literate religion is an important intervening variable. In the rough-and-tumble of colonial empire building, the British seem to have gained dominance primarily in areas possessing literate religions and, hence, to have enjoyed a literacy base on which to build. The French seem, by and large, to have inherited areas with non-literate religions and, hence, to have lacked such a base. The three-variable Matrix 3 sums up this phenomenon.

MATRIX 3

		COUNTRIES FORMERLY UNDER BRITISH RULE	COUNTRIES FORMERLY UNDER FRENCH RULE
LITERACY ABOVE TEN PERCENT	RELIGION PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE	Burma Ceylon Cyprus India Iraq Israel Malaya Pakistan UAR (Jamaica) (Trinidad) [total: 11 (or 9)]	Algeria Cambodia [total: 2]
	RELIGION PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE	Nigeria [total: 1]	Malagasy R [total: 1]
LITERACY BELOW TEN PERCENT	RELIGION PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE	None	None
	RELIGION PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE	Sierre Leo Sudan Tanganyika Uganda [total: 4]	Cameroun Cen Afr Rep Chad Congo (Bra) Dahomey Gabon Guinea Ivory Coast Mali Mauritania Niger Senegal Togo Upper Volta [total: 14]

We have placed Jamaica and Trinidad in parentheses because Matrix 3 happens to be based on the status of religion in each country as of *now*, rather than as of the time of colonial take-over. In most cases the present status and the status at the time of take-over are more or less the same, but

in the cases of Jamaica and Trinidad this is doubtful. Matrix 3, thus interpreted, shows that Jamaica, Trinidad, and Nigeria are the only three countries that Britain took over that at the time of take-over were religiously at least partly non-literate, *and* that at the end of the period of British rule enjoyed a literacy rate above ten percent. This makes three countries out of seven. For France, the record is one—Malagasy—out of fifteen. There are thus four "deviant cases": Jamaica, Trinidad, Nigeria, and Malagasy. In further analysis of these deviant cases, the analyst would normally ponder all available information about them. Upon reflection, he would probably decide that Jamaica and Trinidad are somewhat special. These two polities were British dependencies as early as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively. Their populations are concentrated on relatively small islands and, hence, comparatively easy of access. In contrast, the French in Africa by and large enjoyed neither the advantage of time nor that of easy accessibility. On balance, then, the use of the "literate religion" characteristic as an intervening variable, plus deviant case analysis, makes the French record look less inadequate than it did at first glance.

The example just given illustrates, in a preliminary way, the manner in which we use matrices to reach conclusions, or at least to refine problems. A number of two-by-two matrices are included in the computer-produced portion of this study. Because of limitations of space, we were forced to be highly selective in deciding which matrices to include. In making the selection, we gave preference to

1. Matrices that would portray important relationships.
2. Matrices that would illustrate interesting deviant cases.
3. Matrices dealing with subjects that would, we thought, evoke fairly general reader interest.
4. Matrices that cross a "political" with an "environmental" characteristic.

Because only a small number of matrices could be included, the reader must in the vast majority of cases be satisfied with two-by-two tables that merely give the *number* of polities in each quadrant but do not *name* the polities as a matrix does. Readers who wish to construct their own matrices (two-by-two, two-by-N, or M-by-N) may easily do so. (See pages 49–50.)

OUTLINE OF PROCEDURE

The following outline is skeletal. In some respects it is distorted for the sake of simplicity. If the reader should wish to apply this technique to a problem of his own, we suggest that he first consult Textor's forthcoming technical monograph, *The Pattern Search and Table Translation Technique*.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

We have found it desirable to employ the following terms:

"Raw Characteristic": A raw characteristic is any basic variable. For example, "Former Colonial Ruler."

"Raw Attribute": Subsumed under each raw characteristic are two or more raw attributes. For example, "Britain," "France," "Spain," "Other." Raw attributes are *always* mutually exclusive.

"Finished Characteristic": A finished characteristic is always a dichotomous characteristic. An example would be: " 'Polities that were formerly dependencies of Britain,' as contrasted with 'Polities that were formerly dependencies of France.' " Another finished characteristic contrasts former dependencies of Britain or France, on the one hand, with those of Spain, on the other. Several finished characteristics can, and in practice usually do, result from the dichotomization of a single raw characteristic in a variety of strategically promising ways. Occasionally a raw characteristic is dichotomous to begin with. In such cases, the raw characteristic and the finished characteristic are identical. The reasons why finished characteristics must always be dichotomous will become clear later (pages 23–25).

"Finished Attribute": Either of the two attributes subsumed under a finished characteristic is called a "finished attribute."

1. TENTATIVE SELECTION OF RAW CHARACTERISTICS

Our initial procedural step was to assemble a tentative group of raw characteristics. Two such tentative raw characteristics were: (1) "Almond-Shils System Characterization" and (2) "Former Colonial Ruler." We wished to include the first because it reflected the highly stimulating heuristic typology developed by Gabriel A. Almond and others in *The Politics of the Developing Areas.* In our opinion, this typology offered promise of proving useful in the building of new and more powerful theory. We wished to include the second raw characteristic because we felt it worth while to ask the question, "What difference does it make whether a particular polity is an ex-dependency of one colonizing power rather than another?" Approximately one hundred economic, demographic, cultural, and political variables were tentatively considered for incorporation into the present study. A majority of these were either completely discarded or else substantially revised because of coding difficulties, inadequate data, redundancy, and so forth.

2. ESTABLISHING RULES FOR CODING

The early stages of this study witnessed a constant interaction between specific coding decisions and decisions about general coding rules. This was particularly true with respect to judgmental raw characteristics, but

it was true as well for raw characteristics based primarily on objective fact.

For example, in establishing rules for coding the raw characteristic, "Former Colonial Ruler," we decided to limit the scope of the characteristic to European colonizing powers.[2] Thus Sa'udi Arabia, a former dependency of the Ottoman Empire, and North and South Korea, former dependencies of Japan, were excluded as "irrelevant," along with such countries as Liberia, Thailand, and the USSR. Another rule we found necessary to establish was that in cases where more than one colonial power had successively occupied a particular country, we would base our coding on the most recent occupying power. Thus Trinidad is coded under Britain rather than Spain, Ceylon under Britain rather than the Netherlands or Portugal, Togo under France rather than Germany, and so forth.

Coding rules and the considerations underlying them are spelled out in detail in Chapter 3.

3. *ESTABLISHING RAW ATTRIBUTES*

In establishing raw attributes, one often has considerable freedom of choice. Take again the example of "Former Colonial Ruler." We discover that the former British territories are 24 in number; ex-French, 25; ex-Spanish, 18; ex-Belgian, 3; ex-Italian, 2; and ex-American, Dutch, and Portuguese, 1 each. The decision to combine the former Belgian, Italian, American, Dutch, and Portuguese territories into the single raw attribute, "Other," was clearly an arbitrary one. If our interests had been different, we would have coded differently. For example, we might conceivably have combined former French, Spanish, Belgian, Italian, and Portuguese territories into one raw attribute, "Polities whose former colonial ruler was a primarily Catholic country." This raw attribute category might have been contrasted with polities formerly dependent on Britain or America, under the label "Polities whose former colonial ruler was a primarily Protestant country." Indonesia, as a former Dutch territory, would then be excluded as "ambiguous," since the Netherlands is approximately half Catholic and half Protestant.

In deciding on the range of attributes for any one raw characteristic, we were guided by two considerations. First, we wanted to provide maximum flexibility for the subsequent combining of raw attributes into a variety of finished attributes on a dichotomous basis. Second, we wished to avoid raw attribute categories with too few members. To take an extreme example, there would be no point in establishing a raw attribute, "Polities where the former colonial ruler was the United States," because only one country, the Philippines, would be so codable. It is easier to describe the Philippines by ordinary descriptive techniques than to put it into the computer and contrast it with the other 114 independent polities

[2] Here taken to include the United States as a "European-derived" colonial power.

in the world. The same consideration would usually apply to any attribute class of five or fewer polities, though for reasons of typological consistency and completeness a limited number of such very small classes do appear in the present study.

4. ASSIGNING EACH POLITY TO A RAW ATTRIBUTE CATEGORY

Once the coding rules and raw attributes were established, the next step was to assign each polity to one or another of the various raw attribute categories. For some raw characteristics, such as "Former Colonial Ruler," the procedure was straightforward and presented little or no difficulty. In other instances, the assignments were largely judgmental, rather than factual. In coding for the raw characteristic "[Degree of] Westernization," for example, it was necessary to employ holistic, relativistic judgment.

In order to minimize error and bias, a number of built-in checks were used. First, we coded alphabetically, from Afghanistan to Yugoslavia, for each characteristic. This, we felt, provided some protection against regional or other bias. Second, we attempted conscientiously to avoid "contamination." For example, in coding for RC 55 ("Role of Police" in politics) we attempted to confine our attention to this characteristic exclusively. Thus, in coding polities such as Lebanon, Malagasy, Malaya, and Nigeria, we made an effort to disregard such irrelevant facts as that the first two are ex-French dependencies and the latter two ex-British dependencies.

A third safeguard is what might be called an "internal homogeneity check." For characteristics requiring largely judgmental coding, each polity was given an initial *tentative* assignment to a raw attribute category. The polities assigned to each category were then re-examined to see if each "really belonged" with the rest. This meant, in effect, that to some extent we adopted the tactic of permitting each coding assignment to help define the category itself. In deciding whether a polity is properly to be regarded as "significantly Westernized," "partially Westernized," or "non-Westernized," one is forced to ask whether Burma "really belongs" in the same class with Bolivia; Ceylon with Cambodia; Honduras with Hungary; and so forth. In attempting to achieve maximum internal homogeneity within raw attribute categories of this sort, we often found it necessary to process all of the polities several times. The assignments would become progressively less tentative, until finally we arrived at a set of assignments which were intuitively and logically satisfying in the sense that each polity had been properly coded *relative* to each other polity.

5. ELIMINATING THE RESIDUE

In assigning polities to appropriate raw attribute classes, we would often find that a residue of polities remained which could not meaningfully and reliably be assigned to any specific attribute class. Nor in most

cases was it possible or desirable to set up an additional raw attribute class to which some or all of such polities could be assigned. Such polities were therefore assigned to the "residue." There are four grounds for assigning a polity to the residue.

AMBIGUITY

Suppose that the New Hebrides were today an independent polity and hence a member of our universe of polities. In coding this country for the raw characteristic, "Former Colonial Ruler," we would be forced to place it in the residue, on grounds of ambiguity. The reason, of course, is that the New Hebrides' former colonial ruler would have been a condominium of Britain and France. To place it either in the "Britain" raw attribute category or in that of "France" would violate the basic coding rule of mutual exclusiveness. A theoretical alternative would be to create a new category, "Condominium of Britain and France." But this would be unproductive, because the only polity assignable to such a category would be the New Hebrides itself.

IRRELEVANCE

Of the 115 independent polities in the world, 75 are former European dependencies. The remaining 40 have, by our coding rules, never been under European domination. As indicated earlier, these 40 are coded as "irrelevant," and placed in the residue.

UNASCERTAINEDNESS

A third basis for assigning a polity to the residue is lack of available information. It will be recalled that when we compared the literacy rate in ex-British countries with that in ex-French countries, some countries dropped out of the matrix because their literacy rates had not been reliably ascertained.

UNASCERTAINABILITY

A polity that is "unascertainable" is one that is in such a state of flux that, regardless of how much reliable information we might possess about it, we still could not code it with respect to the raw characteristic in question. For example, countries like Mauritania, Niger, and Chad have so recently gained their independence that they cannot meaningfully be coded for "Governmental Stability." "Unascertainable" differs, therefore, from "unascertained." "Unascertainable" means, in effect, that no data relevant for coding are *possible*. "Unascertained" means that the relevant data are *unavailable* to the coder.

As already indicated, the residue is always excluded from the matrices and tables and is not reflected in the sentences into which the matrices and tables are translated. What this means is that the matrices, tables, and

sentences deal only with those polities that they have a "right" to deal with. That is, they deal only with those polities that are ascertainable rather than in flux; that are "ascertained" in the sense that adequate reliable information is at hand; that are relevant to the characteristic in question; and that can be unambiguously classified with respect to that characteristic.

6. DEFINITIVE SELECTION OF RAW CHARACTERISTICS

At this point a definite decision is made whether a given raw characteristic, however desirable, can be included or not. The "Former Colonial Ruler" characteristic is straightforward, and there was never any serious doubt about its practicability. However, other desirable characteristics proved impossible to operationalize. An example is the "Almond-Shils System Characterization." In this case, despite persistent effort we were not able to formulate satisfactory rules that would serve to discriminate polities validly and reliably into raw attribute classes on a satisfactory basis, with due regard for the need for mutual exclusiveness and a reasonable degree of exhaustiveness. Illustrative of our difficulties were the two Almond-Shils attributes, "Tutelary Democracy" and "Modernizing Oligarchy." We found it impossible to set up coding rules that would render these two attributes mutually exclusive. The same was true of our efforts to utilize or adapt interesting and stimulating typologies appearing in the published works of a number of other scholars. The only non-ordinal classificatory schemes that we took over *in toto* from an external source were C. E. Black's modernization typologies (RCs 22 and 23).

Banks devoted ten months, full-time, to the coding work underlying the present study. The problems he encountered were comparable in nature and inherent difficulty to those frequently complained about by cross-cultural researchers. There was, first, the serious problem of lack of data on many subjects. Beyond this was the equally serious problem that many of the analytical concepts and categories currently in use by comparative government specialists are not globally relevant and hence do not lend themselves to global comparisons.[3] In short, it was often necessary to resist the blandishments of an otherwise interesting typology because of insoluble reliability problems, while it was also necessary to reject the temptation to fall back on categories of easy reliability where little would result that was fresh, valid, or analytically powerful.

7. PREPARING THE RAW CHARACTERISTIC DECK

The Raw Characteristic Deck contains the basic data used in all computations. In key-punching the raw characteristics, one IBM card is used to represent each polity. This card is uniquely identified with the polity's

[3] It is worthy of note that of all the non-ordinal variables considered, only Black's had been previously tested on a *comprehensive* global basis.

name and a serial number based on alphabetical ordering. The code representing the particular polity's raw attribute for the first raw characteristic, "Areal Grouping," is punched in column 1. For example, in column 1 for Card 056 representing Japan, the punch is "I" for East Asia. The appropriate coding for Japan's raw attribute under Raw Characteristic 2 is punched on the same card in column 2. We end up with a deck of 115 cards, each punched in as many columns as there are raw characteristics. Alphabetic codes are used for raw attributes. Numeric codes are used for the residue. Within the residue, punch 3 means "ambiguous"; punch 4 means "irrelevant"; punch 5 means "unascertained"; and punch 6 means "unascertainable."[4]

8. ESTABLISHING FINISHED CHARACTERISTICS

As stated earlier, The Pattern Search and Table Translation Technique, as presently constituted, handles only dichotomous characteristics. The justification for dichotomizing at this particular stage in the analysis is straightforward: it reduces highly complex matters to a format simple enough so that the analyst can readily perceive significant, patterned relationships. The immediate yield is, in effect, a sort of preliminary conceptual distillation on the basis of which more sophisticated, "polychotomous" relationships may later be perceived.

The four principal forms of dichotomization are as follows:

SIMPLE DICHOTOMIZATION WITH ONE POSITIVE CATEGORY

This type of dichotomization contrasts polities occupying a single positive category with those in the "all other" category. An example is FC 1, which contrasts "Polities located in East Europe" with "Polities located elsewhere than in East Europe." The positive attribute is always placed in the left column and the "all other" attribute in the right column. In this kind of dichotomization, no polities are placed in the "irrelevant" part of the residue.

SIMPLE DICHOTOMIZATION WITH TWO POSITIVE CATEGORIES

An example of this type of dichotomization would be "Polities that were formerly dependencies of Britain, rather than France," as contrasted with "Polities that were formerly dependencies of France, rather than Britain." Both finished attributes are equally "positive," and hence the decision concerning which will occupy the left column is purely arbitrary. Except in cases where the original raw characteristic is dichotomous,

[4] For convenience in using the sorting machine on the Raw Characteristic Deck, we have avoided using alphabetic punches C, D, E, F, L, M, N, O, T, U, V, or W, which, for technical reasons, would result in confusion with numeric punches 3, 4, 5, and 6. Raw attributes are thus serialized as A, B, G, H, I, J, K, P, Q, R, S, X, Y, Z.

finished charcteristics of this type will normally fail to exhaust all of the polities in the world; there will usually be some polities in the "irrelevant" part of the residue. In this example, polities become irrelevant if they (1) were formerly ruled by a European colonial power other than either Britain or France, or (2) were never ruled by any European colonial power.

COMPLEX DICHOTOMIZATION WITH ONE POSITIVE CATEGORY

This type of dichotomization contrasts a positive attribute with an "all other" attribute. The positive attribute is "complex" in that it combines raw attributes from one, two, or more raw characteristics. Such combinations may be (1) additive, (2) alternative, or (3) both additive and alternative. An example of the additive type would be "Polities whose date of independence is after 1914, and that were formerly dependencies of Britain," as contrasted with "All others." Here, *both* of two conditions must be satisfied by a polity, or it will fall into the "all other" category. An example of the "alternative" type would be "Polities that were formerly dependencies of either Britain or France," as contrasted with "All others." Here, a polity can qualify for the left column if it has been a dependency of either of these two colonial powers. (It could qualify also if it had been a dependency of both Britain and France conjointly, because the conjunction "or" as we use it is always the "inclusive or," meaning "and/or," unless expressly specified to be otherwise.) An example of the "additive and alternative" type would be "Polities whose date of independence is after 1914, and that were formerly dependencies of Britain or France," as contrasted with "All others."

Finished characteristics formed by complex dichotomization of either this or the following type are called "compound finished characteristics."

COMPLEX DICHOTOMIZATION WITH TWO POSITIVE CATEGORIES

Finished Characteristic 80 exemplifies this type of dichotomization. The left subject is "Polities whose date of independence is after 1914 and that were formerly dependencies of Britain, rather than France." The right subject is "Polities whose date of independence is after 1914 and that were formerly dependencies of France, rather than Britain." In such a case, the following classes of polities would drop into the residue as irrelevant:

a. Polities that were formerly dependencies of Britain or France, but whose date of independence is before 1914, such as the United States and Haiti.

b. Polities that were formerly dependencies of some other European colonial power.

c. Polities that were never dependencies of any European power.

Dichotomization into finished characteristics can, of course, proceed in as many cross-cutting ways as the analyst wishes, in order to extract from the data all contrasts that seem to be strategically promising. Thus, our original 57 raw characteristics have been dichotomized into 194 finished characteristics.

9. ORDERING THE FINISHED CHARACTERISTICS

When all the finished characteristics have been established, it is necessary to place them in whatever order is most likely to maximize clarity of presentation. In the present study we have started with finished characteristics dealing with areal grouping, size, population, and other demographic variables. We have then moved to economic variables. After that, the finished characteristics deal with literacy, religion, language, racial homogeneity, and historical background. The remainder of the printout deals with political subjects. We have thus followed more or less the order that many political analysts would follow if they were writing a political study of a particular country. Our decision to do so was deliberate: We wished to conform as closely as possible to the accustomed intellectual habits of our readers.

Within the group of paragraphs stemming from any one raw characteristic, the order is usually from the general to the specific. Contrasts "within" a particular area of analysis are usually dealt with first and are followed by contrasts "between" two areas of analysis. However, there are no hard-and-fast rules. Our overriding objective throughout has been *clarity* and ease of understanding, and we have sometimes sacrificed pure consistency in an effort to achieve this end.

10. PREPARING THE FINISHED CHARACTERISTIC DECK

At this point the computer enters our procedure for the first time. The Column and Punch Reallocation Program Deck is fed into the computer, followed by the Raw Characteristic Deck. The result is the production of the Finished Characteristic Deck.

An example will suffice. The Raw Characteristic Deck comprises 115 cards. Each card stands for a particular polity and is uniquely identified by means of an identification number. Column 21 of the Raw Characteristic Deck stands for Raw Characteristic 21, "Former Colonial Ruler." In this column, a particular card might be punched A, B, G, H, or 4. The distribution of these punches is as follows:

Punch A: 24 cards, each standing for a former British dependency.
Punch B: 25 cards, each standing for a former French dependency.
Punch G: 18 cards, each standing for a former Spanish dependency.
Punch H: 8 cards, each standing for a former dependency of some other European colonial power.

Punch 4: 40 cards, each standing for a polity that is "irrelevant" in the sense that it has never been a dependency of any European power.

Using Raw Characteristic 21, we wish to create Finished Characteristic 79, which in essence asks the question: "What difference does it make whether a polity is an ex-British or ex-French dependency on the one hand, as contrasted with an ex-Spanish dependency on the other?" In Finished Characteristic 79, the ex-British or ex-French dependencies become the left subject, and the ex-Spanish dependencies become the right subject.

Employing the Column and Punch Reallocation Program Deck, plus appropriate instruction cards, we instruct the computer as follows:

First, examine the Raw Characteristic Deck and find all cards that are punched "A" or "B" in column 21. Now move to the Finished Characteristic Deck and punch all corresponding cards "1" in column 79. (Punch "1" means "left subject.")

Second, examine the Raw Characteristic Deck and find all cards that are punched "G" in column 21. Now move to the Finished Characteristic Deck and punch all corresponding cards "2" in column 79. (Punch "2" means "right subject.")

Third, examine the Raw Characteristic Deck and find all cards that are punched "H" or "4" in column 21. Now move to the Finished Characteristic Deck and punch all corresponding cards "4" in column 79. (Punch "4" means "irrelevant.")

In such a manner, the 49 ex-British and ex-French dependencies become Left Subject 79, entitled "Polities that were formerly dependencies of Britain or France, rather than Spain (49)." The 18 ex-Spanish dependencies become Right Subject 79, entitled "Polities that were formerly dependencies of Spain, rather than Britain or France (18)." The 48 polities that were formerly dependencies of other European colonial powers, or that have never been dependencies of any European colonial power, drop into the residue as "irrelevant."

11. REASSIGNMENT OF RESIDUE

After the Finished Characteristic Deck has been prepared, an additional operation is called for in connection with the residue. Step 5 resulted in the assignment of certain polities to the residue on the basis of coding for *raw* characteristics. In connection with the *finished* characteristics, however, it is possible to "retrieve" some of the earlier residual assignments.

For example, in coding for Raw Characteristic 12, specific literacy figures were unavailable for ten polities, which were therefore placed in the residue on grounds of being "unascertained" (punch 5). But Finished Characteristic 44, which contrasts "Polities where the literacy rate is ninety

percent or above" with "Polities where the literacy rate is below ninety percent," is of narrower scope than the raw characteristic from which it is derived. And it so happens that, although we do not have *precise* literacy-level data for the ten polities in question, we *do* know that, whatever the precise figures might be, they are certainly in all ten cases "below ninety percent." Hence, for this *particular* finished characteristic, all ten polities may be removed from the residual category and coded substantively as "punch 2." This is accomplished by key-punching ten new finished characteristic cards, one for each of the polities affected, changing the coding under column 44 from punch 5 to punch 2. These ten cards represent the following polities: China, Guinea, North Korea, Lebanon, Liberia, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Syria, and North Vietnam.

A similar operation is performed, where possible, for all other finished characteristics. The result is a much smaller residual count for the Finished Characteristic Deck than for the Raw Characteristic Deck.[5] Needless waste of information is thus avoided, and the statements, paragraphs and patterns that ultimately emerge are much more clearly defined.

12. ADMINISTRATION OF THE PATTERN SEARCH PROGRAM

At this point the computer is used for the second time. The Pattern Search Program Deck is fed into the computer, followed by the Finished Characteristic Deck. The result is the production of a large number of automatically punched cards. Each of these represents one two-by-two table, and is called a "table card."

To illustrate, let us take Finished Characteristic 80, which provides a dichotomous contrast between ex-British and ex-French dependencies. The computer crosses this dichotomy with the dichotomies contained in each of the other 193 finished characteristics. In this way the computer generates a very large number of two-by-two tables. For each such table, the computer computes the Fisher Exact calculation. This Fisher value, indicated as "P" in the tables in the printout, is the basic calculation of the Pattern Search Technique. Details are discussed on pages 29–30. Suffice to say here that in the present survey (but not necessarily elsewhere) this value is used as a measure of *strength of association*. It can vary from 1.00 down to almost zero. The lower its value, the stronger is the association between the two finished characteristics entered in the table. The Pattern Search Technique permits each investigator to select the critical level of the Fisher value which is best suited to his research needs. In the present survey, the critical level is set at .14999. As the computer generates tables, it looks at the Fisher value of each table. If this value is too weak—that is, .150 or higher—that table is automatically disre-

[5] For this reason, the raw attribute totals in Chapter 3 often do not tally with the corresponding finished attribute totals.

garded, or "winnowed out." If this value is strong—that is, .14999 or lower—the computer automatically punches for that table a "table card."

The punched information appearing on each table card includes all information needed to carry the analysis forward:

a. The identification number of the finished characteristic that will provide the subjects of the printout statement.

b. The identification number of the finished characteristic that will provide the predicates of the statement.

c. The number of polities to be found in each of the four cells of the two-by-two table.

d. Grammatical instructions for later translating the table into a statement.

e. Other numerical and technical information.

13. ADMINISTRATION OF THE TABLE TRANSLATION PROGRAM

The table cards produced by administration of the Pattern Search program are next arranged in exact numerical order. They are now ready for our third use of the computer, which is designed to translate the tables into English. The Table Translation Program Deck is fed into the computer, followed by the large deck of ordered table cards. The result is the production of printout. The bulk of the present study is simply a carefully edited version of this printout as produced by the computer.

The Table Translation Program translates each table into two English "sentences" which, taken together, comprise one "statement." Each sentence contains the following parts of speech: subject lead, subject clause, verb, and predicate clause. In some cases there is also an adverb. The precise grammatical rules for building a sentence are described on pages 37–39.

14. GENERATING MATRICES

The computer printout will reveal numerous interesting relationships. In some cases, the analyst will be dissatisfied with the mere knowledge of *how many* polities occupy each of the four quadrants of the two-by-two table. He will wish to know, in addition, just *which* polities occupy each quadrant, so that he can, among other things, analyze the deviant cases. To gain this information, he makes use of the computer for the fourth time. The Matrix Generation Program Deck is fed into the computer, followed by appropriate instruction cards and all the table cards representing tables for which matrices are desired. The result is the printout of each of the desired matrices.

We have already seen on page 14 an example of a typical matrix—the one that crossed "Ex-British versus Ex-French" with "Literacy Above

Ten Percent versus Literacy Below Ten Percent." A number of matrices appear in the computer-produced printout in the present study. For each statement for which a matrix is provided, the letter "M" appears alongside the two-by-two table associated with the statement. The matrix appears at the end of the paragraph concerned.

15. RE-RUNS

Careful study of the printout from the first run, and of the printout of the matrices, will probably indicate that a new, revised run is required. Some raw characteristics will probably prove to have discriminated inadequately and, hence, will best be dropped from the Raw Characteristic Deck. The same will probably be true with respect to some of the finished characteristics, which will need to be dropped from the Finished Characteristic Deck. Study of the printout will probably also suggest certain new raw or finished characteristics that ought to be added. If a re-run is decided upon, the procedure outlined in the foregoing pages must, of course, be repeated.

THE FISHER CALCULATION

At this point it would be well to discuss briefly the Fisher calculation, which is the basic calculation employed in the Pattern Search Technique. The Fisher values have been calculated as if for a two-tailed test of significance, in accordance with a procedure suggested by P. Armsen.[6]

The Fisher calculation is usually employed as the Fisher Exact Test of significance. We are instead employing it, in this survey, as a measure of strength of association. We do this because our sample is a "total sample" rather than the usual partial sample. We therefore regard the statements in the printout as summaries of information rather than as statements of significance.

Some statisticians would approach the matter differently. They would assume a theoretical universe consisting of a very large number of collections of all the world's independent polities, of which the present collection is but one. If this assumption is made, then choices must be made concerning what further assumptions are to be made. Illustrative of these choices are the following: First, one might assume that the number (N) of polities in our sample is not fixed. Second, one might assume that the N is fixed but that, for a particular table, the row and column totals are not fixed. Third, one might assume that the N is fixed, and that the

[6] P. Armsen, "Tables for Significance Tests of 2 × 2 Contingency Tables," *Biometrika*, Vol. 42, 1955, pp. 494–511. The decision to use Armsen's procedure was taken on the advice of Professor Miles Davis, a statistician who served as consultant and programmer. Professor Davis is satisfied that the "P" values appearing in the printout are those following from Armsen's Definition D-3.

row and column totals are fixed, but that the cell frequencies are not fixed. Such choices are vexing and complex. Statisticians differ about the way to proceed. Our decision to regard the Fisher value as a measure of strength of association appears to us to be the simplest way out. We assume that the N is fixed, and that for any particular table the row and column totals are fixed, and that the cell frequencies are likewise fixed. However, we are quite aware that this simple way out might not be satisfactory to some readers, or for some purposes. We have no strong reason for arguing against making some other set of assumptions, such as the third one just outlined.

It should be mentioned that the Pattern Search Technique can be, and already has been, applied to data gathered in accordance with random sample designs. In such cases, it would be legitimate to regard the Fisher calculation in the usual manner, as the Fisher Exact Test of significance (making the assumption that row and column totals are fixed).[7]

THE FORMAT OF THE PRINTOUT

The format of the printout is composed of three principal elements: (1) subject listings, (2) polity listings, and (3) predicate listings. Pages 32–33 are two non-consecutive pages of the printout from Paragraph 80, which will be used to illustrate these listings.

THE SUBJECT LISTINGS

Paragraph 80, like all paragraphs in this study, contains two contrasting subjects, namely: "Polities whose date of independence is after 1914, and that were formerly dependencies of Britain, rather than France," versus "Polities whose date of independence is after 1914, and that were formerly dependencies of France, rather than Britain." Each subject is followed by a number in parentheses: 19 in the case of the left subject, and 24 in

[7] We adopted the Fisher calculation rather than some other calculation, because of its extreme versatility. In the first place, the Fisher calculation is, in our view, capable of being used either to measure strength of association or to test significance, depending on the nature of the data being treated and on the assumptions that the analyst wishes to make. In the second place, the Fisher calculation can be used even where N is small and where the expected frequency of a cell is very small. This is an advantage not offered by the chi-square (to test significance) nor by the phi or C coefficients (to measure strength of association).

Nonetheless, the chi-square value appears in the printout in addition to the Fisher value. One reason for this is to afford convenience to readers who are accustomed to thinking in chi-square terms. An added reason for calculating the chi-square value is that, where N becomes too large, the computer exhausts its capacity to compute the Fisher value. In such a case, it is necessary to make a slight change in the Pattern Search Program, keying the winnowing and verb-selecting procedures (see pages 36, 38) to the chi-square value. The revised program would instruct the computer to do this whenever N reaches a size of, say, 200 or greater. Where N is that large, the P associated with the chi-square value is an extremely close approximation to the Fisher value, and hence is satisfactory.

the case of the right subject. The number 19 means that our original count of the number of polities that possess *both* the raw attribute "date of independence after 1914" *and* the raw attribute "former dependency of Britain" produced a total of 19. The number 24 means that the corresponding figure for the right-hand subject was 24.

THE POLITY LISTINGS

Immediately beneath the subject listings are the polity listings. Each polity is listed once. The total number of polities listed is always 115. A polity may be listed as belonging to the finished attribute category of the left-hand subject, the right-hand subject, or the residue. If it is listed as belonging to the residue, then the ground on which it was assigned to the residue is specified, namely, "ambiguous," "irrelevant," "unascertained," or "unascertainable." The number of polities in each listing is specified. These numbers are the result of the computer's count, and thus act as a check to ensure that the computer's count and our own original count are identical. Note, for example, that the computer found 19 polities in the left column, and that this number is identical with the number of polities that we originally counted and stated in parentheses at the end of the left-hand subject. Note also that the polities are listed alphabetically and ten-across, so as to make it more convenient for the reader to check our codings.

PREDICATE LISTINGS, SENTENCES, AND STATEMENTS

Each pair of predicates, like each pair of subjects, has its own identifying number. Thus, Left Subject 80, when joined with Left Predicate 10, becomes Left Sentence 80/10. Left Sentences will always provide some kind of contrast with corresponding Right Sentences. These two sentences, when read together, form a compound sentence, which we call a "statement." Thus Statement 80/10 reads: "Polities whose date of independence is after 1914, and that were formerly dependencies of Britain, rather than France, tend to be located elsewhere than in . . . Africa, [while] polities whose date of independence is after 1914, and that were formerly dependencies of France, rather than Britain, tend to be those located in . . . Africa." This statement, if somewhat ungainly, is nonetheless reasonably clear. A more precise statement would be *more* ungainly, because it would expand the predicate, "tend to be those located in . . . Africa," to read "tend to belong to the category of polities bearing the attribute, 'located in . . . Africa.' " Thus we have compromised somewhat between ungainliness and precision. The reader who might wish to make use of Statement 80/10 could easily simplify it to read something like this: "Leaving out of

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

Left subject

Paragraph number

Right subject

How heading characteristic is run

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

N LEFT COLUMN

BURMA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	GHANA	INDIA	IRAQ	I	ISRAEL	JAMAICA	JORDAN
MALAYA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	SIERRE LEO	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	T	UGANDA	UAR	

24 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	GABON		IVORY COAST
LAOS	LEBANON	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	SENEGAL		TOGO
TUNISIA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP						

72 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVI	BRAZIL	BULGARI	BURUNDI
CANADA	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR		GUATEMALA	HAITI
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDONESIA	IRAN	ITALY	JAPAN		KOREA REP	LIBERIA
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICA	NORWAY	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U AR	SOMALIA	S AFRICA
SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA
YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA								

Right subject keyed to right column

Left subject keyed to left column

10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.63	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.75	7 18 12 6 X SQ= 4.87 P = 0.016 RV YES (YES)	
11	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.68	11	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (28)	0.62	6 15 13 9 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.067 RV YES (YES)	
19	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.78	19	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	1.00	7 18 2 0 X SQ= 1.69 P = 0.103 RV NO (YES)	

Chi-square value

Fisher value

125 TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.67
WHE[illegible]EREST ARTICULATION
BY [illegible]UPS
IS FR[illegible] OCCASIONAL (64)

Total number of polities coded under this attribute

128 TEND TO BE THO[illegible] 0.77
WHERE INTEREST ART[illegible]
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODER[illegible] (48)

129 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.77
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED (56)

133 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.71
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE EXECUTIVE
IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR
NEGLIGIBLE (76)

138 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.64
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE LEGISLATURE
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED (48)

Left majority cell is 64% of column total

139 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.83
WHERE THE PARTY SYST[illegible] [illegible]NTITATIVELY
OTHER THAN ONE-PA[illegible]

141 TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.86
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)

142 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.54
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)

144 LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.60
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN
TWO-PARTY (34)

125 TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.91
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANDMIC GROUPS
IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)

	12	20
	6	2

X SQ= 2.28
P = 0.110
RV NO (YES)

128 TEND TO BE THOSE
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE

Table 80/125 is non-reversal

M

	10	5
	3	17

X SQ= 7.71
P = 0.004
RV YES (YES)

129 TEND TO BE THOSE
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)

Table 129/80 is reversal

	10	7
	3	15

[illegible] 4.97
[illegible] 0.015
RV [illegible] (YES)

133 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.80
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE EXECUTIVE
IS SIGNIFICANT (29)

M

	5	16
	12	4

X SQ= 7.63
P = 0.003
RV YES (YES)

138 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.90
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE LEGISLATURE
IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)

	9	2
	5	19

X SQ= 9.29
P = 0.002
RV YES (YES)

139 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.[illegible]8
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATI[illegible]
ONE-PARTY (34)

Matrix provided for this table

M

	3	15
	15	7

X SQ= 8.64
P = 0.002
RV YES (YES)

141 ALWAYS ARE THOS[illegible] 1.00
WHERE THE PART[illegible] QUANTITATIVELY
OTHER THAN TWO-[illegible]

Right majority cell is 90% of column total

	2	0
	12	22

X SQ= 1.16
P = 0.144
RV NO (YES)

142 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.90
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)

	6	2
	7	19

X SQ= 4.12
P = 0.033
RV NO (YES)

144 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN
TWO-PARTY (34)

	3	15
	2	0

X SQ= 2.96
P = 0.053
RV NO (YES)

consideration polities that gained their independence prior to 1914, the ex-French dependencies tend to be located in Africa, while the ex-British dependencies tend to be located elsewhere."

SUBJECT-ONLY AND PREDICATE-ONLY CHARACTERISTICS

As has by now become clear, in the typical case a table appears twice in the printout. For example, the computer has found that the table resulting from the crossing of FCs 10 and 80 bears a sufficiently strong Fisher value to justify its appearing in the printout. This table therefore appears twice, once as Table 10/80, and once as Table 80/10. In the former case, FC 10 is the subject characteristic, and FC 80 is the predicate characteristic. In the latter case, the table is "turned over," and FC 80 provides the two subjects, while FC 10 provides the two predicates. In some cases, however, for the convenience of the reader we have decided to run a particular characteristic as subject only or as predicate only. There are 29 finished characteristics run as "subject only," and 69 run as "predicate only."

SUBJECT-ONLY CHARACTERISTICS

The "subject-only" characteristics are indicated in the serial listing of finished characteristics in Chapter 3 by the notation "[SO]". On the printout, each subject-only characteristic bears the label "Subject Only" in the lower right-hand corner of the subject listing.

The reason for our decision to run a particular finished characteristic as subject only, and not as predicate, was often that the positive attribute category had a relative frequency so low that the characteristic would not be instructive if run as a predicate. An example of such a subject-only characteristic is seen in Paragraph 12. Here the left-hand, or "positive," attribute category is "Polities located in North Africa (5)." The right-hand, or "all-other," category is "Polities located elsewhere than in North Africa (110)." The frequency of the positive category is 1/22 that of the all-other category. In the final computer run, which produced the printout in this book, we retained the left-hand group of polities (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic) as a subject because we wanted to know what predicate attributes showed an inclination to co-occur with the positive attribute "North African-ness." (The "all-other" attribute "located elsewhere than in North Africa," is of no intrinsic interest; its only function is to provide a contrast with the positive attribute.) We did not use Finished Characteristic 12 as a predicate, however. To have done so would have produced sentences most of which would have told us little of value with respect to the various *subjects* to which this predicate would have been attached. The frequency of the "North Africa" category is simply too small, relative to the frequency of the

analytically uninteresting "all-other" category. Thus, for example, Statement 12/93 appears in the printout, but potential Statement 93/12 does not. Statement 12/93 tells us something of value about North Africa, namely that polities located there tend to have a system style that is mobilizational or limited mobilizational (in contrast to those located elsewhere, which tend to be non-mobilizational). On the other hand, if potential Statement 93/12 had appeared in the printout, it would have told us relatively little of value about the characteristic, "System Style." It would merely have told us that polities where the system style is mobilizational or limited mobilizational tend less to be located elsewhere than in North Africa, while polities where the system style is non-mobilizational tend more to be located elsewhere than in North Africa.

PREDICATE-ONLY CHARACTERISTICS

The "predicate-only" characteristics are indicated in the serial listing of finished characteristics in Chapter 3 by the notation "[PO]". Although a predicate-only characteristic is not run as a subject, the printout includes polity listings for each such characteristic. This is done so as to enable the reader to check the coding of the finished characteristic in question. The listing bears the label, "Predicate Only." After the polity listing, the printout proceeds immediately to the next paragraph, since there are no predicates to appear.[8]

Finished characteristics that we decided to run as predicate only are usually derived from raw characteristics of an ordinal (as distinct from a nominal) nature. Such ordinal raw characteristics are usually dichotomized into several finished characteristics by means of a moving cutting point. This is done so as to enable the reader to discern a staircase effect among successive predicates. (See pages 45–47.) Thus, in the case of the raw characteristic, "Gross National Product Per Capita," we established five attributes: Very High, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low. We then dichotomized three times by placing the cutting point successively between High and Medium, between Medium and Low, and between Low and Very Low. In setting this characteristic up as a subject variable, however, we dichotomized only once, locating the cutting point where the left and right attribute frequencies would be most nearly equal. This location proved to be between Low and Very Low. We adopted this procedure because, in treating this raw characteristic as a subject variable, we merely wanted to discover what were, in general, the implications of "higher" GNP per capita, as contrasted with "lower" GNP per capita. In other words, the moving cutting-point technique provides valuable results when applied

[8] In order to prevent the subject-only characteristics from appearing as predicates, and the predicate-only characteristics from appearing as subjects, one need only remove the appropriate table cards prior to the printout run.

to predicate variables but often results in confusion and quasi-redundancy when applied to subject variables.

In the foregoing example, we had no theoretical or other reason for wanting to discover, for example, what might be the implications of "Very High" GNP per capita, as contrasted with "All Lower." *If* we had had such reasons, then this dichotomy would have been run as a subject. If a particular reader should have reason for wishing to contrast this (or any other) omitted dichotomy with some other characteristic, he can always do so by building his own matrix (pages 49–50).

We can now briefly summarize with respect to both subject-only and predicate-only characteristics. It should first be pointed out that these two types of characteristics, taken together, comprise only about half of the total number of finished characteristics. The other half are run both as subject and as predicate. A second point to emphasize is that running a finished characteristic as subject-only or as predicate-only does *not* mean that any information is thrown away. What it *does* mean is simply that the information is presented only once, rather than twice, solely for the purpose of easing the burden on the reader. We would be throwing away information only if we were to decide not to run a given finished characteristic *either* as subject *or* as predicate—if, in other words, we were completely to remove the characteristic from our corpus of finished characteristics. For the convenience of the reader, we have listed in Appendix C all tables that have been removed because their predicate characteristics have been designated to appear as "Subject Only."[9]

COMPUTER-WINNOWED STATEMENTS

In Paragraph 80, the first statement is Statement 80/10. Potential Statements 80/1 through 80/9 do not appear. The reason is that the Fisher values of these potential tables were weaker than the critical level of .149 established for this study. All such weak statements have, in effect, been "winnowed out" by the computer, leaving only the solid kernels of interesting information. Thus the reader is spared the chore of poring through a large number of statements that are, in general, of little or no importance. It should be emphasized, however, that under some circumstances the *non*-appearance of a potential statement can be highly important, depending on the analyst's purposes and theoretical interests. The failure to confirm an assumed correlation is often as scientifically important as the confirmation of another.

[9] These removals are indicated by the abbreviation "SO." Each entry in Appendix C is comprised of six numbers. Reading from left to right, these numbers signify: (1) The identification number of the finished characteristic that constitutes the subject, or column, characteristic. (2) The identification number of the finished characteristic that constitutes the predicate, or row, characteristic. (3) The frequency of the upper left cell. (4) The frequency of the upper right cell. (5) The frequency of the lower left cell. (6) The frequency of the lower right cell.

THE GRAMMAR OF THE SENTENCES

The sentences produced by the computer are in every case completely grammatical. The subject invariably contains a "subject lead" and a "subject clause." The predicate invariably contains a "verb" and a "predicate clause." In addition, some predicates also contain "adverbs." The computer is programmed to look for, select, and print the subject lead, subject clause, verb, and predicate clause. It is also programmed to decide whether an adverb is necessary, and, if so, to select and print it. These operations will be illustrated with reference to Statement 80/10.

SUBJECT LEAD

In the present study, the subject lead of every sentence is "Polities. . . ."

SUBJECT CLAUSE

The subject clause is next retrieved from the computer's memory. The left subject clause is simply the left attribute clause for Finished Characteristic 80. Joining the subject lead to the left subject clause, the computer prints as the entire Left Subject 80: "Polities whose date of independence is after 1914, and that were formerly dependencies of Britain, rather than France."

PREDICATE CLAUSE

The next task of the computer is to select the predicate clause from between two alternatives. To do this, the computer examines Table 80/10, which is printed just to the right of Statement 80/10. The left column of the table is keyed to the left subject, and the right column to the right subject. This table reads as follows:

	Ex-British	Ex-French
Located in Africa	7	18
Located elsewhere than in Africa	12	6

The computer notices that a majority of 12 out of 19, or 63 percent of the ex-British dependencies are located outside of Africa. The computer selects the predicate clause for Left Sentence 80/10 from the "majority" row, in this case, the lower row. It therefore selects and prints the predicate clause associated with the lower row, namely, "located elsewhere than in . . . Africa (82)."[10]

The computer then chooses the predicate clause for Right Predicate 80/10 in a like manner.[11] It notices that 18 out of 24, or 75 percent of the ex-French dependencies, are "located in . . . Africa," and it therefore chooses and prints that predicate clause.

[10] The number 82 indicates that of all the 115 independent polities in the world, there are 82 that are located elsewhere than in Africa.

[11] When, in a particular column, there is no "majority" row, the computer selects the row that is other than the majority row in the other column.

As a convenience to the reader, the column ratios—here 63 and 75 percent—are printed just to the right of the Left and Right Predicates, respectively.

VERB

The computer must next decide which left verb to select and print, out of several possibilities. For the most part, the selection of the verb depends on the Fisher value, which is printed below the table. If this value is stronger, that is, lower, than .05, then the computer selects and prints the verb, "tend." This is the case in Left Sentence 80/10, where the Fisher value is .016. In cases where the value is stronger than .10 but not stronger than .05, the computer selects and prints the somewhat "weaker" verb, "lean." This is illustrated in Left Sentence 80/11. If the value is stronger than .150, but not stronger than .10, then the computer selects and prints its weakest verb, "tilt." If the value is .150 or weaker, then, of course, the table and its statement will already have been computer-winnowed out (page 36).

THE ADVERBS "MORE" AND "LESS"

None of the statements cited to exemplify the verbs "tend," "lean," and "tilt" contained an adverb. None was necessary, because in all these statements, the ex-British polities were inclined one way and the ex-French polities were inclined the other way. Thus, for example, the ex-French polities were inclined to be located in Africa, while the ex-British polities were inclined to be located outside of Africa. Such a relationship is called a "reversal." A reversal is characterized by having the two majority cells in diagonally opposed positions. A "non-reversal" is characterized by having both majority cells in the same row.

The adverbs "more" and "less" are used only in cases where there is a *non*-reversal, in other words, where both classes of polities are inclined in the same direction. An example is seen in Statement 80/125. In this instance, ex-French polities tilt toward being those where interest articulation by anomic groups is frequent or occasional—to the extent of 20 out of 22, or 91 percent. Ex-British polities also tilt in the same direction, but only to the extent of 12 out of 18, or 67 percent. Thus, both the ex-French and the ex-British polities are inclined in the same direction, but the ex-French territories show *more* of such inclination, and the ex-British territories show *less*. Therefore, the adverb "more" is added to the right predicate, and the adverb "less" is added to the left predicate.

At the bottom of Table 80/125 is printed the expression "Reversal: No (Yes)." The "Reversal: No . . ." means that Table 80/125 does not contain a reversal. The ". . . (Yes)" simply adds the parenthetical information that when the table is "turned over" and becomes Table 125/80, a reversal does occur.

The adverbs "more" and "less" can be added to any predicate where the verb is "tend," "lean," or "tilt."

THE VERB-PHRASE "ALWAYS ARE"

The verb-phrase "always are" is selected whenever one of the four cells in the table contains a zero. An example is seen in Right Sentence 80/144. If the cell diagonally opposed to the zero cell also contained a zero (instead of a two), then the verb-phrase for Left Sentence 80/144 would also be "always are." Such instances do occur, although rarely. In the actual case, Left Sentence 80/144 takes the verb "lean," reflecting the fact that the Fisher value is between .099 and .050, together with the adverb "less," indicating that the statement is a non-reversal.

SYNTAX

We recommend that in first reading a paragraph the reader devote primary attention to the left sentences, with occasional glances at the right sentences and tables, as necessary. This will afford him a quick preliminary contextual overview of the entire "terrain" of the paragraph. Our syntax is planned to facilitate this quick overview. That is, we have designed the format of our syntax in such a way that the reader, as his eye moves down the left sentences, will usually know what is contained in the corresponding right sentences without having to look at them. Chart 2.1 gives the relevant syntactic rules.

CHART 2.1 SYNTACTIC RULES

If the Left Verb is	Then the Right Verb will be
Tend	Tend — in the opposite direction, or Always — in the opposite direction
Lean	Lean — in the opposite direction, or Always — in the opposite direction
Tilt	Tilt — in the opposite direction, or Always — in the opposite direction
Tend More	Tend Less — in the same direction
Lean More	Lean Less — in the same direction
Tilt More	Tilt Less — in the same direction
Tend Less	Tend More — in the same direction, or Always — in the same direction
Lean Less	Lean More — in the same direction, or Always — in the same direction
Tilt Less	Tilt More — in the same direction, or Always — in the same direction
Always Are	[There are many possibilities. It is best to examine the Right Predicate rather than to attempt to guess.]

There is one other general principle of syntax that should be mentioned. Where the left subject or predicate clause does not specify otherwise, the reader may safely assume that this left clause defines a class of polities that is being contrasted with "all other" polities in the world. To illustrate, when the reader sees a left predicate that involves polities "located in East Europe," he will know immediately that this class of polities is being contrasted with all other substantively codable polities, and that no polities have been classified as "irrelevant." On the other hand, when the reader sees a left predicate that includes the words "rather than" (as in "Polities located in Scandinavia or West Europe, rather than in East Europe"), he knows that two classes of polities are being contrasted, and that others are ex*cluded* and drop into the residue as "irrelevant."

HAND-WINNOWED STATEMENTS

There are only two means by which statements can be winnowed out of the printout. The first, described on page 36, is computer-winnowing. The second is hand-winnowing. Hand-winnowing is not an automatic process, though it does follow fixed rules. In brief, the next-to-last printout is inspected to decide what statements are redundant. The table cards for each such redundant statement are then removed, so that they do not appear in the final printout. The purpose of hand-winnowing is to minimize the reading burden without sacrificing information and, in some cases, to eliminate confusion that would otherwise result. Each such hand-winnowed statement is summarized in Appendix C at the end of the printout.[12]

Redundant statements take two principal forms: the "pure" redundant and the "quasi"-redundant. Pure redundant statements result from tables where both the "subject" finished characteristic and the "predicate" finished characteristic derive from the same raw characteristic. For example, if it had not been winnowed out, Left Sentence 1/11 would have appeared in the final printout with the information that "Polities located in East Europe always are those located elsewhere than in Central or South Africa."

Quasi-redundant statements are both more common and more complex. Such a statement can occur where there appears in the preliminary printout more than one predicate-pair deriving from the same raw characteristic, and where that raw characteristic is of an *ordinal* nature.[13]

[12] In Appendix C, statements winnowed for reason of redundancy are identified by the abbreviation "RD." (The other abbreviation, "SO," meaning "Subject Only," is explained on pages 34–35.) Since the cell frequencies are provided, the reader is enabled to reassemble the deleted table if he wishes. Appendix C is a convenient means of checking whether a particular table and its accompanying statement have been eliminated on a "redundant" or a "subject-only" basis. If neither, the only other possibility is that the statement was computer-winnowed.

[13] Where only one predicate-pair deriving from a particular ordinal raw characteristic appears, it is never regarded as quasi-redundant.

In such a case, we *retain* all predicate-pairs that contain a reversal (that is, that do not possess the adverbs "more" or "less") and, with one exception, all predicate-pairs that contain the verb-phrase, "always are."[14] We hand-winnowed *out* those pairs of predicates where each predicate contains the adverb "more" or "less." We do this because experience has shown that such statements are the most cumbersome to read and the least informative.[15]

Examples are found in Paragraph 41. Statement 41/38 was deleted. Here, the left predicate was "tend less to be those whose international financial status is medium, low, or very low." The right predicate was "tend more to be those whose international financial status is medium, low, or very low." The essential "thrust" of this deleted statement is more succinctly expressed in Statement 41/39. Statement 41/40 was allowed to remain in the printout because its left sentence adds new information, namely, that it *never* happens that polities whose economic developmental status is developed, have an international financial status that is very low.

Our policy on the hand-winnowing of quasi-redundant statements means that in some cases as few as one statement remains which derives from a particular ordinal raw characteristic. Therefore, if the reader finds even one such statement, and it deals with a subject that interests him, he would be well advised to assemble the two raw characteristics concerned into a 2-by-N or M-by-N matrix, as described on pages 49–50.

HOW TO USE THE PRINTOUT

It should be emphasized, once again, that the printout simply tells us what classes of polities co-occur or overlap with what other classes. It tells us, for example, that the class of polities that possesses the attribute "former British dependency" tends to overlap with the class of polities that possesses the attribute "literate religion." What the computer c*annot* do is to tell us *why* this is so. Indeed, like most other researchers who have worked with the computer, we are impressed with the essential "stupidity" of the machine. The computer, at least as we use it, can perform only those operations that it has been instructed to perform. And while many of these tasks are of a highly complex character, they are all wholly mechanical. The proper interpretation of our computer printout

[14] Occasionally *two* "always are" predicate-pairs will appear, one of which contains more precise information than the other. In such a case, the less precise statement will be hand-winnowed out. For example, we deleted Statement 10/53, which tells us that polities located in Africa always are those where newspaper circulation is less than three hundred per thousand. We retained the more precise and informative Statement 10/54, which tells us that African polities always are those where newspaper circulation is less than one hundred per thousand. Both statements are true, but the first one is less precise and, indeed, misleading.

[15] Again, however, there is an exception. In the rare case where two or more predicate-pairs appear, *all of which* contain adverbs in both the left and right predicates, *none* of the pairs are deleted.

must, then, always come from the free creative intellect of the analyst himself. The following recommendations are designed to aid the reader in the task of interpreting a portion of the printout.

LISTINGS OF RAW AND FINISHED CHARACTERISTICS

It would be best to begin by briefly scanning the serial listings of raw and finished characteristics in Chapter 3. These provide a general idea of the scope of the present study.[16]

SELECTING A RAW CHARACTERISTIC

Next, it is suggested that the reader select a raw characteristic that is of particular interest to him, and that covers a subject with which he is familiar. It would be well to examine the commentary that follows after the raw characteristic listing. This states what coding rules were used, how borderline decisions were reached, and so on. Immediately following the commentary are listed the finished characteristics derived from this raw characteristic.

PARAGRAPH CODINGS

The reader is now ready to turn to the printout, and to the beginning of the first paragraph representing a finished characteristic derived from the raw characteristic in question. He may wish first to examine the polity listings for this paragraph, to determine whether he would have coded certain polities differently.[17]

The question now arises: To what extent can the reader disagree with our codings and still be justified in proceeding to read the paragraph concerned? The answer to this question depends on the extent and distribution of the cases involved. If the reader disagrees with a substantial proportion of the codings listed at the top of a particular paragraph, then obviously there would be little point in proceeding to read the paragraph. However, if the reader disagrees with only a small proportion of our codings, and especially if one questionable coding would seem to cancel out another, then he can proceed to read the paragraph with a measure of confidence. Of crucial importance is the extent to which the *proportions* of a particular column or row may thus be affected. If, for example, a particular column has a relatively small marginal total to begin with,

[16] The Raw Characteristic Code Sheet appears as Appendix A. The Finished Characteristic Code Sheet appears as Appendix B. These code sheets enable the reader to check all codings for a particular polity.

[17] Owing to the "reassignment of residue," discussed on pages 26–27, discrepancies will be noted between the codings as given in the Raw Characteristic Code Sheet and the codings presented in the polity listings for a particular paragraph. There should, however, be no discrepancies between polity listings and the *Finished* Characteristic Code Sheet.

then considerable disturbance could result from the shift of two or three polities from one cell to the other within the column, or from that column to the other column.

It is possible to illustrate with concrete examples. Paragraph 67 contrasts the 82 polities coded as "racially homogeneous" with the 27 polities coded as "racially heterogeneous." As will be noted in Table 67/2, however, the left column adds up to only 80 instead of 82, while the right column total is 29 instead of 27. This is the result of a clerical error. Two polities—Uganda and Tanganyika—that we had coded as "homogeneous" were inadvertently punched on the input cards as "heterogeneous." Since the cost of correcting this error would have been great, we decided to let the error stand.

The right column of Paragraph 67 should contain 27 polities, but because of the above-mentioned error, it actually contains 29. This column total is relatively low, and under such circumstances the loss of two polities can disturb a column's proportions considerably. While in the great majority of cases no substantial change results, it is worth while to cite a few extreme cases so that the reader will be aware of the upsets that can sometimes result when coding or punching errors occur. Table 67/45 should have cell frequencies of 43, 10, 33, and 17. This renders the table less "lopsided" than appears in the printout, with the result that the true Fisher value is .116 instead of .048. In other words, the verb ought to be a "tilt" instead of the "tend" that appears in the printout. Table 67/50's true cell frequencies are 28, 13, 42, and 10. The true Fisher value, instead of being .098, is larger than the critical level of .149, so that this table actually should not have appeared in the printout at all. In the main, however, these punching errors have not proved serious, and a coding error of equal proportions elsewhere would likewise not be serious.[18]

An added safety feature derives from the fact that many of our raw characteristics are of an ordinal nature, and have been dichotomized into two or more finished characteristics by means of a moving cutting point (page 45). The result of such dichotomization is often a quasi-redundancy among predicates resulting from the same raw characteristic, as explained on pages 40–41. The essential "thrust" of such a set of quasi-redundant predicate-pairs will, of course, be in the same direction. It seems probable to us that in many such instances coding errors might distort particular predicate-pairs, yet still not distort the general thrust of such a set of predicate-pairs found in the printout or in Appendix C.[19]

[18] A few additional changes in Fisher values would seem worth listing. Table 67/41 changes its value from .022 to .039. Table 67/42 goes from .061 to .096. Table 67/53 changes from .107 to .116. Table 67/54 drops from .002 to .004.

[19] However, there will also be cases, such as that of predicate-pair 67/50 mentioned previously, where this will not be true. Here, only two predicate-pairs emerge: 67/50 in the printout, and 67/51 which was hand-winnowed out and appears in Appendix C. Both of these predicate-pairs would have been machine-winnowed out if the punching error had not occurred.

In the examples cited, the correction of punching errors has led to decreases in strength of association. It could just as easily happen, however, that such corrections could lead to increases in strength of association.[20]

QUICK READING

The next recommended step is to obtain a quick over-all picture of the "general terrain" of the section. The reader will thus gain a "holistic" contextual "feel" for the data before embarking on a more atomistic search for crucial relationships. As noted on pages 39–40 in the discussion of syntax, the statements are arranged in a format such that the reader can develop this over-all feel quite easily by concentrating primarily on the left-hand sentences during the first reading.

DETAILED READING

The reader will probably now wish to return to the beginning of the section and this time read the paragraphs more thoroughly. Both left and right predicates should be studied. Attention should also be paid to the tables on which statements are based, and to any matrices that might appear at the end of a paragraph.

DRAFT SUMMARY

At this point it should be possible to prepare a draft summary of the section, listing the major conclusions that seem to emerge. Each such conclusion should indicate the statement numbers from which it is derived.

In reaching these conclusions, we recommend that the reader place most weight on the "tend" statements, and only moderate weight on the "lean" statements. We regard the "tilt" statements as being of value primarily insofar as they give contextual support to the "tend" and "lean"

[20] To our knowledge, there is only one other substantive error in the printout. This is in Paragraph 70. Malagasy is religiously heterogeneous, and hence belongs in the right column. Because of a punching error, Malagasy was placed in the residue. The right column of Table 70/2, therefore, totals only 84 polities, whereas it ought to total 85. This case is different from that in Paragraph 67 in that a change occurs in the total for only one of the two columns. The case is instructive in that this column total is by far the larger one. Adding one polity to 84 alters the table's proportions hardly at all. For example, it changes the Fisher value of Table 70/36 from .024 to .023, while Tables 70/54, 56, 63 retain the same Fisher values as before.

The polity listings for Paragraphs 67 and 70, and Matrices 67/153 and 70/125 have been corrected so as to show the proper codings for Tanganyika, Uganda, and Malagasy.

As far as procedural errors are concerned, we are aware of only two, both of them inconsequential. The first is that we inadvertently neglected to correct a "bug" in the program prior to the final print run, with the result that a predicate-pair where both verb phrases are "always are" can creep into the printout, even though its associated Fisher value is higher than .149. To our knowledge, this occurred only twice, in Statements 191/48, 99.

The second procedural error is of even less consequence. It was almost inevitable that hand-winnowing would be less than 100 percent thorough. We know of one predicate-pair, 67/70, that should have been hand-winnowed out, but was not. There might, of course, be a few more such cases.

statements. "Always" statements should be evaluated somewhat more individually, but certainly the Fisher level would be an important consideration in their case as well. Occasionally the reader might reach a conclusion from a single isolated statement, and such conclusions can deal with quite crucial relationships. However, our experience has been that a conclusion of real value will more frequently assume the form of a pattern based on a whole congeries of inter-related statements. And indeed, the aspect of the present survey that we regard as the most reassuring is the degree of internal consistency among the statements that appear in the printout.

CROSS-CHECKING

One of the advantages of the Pattern Search Technique is that tables are "turned over" so that an interesting predicate can be examined in another paragraph where it becomes the subject. By reading this other paragraph, the analyst can obtain a rich contextual view of the new subject characteristic. This is valuable both for identifying important intervening variables, and for suggesting new research leads involving variables not included in the present study.

STAIRCASING

Most of the characteristics and statements thus far used for illustrative purposes have been supported by data of a qualitative, or nominal, variety. However, many of our raw characteristics are not nominal, but ordinal. An example is the (originally metric) characteristic "Gross National Product Per Capita," under which we have subsumed the five ordinal raw attributes "Very High," "High," "Medium," "Low," and "Very Low." Since the Pattern Search Technique, as presently constituted, requires that finished characteristics be dichotomous, we have dichotomized this raw characteristic into three finished characteristics, by means of a moving cutting point, as follows:

Very High or High	*versus*	Medium, Low, or Very Low
Very High, High, or Medium	*versus*	Low or Very Low
Very High, High, Medium, or Low	*versus*	Very Low

This moving cutting point is designed to help the analyst notice "staircasing" among predicates. For example, suppose we are concerned as to whether there is any relationship between the above-mentioned raw characteristic and the raw characteristic "Role of Police." The latter contains only two attributes, which serve as subjects for Paragraph 187: "Polities where the role of the police is politically significant" versus "Polities where the role of the police is not politically significant." When the analyst confronts Statements 187/35–37, he will immediately note

MATRIX 4

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA

	VERY HIGH	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	VERY LOW
POLICE IN POLITICAL ROLE		Czechos'kia *Germany, E* *USSR* Venezuela	Argentina *Bulgaria* *Cuba* *Hungary* Lebanon *Poland* *Rumania* So Africa Spain *Yugoslavia*	*Albania* Algeria Colombia Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Iraq Nicaragua Portugal Sa'u Arabia Syria Tunisia Turkey UAR	Afghanistan Bolivia Burma Cambodia Cameroun Cen Afr Rep *China, PR* Congo (Bra) Congo (Leo) Dahomey Ethiopia Gabon Ghana Guinea Haiti Indonesia Iran Ivory Coast Jordan *Korea, N* Korea Rep Laos Liberia *Mongolia* Morocco Nepal Nigeria Pakistan Paraguay Senegal Somalia Sudan Thailand Togo *Vietnam, N* Vietnam Rep Yemen
POLICE NOT IN POLITICAL ROLE	AUSTRALIA BELGIUM CANADA FRANCE LUXEMBOURG NEW ZEALAND NORWAY SWEDEN SWITZERLAND UK US	AUSTRIA DENMARK FINLAND GERMAN FR ICELAND IRELAND Israel ITALY NETHERLANDS	Greece Jamaica Japan Malaya Trinidad Uruguay	Mexico Philippines	Ceylon India Malagasy R Mauritania Sierre Leo Tanganyika Uganda

Note: Developed West in capitals
Communist bloc in italics

a staircase phenomenon. These statements clearly suggest that there is an inverse relationship between high GNP per capita and political involvement on the part of the police. This relationship is summarized by Matrix 4.

In watching for the staircase phenomenon, the reader should bear in mind that quasi-redundant statements have been removed. Hence, if even *one* statement appears that suggests staircasing, it might well be that a 2-by-N or M-by-N matrix would bear out the presence of such a phenomenon. (The reader can check to see what statements and tables have been removed on grounds of quasi-redundance by referring to Appendix C.)

MATRICES OF RAW ATTRIBUTES

Matrix 4 is an example of a matrix including all raw attributes from two raw characteristics. It happens to be a "2-by-N" matrix, but one can also construct useful "M-by-N" matrices. Such a matrix might result from the crossing of two nominal characteristics, or two that are ordinal, or one of each. Matrix 5 involves one nominal raw characteristic, "Legislative-Executive Structure." The other raw characteristic, "Party System: Quantitative," is in a sense an ordinal variable, although we do not treat it as such in this matrix.

Matrix 5 in some ways merely confirms the obvious, as when it tells us that if a polity is "Communist" in its legislative-executive structure, then it will have only one party. But it also reveals other relationships that the reader might not have anticipated. For example: If a polity is "one-party presidential," it will invariably be located in Africa and will almost invariably be a former French territory. On the other hand, a "multi-party presidential" system will almost invariably be Latin American.

STUDY OF DEVIANT CASES

One of the main reasons why we have suggested that the reader plot out matrices concerning the crossing of characteristics that interest him is that a matrix clearly reveals which polities are deviant cases. Deviant case analysis can be a powerful technique. It enables the analyst to see beyond the attribute categories immediately involved, and also to perceive the relevance of outside factors not included among the characteristics employed in the present study. In some cases, such factors would perhaps have been readily codable, but we simply happened not to use them. In other cases, however, it will turn out that these outside factors are inherently difficult or impossible to code for on a global basis. It is here that the well-informed reader, particularly the historian and area expert, can bring to bear his broad knowledge of the polities involved and their particular or unique characteristics.

MATRIX 5

LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE*

PARTY SYSTEM: QUANTITATIVE	Communist	Presidential-Parliamentary	Presidential	Parliamentary-Republican	Parliamentary-Royalist	Monarchical or Monarchical-Parliamentary
One-Party	Albania Bulgaria China, PR Czechos'kia Germany, E Hungary Korea, N Mongolia Poland Rumania USSR Vietnam, N Yugoslavia	Chad	Cen Afr Rep Dahomey Gabon Ghana Guinea Ivory Coast Liberia Mauritania Niger Senegal Tunisia Upper Volta			
One-Party Dominant		France	Bolivia Cameroun Congo (Bra) Malagasy R Mexico Paraguay Rwanda Vietnam Rep	India Somalia	Burundi Greece	
Multi-Party		Lebanon	Argentina Brazil Chile Costa Rica Cyprus Domin Rep Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Panama Venezuela	Congo (Leo) Finland Iceland Ireland Israel Italy	Belgium Ceylon Denmark Laos Luxembourg Netherlands Nigeria Norway Sweden Uganda	
Two-Party			Colombia Honduras Philippines US	Austria	Australia Canada Jamaica New Zealand Sierre Leo UK	
One-and-a-Half Party				German FR	Japan Trinidad	
No Parties			Haiti			Afghanistan Ethiopia Libya

*The following thirty polities do not appear in the matrix for the following reasons:
Because there is no matrix column for "Pure Parliamentary": *Mali* (1).
Because there is no matrix column for "Other": *Switzerland* and *Uruguay* (2).
Because "ambiguous" with respect to legislative-executive structure: *Cambodia, Portugal, Spain,* and *Tanganyika* (4).
Because "unascertainable" with respect to legislative-executive structure: *Algeria, Cuba, Peru,* and the *United Arab Republic* (4).
Because "irrelevant" with respect to legislative-executive structure. *Sa'udi Arabia* (1).
Because "unascertainable" with respect to *both* legislative-executive structure and party system: *Burma, Iran, Iraq, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo,* and *Yemen* (9).
Because "ambiguous" with respect to party system: *Indonesia, Malaya, Morocco, Nicaragua, South Africa,* and *Turkey* (6).
Because "unascertainable" with respect to party system: *Jordan, Nepal,* and *Pakistan* (3).

Skillful analysis of deviant cases can also lead to other fruitful discoveries, such as (1) the existence of coding errors, (2) the need for a refinement of coding rules, (3) the need for redefinition of coding categories, or even (4) the need for a complete redesigning of one's conceptual or analytical approach.

THE RESIDUE

No statement should be regarded as authoritative until the reader has checked the residue applying to the table on which the statement is based. In cross-checking and in constructing matrices, it becomes readily apparent how many polities drop out into the residue. Generally speaking, if such polities drop out for the reason of "irrelevance," there is no cause for concern. A polity that has been coded as "irrelevant" to either of the finished characteristics of the matrix is, by definition, a polity that need not, and should not, enter into the over-all analytic result. If, however, an excessive number of polities drop out on grounds of "ambiguity," "unascertainedness," or "unascertainability," then a serious bias might be introduced.[21] This is particularly true when such dropouts tend to possess some common quality, such as being located mostly in Africa, being mostly Communist nations, being mostly "underdeveloped," and so on.

USE OF THE SORTER AND TABULATOR

If the reader discovers a table for which he desires a matrix, and if a matrix for that table does not appear in the printout, it will be necessary for him to prepare his own. It is possible to do this by copying our codings from the polity listings at the top of each paragraph, or from Appendix A, the Raw Characteristic Code Sheet, as the case may be. However, a much more efficient and accurate method would be to utilize the sorter and tabulator, two extremely simple data processing machines which require no previous experience. The analyst will also need a copy of our Raw Characteristic Deck. Both this and the Finished Characteristic Deck are planned in such a way as to make them maximally convenient to use. For example, each individual card is punched not only with its alphabetically ordered polity identification number but also with the name of that polity, so that listing is simple and error improbable.[22]

For the benefit of those readers who have not used the sorter and tabulator, an example will be given. Suppose that we wished to build Matrix 4 (page 46), which crosses "Role of Police in Politics" with "Per

[21] The loss from a table of polities on any of these three grounds will, of course, affect the Fisher value to an indeterminate degree.

[22] These decks are available at cost plus postage from the Carnegie Seminar, Department of Government, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. Please specify whether only the Raw Characteristic Deck or both Raw and Finished Decks are desired.

Capita Gross National Product." We first sort on Raw Column 55, and the sorter deposits 66 cards into the "A" pocket and 35 cards into the "B" pocket. (It also drops 12 cards into the "5" pocket, and 2 into the "6" pocket.) The 66 cards represent the 66 polities where the role of the police is politically significant, and the 35 cards represent the polities where it is not. (The 12 cards in the "5" pocket are residual because "unascertained," and the 2 cards in the "6" pocket are residual because "unascertainable.") We now sort the 66 cards on Raw Column 9, and the sorter will deposit 4 cards in the "B" pocket, 10 cards in the "G" pocket, 15 cards in the "H" pocket, and 37 cards in the "I" pocket. A similar operation is now performed for the 35 cards that represent polities where the role of the police is not politically significant. The A, B, G, H, and I pockets will contain 11, 9, 6, 2, and 7 cards, respectively. This makes a total of 9 small decks. Each of these is now listed on the tabulator, and copied off onto squared paper in matrix form.

ADDITIONAL ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES

As has been pointed out, the Pattern Search Technique employs characteristics in dichotomous form because this simplifies the analysis and hence helps to "trigger off" in the mind of the reader a new insight or hypothesis. To follow up such an insight, it is necessary to move once again to the polychotomous raw characteristics, as they afford a more comprehensive view of the inter-relations between the variables under study. In addition to the simple building of matrices as already described, there are numerous techniques of data manipulation and of measurement that might be employed. A few illustrative examples follow.

OTHER MEASURES OF CORRELATION

Multiple and partial correlation matrices could be constructed, using various measures of correlation. The raw characteristics used might be nominal, ordinal, or a mixture of the two.[23]

CLUSTER ANALYSIS

Polities can be clustered in such a way that a polity falling into a given cluster possesses more attributes in common with other polities in that cluster than with polities in any other cluster. This kind of analysis can also be used to produce clusters of attributes.[24]

[23] See, in this regard, Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences.* McGraw-Hill, 1956; and John E. Walsh, *Handbook of Nonparametric Statistics.* D. Van Nostrand, 1962.

[24] See C. Radhakrishna Rao, *Advanced Statistical Methods in Biometric Research.* John Wiley & Sons, 1952.

SCALING

Raw attributes can possibly be converted into an ordinal scale by means of such techniques as the Guttman Scale. If a number of carefully chosen attributes can be successfully scaled in accordance with Guttman's criteria, the result could be the establishment of one or more fairly general profiles of political evolution. Such profiles would be especially interesting if they contained, in addition to political attributes, at least a few "environmental" attributes from the economic, demographic, and cultural realms.[25]

RECONVERTING DATA TO INTERVAL FORM

A number of our ordinal raw characteristics are derived from interval data, as for example, per capita gross national product. Under some circumstances, it would be well to reconvert such data to interval form. This would afford opportunities for correlational and regression analysis.[26]

A PARTIAL TEST OF THE MEANINGFULNESS OF THE FINDINGS

We are convinced that the degree of meaningfulness of most of the paragraphs in the printout is reasonably high. The primary ground for this conviction is that there is a reassuringly high degree of internal consistency among the statements appearing in almost every paragraph. We decided, nonetheless, to subject our technique and findings to a partial test of meaningfulness.

We asked ourselves the question: "How sure can we be that the co-occurrences stated in the printout are not simply the consequence of chance?" To answer this question, we set up five nonsense variables which appear as Paragraphs 195 to 199. These are the "whiskers" characteristics, which straight-facedly tell us what color whiskers are worn, or are not worn, by particular polities. Paragraph 195 contrasts "Polities that belong to the fifty percent that have purple whiskers" with the "fifty percent that do not have purple whiskers." Paragraph 196 contrasts the "forty percent that have blue whiskers" with the "sixty percent that do not have blue whiskers," and so forth. To determine which fifty percent of the 115 polities were to be regarded as sporting purple whiskers, we simply consulted a table of random numbers. We did the same, independently, with each other "whiskers" characteristic. To gain some

[25] For a suggestive discussion of the use of Guttman scaling as a means of establishing sequences of evolutionary development, see Robert L. Carneiro, "Scale Analysis as an Instrument for the Study of Cultural Evolution," *Southwest Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 18, 1962, pp. 149–169.

[26] For a discussion of techniques for dealing with an interval and an ordinal variable, or with an interval and a nominal variable, see Robert M. Elashoff, *Multivariate Two-Sample Problems with Discrete and Continuous Variables*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1963.

idea of the quantity and nature of the statements that result from these purely chance co-occurrences, the reader may glance at the paragraphs in question. In doing so, it would be well to keep in mind that the present technique can be applied to a random sample of objects, as distinct from a whole universe of objects as in the present survey.

Our a *priori* expectation was that the average "whiskers" paragraph would contain about 25 predicate-pairs, that is, about 15 percent of the total number of potential predicate-pairs that theoretically could appear under a particular paragraph.[27] We also expected that about one-third, or 8, of these predicate-pairs would contain the verb "tend," that there would be another 8 containing the verb "lean," and 8 containing the verb "tilt."[28]

The actual results are somewhat different from the above-mentioned expectations. None of the five "whiskers" paragraphs yields as many as 25 predicate-pairs, although Paragraphs 197 and 199 come close. The mean number of "tends" in the five paragraphs is 6.2, rather than the expected 8.2 The mean number of "leans" is only 4.2, as against the expected 8.2. And the mean number of "tilts" is 5.4, again well short of 8.2. The reason for this "conservative" discrepancy has to do with the manner in which the Fisher calculation was made. Following the procedure suggested by Armsen, this calculation is characterized by a significance level smaller than the nominal level. (See pages 29–30.) This "conservative" discrepancy should, if anything, increase the credibility of the entire survey.

The small number of predicate-pairs appearing in the nonsense paragraphs is in striking contrast to the large average number appearing in the meaningful paragraphs.[29] The median number of statements appearing in the 125 paragraphs is 70. This is almost three times the number that would be expected by chance, and is over 40 percent of the total number, 165, of statements that are theoretically possible. The number of statements ranges from 110 in Paragraphs 30 and 116 down to 7 in Paragraph 150. The semi-interquartile range is from 92 down to 49.

It should be pointed out that our decision to retain or discard a particular paragraph after examining the printout from a preliminary run was not governed primarily by the *number* of predicate-pairs appearing therein, but rather by whether these predicate-pairs revealed information which we considered interesting. In the present printout we have, indeed,

[27] There are 194 finished characteristics. Of these, 29 are "subject-only" characteristics, and hence could not appear as predicates. The remaining 165 finished characteristics could theoretically appear as predicate-pairs in a particular paragraph. Fifteen percent of 165 equals 24.75.

[28] Predicates containing the verb-phrase "always are" were counted as if they were "tends," "leans," or "tilts," depending on their Fisher values.

[29] While there are 194 meaningful finished characteristics, it will be remembered that 69 of these are run as "predicate-only," and hence do not serve as subject-pairs of paragraphs. Of the remaining 125 paragraphs, 29 are those in which the subject characteristic is run as "subject-only," while in the remaining 96 cases the characteristic is run as "both subject and predicate."

retained some paragraphs where the number of predicate-pairs is small, precisely *because* we believe that the *paucity* of such predicate-pairs is an interesting fact in itself.[30] Paragraph 150, for example, brings out the point that it makes little difference, in terms of the present survey, whether a polity is of the "Latin Liberal Conservative" type or of the "Latin Social Revolutionary" type. We might add that none of the figures just given include those predicate-pairs that were hand-winnowed out of the print-out on grounds of redundance.

Aside from the question of the quantity of predicate-pairs appearing in the nonsense paragraphs, as contrasted with the meaningful paragraphs, there is the question of the quality and internal consistency of the statements appearing in each of the two kinds of paragraph. In the case of the meaningful paragraphs, large numbers of redundant predicate-pairs were hand-winnowed out, as is immediately clear from a glance at Appendix C.[31] This can be taken to mean that there is a considerable degree of consistency in the meaningful paragraphs. By contrast, in all of the five "whiskers" paragraphs, it was necessary to remove only one quasi-redundant predicate-pair.

As one glances through the whiskers paragraphs, it becomes readily evident that their internal consistency is generally low. When it does happen that a nonsense paragraph reveals a fair degree of internal consistency, an explanation is usually readily apparent. Paragraph 199 is an example. Here, through the workings of chance, it turns out that 7 of the 12 polities with yellow whiskers are new nations located in Central Africa. It should come as no surprise that, given such a distribution, the statements in Paragraph 199 are not only fairly numerous but reveal a fair degree of internal consistency.[32]

[30] These include eight paragraphs where the number of predicate-pairs is lower than the 24.75 that would be expected on the basis of chance alone, namely, Paragraphs 7, 12, 16, 88, 103, 150, 151, and 191.

[31] In this Appendix, both "pure" redundant and "quasi"-redundant removals are identified by the symbol "RD." However, the great majority of these are quasi-redundant.

[32] In only one instance does a "whiskers" finished attribute co-occur with another such attribute. If we had permitted "whiskers" predicates to appear in the final printout, Statements 197/199 and 199/197 would have appeared. These would have revealed that green-whiskered polities tilt more toward being non-yellow, and that yellow-whiskered polities tilt more toward being non-green, respectively.

3. The Raw and Finished Characteristics

THE format of this chapter is quite simple. Each of the 57 raw characteristics, with its subsumed raw attributes, is presented in serial order, accompanied by a brief commentary on coding procedures and problems. Immediately following the commentary are listed the finished characteristics derived from the raw characteristics. For the sake of convenience, the following abbreviations are used:

Pol = Polities
rt = rather than
v = as contrasted with
AO = all others
CONV = converse
[SO] = Subject Only
[PO] = Predicate Only

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1. AREAL GROUPING

A. Australasia [2]
B. Caribbean [5]
G. Central America [7]
H. Central and South Africa [28]
I. East Asia [5]
J. East Europe [9]
K. Middle East [11]
P. North Africa [5]
Q. North America [2]
R. Scandinavia [5]
S. South America [10]
X. South Asia [4]
Y. Southeast Asia [9]
Z. West Europe [13]

n = 115

Areal grouping proved to be one of the most discriminating characteristics employed in this study, much more so, in fact, than we had originally anticipated.

The raw characteristic breakdown adheres, insofar as possible, to generally accepted geographic criteria. Some readers will object to the inclusion of Mexico and Panama in "Central America," but with some hesitation we retain this expression rather than the less familiar "Middle America." More serious difficulties concern delimitation of the Middle East and North Africa, respectively. As Dankwart A. Rustow has pointed out,[1] there are "minimal" and "maximal" definitions of the Middle East. The "maximal" definition sometimes embraces all of North Africa, together with portions of the Balkans and Southwest Asia. We incline toward the "minimal" view and take the Middle East to include Afghanistan, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Sa'udi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen. We have restricted our definition of North Africa to the five Mediterranean states: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic (Egypt). A case can admittedly be made for the inclusion of Sudan, but the criteria employed might just as easily require the inclusion of Mauritania and perhaps Mali, Niger, and Chad. Somewhat arbitrarily, we have included all five states in "Central and South Africa." We have included the Malagasy Republic in Central and South Africa with full awareness that it does not, strictly speaking, consider itself an "African" state. In distinguishing between East and West Europe, we have adhered to the boundary established by the Cold War, though this differs significantly from our demarcation of the "traditional West" in Raw Characteristic 20.

In the preparation of finished characteristics, it was necessary to combine certain areas into larger groupings so as to avoid both self-obvious and statistically unimportant results.[2] In one such case, the larger grouping is not defined in strictly contiguous terms, namely, West Europe, Scandinavia, North America, and Australasia.

FC 1. Pol located in East Europe (9) v AO (106) [SO]
FC 2. Pol located in West Europe, Scandinavia, North America, or Australasia (22) v AO (93)
FC 3. Pol located in West Europe (13) v AO (102)
FC 4. Pol located in Scandinavia (5) v AO (110) [SO]
FC 5. Pol located in Scandinavia or West Europe, rt in East Europe (18) v CONV (9)
FC 6. Pol located in the Caribbean, Central America, or South America (22) v AO (93)

[1] Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Politics of the Near East," in *PDA*, pp. 369 ff.

[2] South Asia v AO and East Asia v AO were employed as finished characteristics in an earlier computer run. The first did not yield results markedly at variance with those of Asia as a whole. The latter produced few statements of any interest, apparently because of the extreme diversity among the relatively few countries involved.

FC 7. Pol located in Central America, rt in South America (7) v CONV (10)
FC 8. Pol located in East Asia, South Asia, or Southeast Asia (18) v AO (97)
FC 9. Pol located in Southeast Asia (9) v AO (106)
FC 10. Pol located in North Africa, or Central and South Africa (33) v AO (82)
FC 11. Pol located in Central and South Africa (28) v AO (87)
FC 12. Pol located in North Africa (5) v AO (110) [SO]
FC 13. Pol located in North Africa or the Middle East (16) v AO (99)
FC 14. Pol located in the Middle East (11) v AO (104)
FC 15. Pol located in the Middle East, rt in North Africa, or Central and South Africa (11) v CONV (33)
FC 16. Pol located in the Middle East, rt in East Asia, South Asia, or Southeast Asia (11) v CONV (18)
FC 17. Pol located in the Middle East, rt in the Caribbean, Central America, or South America (11) v CONV (22)
FC 18. Pol located in North Africa or Central and South Africa, rt in East Asia, South Asia, or Southeast Asia (33) v CONV (18)
FC 19. Pol located in North Africa or Central and South Africa, rt in the Caribbean, Central America, or South America (33) v CONV (22)
FC 20. Pol located in East Asia, South Asia, or Southeast Asia, rt in the Caribbean, Central America, or South America (18) v CONV (22)

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2. SIZE

A. Very large (2 million sq. mi. & above) [6]
B. Large (300,000–1.9 million sq. mi.) [26]
G. Medium (75,000–299,000 sq. mi.) [36]
H. Small (below 75,000 sq. mi.) [47]

n = 115

This raw characteristic, like a number to follow, is an ordinal characteristic derived from an "interval" continuum. Our first step was to arrange all the countries in precise order from the largest to smallest. We then proceeded to divide the continuum into an appropriate number of segments by establishing cutting points at places that seemed most satisfactory in terms of our research objectives.

In deciding on a procedure by which to establish the cutting points, we considered and rejected two arbitrary procedures. One would have been to space the cutting points at equal intervals in terms of numbers of square miles. The other would have been to space them so that each segment would contain an equal number of countries.

The procedure we actually followed was somewhat more complex. It contains an admittedly "intuitive" element, but has yielded results that appear to be analytically fruitful. We examined the list of countries for gaps or breaks in the continuum, so as to decide whether segmentation on the basis of two, three, or four cutting points would be most "natural." Three such intervals readily appeared, sufficiently near the 75,000, 300,000, and 2,000,000 sq. mi. levels to permit our using these as our cutting points in the construction of a four-attribute characteristic. The resulting distribution is "pyramidal" in shape. United Nations figures were used,[3] with conversion from square kilometers to square miles and rounding to the nearest 1000.

Of the finished characteristics tested during the first computer run, only two were retained. Those based on extreme contrast and on adjacent contrast were found to be relatively unproductive and were discarded. The result is a modified use of the "moving cutting point" approach (page 45).[4]

FC 21. Pol whose territorial size is very large or large (32) v Pol whose territorial size is medium or small (83)

FC 22. Pol whose territorial size is very large, large, or medium (68) v Pol whose territorial size is small (47) [PO]

---

3. POPULATION

A. Very large (100 million & above) [4]
B. Large (17–99.9 million) [23]
G. Medium (6–16.9 million) [34]
H. Small (under 6 million) [54]

n = 115

Despite laudable efforts by the Statistical Office of the United Nations and other agencies, the reliability of basic census data for many countries, particularly the newer ones, ranges from the somewhat questionable to the highly suspect. The situation is complicated by the fact that in several countries—Lebanon and Nigeria, for example—even the *desirability* of an accurate census has, for reasons associated with problems of communal or ethnic representation, become a distinctly political issue. Other countries, for somewhat more obscure reasons, appear to have issued grossly inflated "official" figures. Ethiopia is perhaps the worst offender in this respect.

Our caveat having been entered, we make no apologies for having

[3] United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook: 1961*. New York, 1961. Hereafter cited as *SY: 1961*.

[4] Very large v Large, medium, or small was not used because of the limited number of "Very large" countries.

employed the latest available UN data.[5] These are, in virtually all instances, estimated or provisional data for the years 1960, 1961, or 1962. We have used P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan's figure of 15 million (as contrasted with the official 20 million) for Ethiopia.[6] Figures for Burundi and Rwanda were calculated from density figures provided by the 1961 *Report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi.*[7]

Cutting points for the present raw characteristic were established in the same manner as were those for territorial size. The finished characteristics derived from RC 3 are structurally similar to those for RC 2.

FC 23. Pol whose population is very large or large (27) v Pol whose population is medium or small (88)
FC 24. Pol whose population is very large, large, or medium (61) v Pol whose population is small (54) [PO]

---

4. POPULATION DENSITY

A. Very high (600/sq. mi. & above) [4]
B. High (300–599/sq. mi.) [13]
G. Medium (100–299/sq. mi) [31]
H. Low (below 100/sq. mi.) [67]

n = 115

Population density varies from a scant 2 persons per square mile in Libya, Mauritania, and Mongolia to a teeming 903 in the Netherlands. Belgium, with 769, remains the second most densely populated country, but it is of interest to note that South Korea, rather than Japan, now ranks third with 687.

It need hardly be pointed out that density figures can often be quite deceptive. India, with 375 per square mile, actually has a far greater "population problem" than does the German Federal Republic with 590. However else they may differ, both France and the Philippines, with densities of 217 and 252, respectively, could easily support higher populations, while Israel, with 280, could do so only with difficulty. Indeed, while the "population explosion" is a frightening reality for many countries, *under-population* is almost as great a problem for others. Again, however, caution is in order. Jordan has a relatively low population density of 46 per square

[5] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, "Population and Vital Statistics Report: Data Available as of 1 July 1962," *Statistical Papers, Series A,* Vol. XIV, No. 3.

[6] P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries," *The Review of Economics and Statistics,* Vol. XLIII, No. 2, May 1961.

[7] United Nations, General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, "Report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi," *Annexes, Addendum to Agenda Item 49,* Document A/4994, 30 November 1961.

mile, but, as George L. Harris has pointed out, "since . . . the area under cultivation is considerably under 2,000 square miles (4.8 percent of the total), the density of the planted area [is] about 780 persons per square mile—a high density for an agrarian country."[8] A far more extreme case is that of Egypt, with a gross population density of 69, but with nearly 2,000 persons per square mile of arable area.[9]

Cutting points for the present raw characteristic were established in the same manner as were those for size and population. In the case of the finished characteristics, two were retained from the first computer run, while one new (and rather unusual) characteristic was added. Very little is usually gained by constrasting the median component of an ordinal series with *both* extremes. But in examining the first-run printout it became apparent that in some respects polities with high and low population densities had more in common than did either extreme group with those of medium density. For this reason, we added Medium v Very high, high, or low to the present group of finished characteristics.

FC 25. Pol whose population density is very high or high (17) v Pol whose population density is medium or low (98) [PO]
FC 26. Pol whose population density is very high, high, or medium (48) v Pol whose population density is low (67)
FC 27. Pol whose population density is medium (31) v Pol whose population density is very high, high, or low (84) [SO]

---

5. POPULATION GROWTH RATE

A. High (2% or above) [62]
B. Low (less than 2%) [48]

n = 110
punch 5 = 5

The sophistication of any ordinal segmentation must depend, in part, upon the reliability of its supporting data, and perhaps the least reliable of current demographic data are those dealing with population growth rates. For this reason, we have confined ourselves here to a simple high-low schema, using 2 percent as our cutting point.

Two sets of data have been collated for this characteristic: the latest available "official" United Nations figures[10] and a somewhat shorter list

[8] George L. Harris, *Jordan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture*. Human Relations Area Files Press, 1958, p. 23. Harris has a gross population density for Jordan of 39 per square mile, but the figure is based on a 1956 population estimate.

[9] The exact figure is 1969, based on the 1961 population estimate of 26,578,000 and an arable area estimate of 13,500 sq. mi.

[10] *SY: 1961*.

for the "underdeveloped" countries compiled by Rosenstein-Rodan.[11] In general, Rosenstein-Rodan's data are regarded as the more accurate and were relied upon in most doubtful cases, except for Ghana and Togo, which were coded as unascertained (punch 5). Neither list contained data for Ethiopia, North Korea, or the USSR.

On the basis of United Nations figures, three countries (East Germany, Ireland, and North Vietnam) would appear to have net declining populations, the rates being —0.7 percent, —0.6 percent, and —0.2 percent respectively.

FC 28. Pol whose population growth rate is high (62) v Pol whose population growth rate is low (48)

---

6. URBANIZATION

A. High (20% or more of population in cities of 20,000 or more and 12.5% or more of population in cities of 100,000 or more) [56]
B. Low (less than 20% of population in cities of 20,000 or more and less than 12.5% of population in cities of 100,000 or more) [49]

n = 105
punch 3 = 7
punch 5 = 3

There is no generally accepted formula for rating "degree of urbanization." United Nations urbanization studies usually consist of data supplied by member states, adorned with extensive footnotes attesting to the wide variety of criteria employed by the reporting governments.

The UN does, however, issue data periodically on percentage of population in cities of specified size, and we have keyed our urbanization characteristic to this material. Again, we have restricted ourselves to a simple high-low schema. We have based this schema on two criteria: (1) 20 percent or more of the population in cities of 20,000 or more *and* (2) 12.5 percent or more of the population in cities of 100,000 or more. Six polities (Malaya, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Trinidad, Republic of Vietnam) satisfy one of these criteria but not the other, and hence have been coded as ambiguous (punch 3). Costa Rica has also been coded as ambiguous because of apparent uncertainty concerning the boundaries of its single large city, San José.[12]

The UN has provided data on percentage of population in cities of

[11] Rosenstein-Rodan, *op. cit.*

[12] Iceland and Luxembourg, neither of which has cities as large as 100,000, have been coded as highly urbanized: 40.5 percent of Iceland's population of 179,000 is located in the capital, Reykjavik; 30.5 percent of Luxembourg's population of 316,000 is located in cities of 20,000 or more.

100,000 or more for 93 countries, and on percentage of population in cities of 20,000 or more for 74 countries.[13] For countries not included in either or both UN lists, individual computations were prepared from two separate sources: *The Statesman's Yearbook* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica World Atlas*. These computations were then collated and appropriate percentage estimates made. There were only three countries, all Communist, for which reasonably reliable data could not thus be assembled: China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

It should be observed that while urbanization (however defined) correlates to some extent in an *over-all* way with "economic development" and related variables, there are many *specific* exceptions. The capital of the relatively underpopulated Republic of Congo, Brazzaville, will shortly attain a population of 100,000, representing approximately 12.5 percent of the national total—thus satisfying one of our urbanization criteria. Jordan is already "urbanized" by our definition, with about 14 percent of its population dwelling in the capital city of Amman, and 20 percent in Amman and the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem combined. These illustrations would suggest that a clear distinction should be made between what economists have designated as "push" and "pull" factors, that is, between the character of the various forces *generating* urbanization. Until this is done, it will be difficult to reach conclusions concerning the economic significance of the phenomenon of urbanization in various of the underdeveloped countries.

FC 29. Pol where the degree of urbanization is high (56) v Pol where the degree of urbanization is low (49)

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7. AGRICULTURAL POPULATION

A. High (over 66%) [56]
B. Medium (34–66%) [33]
G. Low (16–33%) [17]
H. Very low (under 16%) [7]

n = 113
punch 5 = 2

The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations issues statistics periodically on world agricultural population, the most recent of which provide data for about 80 countries.[14] These data are subsumed under two time spans (1930–1944; 1945–1960) for each of two overlapping

[13] United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook: 1960*. New York, 1960. Hereafter cited as *DY:1960*.

[14] Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, *Production Yearbook: 1961*. Rome, 1962.

groups, "Agricultural Population" and "Population Engaged in Agricultural Occupations." The first, generally speaking, includes those engaged directly in agricultural pursuits, plus their dependents. The second provides indices of work force in agricultural occupations, including those engaged in processing agricultural commodities.

Our coding has been keyed to the "Agricultural Population" group. For a few countries we have had to rely on data provided by the *1950 World Census of Agriculture,*[15] and in some cases have had to extrapolate from the 1930–44 figures.

In the case of the following 20 countries, for which no precise figures are available, we have estimated that the agricultural population (including hunting, fishing, and forestry, where significant) constitutes at least 66 percent of the total: Burundi, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Bra), Dahomey, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Laos, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Upper Volta, Republic of Vietnam, and Yemen. No figures could be obtained, or appropriate estimates made, for Sa'udi Arabia and North Vietnam.

Two finished characteristics are provided. We did not dichotomize on the basis of High, medium, or low v Very low, since the seven polities in the latter category (Australia, Belgium, Canada, German Federal Republic, Israel, United Kingdom, United States) are, with the possible or partial exception of Israel, all members of the "developed West."

FC 30. Pol whose agricultural population is high (56) v Pol whose agricultural population is medium, low, or very low (57)
FC 31. Pol whose agricultural population is high or medium (90) v Pol whose agricultural population is low or very low (24) [PO]

---

8. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

A. Very high ($125 billion & above) [2]
B. High ($25–124.9 billion) [8]
G. Medium ($5–24.9 billion) [20]
H. Low ($1–4.9 billion) [32]
I. Very low (under $1 billion) [53]

n = 115

The United States and the USSR are the only two nations with Gross National Products exceeding $100 billion (515 for the US; 176 for the USSR). At the other extreme is Togo, with an estimated GNP for 1961 of $63 million.

[15] Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, *Report on the 1950 World Census of Agriculture*, Vol. I. Rome, 1955.

The greater part of the data for this characteristic is taken or calculated from Rosenstein-Rodan.[16] Figures for Australia, Austria, Iceland, and New Zealand were calculated from the *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics*.[17] Figures for Burundi and Rwanda, respectively, were each derived on the basis of 50 percent of the estimate for the former mandated territory of Ruanda-Urundi. Mongolia and 13 newly independent Central and West African states for which specific data could not be obtained were coded as "under $1 billion."

FC 32. Pol whose gross national product is very high or high (10) v Pol whose gross national product is medium, low, or very low (105) [PO]
FC 33. Pol whose gross national product is very high, high, or medium (30) v Pol whose gross national product is low or very low (85)
FC 34. Pol whose gross national product is very high, high, medium, or low (62) v Pol whose gross national product is very low (53) [PO]

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9. PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

A. Very high ($1200 & above) [11]
B. High ($600–1199) [13]
G. Medium ($300–599) [18]
H. Low ($150–299) [22]
I. Very low (under $150) [51]

n = 115

GNP per capita is, for many purposes, far from being the most useful per capita economic indicator. Ideally, "real" GNP per capita, per capita income, and "real" per capita income afford successively more meaningful indices of individual economic status. But unfortunately this holds in a manner almost inversely proportional to the reliability of the relevant data. For this reason we have confined ourselves to GNP per capita.

Our figures, again, are largely taken or calculated from Rosenstein-Rodan, with exceptions as noted in the commentary for RC 8.

FC 35. Pol whose per capita gross national product is very high or high (24) v Pol whose per capita gross national product is medium, low, or very low (91) [PO]
FC 36. Pol whose per capita gross national product is very high, high, or medium (42) v Pol whose per capita gross national product is low or very low (73)

[16] Rosenstein-Rodan, *op. cit.*
[17] United Nations, *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics: 1961*. New York, 1962.

FC 37. Pol whose per capita gross national product is very high, high, medium, or low (64) v Pol whose per capita gross national product is very low (51) [PO]

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10. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS

A. Very high (UN assessment of 10% or above) [2]
B. High (UN assessment of 1.50–9.99%) [8]
G. Medium (UN assessment of 0.25–1.49%) [27]
H. Low (UN assessment of 0.05–0.24%) [32]
I. Very low (minimum UN assessment of 0.04%) [39]

n = 108
punch 5 = 7

Although Article 17 of the United Nations Charter specifies only that "the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly," ability to pay has long been recognized as the principal criterion to be employed in determining the scale of assessments.[18] This being the case, it seemed reasonable to base a scale dealing with each polity's financial status on the UN assessment rates.[19]

Coding for four countries (German Federal Republic, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Republic of Vietnam) that are not members of the United Nations was possible on the basis of assessments for UN-affiliated agencies. Data could not be obtained for seven countries (Algeria, China, East Germany, Jamaica, North Korea, Trinidad, North Vietnam) that are not members of the UN or affiliated agencies, or for which assessments as members have not yet been announced. Burundi and Rwanda, for which data were also unobtainable, were coded as "Very low."

FC 38. Pol whose international financial status is very high or high (10) v Pol whose international financial status is medium, low, or very low (103) [PO]
FC 39. Pol whose international financial status is very high, high, or medium (38) v Pol whose international financial status is low or very low (76)

[18] Except that "in principle, the maximum contribution of any Member State to the ordinary expenses of the United Nations shall not exceed 30 percent of the total." [United Nations, Public Inquiries Unit, *United Nations Budget*, 9 February 1961, p. 2.] The United States assessment is currently 32.02 percent.

[19] United Nations, General Assembly, *Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations*, A/Res/1870 (XVI), 27 December 1961.
United Nations, General Assembly, *Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations*, A/Res/1870 (XVII), 27 December 1962.

FC 40. Pol whose international financial status is very high, high, medium, or low (71) v Pol whose international financial status is very low (39) [PO]

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11. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS

A. Developed (self-sustaining economic growth; GNP/capita over $600) [19]
B. Intermediate (sustained and near self-sustaining economic growth) [17]
G. Underdeveloped (reasonable prospect of attaining sustained economic growth by the mid-1970's) [17]
H. Very underdeveloped (little or no prospect of attaining sustained economic growth within the foreseeable future) [57]

n = 110
punch 3 = 5

In establishing cutting points for this raw characteristic, we rely primarily upon the distinction between "sustained" and "self-sustaining" growth. As Rosenstein-Rodan puts it, " 'economic factors' are a necessary, but not sufficient condition of sustained growth. . . . Important symptoms of sustained growth are, on the one hand, the ability to imitate and to absorb other countries' methods of production—frequently referred to as 'technological progress'—and, on the other hand, a differentiated structure of production and investment, notably including a minimum quantum and growth of industrial production."[20]

A nation that has attained a capacity for sustained growth is not necessarily lacking in foreign aid requirements. Indeed, an important aspect of sustained growth is usually the capacity to absorb more foreign aid more efficiently than would be possible for a relatively *less* developed economy. Only with self-sustaining growth does a nation ordinarily reach the stage where public foreign aid is no longer required; though normal capital imports may continue.[21]

We have characterized "developed" economic status as requiring self-sustaining growth, *in addition* to a GNP per capita of at least $600. A few countries (for example, Ireland, Venezuela) have GNP per capita rates in excess of $600, but do not otherwise qualify as fully developed. Other states (for example, Japan) have attained a level of self-sustaining growth but rank quite low in GNP per capita.

For a number of countries it is extremely difficult to estimate the

[20] Rosenstein-Rodan, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

impact of current political developments on the economy. Codings for countries currently experiencing internal difficulties of the sort faced by Argentina, Burma, and Ceylon must necessarily be regarded as highly tentative.

The developmental status of five countries (Costa Rica, Israel, Lebanon, Sa'udi Arabia, Venezuela) is coded as ambiguous. Costa Rica has a relatively high income level but little apparent growth potential, for which its current high rate of population increase is at least partly responsible. The present oil revenues of Sa'udi Arabia are impressive, but that country otherwise appears to have reached the limit of its developmental potential.

Libya (here coded as "underdeveloped") is an interesting case in that it has formally abandoned all reliance on direct foreign aid. There is, however, considerable question concerning Libya's future yield from petroleum investment.

FC 41. Pol whose economic developmental status is developed (19) v Pol whose economic developmental status is intermediate, underdeveloped, or very underdeveloped (94)

FC 42. Pol whose economic developmental status is developed or intermediate (36) v Pol whose economic developmental status is underdeveloped or very underdeveloped (76) [PO]

FC 43. Pol whose economic developmental status is developed, intermediate, or underdeveloped (55) v Pol whose economic developmental status is very underdeveloped (57)

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12. LITERACY RATE

A. High (90% or above) [25]
B. Medium (50–89%) [30]
G. Low (10–49%) [24]
H. Very low (under 10%) [26]

n = 105
punch 5 = 10

There is no universal consensus as to the precise minimal proficiency required before a person is considered "literate." An individual classified as "literate" by one nation's standards might well be designated as semi-literate or even as illiterate by those of another.

Another difficulty, quite apart from wide variation in the reliability of reported figures, concerns the age-group covered. Some countries report only on adult literacy (usually 15 years or older), while others report on all persons of school age or older. We have tried, wherever necessary, to weigh relevant data so as to yield estimates covering the latter group.

Our principal source for this characteristic has been United Nations data,[22] though we have not hesitated to depart therefrom in certain cases. For example, the UN *il*literacy rate for Ecuador of 44.2 percent seemed excessively low, even though the Amerindian jungle population was specifically excluded.

Ten polities (China, Guinea, North Korea, Lebanon, Liberia, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Syria, North Vietnam) are unascertained (punch 5) for this characteristic.

FC 44. Pol where the literacy rate is ninety percent or above (25) v Pol where the literacy rate is below ninety percent (90) [PO]
FC 45. Pol where the literacy rate is fifty percent or above (55) v Pol where the literacy rate is below fifty percent (54)
FC 46. Pol where the literacy rate is ten percent or above (84) v Pol where the literacy rate is below ten percent (26) [PO]
FC 47. Pol where the literacy rate is ninety percent or above, rt between fifty and ninety percent (25) v CONV (30) [PO]
FC 48. Pol where the literacy rate is between fifty and ninety percent, rt between ten and fifty percent (30) v CONV (24) [PO]
FC 49. Pol where the literacy rate is between ten and fifty percent, rt below ten percent (24) v CONV (26) [PO]

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13. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

A. Complete (no censorship or government control of either domestic press or foreign correspondents) [43]
B. Intermittent (occasional or selective censorship of either domestic press or foreign correspondents) [17]
G. Internally absent (strict domestic censorship; no restraint on foreign newsgathering, or selective cable-head censorship) [21]
H. Internally and externally absent (strict direct or indirect censorship or control, domestic and foreign) [16]

n = 97
punch 3 = 1
punch 5 = 13
punch 6 = 4

Criteria for designating specific degrees of press freedom are not easily established, and the foregoing is a rather crude attempt to combine elements of two different but related ordinal continua dealing with the

[22] *DY:1960.* A limited number of more recent figures are contained in UNESCO, General Conference, Twelfth Session, *World Campaign for Universal Literacy,* 12C/PRG/3, Paris, 1963. This source should, however, be used with extreme caution. It contains several typographical errors in addition to data that are, in part, suspect on other grounds.

frequency of restrictive action and the *scope* of such action, respectively.

Our principal sources have been the Associated Press year-end censorship reports for 1961[23] and 1962.[24] We have referred also to the 1959 study by the International Press Institute on censorship in authoritarian countries.[25]

The Associated Press identifies three major types of censorship as follows: "formal censorship involves blue-penciling or outright killing of stories that do not fit a government's pattern of propaganda. Then there is 'responsibility censorship,' which in some countries holds a threat of expulsion over correspondents who offend the regime.

"The most widespread sort of censorship is a withholding of information at the source. This often involves a lack of access to news sources, especially public officials.

"Even in the United States, complaints were heard in 1962 of 'management of news.' These were applied especially to officials who leaked information or parceled it out in a manner presumed to suit government objectives."[23]

Taking a somewhat narrower view than that of the Associated Press, we do not regard "managed news" as necessarily constituting censorship. We simply ask the question, "Is the reporter, newspaper, or news-gathering agency restrained, directly or indirectly, from filing or publishing legitimate news already in his or its possession?"

Of the thirteen countries for which information on freedom of the press was unascertained at the time of coding, nine are Central African and four are Central American. These two high residual concentrations should be borne in mind when drawing conclusions from Paragraphs 50, 51, and 52 in the printout.

The four countries coded as currently "unascertainable" for this characteristic are Ceylon, Iraq, Togo, and Yemen. The last three have recently undergone drastic changes of regime. In the case of Ceylon, no censorship was imposed in 1962, but a drastic censorship bill was before the legislature as of April, 1963.

Greece is coded as ambiguous (punch 3) in view of the fact that while no censorship, as such, is imposed, the only domestic news agency is government-owned.

FC 50. Pol where freedom of the press is complete (43) v Pol where freedom of the press is intermittent, internally absent, or internally and externally absent (56)

[23] Associated Press, "Annual Report on World-Wide Press Curbs," *New York Times*, January 7, 1962.

[24] Associated Press, "Annual Censorship Roundup," dated December 28, 1962 (copy provided by AP, New York).

[25] International Press Institute, *The Press in Authoritarian Countries*. Zurich, 1959.

FC 51. Pol where freedom of the press is complete or intermittent (60) v Pol where freedom of the press is internally absent, or internally and externally absent (37) [PO]

FC 52. Pol where freedom of the press is complete, intermittent, or internally absent (82) v Pol where freedom of the press is internally and externally absent (16) [PO]

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14. NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION PER 1000 POPULATION

A. High (300 & over) [14]
B. Medium (100–299) [23]
G. Low (10–99) [41]
H. Very low (below 10) [35]

n = 113
punch 5 = 2

In the communications realm, several kinds of data of varying comprehensiveness and reliability exist. The present raw characteristic could easily be supplemented by others dealing with such artifacts of modern life as cinema seats, radio receivers, and television sets. However, space limitations have compelled us to be selective. We have therefore confined ourselves to newspaper circulation as a universally applicable and representative communications variable, and as one for which reasonably adequate and reliable data are available.

Codings for 108 countries are based on current UN figures.[26] Of the seven countries for which figures are not available, five (Burundi, Gabon, Mauritania, Rwanda, Yemen) have been estimated to be in the "Very low" category. The remaining two (North Korea and North Vietnam) are coded as unascertained (punch 5).

FC 53. Pol where newspaper circulation is three hundred or more per thousand (14) v Pol where newspaper circulation is less than three hundred per thousand (101) [PO]

FC 54. Pol where newspaper circulation is one hundred or more per thousand (37) v Pol where newspaper circulation is less than one hundred per thousand (76)

FC 55. Pol where newspaper circulation is ten or more per thousand (78) v Pol where newspaper circulation is less than ten per thousand (35) [PO]

[26] *SY: 1961.*

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15. RELIGIOUS CONFIGURATION

A. Protestant [5]
B. Catholic [25]
G. East Orthodox [3]
H. Mixed Christian [13]
I. Hindu [1]
J. Buddhist [4]
K. Muslim [18]
P. Jewish [1]
Q. Mixed literate non-Christian [4]
R. Mixed: Christian, literate non-Christian [4]
S. Non-literate [1]
X. Mixed: Christian, non-literate [13]
Y. Mixed: literate non-Christian, non-literate [7]
Z. Mixed: Christian, literate non-Christian, non-literate [8]

n = 107
punch 3 = 2
punch 5 = 6

This typology is designed to afford approximate, yet meaningful, religious identification for each polity for which relevant information is presently available. In general, we have adhered to a rule of 80 to 85 percent predominance. This means, for example, that a polity coded as "Muslim" could have a non-Muslim religious minority of as much as 15 to 20 percent, but no greater. The lack of a more precise cutoff point is due to a lack of reliability in religious statistics generally.

A certain ethnocentrism must be conceded in that Christianity is divided into its leading components, while Islam and Buddhism are not. The schism between Sunni and Shi'i Muslim is undoubtedly as significant, for certain analytical purposes, as that between Catholic and Protestant Christian. Nor is a collateral distinction between Theravada and Mahayana Buddhist to be ignored. But limits had to be imposed on the number of attributes subsumed under any one raw characteristic.[27]

Some readers might question our coding Colombia and Mexico under (B), while assigning Ecuador and Guatemala to (X). We can only say that the Amerindian population in the first two countries appears to be far more thoroughly "Catholicized" than in the last two.

Some sources identify Nepal as being "predominantly Hindu." There appears, however, to be a high degree of syncretism between Hinduism and Buddhism in Nepal, and for this reason we have coded it under (Q).

South Korea and South Vietnam are coded as ambiguous (punch 3) in view of the unusually complex intermixture of literate and non-literate

[27] Ethiopia is coded under (Z), the Christian component being, of course, Coptic Christian. "Muslim" is here taken to include *all* Islamic sects including, for example, Ismailis in addition to Sunnis and Shi'is.

components in each case. There is also a question concerning the status of Confucianism as a *bona fide* religion in these two countries. Six polities (Burundi, China, North Korea, Rwanda, USSR, North Vietnam) are unascertained (punch 5) for this characteristic.

In establishing the following finished characteristics, we have not dichotomized on the basis of Protestant v AO, since the five predominantly Protestant countries are identical with the five Scandinavian countries, and the reader may refer to FC 4.

FC 56. Pol where the religion is predominantly literate (79) v Pol where the religion is predominantly or partly non-literate (31)
FC 57. Pol where the religion is Catholic (25) v AO (90)
FC 58. Pol where the religion is Muslim (18) v AO (97)
FC 59. Pol where the religion is mixed: Christian, non-literate (13) v AO (100) [SO]
FC 60. Pol where the religion is mixed: literate non-Christian, non-literate (7) v AO (103) [SO]
FC 61. Pol where the religion is mixed: Christian, literate non-Christian, non-literate (8) v AO (104) [SO]
FC 62. Pol where the religion is Protestant, rt Catholic (5) v CONV (25)
FC 63. Pol where the religion is predominantly some kind of Christian (46) v Pol where the religion is predominantly or partly other than Christian (68)
FC 64. Pol where the religion is Christian, rt Muslim (46) v CONV (18)
FC 65. Pol where the religion is Catholic, rt Muslim (25) v CONV (18) [PO]

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16. RELIGIOUS HOMOGENEITY

A. Homogeneous (A, B, G, I, J, K, or P, above) [57]
B. Heterogeneous (H, Q, R, X, Y, or Z, above [49]

n = 106
punch 3 = 3
punch 5 = 6

In coding for this characteristic, attribute (S) of RC 15 is regarded as ambiguous (punch 3).

FC 66. Pol that are religiously homogeneous (57) v Pol that are religiously heterogeneous (49)

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17. RACIAL HOMOGENEITY

A. Homogeneous (90% or more of one race) [82]
B. Heterogeneous (less than 90% of one race) [27]

n = 109
punch 3 = 4
punch 5 = 2

The essential question we ask here is: "In a particular polity, do people generally look alike, in a racial sense, or not?" In coding for this raw characteristic, we confine ourselves to the three most populous racial stocks recognized by most anthropologists: Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid.[28] Where 90 percent or more of a particular polity's population belong to only one of these three major stocks, we code that polity as "homogeneous." Otherwise, we code the polity as "heterogeneous."

It should be emphasized that we refrain from asking "racist" questions, such as which race has "superior" polity-building abilities. Thus, we have no finished characteristic that contrasts "Caucasoid polities" with "Negroid polities," or the like. We simply contrast "homogeneous" polities with "heterogeneous" polities, because it seems clear that, generally speaking, racial heterogeneity often accompanies political divisiveness.

Chile, the Malagasy Republic, Nepal, and Paraguay are coded as ambiguous (punch 3). The people of the Malagasy Republic appear to be, for all practical purposes, of a single mixed stock of Negroid and Mongoloid. The other three are apparently ambiguous in a similar sense, the mixed stocks being of Mongoloid and Caucasoid composition.

We have coded Sa'udi Arabia and Yemen as unascertained (punch 5). There are many coastal and urban Negroes in both countries, but we are unable to estimate whether they constitute as much as 10 percent of the total population, partly because the governments concerned have discouraged research in such matters.

FC 67. Pol that are racially homogeneous (82) v Pol that are racially heterogeneous (27)

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18. LINGUISTIC HOMOGENEITY

A. Homogeneous (majority of 85% or more; no significant single minority) [52]
B. Weakly heterogeneous (majority of 85% or more; significant minority of 15% or less) [12]

[28] The Bushmanoid and Pygmoid races are not sufficiently numerous or concentrated to warrant their consideration here.

G. Strongly heterogeneous (no single group of 85% or more) [50]

n = 114
punch 3 = 1

In setting up this characteristic, our central question was: "Are people in a particular country culturally homogeneous or culturally fragmented?" We employ the criterion of language as a convenient index. For each country we have estimated the adult population that speaks each of that country's languages as a *native* tongue. A "native" speaker is defined as a person who has learned the language in childhood or adolescence as an integral part of his over-all enculturation. Thus, for example, a language learned in an elementary or secondary schoolroom but not used "naturally" outside the school by the person as he was growing up would not be considered a language "native" to that person. It is, of course, recognized that some persons might grow up speaking more than one language natively or near-natively. This might take either of two principal forms: (1) diglossia, as found, for example, in Haiti or Sa'udi Arabia; and (2) bilingualism, as found, for example, in Paraguay and among many Sino-Thai persons in Thailand.

In dealing with the vexing question of defining a language, we follow Ferguson and Gumperz: "A language consists of all varieties (whether only a single variety or an indefinitely large number of them) which share a single superposed variety (such as a literary standard) having substantial similarity in phonology and grammar with the included varieties or which are either mutually intelligible or are connected by a series of mutually intelligible varieties."[29]

We have coded a particular country as linguistically "homogeneous" in cases where an estimated 85 percent of the adult population are native speakers of a common language, and where there is no other significant language present. We have coded a country as "weakly heterogeneous" where at least an estimated 85 percent of the adults are native speakers of a common language, but where another significant language is also present. Finally, we have coded as "strongly heterogeneous" those countries where no single language is spoken as a native tongue by as many as 85 percent of the adult population.

Linguistic census data often reveal large gaps. Even where gaps are no problem, the available material usually gives numbers of persons who speak a given language, which can often be quite different from the numbers of persons who learned that language natively in childhood or adolescence. For these reasons, coding for this raw characteristic has been difficult. The most difficult decisions involved cases on the borderline between "homogeneous" and "weakly heterogeneous." Here, the decision hinged on whether to regard any one minority language as

[29] Charles A. Ferguson and John J. Gumperz, "Linguistic Diversity in South Asia," *International Journal of American Linguistics*, Vol. 26, No. 3, July 1960, p. 5.

"significant." Illustrative of our coding problem were our decisions to regard as significant the Turkish language in Bulgaria, English in Panama (not counting U. S. citizens in the Canal Zone), Basque in Spain, and Chinese and Khmer in South Vietnam.

Occasionally there were also difficult borderline decisions between the "weakly heterogeneous" and the "strongly heterogeneous" categories. Illustrative of these difficulties were our decisions to place Algeria, Ecuador, and Iraq in the "strongly heterogeneous" category, because the following languages appeared respectively to comprise a larger than 15 percent minority: Berber, Quechua, and Kurdish.

It would, of course, be desirable to code additionally on the basis of a variety of non-linguistic aspects of culture. However, the cost of such a procedure would be prohibitive. In selecting language as a manageable index, yet one that is reasonably reliable and valid, we are in accord with common practice among ethnologists.

We are aware of the limitations on the validity of this technique. There are deviant cases where the linguistic situation is not an adequately valid index of the total cultural situation. The four "native" languages of Switzerland and the two found in Belgium might suggest to some persons a somewhat greater cultural fragmentation than actually exists. On the other hand, the single "native" language of the United States might obscure, to some observers, the very real cultural or subcultural fragmentation that exists in this country as a result of the "separate caste" structure of the Negro community. However, it should not be overlooked that one reason why the Swiss and Belgians are somewhat more socially cohesive than their linguistic situation might suggest is that they have had relatively long periods of time in which to learn to live together, despite ethnolinguistic differences. Consult, in this regard, RC 19, dealing with the date of independence of each polity. Another reason in the case of Belgium is that persons who profess any religion at all are overwhelmingly of the Catholic faith. Consult here RC 15, dealing with religion. Similarly, in connection with the example of the United States, it should be noted that we have introduced (RC 17) the variable of racial homogeneity. In short, we recognize that the linguistic variable will carry only so much analytical weight, after which it, like all the other characteristics that we have introduced, begins to lose strength.

Following the two finished characteristics dealing with linguistic homogeneity, we have added a composite finished characteristic covering the full range of religious, racial, and linguistic homogeneity.

FC 68. Pol that are linguistically homogeneous (52) v Pol that are linguistically weakly heterogeneous or strongly heterogeneous (62)

FC 69. Pol that are linguistically homogeneous or weakly heterogeneous (64) v Pol that are linguistically strongly heterogeneous (50) [PO]
FC 70. Pol that are religiously, racially, and linguistically homogeneous (21) v Pol that are religiously, racially, or linguistically heterogeneous (85)

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19. DATE OF INDEPENDENCE

A. Before nineteenth century [21]
B. 1800–1913 [31]
G. 1914–1945 [13]
H. After 1945 [46]

n = 111
punch 3 = 4

Cutting points for a time-continuum dealing with a polity's date of independence were dictated primarily by events in Latin America during the nineteenth century and by the impact of the two major wars of this century.

For states once autonomous but later subjugated (for example, Poland), the date of modern independence has been used. German, Italian, and Japanese aggrandizement during the period 1930–1945 has been disregarded.

For original members of the British Commonwealth, the date used is that of the acquisition of dominion status. In the case of Norway, union with Denmark (1381–1814) and with Sweden (1814–1905) is disregarded. Also disregarded is the British "residency" in Nepal, 1816–1846.

The two Germanies and the two Koreas are considered ambiguous (punch 3).

FC 71. Pol whose date of independence is before 1800 (21) v Pol whose date of independence is after 1800 (90)
FC 72. Pol whose date of independence is before 1914 (52) v Pol whose date of independence is after 1914 (59)
FC 73. Pol whose date of independence is before 1945 (65) v Pol whose date of independence is after 1945 (46)

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20. WESTERNIZATION

A. Historically Western nation [26]
B. Significantly Westernized (no colonial relationship) [7]
G. Significantly Westernized (colonial relationship) [28]

H. Partially Westernized (no colonial relationship) [8]
I. Partially Westernized (colonial relationship) [41]
J. Non-Westernized (no colonial relationship; little or no visible Westernization) [2]

n = 112
punch 3 = 2
punch 6 = 1

For this characteristic, the demarcation of the "historic West" on the European continent is based on the limits of the Ottoman Empire, with the exception that Greece is considered Western. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland are thus regarded as historically Western; Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia are not.

Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States are included in A; the former Latin American colonies of Spain and Portugal are included in G or I.

Israel and South Africa have been coded as ambiguous (punch 3). Israel was so coded because the greater part of its population immigrated after the Palestinian mandate had been lifted, and such immigrants came from a wide variety of Western and non-Western areas. South Africa was considered ambiguous because of the mixed character of its population and the separateness of its social institutions. Yemen has been coded as unascertainable (punch 6) under current conditions.

The present raw characteristic, like a number of others that follow, is of a hybrid character. Essentially typological in structure, it also exhibits an ordinal component. This has been taken into account in framing the finished characteristics.

FC 74. Pol that are historically Western (26) v AO (87)
FC 75. Pol that are historically Western or significantly Westernized (62) v AO (52)
FC 76. Pol that are historically Western, rt having been significantly or partially Westernized through a colonial relationship (26) v CONV (70) [PO]
FC 77. Pol that have been significantly Westernized, rt partially Westernized, through a colonial relationship (28) v CONV (41) [PO]
FC 78. Pol that have been significantly Westernized through a colonial relationship, rt without such a relationship (28) v CONV (7)

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21. FORMER COLONIAL RULER

A. Britain [24]
B. France [25]
G. Spain [18]

H. Other [8]

n = 75
punch 4 = 40

In establishing this raw characteristic, we have restricted ourselves to instances of Western colonialism, including mandates and protectorates. Polities with records of other kinds of dependency (for example, as components of the Ottoman Empire), or with no record of dependency, are excluded as irrelevant (punch 4).

In cases of successive dependency, the more recent is utilized for coding purposes. Thus, the Philippines is regarded as a former dependency of the United States, rather than of Spain.

We have coded Cameroun and Morocco under B and Somalia under H. In all three cases, substantially less than half of the present polity's territory was held by a second colonial power: the southern portion of former British Cameroons, Spanish Morocco, British Somaliland.

The eight polities in the "other" category were formerly dependencies of Belgium (Burundi, Congo [Leo], Rwanda), Italy (Libya, Somalia), the Netherlands (Indonesia), Portugal (Brazil), and the United States (Philippines).

In contrasting ex-British with ex-French dependencies, it is somewhat more meaningful if one concentrates on those countries that have become independent since 1914. Hence FC 80 is composite in nature.

It would perhaps have been equally desirable to have made FC 79 a composite characteristic with a cutoff point of, say, 1800. But the only country affected as a result would have been the United States.

FC 79. Pol that were formerly dependencies of Britain or France, rt Spain (49) v CONV (18)

FC 80. Pol whose date of independence is after 1914, and that were formerly dependencies of Britain, rt France (19) v Pol whose date of independence is after 1914, and that were formerly dependencies of France, rt Britain (24)

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22. POLITICAL MODERNIZATION: HISTORICAL TYPE

A. Early European or early European derived (early modernizing European society or offshoot) [11]

B. Later European or later European derived (later modernizing European society or offshoot) [40]

G. Non-European autochthonous (self-modernizing extra-European society) [9]

H. Developed tutelary (developed society modernizing under tutelage) [31]
I. Undeveloped tutelary (undeveloped society modernizing under tutelage) [24]

n = 115

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23. POLITICAL MODERNIZATION: PERIODIZATION

A. Advanced (transitional phase completed) [60]
B. Mid-transitional (entered transitional phase prior to 1945) [16]
G. Early transitional (entered transitional phase 1945 or later) [38]
H. Pre-transitional (not yet entered transitional phase) [1]

n = 115

These two raw characteristics are adapted, without substantial change, from current research by C. E. Black on political modernization.[30] Black's material is particularly useful because it focuses sharply on leadership as a factor in modernization. In establishing his historical typology, Black is interested in "the characteristic problems that modernizing leaders have faced in gaining political power and in implementing their programs." As regards periodization, he is concerned with "the principal phases in the transfer of political power from traditional to modernizing leaders."[31]

As Black puts it, "political leaders in the first societies to modernize had to find solution to their problems without the assistance of outside models, but they were favored by an essential continuity of political and territorial structure. The second type embraces those societies where the seizure of power by modernizing leaders involved a fundamental reorganization of political structure and of territory. In these cases the establishment of national identity was a predominant issue for several generations, relegating to a secondary place the intellectual, economic, and social aspects of modernization. The third type comprises those later-modernizing societies which, by virtue of a long tradition of effective central government, never came under the direct rule of more modern societies. In these societies the struggle between traditional and modernizing leaders took place within the established framework of territory and institutions, but under great pressure from the example of the more modern societies. The fourth and fifth types are those in which the

[30] C. E. Black, *Modernizing Societies: Typology and Periodization*, unpublished mimeograph draft, February 2, 1963. See also Black's earlier paper, *Political Modernization in Historical Perspective*, prepared for the Conference on Political Modernization sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council, Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., June 8–11, 1959. We are indebted to Professor Black for his courtesy in permitting this use of his material prior to its publication.

[31] *Modernizing Societies*, p. 1.

direct tutelage of a more modern society was the principal factor in political modernization. Where the traditional institutions of a society were well developed, modernization resulted from an interaction between these institutions and those of a tutelary society. Where the societies under tutelage did not have well-developed institutions, the influence of the tutelary society was correspondingly much greater."[32]

With respect to the overseas territories of the European colonial powers, Black distinguishes between "the 'offshoots' of metropolitan societies, and the other societies which came under their tutelage. Offshoots are those societies where immigrants from the metropolitan society form the majority or a dominant element of the population, bringing with them their traditional ideas and institutions. . . . In the case of the societies under tutelage, the influence of the tutelary society may be very great but it is the native ideas and institutions which remain the bases from which the modern society evolves."[33]

Black divides the modernization process into three phases. "The initial phase is that in which modern ideas first begin to have an impact on a traditional society, without as yet causing a profound upheaval."[34]

Black's "transitional phase" is "the phase of active struggle," consisting of "three essential features. . . . The first is the assertion on the part of political leaders of the determination to modernize. This assertion may take the form of a revolution by disaffected members of the traditional oligarchy, or by modernizing leaders representing new political interests. Occasionally the traditional oligarchy itself initiates the process. . . . The second feature is an effective and decisive break with the institutions associated with a predominantly agrarian way of life, permitting the transition to an industrial way of life. . . . Finally, the creation of a politically organized society in those cases where one did not exist in the initial phase is also essential."[35]

Black's "advanced phase" is that in which "all the principal groups of the elite are agreed that modernization is desirable, and the political struggle is now engaged between the supporters of rival programs of modernization rather than between modernizers and traditionalists. Whereas political struggles in the intermediate phase are concerned with a fundamental social revolution, they now (as in the initial phase) take the form rather of rebellions or *coups d'état*. Nationalism and liberalism, which were revolutionary forces in the intermediate phase . . . now become conservative forces in that their main purpose is to preserve the newly-won order."[36]

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 11–12.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

The first of Black's raw characteristics is essentially typological but also has an ordinal component. For this reason, A and B are collectively contrasted with H and I, while G is the only attribute contrasted with "all other." We have also provided the *adjacent* contrasts of A v B and H v I.

The periodization characteristic is essentially ordinal in nature, and this is reflected in the structure of the finished characteristics. We have excluded "pre-transitional" (Black's "initial phase"), since Sa'udi Arabia is the only independent polity covered by this attribute.

FC 81. Pol where the type of political modernization is early European or early European derived, rt later European or later European derived (11) v CONV (40)
FC 82. Pol where the type of political modernization is early or later European or European derived, rt developed tutelary or undeveloped tutelary (51) v CONV (55)
FC 83. Pol where the type of political modernization is non-European autochthonous (9) v AO (106)
FC 84. Pol where the type of political modernization is developed tutelary, rt undeveloped tutelary (31) v CONV (24)
FC 85. Pol where the stage of political modernization is advanced, rt mid- or early transitional (60) v CONV (54)
FC 86. Pol where the stage of political modernization is advanced or mid-transitional, rt early transitional (76) v CONV (38)

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24. IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

A. Doctrinal [13]
B. Developmental [31]
G. Situational [5]
H. Conventional [33]
I. Traditional [5]

n = 87
punch 3 = 25
punch 6 = 3

It is exceedingly difficult to construct a workable ideological typology for coding polities on a global basis. Since only a totalitarian regime is capable of committing the nation as a whole to a single doctrine, it was necessary to establish the present raw characteristic on the basis of over-all "ideological orientation," with specific "doctrinal" commitment as only one of the five attributes.

Formal doctrine, however, is presently the major component of ideological orientation only for the Communist states. For this reason, we have

not established a separate finished characteristic, "doctrinal v AO," because the reader need simply consult FC 194 (Communist v Non-Communist).

"Developmental" seems to us to be a more meaningful attribute-class than the much broader category "nationalistic." All modern states exhibit some degree of nationalist fervor. *Not* all states, however, are equally committed to development as a national goal. Yet, as an inspection of the public utterances of virtually any leader of the "underdeveloped" world will quickly reveal, dedication to developmental objectives tends to transcend all other forms of ideological commitment.

A "situational" outlook necessarily entails a rejection of ideology. But the very negation of commitment involves an orientation *toward* ideology that is, we feel, distinctly relevant to the present characteristic.

The term "conventional" is taken from Leonard Binder's recent book on Iran.[37] Binder's highly stimulating schema of "traditional," "conventional," and "rational" system types could not be directly incorporated into the present study because of its "ideal-type" character. Relatively few polities can actually be *coded* on the basis of this trichotomy without the creation of an excessive number of composite or "hybrid" attribute classes.

Unlike Binder, we do not necessarily regard a conventional system as the equivalent of a "working constitutional democracy." Thus we regard South Africa, for example, as relying on more or less "conventionalized procedures for achieving the legitimization of new or changed power relationships,"[38] even though *access* to the conventions in question is effectively denied to a majority of the population.

Three polities (South Korea, Peru, Yemen) are coded as currently unascertainable (punch 6) for this characteristic. We have coded 25 polities as ambiguous (punch 3) on the ground that, in each instance, no single ideological orientation *clearly* predominates over all others. We regard Cuba, for example, as being "doctrinal-developmental"; India and Jamaica as being "developmental-conventional"; Cambodia, Libya, and Uganda as being "developmental-traditional"; and so forth.

FC 87. Pol whose ideological orientation is developmental (31) v AO (58)
FC 88. Pol whose ideological orientation is situational (5) v AO (95) [SO]
FC 89. Pol whose ideological orientation is conventional (33) v AO (62)
FC 90. Pol whose ideological orientation is traditional (5) v AO (102) [SO]

[37] Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society.* University of California Press, 1962, pp. 40, ff.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 41

FC 91. Pol whose ideological orientation is developmental, rt traditional (31) v CONV (5)

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25. SYSTEM STYLE

A. Mobilizational [20]
B. Limited mobilizational [12]
G. Non-mobilizational [78]

n = 110
punch 3 = 1
punch 6 = 4

In this raw characteristic we attempt to discriminate between those polities that have mobilized or partially mobilized their resources (human and otherwise) to meet what are perceived to be compelling problems of national urgency, and those that have not. It is, of course, important that "mobilization" be interpreted here in a *political,* rather than in a military sense. Communist nations are, by doctrine, committed to a mobilizational style, but are by no means the only nations so committed. It should also be noted that a "developmental" ideological commitment is by no means invariably supported by a "mobilizational" system style.

We have coded Spain, whose system style might be termed "decayed mobilizational," as ambiguous (punch 3).

South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, and Yemen have been coded as currently unascertainable (punch 6). Nepal may here appear to be in rather strange company, but recent events seem to suggest that efforts are being made to "mobilize" the socio-political structure of that Himalayan state, albeit along avowedly traditionalist lines.[39]

FC 92. Pol where the system style is mobilizational (20) v Pol where the system style is limited mobilizational, or non-mobilizational (93)
FC 93. Pol where the system style is mobilizational, or limited mobilizational (32) v Pol where the system style is non-mobilizational (78)

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[39] See, for example, the comments of Leo E. Rose in "The Himalayan Border States: 'Buffers' in Transition," *Asian Survey*, Vol. III, No. 2, February 1963.

26. CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF PRESENT REGIME

A. Constitutional (government conducted with reference to recognized constitutional norms) [51]
B. Authoritarian (no effective constitutional limitation, or fairly regular recourse to extra-constitutional powers. Arbitrary exercise of power confined largely to the political sector) [23]
G. Totalitarian (no effective constitutional limitation. Broad exercise of power by the regime in both political and social spheres) [16]

n = 90
punch 3 = 5
punch 5 = 11
punch 6 = 9

The more or less value-laden distinctions of Western political science between constitutional, authoritarian, and totalitarian regimes are premised on the ethical concept of the moral worth of the individual—a concept often located in somewhat uneasy juxtaposition with the principle of majority rule. Constitutionalism is, in part at least, regarded as a defense of individual rights. As a practical matter, the limits of these rights are established on a consensual basis as formalized by some variation of majoritarianism in which the vote of each citizen counts equally. The implicit paradox between "right" and "majoritarianism" is of ancient vintage and need not detain us. It is important to note, however, that in many nations of the contemporary world, the concept of individual rights, *per se*, tends to be downgraded, while the notion of consensus tends to be magnified—but without much emphasis on majoritarianism. This means that it is extremely difficult, particularly with respect to many of the new African states, to differentiate with any degree of confidence between "constitutional" and "authoritarian" regimes. This is one reason, among several, explaining the relatively high residual count for the present raw characteristic.

While Argentina, the Ivory Coast, and Haiti are here coded as ambiguous (punch 3), it should be pointed out that the first two are certainly not totalitarian, and that Haiti is certainly not constitutional.

FC 94. Pol where the status of the regime is constitutional (51) v Pol where the status of the regime is authoritarian or totalitarian (41)
FC 95. Pol where the status of the regime is constitutional or authoritarian (95) v Pol where the status of the regime is totalitarian (16)
FC 96. Pol where the status of the regime is constitutional or totalitarian (67) v Pol where the status of the regime is authoritarian (23)
FC 97. Pol where the status of the regime is authoritarian, rt totalitarian (23) v CONV (16)

27. GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY

A. Government generally stable since World War I or major inter-war constitutional change [22]
B. Government generally stable since World War II or major post-war constitutional change [28]
G. Government moderately stable since World War II or major post-war constitutional change [11]
H. Government unstable since World War II or major post-war constitutional change [22]

n = 83
punch 3 = 3
punch 6 = 29

There are no convenient rules of thumb for evaluating governmental stability. Instability is obviously present when a constitution is suspended or when an elected president is forcibly ousted from office. And yet major changes of this sort may have a purgative effect and be followed by periods of relative stability. Even more difficult to assess is the significance of frequent cabinet changes under a parliamentary system. The coder must rely primarily on his own judgment in determining the point at which cabinet changes become so frequent as to justify coding a particular polity as "unstable." This raw characteristic constitutes an illustration, par excellence, of the importance of the "relativistic" approach to coding (pages 8–9).

We have regarded differentiation between B and G as unascertainable (punch 6) when the major constitutional change in question occurred after 1 January 1959. This entails, of course, the disadvantage that most of the twenty-odd states (primarily African) that achieved independence after this date are excluded. The disadvantage is somewhat mitigated, however, in that those newly independent polities evidencing obvious *in*stability since independence are coded under H.

Haiti, Hungary, and Paraguay are coded as ambiguous (punch 3). Haiti has experienced no change of regime since the advent of President Duvalier in 1957, but the current situation could hardly be described as tranquil. Hungary is rendered ambiguous by the revolutionary events of 1956. Paraguay's apparent stability has been of a peculiarly enforced nature since the installation of General Stroessner's dictatorship in 1954.

FC 98. Pol where governmental stability is generally present and dates at least from the inter-war period (22) v Pol where governmental stability is generally or moderately present and dates from the post-war period, or is absent (93)
FC 99. Pol where governmental stability is generally present and dates from at least the inter-war period, or from the post-war period

(50) v Pol where governmental stability is moderately present and dates from the post-war period, or is absent (36)

FC 100. Pol where governmental stability is generally present and dates from at least the inter-war period, or is generally or moderately present, and dates from the post-war period (64) v Pol where governmental stability is absent (22)

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28. REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF CURRENT REGIME

A. Polyarchic (broadly representative system) [41]
B. Limited polyarchic (mass-sector representative or broadly oligarchic system) [8]
G. Pseudo-polyarchic (ineffective representative, or disguised oligarchic or autocratic system) [43]
H. Non-polyarchic (non-representative in form as well as content) [6]

n = 98
punch 3 = 7
punch 5 = 2
punch 6 = 8

"Limited polyarchic" is used here to include situations where a relatively broad-based, but nonetheless discriminatory, franchise prevails. This might take the form of a literacy requirement in a nation where illiteracy is widespread, as in the case of Brazil. Or it might take the form of racial or regional disqualification, and so on.

"Pseudo-polyarchic" includes polities where single-list elections prevail, or where elected representatives have only limited or consultative functions to perform.

Seven polities (Argentina, Cameroun, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda) are coded as ambiguous (punch 3). Lebanon has an ostensibly polyarchic system, but the communal distribution of seats has been "frozen" on the basis of the 1942 census, with no official census subsequent to that date. Nigeria and Uganda have mixed mass representative and oligarchic systems. Libya's government is only partially representative.

Burundi and Rwanda have been classified as unascertained (punch 5). Congo (Leo), Guatemala, Iraq, South Korea, Peru, Syria, Togo, and Yemen are regarded as unascertainable (punch 6) under present conditions.

FC 101. Pol where the representative character of the regime is polyarchic (41) v Pol where the representative character of the regime is limited polyarchic, pseudo-polyarchic, or non-polyarchic (57) [PO]

FC 102. Pol where the representative character of the regime is polyarchic or limited polyarchic (59) v Pol where the representative

character of the regime is pseudo-polyarchic or non-polyarchic (49) [PO]

FC 103. Pol where the representative character of the regime is pseudo-polyarchic, rt non-polyarchic (43) v CONV (6) [SO]

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29. CURRENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM

A. Competitive (no party ban, or ban on extremist or extra-constitutional parties only) [43]
B. Partially competitive (one party with 85% or more of legislative seats) [9]
G. Non-competitive (single-list voting or no elected opposition) [30]

n = 82
punch 3 = 11
punch 4 = 1
punch 6 = 21

Many of the newly independent African states that exhibited competitive or partially competitive electoral systems shortly after independence have recently been moving, at varying rates, toward the adoption of one-party or fusional single-list systems. Current practices vary all the way from the arresting of particular opposition leaders to the wholesale banning of opposition parties. In only a few African polities does there seem to be much doubt that this process will continue.

Of the countries classified as ambiguous for this characteristic, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Jordan, Laos, and Libya have only partially elected legislatures. Colombia, Cyprus, and Lebanon each have "parity" formulas for the distribution of legislative seats that act to limit the competitive principle, albeit in the avowed interest of more genuinely "representative" government.

FC 104. Pol where the electoral system is competitive, rt non-competitive (43) v CONV (30) [SO]

FC 105. Pol where the electoral system is competitive (43) v Pol where the electoral system is partially competitive or non-competitive (47) [PO]

FC 106. Pol where the electoral system is competitive or partially competitive (52) v Pol where the electoral system is non-competitive (30) [PO]

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30. FREEDOM OF GROUP OPPOSITION

A. Autonomous groups free to enter politics and able to oppose government (save for extremist groups, where banned) [46]
B. Autonomous groups free to organize in politics, but limited in capacity to oppose government (includes absorption of actual or potential opposition leadership into government) [18]
G. Autonomous groups tolerated informally and outside politics [24]
H. No genuinely autonomous groups tolerated [11]

n = 99
punch 3 = 3
punch 6 = 13

Virtually any restraint on political activity by opposition or potential opposition groups is likely to be justified by the government concerned as being "in the national interest." For this reason, it is often as difficult to distinguish "freedom" from "license" in the case of groups, as it is in the case of individuals. It is with some hesitancy, therefore, that we code a country such as Argentina, with its "Peronista" problem, as A for this characteristic. Other countries present similar difficulties. Guatemala, for example, is currently a nation of essentially "centrist" political groupings, both extremes of the political spectrum being more or less repressed.

Despite difficulties in coding, only three polities were regarded as genuinely ambiguous (punch 3) for this characteristic: Jordan, Laos, and South Africa. The regime in Jordan has since 1957 vacillated considerably with respect to the degree of freedom it has been willing to accord political groups, particularly political parties.

FC 107. Pol where autonomous groups are fully tolerated in politics (46) v Pol where autonomous groups are partially tolerated in politics, are tolerated only outside politics, or are not tolerated at all (65) [PO]
FC 108. Pol where autonomous groups are fully or partially tolerated in politics (65) v Pol where autonomous groups are tolerated only outside politics or are not tolerated at all (35) [PO]

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31. POLITICAL ENCULTURATION

A. High (integrated and homogeneous polity with little or no extreme opposition, communalism, fractionalism, disenfranchisement, or political non-assimilation) [15]
B. Medium (less fully integrated polity with significant minority in extreme opposition, communalized, fractionalized, disenfranchised, or politically non-assimilated) [38]

G. Low (relatively non-integrated or restrictive polity with majority or near majority in extreme opposition, communalized, fractionalized, disenfranchised, or politically non-assimilated) [42]

n = 95
punch 3 = 2
punch 5 = 18

In including the raw characteristic, "political enculturation," in the present survey, we are again going a little out of our way to include a concept and a label that are currently the subject of much interest among American political scientists. Unfortunately, much theoretical work remains to be done toward the refining of this concept. We have therefore decided to construe it in the broadest possible sense. A possible weakness of such a freewheeling approach is that it permits no distinction between instances of conflict and of non-assimilation, respectively, within a body politic.

Precise assignment for most Communist states is necessarily unascertained (punch 5) for this characteristic. Switzerland and Uruguay have been coded as ambiguous (punch 3).

FC 109. Pol where political enculturation is high, rt low (15) v CONV (42) [SO]
FC 110. Pol where political enculturation is high (15) v Pol where political enculturation is medium or low (80) [PO]
FC 111. Pol where political enculturation is high or medium (53) v Pol where political enculturation is low (42) [PO]

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32. SECTIONALISM

A. Extreme (one or more groups with extreme sectional feeling) [27]
B. Moderate (one group with strong sectional feeling or several with moderate sectional feeling) [34]
G. Negligible (no significant sectional feeling) [47]

n = 108
punch 3 = 3
punch 5 = 4

Sectionalism is here defined as the phenomenon in which a significant percentage of the population of a nation lives in a sizable geographic area and indentifies self-consciously and distinctively with that area to a degree that the cohesion of the polity as a whole is appreciably challenged or impaired. Sectionalism may or may not be characterized or reinforced by communalism or tribalism. It is never to be equated with localism in the sense of a group's identifying with a very small locality. Nor should the existence of a sectionally confined non-assimilated group necessarily be regarded as "sectionalism," *per se*. Liberia, for example, is coded under

B because of what may be described as moderate sectionalism on the part of the coastal population, rather than of the less assimilated interior population.

Three countries (Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay) are coded as ambiguous (punch 3) for this characteristic. In both Argentina and Uruguay there is a distinct political cleavage between capital and hinterland, but there is some question whether this may not be simple ruralism versus urbanism, rather than a matter of sectional geography. In the case of Mexico, "*localismo*" is a widespread and often politically articulated phenomenon, but, as stated earlier, this does not in itself constitute "sectionalism" in our sense. It need hardly be noted that a polity lacking sectionalism is not necessarily politically "homogeneous."

FC 112. Pol where sectionalism is extreme, rt negligible (27) v CONV (47) [SO]
FC 113. Pol where sectionalism is extreme (27) v Pol where sectionalism is moderate or negligible (81) [PO]
FC 114. Pol where sectionalism is extreme or moderate (61) v Pol where sectionalism is negligible (47) [PO]

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33. INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS

A. Significant [20]
B. Moderate [12]
G. Limited [28]
H. Negligible [51]

n = 111
punch 3 = 3
punch 6 = 1

This raw characteristic and the three that follow are based on the interest articulation schema set forth in *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. Almond and Coleman describe associational interest groups as "the specialized structures of interest articulation—trade unions, organizations of businessmen or industrialists, ethnic associations [but not the ethnic groups themselves], associations organized by religious denominations [but not the churches themselves], civic groups, and the like. Their characteristics are explicit representation of the interests of a particular group, orderly procedures for the formulation of interests and demands, and transmission of these demands to other political structures such as political parties, legislatures, bureaucracies."[40]

Portugal, Spain, and Yugoslavia are regarded as ambiguous (punch 3)

[40] *PDA*, p. 34.

for this characteristic. All three have attempted to eliminate "boundary maintenance between the polity and the society"[41] by assigning formal governmental functions to groups which in most societies serve as informal transmission belts from the private sector to the public sector. Spain and Portugal formally embrace "corporativism"; Yugoslavia does so in all but name in its legislative upper house (Council of Producers) and in other official organs.[42]

South Korea is regarded as unascertainable (punch 6) for this characteristic under present circumstances.

FC 115. Pol where interest articulation by associational groups is significant (20) v Pol where interest articulation by associational groups is moderate, limited, or negligible (91) [PO]

FC 116. Pol where interest articulation by associational groups is significant or moderate (32) v Pol where interest articulation by associational groups is limited or negligible (79)

FC 117. Pol where interest articulation by associational groups is significant, moderate, or limited (60) v Pol where interest articulation by associational groups is negligible (51) [PO]

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34. INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS

A. Very significant [40]
B. Significant [34]
G. Moderate [16]
H. Limited [10]

n = 100
punch 6 = 15

In their discussion of institutional interest groups, Almond and Coleman state that "we have in mind phenomena occurring within such organizations as legislatures, political executives, armies, bureaucracies, churches, and the like. These are organizations which perform other social or political functions but which, as corporate bodies or through groups within them (such as legislative blocs, officer cliques, higher or lower clergy or religious orders, departments, skill groups, and ideological cliques in bureaucracies), may articulate their own interests or represent the interests of groups in the society."[43]

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[42] For an interesting attempt to relate Yugoslavian interest groups to David B. Truman's classificatory scheme (in *The Governmental Process*. Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), see Jovan Djordjevik, "Interest Groups and the Political System of Yugoslavia," in Henry W. Ehrmann, ed., *Interest Groups on Four Continents*. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958, pp. 197 ff.

[43] *PDA*, p. 33.

For present purposes we go somewhat beyond the apparent scope of the foregoing quotation by regarding totalitarian parties as institutional groups. Thus, all Communist-bloc polities are classified under A.

The term "institutional group" is possibly the most broad-gauged term found in the Almond-Coleman interest-group formulations. More sophisticated use of this concept as a research tool will probably require comparative analysis of interest articulation by *specific kinds* of institutional groups. Indeed, an initial step of this sort has already been taken by a group of scholars (some of whom contributed to the Almond-Coleman volume) investigating the role of the military in certain underdeveloped areas.[44] Our own interest in this subject is reflected in RCs 54 and 55, which examine the role of the military and the police in politics.

It will be noted that the phrasing of the attributes for the present raw characteristic differs somewhat from that used in RC 33, in that the category "negligible" is not here used. The reason for this omission is that *any* polity among the 115 is bound to exhibit a congeries of institutional groups, at least some of which will possess "limited" capacity to articulate interests. By contrast, in some of our 115 polities, associational group structures are virtually absent, and possess at best only "negligible" capacity to articulate interests.

Most sub-Saharan African states are regarded as currently unascertainable (punch 6) for this characteristic.[45]

FC 118. Pol where interest articulation by institutional groups is very significant (40) v Pol where interest articulation by institutional groups is significant, moderate, or limited (60) [PO]

FC 119. Pol where interest articulation by institutional groups is very significant or significant (74) v Pol where interest articulation by institutional groups is moderate or limited (26)

FC 120. Pol where interest articulation by institutional groups is very significant, significant, or moderate (90) v Pol where interest articulation by institutional groups is limited (10) [PO]

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35. INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS

A. Significant [54]
B. Moderate [29]
G. Limited [24]
H. Negligible [8]

n = 115

[44] John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Princeton University Press, 1962.

[45] See, in this regard, James S. Coleman's comments in *PDA*, pp. 313 ff.

Almond and Coleman describe non-associational groups as embracing "kinship and lineage groups, ethnic, regional, religious, status, and class groups which articulate interests informally and intermittently, through individuals, cliques, family and religious heads, and the like."[46]

In some respects, the term "non-associational group" is an unfortunate one, suggesting to the unwary reader that it includes all groups not classifiable as "associational." The particular set of non-"associational" groups actually referred to might more accurately be designated as "ascriptive," in that one usually becomes a member by birth, rather than by conscious choice or deliberate achievement. However, since the term "non-associational" seems now to have entered the political science lexicon, we retain it here.

As in the case of "institutional group," the "non-associational" category is probably too comprehensive for sophisticated analytic purposes. At the very least, it would seem desirable to be able to differentiate between what are usually called "primary group" structures, as contrasted with other, distinctly different group structures now subsumed under the "non-associational" rubric.

FC 121. Pol where interest articulation by non-associational groups is significant (54) v Pol where interest articulation by non-associational groups is moderate, limited, or negligible (61) [PO]

FC 122. Pol where interest articulation by non-associational groups is significant or moderate (83) v Pol where interest articulation by non-associational groups is limited or negligible (32)

FC 123. Pol where interest articulation by non-associational groups is significant, moderate, or limited (107) v Pol where interest articulation by non-associational groups is negligible (8) [PO]

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36. INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS

A. Frequent [14]
B. Occasional [50]
G. Infrequent [19]
H. Very infrequent [16]

n = 99
punch 3 = 6
punch 5 = 6
punch 6 = 4

Almond and Coleman define anomic interest groups as "more or less spontaneous breakthroughs into the political system from the society,

[46] *PDA*, p. 33.

such as riots and demonstrations. Their distinguishing characteristic is their relative structural and functional lability."[47]

We have coded six polities (Argentina, Cyprus, France, Hungary, the United States, Venezuela) as ambiguous (punch 3); six polities (Albania, Bulgaria, North Korea, Mongolia, Rumania, North Vietnam) as unascertained (punch 5); and four polities (Algeria, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Yemen) as currently unascertainable (punch 6).

FC 124. Pol where interest articulation by anomic groups is frequent (14) v Pol where interest articulation by anomic groups is occasional, infrequent, or very infrequent (85) [PO]

FC 125. Pol where interest articulation by anomic groups is frequent or occasional (64) v Pol where interest articulation by anomic groups is infrequent or very infrequent (35)

FC 126. Pol where interest articulation by anomic groups is frequent, occasional, or infrequent (83) v Pol where interest articulation by anomic groups is very infrequent (16) [PO]

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37. INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES

A. Significant [21]
B. Moderate [27]
G. Limited [8]
H. Negligible [37]

n = 93
punch 3 = 5
punch 4 = 5
punch 6 = 12

With the present raw characteristic we depart somewhat from the Almond-Coleman schema as strictly interpreted. According to Almond, the "modern" (by which he means the modern-*Western*) party performs an essentially aggregative, rather than an articulative, function. He readily admits circumstances under which the aggregative function, even under modern conditions, may not be performed, particularly where "interest groups control parties."[48] But he does not refer specifically to interest articulation *by* parties. We regard the latter as a meaningful category of analysis, however pathological a condition it may represent to those who prefer thinking in terms of a "pure" party function. Even if no articulation were to occur without the party being the "captive" of an interest group, it would nonetheless be extremely useful to be able to distinguish between

[47] *PDA*, p. 34.

[48] *PDA*, p. 38, quoting Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LII, No. 1, March 1958, p. 276.

cases of this type and cases where no "captive" party served as an intervening mechanism.

It may be mentioned in passing that a more or less typical "modern" political system may well have one or more "aggregative" parties in addition to minor parties not only serving interest groups but serving as interest groups (for example, the Prohibition Party in the United States).

Five polities (Cyprus, Indonesia, Laos, South Africa, Uruguay) are coded as ambiguous (punch 3) for this characteristic. We have coded as "irrelevant" five polities where no parties currently exist or are likely to exist within the foreseeable future: Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, Libya, and Sa'udi Arabia. The twelve polities coded as presently unascertainable (punch 6) are Algeria, Burma, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen.

FC 127. Pol where interest articulation by political parties is significant (21) v Pol where interest articulation by political parties is moderate, limited, or negligible (72) [PO]

FC 128. Pol where interest articulation by political parties is significant or moderate (48) v Pol where interest articulation by political parties is limited or negligible (45)

FC 129. Pol where interest articulation by political parties is significant, moderate, or limited (56) v Pol where interest articulation by political parties is negligible (37) [PO]

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38. INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES

A. Significant [12]
B. Moderate [18]
G. Limited [19]
H. Negligible [9]

n = 58
punch 3 = 7
punch 4 = 5
punch 5 = 29
punch 6 = 16

In this age of mass parties, it is in many cases extremely difficult to determine, or even to estimate, the extent of interest aggregation by political parties. This is almost universally true with respect to one-party or one party dominant systems. Many of these systems are of quite recent vintage and cannot yet be said to have acquired either internal stability or equilibrium within the broader political complex. All of this has made coding for this raw characteristic particularly difficult.

There are some scholars who maintain that true interest aggregation cannot occur in a one-party context. They argue that the basic incentive for interest aggregation derives from inter-party competition, preferably of a bi-polar character. We cannot agree. There are examples of one-party aggregation. Mexico is perhaps the best contemporary example.[49]

It is our contention that what may be called the breadth of the interest spectrum is of major importance in determining whether a one-party system can successfully aggregate interests. If the spectrum in a particular polity is relatively narrow (by which we mean relatively non-diverse), and particularly if the polity has only recently attained independence, then a one-party system may aggregate just as successfully, or more so, than a two- or multi-party system. In other words, a one-party system for, say, Senegal, may aggregate existing interests with some success, while it could not hope to do so in the United States[50] or in the Soviet Union. There is, of course, no assurance that even under "narrow spectrum" conditions a one-party system *will* perform an aggregative function.

The foregoing speculations are, however, highly tentative. We admit to a complete inability to code 29 polities for the present characteristic. Over half of these are located in sub-Saharan Africa. Also unascertained are the totalitarian systems. The reader is cautioned to bear these biasing factors in mind when reading Paragraphs 130, 131, and 132 in the printout.

Seven polities are coded as ambiguous (punch 3): Argentina, Colombia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Indonesia, and South Africa. The five polities coded as irrelevant for the preceding characteristic are similarly coded here. Sixteen polities are coded as currently unascertainable (punch 6).

FC 130. Pol where interest aggregation by political parties is significant (12) v Pol where interest aggregation by political parties is moderate, limited, or negligible (71) [PO]

FC 131. Pol where interest aggregation by political parties is significant or moderate (30) v Pol where interest aggregation by political parties is limited or negligible (35)

FC 132. Pol where interest aggregation by political parties is significant, moderate, or limited (67) v Pol where interest aggregation by political parties is negligible (9) [PO]

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[49] See, in this connection, Robert E. Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition*. University of Illinois Press, 1959, ch. 6.

[50] Even this observation may have to be qualified. There is considerable evidence that interests are successfully and continuously aggregated in many of the traditional "one-party" areas of the American South.

39. INTEREST AGGREGATION BY EXECUTIVE

A. Significant [29]
B. Moderate [28]
G. Limited [18]
H. Negligible [13]

n = 88
punch 3 = 5
punch 5 = 11
punch 6 = 11

There are at least two factors that must be weighed in estimating degree of interest aggregation by the executive: (1) whether alternative mechanisms (party, legislature, bureaucracy, and so forth) are available and functioning components in the aggregative process, and (2) the extent to which the executive facilitates or impedes aggregative activity by these other organs. Needless to say, estimates made on the basis of such intangible criteria must necessarily be highly intuitive, and the most we can claim for codings under this characteristic is that they have been conscientiously entered.

Five polities are coded as ambiguous (punch 3): Cyprus, Laos, Lebanon, South Africa, and Uruguay. All of these except South Africa have distinctly atypical executive structures. In the case of South Africa it is a fair question as to *whose* interests are being aggregated.

All of the polities coded as unascertained are Communist-bloc nations. Coded as unascertainable (punch 6) are Algeria, Burma, Congo (Leo), Iraq, South Korea, Pakistan, Peru, Sudan, Syria, Togo, and Yemen.

FC 133. Pol where interest aggregation by the executive is significant (29) v Pol where interest aggregation by the executive is moderate, limited, or negligible (76) [PO]
FC 134. Pol where interest aggregation by the executive is significant or moderate (57) v Pol where interest aggregation by the executive is limited or negligible (46)
FC 135. Pol where interest aggregation by the executive is significant, moderate, or limited (77) v Pol where interest aggregation by the executive is negligible (13) [PO]

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40. INTEREST AGGREGATION BY LEGISLATURE

A. Significant [12]
B. Moderate [17]
G. Limited [16]
H. Negligible [49]

n = 94
punch 3 = 6
punch 4 = 1
punch 6 = 14

Interest aggregation by the legislature is most significant in the so-called "working multi-party" context, where parliamentary accommodation by the parties concerned is an indispensible requisite of reasonably stable government.[51] At the other extreme, of course, are the rubber-stamp legislatures of the totalitarian countries and the essentially "consultative" legislatures of the traditionalist regimes.

Six polities are coded as ambiguous (punch 3): Colombia, Cyprus, Indonesia, Portugal, South Africa, and Spain. Sa'udi Arabia, with no legislature and no foreseeable prospect of acquiring one, is coded as irrelevant. Algeria, Burma, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Iran, Iraq, South Korea, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Sudan, Syria, UAR, and Yemen are regarded as currently unascertainable (punch 6).

FC 136. Pol where interest aggregation by the legislature is significant (12) v Pol where interest aggregation by the legislature is moderate, limited, or negligible (85) [PO]

FC 137. Pol where interest aggregation by the legislature is significant or moderate (29) v Pol where interest aggregation by the legislature is limited or negligible (68)

FC 138. Pol where interest aggregation by the legislature is significant, moderate, or limited (48) v Pol where interest aggregation by the legislature is negligible (49) [PO]

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41. PARTY SYSTEM: QUANTITATIVE

A. One-party (all others non-existent, banned, non-participant, or adjuncts of dominant party in electoral activity. Includes "national fronts" and one-party fusional systems) [34]

B. One party dominant (opposition, but numerically ineffective at national level. Includes minority participation in government while retaining party identity for electoral purposes) [13]

G. One-and-a-half-party (opposition significant, but unable to win majority) [3]

H. Two-party or effectively two-party (reasonable expectation of party rotation) [11]

I. Multi-party (coalition or minority party government normally mandatory if parliamentary system) [30]

[51] See, in this connection, Dankwart A. Rustow, "Scandinavia: Working Multiparty Systems" and also Felix E. Oppenheim, "Belgium: Party Cleavage and Compromise," in Sigmund Neumann, ed., *Modern Political Parties*. University of Chicago Press, 1956. For the Netherlands, see Robert C. Bone, "The Dynamics of Dutch Politics," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 1, February 1962.

J. No parties, or all parties illegal or ineffective [5]

n = 96
punch 3 = 7
punch 6 = 12

This raw characteristic is quite orthodox, except, perhaps, for the raw attribute "one-and-a-half-party," a concept apparently originating with Robert A. Scalapino.[52] Although we have coded only three polities (German Federal Republic, Japan, Trinidad) in this category, we feel that the term represents a worthwhile addition to the vocabulary of quantitative party analysis. It would appear that the lot of a doctrinal party competing with a broadly aggregative party within what would normally be a two-party system is not an enviable one. Such a party must either broaden its ideological appeal (that is, become *less* doctrinal) or resign itself to a more or less permanent minority status. The British Labour Party has pursued the former course in recent years. A similar trend is perhaps evident within the German Social Democratic Party, although it remains to be seen whether the latter will emerge as a serious challenge to Christian Democratic hegemony in a post-Adenauer election.

Indonesia, Malaya, Morocco, Nicaragua, South Africa, Turkey, and Uruguay are coded as ambiguous (punch 3) for this characteristic. In Indonesia, parties are not now permitted an electoral function. Nicaragua has two parties, but under present conditions there is virtually no possibility of party rotation. The South African parties cater only to the white minority. Turkey seems currently poised between a one party dominant and a multi-party system. In the case of Uruguay, there is some question as to whether the Blanco and Colorado organizations or their respective *sublemas* should be regarded as the significant party groupings.

Burma, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, and Yemen are coded as currently unascertainable (punch 6).

FC 139. Pol where the party system is quantitatively one-party (34) v AO (71)
FC 140. Pol where the party system is quantitatively one-party dominant (13) v AO (87)
FC 141. Pol where the party system is quantitatively two-party (11) v AO (87)
FC 142. Pol where the party system is quantitatively multi-party (30) v AO (66)
FC 143. Pol where the party system is quantitatively no-party (5) v AO (100) [SO]
FC 144. Pol where the party system is quantitatively one-party, rt two-party (34) v CONV (11) [PO]

[52] Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*. University of California Press, 1962.

FC 145. Pol where the party system is quantitatively multi-party, rt two-party (30) v CONV (11) [PO]

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42. PARTY SYSTEM: QUALITATIVE

A. Communist [13]
B. Mass-based territorial [8]
G. Regional or regional-ethnic [5]
H. Communal [2]
I. Corporative [2]
J. Broadly aggregative [4]
K. Class-oriented or multi-ideological [23]
P. Personalistic, situational, or *ad hoc* [4]
Q. Latin Liberal-Conservative [5]
R. Latin Social Revolutionary [4]
S. African transitional [14]

n = 84
punch 3 = 14
punch 4 = 5
punch 6 = 12

Whatever difficulties may bedevil the construction of a typology of political parties, they are compounded tenfold in attempting to build a typology of party systems. Except in one-party states and in two-party aggregative states, party systems tend to be complex conglomerates, no two of which exhibit identical spectra of specific components. Any attempt, therefore, to conceptualize within manageable limits on a global basis must be a rather rough-and-ready procedure. We are far less satisfied with the structure of this raw characteristic than with any other used in this study. We have nonetheless included it, because of the crucial importance of the subject it covers, and also because we hope it will stimulate other students to typologize more adequately.

"Mass-based territorial" refers to a one-party or one party dominant system with membership theoretically open to all (as contrasted with Communism's quasi-elitism) and without specific ideological content. The eight polities so coded are all African, though there is no inherent reason why this need be so. The "regional or regional-ethnic" systems, of which the Congo (Leopoldville) is perhaps the most flamboyant example, are also exclusively African. Other African systems are in varying stages of movement from multi-party to one-party or one party dominant systems and are coded as "African transitional."

Only two systems (Cyprus and Malaya) are regarded as wholly communal in character, though varying admixtures of communalism are also present in Ceylon, India, and Lebanon.

Spain and Portugal are coded as "corporative." Canada, Mexico, the Philippines, and the United States are coded as "broadly aggregative."

A "class-oriented or multi-ideological" system is always a two- or multi-party system. Each significant party organization in this category will exhibit some form of class or ideological bias, ranging from doctrinal radicalism to the mild class orientation of, say, the British Conservative Party. No party, in such a system, is exclusively "aggregative" in character.

"Personalistic, situational, or *ad hoc*" systems are those in which all significant parties are of the character suggested, namely, "personal" groupings called into being to serve the electoral purposes of a particular candidate or clique. Needless to say, such systems tend to be quite unstable.

A "Latin Liberal-Conservative" system is one in which the "traditional" Hispanic-American complex of Liberal and Conservative parties remains relatively unimpaired. We have coded five polities (Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay) within this category, though the "opposition" in the latter two cases exists in rather emaciated form.

"Latin Social Revolutionary" systems are those in which the leading parties exhibit what may be called neo-Aprista orientation. The four systems so coded are those of Bolivia, Costa Rica (somewhat hesitantly), the Dominican Republic (perhaps prematurely), and Venezuela.

Communist v AO is not included among the following finished characteristics, since the equivalent may be found under RC 57. It should be noted that "regional or regional-ethnic" has been contrasted with all other sub-Saharan African systems in the form of a composite finished characteristic, FC 151.

FC 146. Pol where the party system is qualitatively mass-based territorial (8) v AO (92)

FC 147. Pol where the party system is qualitatively class-oriented or multi-ideological (23) v AO (67)

FC 148. Pol where the party system is qualitatively African transitional (14) v AO (96)

FC 149. Pol where the party system is qualitatively broadly aggregative, rt personalistic, situational, or *ad hoc* (4) v CONV (4) [SO]

FC 150. Pol where the party system is qualitatively Latin Liberal-Conservative, rt Latin Social Revolutionary (5) v CONV (4) [SO]

FC 151. Pol located in Central and South Africa and where the party system is qualitatively regional or regional-ethnic (5) v Pol located in Central and South Africa and where the party system is qualitatively other than regional or regional-ethnic (22) [SO]

43. STABILITY OF PARTY SYSTEM

A. Stable (all significant parties stable and organizationally non-situational) [42]
B. Moderately stable (relatively infrequent or non-abrupt system changes, or mixed situational-permanent party complex) [13]
G. Unstable (all parties unstable, situational, personalistic, or *ad hoc*) [25]

n = 80
punch 3 = 3
punch 4 = 5
punch 6 = 27

It is impossible to take a "snapshot" of stability, hence it would be meaningless to talk of the "current stability" of any aspect of a political system. But granting that a temporal dimension of *some* magnitude is required, it is nontheless true that coding for "stability" remains a highly relativistic matter. We have not confined ourselves to any hard-and-fast time span in coding for this characteristic. We have, however, regarded most of the recently independent states as being currently unascertainable. Hence, there is a rather large "punch 6" residue of 27 polities, 20 of which are African.

We have coded Indonesia, Colombia, and Uruguay as ambiguous (punch 3), the latter two-party systems being more or less constitutionally "frozen." Once again, we code as irrelevant the five states with no parties and little current likelihood of establishing party systems: Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, Libya, and Sa'udi Arabia.

In FC 155 we have added a composite finished characteristic dealing with stability within the sub-universe of polities that have multi-party systems.

FC 152. Pol where the party system is stable, rt unstable (42) v CONV (25) [SO]
FC 153. Pol where the party system is stable (42) v Pol where the party system is moderately stable or unstable (38) [PO]
FC 154. Pol where the party system is stable or moderately stable (55) v Pol where the party system is unstable (25) [PO]
FC 155. Pol where the party system is stable multi-party rt unstable multi-party (11) v CONV (13) [SO]

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44. *PERSONALISMO*

A. Pronounced (all parties highly personalistic or fractionalized along personalistic lines) [14]

B. Moderate (some tendency toward personalism by all parties, or mixed personalistic, non-personalistic party complex) [26]
G. Negligible (no parties with significant personalist tendencies) [56]

n = 96
punch 4 = 5
punch 5 = 3
punch 6 = 11

According to George I. Blanksten, "*Personalismo* may be defined as the tendency of the politically active sectors of the population to follow or oppose a leader for personal, individual, and family reasons rather than because of the influence of a political idea, program, or party."[53] *Personalismo,* as thus defined, is pre-eminently a Latin American phenomenon, but it is by no means restricted to that area.

Personalismo should not be confused with "charismatic" leadership (see RC 46, pages 104–105), though the two phenomena may indeed co-occur, and in such cases each undoubtedly serves to reinforce the other. Contemporary Cambodia provides an illustrative example. However, it is also true that each of these phenomena can exist quite apart from the other, and indeed no statement appears in the printout indicating a strong association between the two. Panamanian politics are steeped in *personalismo,* yet charismatic leaders are extremely rare. Conversely, President Nyerere



Figure 3.1. Interaction of charisma and *personalismo*

[53]Harold E. Davis, ed., *Government and Politics in Latin America*. Ronald Press, 1958, p. 144

of Tanganyika is a highly charismatic leader, but the Tanganyika African National Union could hardly be described as a personalist organization. Polities such as Colombia and Ghana are ranged between these two poles. The gamut of possibilities is roughly suggested by Figure 3.1.

Burundi, Cyprus, and Rwanda are unascertained (punch 5) for this characteristic. Eleven polities are coded as currently unascertainable (punch 6): Burma, Dominican Republic, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Sudan, Togo, and Yemen.

FC 156. Pol where personalismo is pronounced, rt negligible (14) v CONV (56) [SO]
FC 157. Pol where personalismo is pronounced (14) v Pol where personalismo is moderate or negligible (84) [PO]
FC 158. Pol where personalismo is pronounced or moderate (40) v Pol where personalismo is negligible (56) [PO]

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45. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

A. Elitist (recruitment confined to a particular racial, social, or ideological stratum) [30]
B. Moderate elitist (recruitment largely, but not wholly confined to a particular racial, social, or ideological stratum) [17]
G. Non-elitist (recruitment largely on the basis of achievement criteria only) [50]

n = 97
punch 3 = 10
punch 6 = 8

In coding for this raw characteristic, two more or less arbitrary decisions were made. First, leadership in a Communist system is regarded as "elitist," since party membership itself is of a cadre character. Second, we assume that for most of the newly independent sub-Saharan African states leadership does *not* come from a particular social class (one sometimes referred to as the "educated elite") but from a leadership pool, membership in which is acquired on the basis of achievement. When, however, social stratification has a manifest bearing on political recruitment (as, for example, in Northern Nigeria), this fact is of course taken into account.

Ten polities are coded as ambiguous (punch 3) for this characteristic: Cambodia, Cyprus, Haiti, Iran, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Uganda, and the UAR. It is interesting to note that ambiguity in the cases of Haiti and Rwanda stems from the existence of what may be called "reverse elitism." President Duvalier of Haiti insists upon "all-black" rule. In Rwanda, the formerly privileged Watusi element has been partially barred from political participation.

Eight polities (Algeria, Burma, Cuba, Iraq, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, Yemen) are coded as currently unascertainable (punch 6).

FC 159. Pol where the political leadership is elitist, rt non-elitist (30) v CONV (50) [SO]
FC 160. Pol where the political leadership is elitist (30) v Pol where the political leadership is moderately elitist or non-elitist (67) [PO]
FC 161. Pol where the political leadership is elitist or moderately elitist (47) v Pol where the political leadership is non-elitist (50) [PO]

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46. LEADERSHIP CHARISMA

A. Pronounced [13]
B. Moderate [21]
G. Negligible [65]

n = 99
punch 3 = 7
punch 5 = 4
punch 6 = 5

Max Weber, at one point, defined "charismatic authority" as a form of rule "to which the governed submit because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the specific person."[54] We are not here concerned with the question whether the powers of the charismatic leader need necessarily be regarded as "magical" or "supernatural." It suffices, for our purposes, that they be viewed as going (again, in Weber's words) "beyond the normal human qualities "—a phrase which we take to mean "beyond the qualities that most humans usually possess."

It may be argued that such a dilution of Weber's concept results in too great an overlap between the concept of "charisma" and that of "leadership." This does not bother us greatly. Probably *all* leadership necessarily involves some charisma, particularly where the attitudes of the leader's immediate followers are concerned. But some leaders are more charismatically regarded than others. And it is the *relatively more* charismatic that we have here attempted to code under attribute A—Nkrumah of Ghana, for example, as contrasted with Kennedy of the USA.

Seven polities have been coded as ambiguous (punch 3) for this characteristic: Afghanistan, Congo (Leo), Cyprus, Iran, Nigeria, Uganda, and the USSR. Four polities (Burundi, Laos, Nepal, Rwanda) are unascertained (punch 5). Five are regarded as currently unascertainable: Burma, Iraq, Syria, Togo, and Yemen.

[54] Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 295.

FC 162. Pol where the regime's leadership charisma is pronounced, rt negligible (13) v CONV (65) [SO]
FC 163. Pol where the regime's leadership charisma is pronounced (13) v Pol where the regime's leadership charisma is moderate or negligible (87) [PO]
FC 164. Pol where the regime's leadership charisma is pronounced or moderate (34) v Pol where the regime's leadership charisma is negligible (65) [PO]

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47. VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION

A. Effective federalism [8]
B. Limited federalism (federal structure with limited separation or pronounced "centralist" tendencies) [7]
G. Former federalism (formal or limited formal federal structure only) [6]
H. Formal and effective unitarism [93]

n = 114
punch 6 = 1

Federalism has been defined by a leading authority as "the principle of . . . general and regional governments being coordinate and independent in their respective spheres."[55] On the basis of this definition, we have coded Cameroun and Uganda under A, though one may question whether either state has yet attained stability with respect to its internal distribution of power. It may be noted that the Ethiopian-Eritrean federation has recently been abandoned in favor of a unitary Ethiopian state.

By "formal federalism" we mean formal adherence to the federal principle, unaccompanied by substantive adherence. The USSR is a conspicuous example.

The Congo (Leo) has been coded as currently unascertainable (punch 6) for this characteristic.

FC 165. Pol where the vertical power distribution is that of effective federalism (8) v Pol where the vertical power distribution is that of limited federalism, formal federalism, or formal and effective unitarism (106) [SO]
FC 166. Pol where the vertical power distribution is that of effective federalism or limited federalism (15) v Pol where the vertical power distribution is that of formal federalism or formal and effective unitarism (99)

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[55] K. C. Wheare, *Federal Government*. Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 5.

48. HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION

A. Significant (effective allocation of power to functionally autonomous legislative, executive and judicial organs) [34]
B. Limited (one branch of government without genuine functional autonomy, or two branches with limited functional autonomy) [24]
G. Negligible (complete dominance of government by one branch or by extra-governmental agency) [48]

n = 106
punch 5 = 1
punch 6 = 8

We are here concerned with the *functional distribution* of power in the Lockean sense. That is, we regard a "functionally autonomous" legislature, executive, or judiciary as one capable of exercising the functions normally attributable to it, regardless of whether the legislative-executive structure is parliamentary or presidential, or whether the judiciary possesses "judicial review," and so forth.

Uganda is unascertained for this characteristic. Eight polities are regarded as currently unascertainable: Argentina, Burma, Congo (Leo), Iraq, South Korea, Peru, Syria, and Yemen.

FC 167. Pol where the horizontal power distribution is significant, rt negligible (34) v CONV (48) [SO]
FC 168. Pol where the horizontal power distribution is significant (34) v Pol where the horizontal power distribution is limited or negligible (72) [PO]
FC 169. Pol where the horizontal power distribution is significant or limited (58) v Pol where the horizontal power distribution is negligible (48) [PO]

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49. LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE

A. Presidential [39]
B. Presidential-Parliamentary [3]
G. Parliamentary-Republican [12]
H. Pure Parliamentary [1]
I. Parliamentary-Royalist [21]
J. Monarchical-Parliamentary [4]
K. Monarchical [2]
P. Communist [13]
Q. Other [2]

n = 97
punch 3 = 4
punch 4 = 1
punch 6 = 13

This characteristic is based on an eightfold classificatory scheme. The scheme in turn reflects three general criteria: (1) whether the Head of State is monarchical or non-monarchical, (2) whether effective executive power is exercised by the Head of State or by the formal executive (where the two are not constitutionally or otherwise conjoined), and (3) whether the formal executive is or is not dependent upon parliamentary support for continuance in office. Figure 3.2 illustrates this classificatory scheme.



Figure 3.2. Legislative-executive structures

The "pure parliamentary" form, that is, absolute parliamentary control over both Head of State and Executive, is an exceedingly rare and manifestly unstable political phenomenon. Viewed in historical perspective, such "assembly government" would seem to be of an essentially transitional character. The French Convention 1792–1795 is undoubtedly the leading example. And it is of more than passing interest that a large number of France's former African dependencies exhibited essentially "pure parliamentary" forms immediately after independence. Such men as Tombalbaye of Chad, Dacko of the Central African Republic, and M'ba of Gabon were all premiers constitutionally dependent in 1959–1960 upon parliamentary majorities. Then came independence, and each incumbent was simply designated additionally as Chief of State. With the later adoption of new constitutions embodying variations of the presidential system, the pure parliamentary forms were abandoned. Only in the West African state of Mali do the essentials of this type of legislative-executive structure remain (as of April 1, 1963).[56]

[56]In Tanganyika the President is elected by the legislature, and if the legislature "over-rides" him with respect to proposed legislation, he must either assent to the legislation or dissolve parliament, thus putting his own job on the line. This is regarded by the Tanganyikans as a variation of the Ghanaian system. Since it may also perhaps be regarded as exhibiting an element of the "pure parliamentary," we have coded Tanganyika as ambiguous for this characteristic.

The thirteen Communist states are the closest in form, but the most distant in reality, from the pure parliamentary type. In all thirteen states, the legislature has complete *formal* control over the appointment and tenure of both the Head of State and the Premier. Effective control, however, is exercised by the party hierarchy.

The Communist states are, of course, variations on a single theme. There are, however, discernible differences in the form, if not the content, of their executive structures. These may briefly be indentified as (1) *Presidential-Premierial* (China, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Yugoslavia); (2) *Conciliar-Premierial* (East Germany, Poland, Rumania); and (3) *Praesidial-Premierial* (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia, USSR). A Communist "Praesidium" is, of course, a conciliar body which differs from a "State Council" only in that it is constitutionally recognized as a superior council of the legislature, rather than as a theoretically autonomous body.

The remaining six types of non-Communist legislative-executive structure may be described as follows:

1. PRESIDENTIAL

A presidential structure is characterized by the presence of an elected official (whether directly or indirectly designated) who serves for a stated term as both Head of State and Chief Executive, or as Head of State and *effective* executive, in conjunction with a "weak" premier not dependent upon a parliamentary majority.

Presidential structures tend to occur in conjunction with either one-party or multi-party systems. All of the current *one-party* presidential systems are African. All but one of the *multi-party* presidential systems are Latin American. Cyprus is the lone exception, and in some respects its multi-party configuration is quite atypical.

2. PRESIDENTIAL-PARLIAMENTARY

The presidential-parliamentary structure has a "strong" president serving as Head of State and as effective executive, in conjunction with a "weak" premier who is dependent upon parliamentary support. Gaullist France is the leading example. In Chad, where both offices are currently held by the same individual, Tombalbaye can evidently be ousted as Premier, but not as President.

3. PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN

The parliamentary-republican structure differs from the presidential-parliamentary in that the power positions of president and premier, respectively, are reversed. Here a "weak" president serves as Head of State, in conjunction with a "strong" premier dependent upon parliamentary support. India and West Germany are examples.

4. PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST

The parliamentary-royalist structure differs from the parliamentary-republican in that the Head of State is a "weak" monarch, rather than an elected president. Here again, the premier is "strong" and is dependent upon parliamentary support. The United Kingdom is the classic example.

Parliamentary-Royalist structures tend to occur in *multi-party* or *two-party* contexts. Where the context is two-party the polity is invariably a member of the British Commonwealth: Australia, Canada, Jamaica, New Zealand, Sierre Leone, United Kingdom.

5. MONARCHICAL-PARLIAMENTARY

A monarchical-parliamentary structure has a "strong" monarch serving as Head of State and as effective executive, in conjunction with a "weak" premier dependent, at least to some degree, upon parliamentary support. The "constitutional" monarchies of Afghanistan, Jordan, Libya, and Morocco are of this type.

6. MONARCHICAL

The monarchical structure has a "strong" monarch serving as Head of State and as Chief Executive, or as Head of State and effective executive, in conjunction with a "weak" premier not dependent upon parliamentary support. Ethiopia and Nepal are currently of this type. Sa'udi Arabia has been classified as irrelevant (punch 4) for this raw characteristic, since it possesses no legislature of any kind.

Switzerland and Uruguay are here coded as "other" (Q), since both appoint annual chiefs of state from conciliar executive bodies.

Cambodia, Portugal, and Spain, in addition to Tanganyika[56] are coded as ambiguous (punch 3). Cambodia is unique in possessing both a "monarch" (Queen Sisowath Kossamak) *and* a Chief of State (Prince Sihanouk), who also serves as Premier.[57]

Thirteen polities are regarded as currently unascertainable for this characteristic: Algeria, Burma, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, South Korea, Peru, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, UAR, and Yemen.

With respect to the finished characteristics, parliamentary-republican v parliamentary-royalist and presidential-parliamentary v monarchical-parliamentary were included in an earlier computer run. Neither dichotomous contrast discriminated sufficiently, in our opinion, to warrant its inclusion in the final printout.

FN 170. Pol where the legislative-executive structure is presidential (39) v AO (63)

[57] Prince Sihanouk has declared that Cambodia will become a republic after the next election.

FN 171. Pol where the legislative-executive structure is parliamentary-republican (12) v AO (90)
FN 172. Pol where the legislative-executive structure is parliamentary-royalist (21) v AO (88)
FN 173. Pol where the legislative-executive structure is parliamentary-republican or parliamentary-royalist, rt presidential-parliamentary or monarchical-parliamentary (33) v CONV (7) [SO]

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50. CURRENT STATUS OF LEGISLATURE

A. Fully effective (performs normal legislative function as reasonably "co-equal" branch of national government) [28]
B. Partially effective (tendency toward domination by executive, or otherwise partially limited in effective exercise of legislative function) [23]
G. Largely ineffective (virtually complete domination by executive or by one-party or dominant party organization) [21]
H. Wholly ineffective (restricted to consultative or "rubber-stamp" legislative function) [28]

n = 100
punch 4 = 1
punch 6 = 14

This raw characteristic is largely self-explanatory. As the printout indicates, the "developed West" is virtually the exclusive locale of A, while B tends to occur in Latin American states, and G in African states. All of the Communist states fall in H.

Sa'udi Arabia is coded as irrelevant for this characteristic. Fourteen states are coded as currently unascertainable: Burma, Congo (Leo), Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Iran, Iraq, South Korea, Pakistan, Peru, Sudan, Syria, Togo, and Yemen.

FC 174. Pol where the legislature is fully effective (28) v Pol where the legislature is partially effective, largely ineffective, or wholly ineffective (72) [PO]
FC 175. Pol where the legislature is fully effective or partially effective (51) v Pol where the legislature is largely ineffective or wholly ineffective (49)
FC 176. Pol where the legislature is fully effective, partially effective, or largely ineffective (72) v Pol where the legislature is wholly ineffective (28) [PO]
FC 177. Pol where the legislature is partially effective, rt largely ineffective (23) v CONV (21) [SO]

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51. CHARACTER OF LEGISLATURE

A. Unicameral [53]
B. Bicameral [51]

n = 104
punch 3 = 1
punch 4 = 1
punch 6 = 9

Our original raw characteristic on "character of the legislature" had three attributes: A. Unicameral; B. Bicameral: unequal powers; and G. Bicameral: equal powers. For many polities, however, it proved exceedingly difficult to differentiate between B and G, and for this reason the threefold scheme was abandoned in favor of a simple dichotomy.

Even a simple discrimination between "unicameral" and "bicameral" is not always as easily codable as one might imagine. There is some question, for example, whether the Laotian "King's Council" and its Cambodian counterpart, the "Council of the Kingdom," are genuine upper houses. Both polities are, however, here coded as bicameral.

Upper and lower chambers differ markedly not only in powers but in methods of selection. Most lower houses are elected bodies. Upper house membership may be by appointment, by election, or by a combination of the two. In some cases (for example, the Norwegian *Storting*), designation of upper house membership is by vote of the legislators themselves, all members not so designated constituting the lower chamber.

There is no theoretical reason why a legislature must be *either* unicameral or bicameral. Yet in practice virtually all of the 115 polities can be coded as one or the other.[58]

Nine polities are coded as currently unascertainable (punch 6) for this characteristic: Burma, Cuba, Iraq, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, UAR, and Yemen.

FC 178. Pol where the legislature is unicameral (53) v Pol where the legislature is bicameral (51)

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52. CURRENT STATUS OF EXECUTIVE

A. Dominant [52]
B. Strong [39]
G. Weak [2]

[58]A significant exception is Cyprus, which we have coded as ambiguous. Cyprus has a single House of Representatives, but certain matters are within the jurisdiction of two communal chambers representing the Greek and Turkish ethnic groups, respectively. It may also be noted that Yugoslavia will shortly adopt a new constitution, embodying a unique five-chambered national parliament.

n = 93
punch 3 = 4
punch 5 = 6
punch 6 = 12

In coding for this characteristic, we have assigned all instances of rule by military junta to the residue. In some cases it is not possible to describe the regime as being unambiguously civilian or military, and in such cases the assignment has also been to the residue.

We regard a "dominant" executive as one generally capable of imposing his will throughout the government establishment. A "strong" executive, on the other hand, is one whose effective dominance is largely confined to the executive realm. The distinction should not be construed in strictly "constitutional" terms. Thus, we regard Nehru as "dominant" within the effective governing structure of contemporary India, despite the fact that constitutional forms are largely respected.[59]

Only two polities (Switzerland and Uruguay) have been coded as possessing genuinely "weak" executives. Both are of a collegial character.

Four polities (Ceylon, Chile, Greece, Laos) are coded as ambiguous (punch 3) for this characteristic. For six polities, the precise status of the executive has not been ascertained: Burundi, Chad, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, and Uganda. The twelve polities regarded as currently unascertainable (punch 6) are Argentina, Burma, Congo (Leo), Guatemala, Iraq, South Korea, Peru, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, and Yemen.

FC 179. Pol where the executive is dominant (52) v Pol where the executive is strong (39)

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53. CHARACTER OF BUREAUCRACY

A. Modern (generally effective and responsible civil service or equivalent, performing in a functionally specific, non-ascriptive social context) [21]

B. Semi-modern (largely "rationalized" bureaucratic structure of limited efficiency because of shortage of skilled personnel, inadequacy of recruitment or performance criteria, excessive intrusion by non-administrative organs, or partially non-congruent social institutions) [55]

G. Post-colonial transitional (largely rationalized ex-colonial bureaucratic structure in process of personnel "nationalization" and adaptation to the servicing or restructuring of autochthonous social institutions) [25]

[59] The events surrounding Menon's resignation as Defense Minister in November, 1962, while virtually unprecedented, may, of course, presage a severe decline in Nehru's stature.

H. Traditional (largely non-rationalized bureaucractic structure performing in the context of an ascriptive or "deferential" stratification system) [9]

n = 110
punch 3 = 3
punch 6 = 2

The comparative study of public administration is still very much in its infancy. The pioneering 1959 volume edited by William J. Siffin[60] contains useful case studies but needs to be supplemented tenfold before it will be possible to make valid global generalizations in this area.

Because of this dearth of relevant country studies, our typology for this characteristic is less than adequate. It fails to deal with specific bureaucratic structure or with the calibre of performance of specific functions. The result is a somewhat unproductive characteristic—"unproductive" in the sense that much of its yield was fairly predictable from the beginning.

Indonesia, Pakistan, and South Vietnam are regarded as ambiguous (punch 3) for this characteristic. Iraq and Yemen are coded as currently unascertainable (punch 6).

It should be noted that we have dichotomized for the following finished characteristics by contrasting adjacent categories, rather than on the basis of a moving cutting point.

FC 180. Pol where the bureaucracy is modern or semi-modern (76) v Pol where the bureaucracy is post-colonial transitional or traditional (34) [SO]
FC 181. Pol where the bureaucracy is modern, rt semi-modern (21) v CONV (55) [PO]
FC 182. Pol where the bureaucracy is semi-modern, rt post-colonial transitional (55) v CONV (25) [PO]
FC 183. Pol where the bureaucracy is post-colonial transitional, rt traditional (25) v CONV (9) [PO]

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54. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY

A. Interventive (presently exercises or has recently exercised direct power) [21]
B. Supportive (performs para-political role in support of traditionalist, authoritarian, totalitarian, or modernizing regime) [31]
G. Neutral (apolitical, or of minor political importance) [56]

n = 108
punch 3 = 7

Throughout history, military establishments have enjoyed political power, often much more power than would ordinarily accrue to them

[60] William J. Siffin, ed., *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration*. Indiana University Press, 1959.

if they were to confine their concern to defense against outside threats. For nearly a century and a half, the nations of Latin America have suffered from the uneasy alliances between arms and politics in the form of recurrent *caudillismo*. In more recent times, rule by the military has become a more or less typical means of providing "transitional" leadership for fledgling nations as they move toward "development."[61]

The present raw characteristic asks only whether a nation's military establishment performs in a politically "interventive," "supportive," or "neutral" manner. It does not attempt to distinguish between "oppressive" and "constructive" intervention or support. In the case of both B and G, the military is presumed to be under civilian control. But in B, as contrasted with G, the military is used by the regime as a means of consolidating, enlarging, or defending political power.

Colombia is coded G, despite the not-too-distant events of the Rojas era.[62] Coding of the Dominican Republic as G may be somewhat premature in view of the critical role played by the military in the 1961 ouster of Trujillo coupled with uncertainties concerning the viability of the present government of Juan Bosch.

Seven polities are coded as ambiguous for this characteristic: Congo (Leo), Cuba, France, Laos, Nepal, Somalia, and Venezuela. In the case of Somalia there is quite evidently a *faction* of the military in former British Somaliland that would *like* to alter the status quo if they could. In Venezuela, the army, which generally controlled politics until 1959, is still being treated with delicacy by President Betancourt.

FC 184. Pol where participation by the military in politics is interventive, rt neutral (21) v CONV (56) [SO]
FC 185. Pol where participation by the military in politics is interventive, rt supportive (21) v CONV (31) [PO]
FC 186. Pol where participation by the military in politics is supportive, rt neutral (13) v CONV (56) [PO]

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55. ROLE OF POLICE

A. Politically significant (important continuing or intermittent political function in addition to law enforcement) [66]
B. Not politically significant (role confined primarily to law enforcement) [35]

n = 101
punch 5 = 12
punch 6 = 2

[61] See particularly Johnson, *op. cit.* and Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America*. Praeger, 1961.

[62] Lieuwen regards the Colombian armed forces as "nonpolitical" (Lieuwen, *op. cit.*, p. 168); Herbert L. Mathews calls Colombia a "borderline case" ("When Generals Take Over in Latin America," *The New York Times Magazine*, September 9, 1962).

For many polities, the term "police" embraces a variety of organizations with functions ranging all the way from traffic control to para-military activity. In coding for this characteristic we have taken the term in its broadest possible sense and have then asked the question: "Is the activity of the police in Polity X essentially confined to law enforcement, or does it also significantly impinge upon the political process?" We grant that this is not a wholly satisfactory formula. However, in the absence of any extensive literature on this subject, a simple dichotomous characteristic was the best that we could devise.

Twelve polities are coded as unascertained (punch 5): Brazil, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Libya, Mali, Niger, Panama, Rwanda, and Upper Volta. The Dominican Republic and Peru are regarded as currently unascertainable (punch 6).

FC 187. Pol where the role of the police is politically significant (66) v Pol where the role of the police is not politically significant (35)

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56. CHARACTER OF LEGAL SYSTEM

A. Civil law [32]
B. Mixed civil-indigenous [11]
G. Common law [7]
H. Mixed common-indigenous [1]
I. Mixed civil-common [2]
J. Mixed civil-common-indigenous [1]
K. Muslim [2]
P. Mixed civil-Muslim [9]
Q. Mixed common-Muslim [3]
R. Mixed civil-Muslim-indigenous [8]
S. Mixed common-Muslim-indigenous [5]
X. Scandinavian [5]
Y. Communist [13]
Z. Other [12]

n = 111
punch 3 = 2
punch 6 = 2

As far as we can determine, the only existing attempt to provide a comprehensive typology of the world's legal systems is the now somewhat dated survey by John Henry Wigmore.[63] Writing some three decades ago,

[63] John Henry Wigmore, *A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems*, rev. ed., Washington Law Book Company, 1936. The original three-volume edition was published in 1928.

Wigmore identified ten system types: (1) Anglican, (2) Chinese, (3) Germanic, (4) Hindu, (5) Japanese, (6) Mohammedan, (7) Romanesque, (8) Slavic, (9) Soviet Slavic, and (10) Tribal Customary.

We have used the more familiar terms "common law" and "civil law" in place of Wigmore's "Anglican" and "Romanesque," and "Muslim" for his "Mohammedan." Our term "indigenous" may be defined as "unique to a particular locality." As such, it embraces all essentially non-literate law, and hence is of somewhat broader scope than Wigmore's "Tribal Customary." On the other hand, a relatively autochthonous legal system that is no longer unique to a particular area (for example, English Common Law) is not here regarded as "indigenous."

Wigmore's remaining six systems have no counterparts in our basic scheme. His "Chinese System" is now significant only with respect to the Nationalist government of Taiwan, which is not included in this survey. Hindu law does not exist as a national system, though it does comprise a component of several of the systems coded under Z. Japanese law, combined with elements of civil and common law, is to be found only in Japan and South Korea, both of which are also coded as Z. Slavic law has been largely absorbed into Communist law. Wigmore's "Germanic" law appeared only in the composite "Romanesque-Germanic" of the five Scandinavian countries, which we have coded under the single term "Scandinavian."

In Cameroun we have disregarded the common-law component found in the small portion of that country which was once part of the British Cameroons. Mongolia is coded as "Communist," although some Buddhist-tribal elements undoubtedly remain. Scottish civil law is disregarded as a component of the legal system of the United Kingdom.

The twelve polities coded as "Other" (Z) are as follows:

1. Afghanistan (Muslim, indigenous)
2. Cambodia (civil, Hindu)
3. Ceylon (civil, common, Hindu)
4. Cyprus (common, sectarian)
5. India (common, Hindu, Muslim)
6. Iraq (civil, sectarian, indigenous)
7. Israel (civil, common, Ottoman, rabbinical)
8. Japan (civil, common, Japanese)
9. So. Korea (civil, common, Japanese)
10. Lebanon (civil, sectarian, indigenous)
11. Nepal (Hindu, indigenous)
12. Somalia (civil, common, Muslim)

Ethiopia and Guinea are regarded as ambiguous (punch 3). Ethiopian law includes civil, Coptic Christian ecclesiastical, and Muslim components.

A European legal commission has been working in that country for some years on a codification of the law, but without notable implementation to date. Judicial inefficiency and incompetence add to the difficulty of correctly assessing Ethiopia's status.[64] Guinea's legal system is based primarily on the French civil law tradition, but elements have been added that are suggestive of Communist law. For example, crimes against the Guinean state "may be judged outside the judicial framework by people's courts."[65]

Burma and Cuba are regarded as currently unascertainable (punch 6) for this characteristic.

In the following finished characteristics, we have not dichotomized on the basis of Scandinavian v AO or on the basis of Communist v AO, since equivalents can be found by consulting FC 4 and FC 194, respectively.

FC 188. Pol where the character of the legal system is civil law (32) v AO (81)
FC 189. Pol where the character of the legal system is common law (7) v AO (108)
FC 190. Pol where the character of the legal system is civil law, rt common law (32) v CONV (7)
FC 191. Pol where the character of the legal system is mixed civil-Muslim-indigenous, rt mixed common-Muslim-indigenous (8) v CONV (5) [SO]
FC 192. Pol where the character of the legal system is Muslim or partly Muslim (27) v AO (86)
FC 193. Pol where the character of the legal system is partly indigenous (28) v AO (86)

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57. COMMUNIST BLOC

A. Communist [13]
B. Quasi-Communist [1]
G. Non-Communist [101]

n = 115

Cuba, despite its definite alignment with international Communism, has not (as of April 1, 1963) adopted many of the domestic organizational features of a typical Communist state. It is therefore coded as "quasi-Communist."

FC 194. Pol that are Communist (13) v Pol that are non-Communist (101)

[64]See Ernest W. Luther, *Ethiopia Today*. Stanford University Press, 1958, p. 46.

[65]Gray Cowan, "Guinea," in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., *African One-Party States*. Cornell University Press, 1962, p. 215.

WHISKERS CHARACTERISTICS (see pages 51–53)

FC 195. Pol belonging to the fifty percent that have purple whiskers (58) v AO (57) [SO]
FC 196. Pol belonging to the forty percent that have blue whiskers (46) v AO (69) [SO]
FC 197. Pol belonging to the thirty percent that have green whiskers (35) v AO (80) [SO]
FC 198. Pol belonging to the twenty percent that have pink whiskers (23) v AO (92) [SO]
FC 199. Pol belonging to the ten percent that have yellow whiskers (12) v AO (103) [SO]

Computer Printout

Tables and matrices numbered 36/119, 36/125, 36/128, 67/153, 70/125, and 80/56:

Because of machine errors, slight discrepancies exist. In each instance, the matrix is accurate, rather than the table.

1	POLITIES LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE (9)	1	POLITIES LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST EUROPE (106)

SUBJECT ONLY

9 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CZECHOS*KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	POLAND	RUMANIA	USSR	YUGOSLAVIA

106 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	BURUNDI
CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS
ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA
JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA
NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	RWANDA
SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA
TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	UK	US
UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN				

24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.89	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.50	8 53 1 53 X SQ= 3.60 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.89	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.62	8 40 1 66 X SQ= 6.95 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.87	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.60	1 61 7 41 X SQ= 4.96 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.67	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.77	6 24 3 82 X SQ= 6.21 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)

36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.89	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.68	8 34 1 72 X SQ= 9.23 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
37	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	1.00	37	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.52	9 55 0 51 X SQ= 5.95 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.75	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.70	6 32 2 74 X SQ= 4.86 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.89	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.73	8 28 1 75 X SQ= 11.76 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.67	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.82	6 19 3 87 X SQ= 8.90 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.54	9 46 0 54 X SQ= 7.59 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	1.00	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.68	0 60 9 28 X SQ= 13.33 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (16)	0.67	52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.89	3 79 6 10 X SQ= 14.55 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.78	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.71	7 30 2 74 X SQ= 6.92 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)

55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.66	9 69 0 35 X SQ= 2.96 P = 0.055 RV NO (NO)	
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.69	9 70 0 31 X SQ= 2.48 P = 0.059 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.87	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.63	7 39 1 67 X SQ= 5.98 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
64	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	1.00	64	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.68	7 39 0 18 X SQ= 1.71 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)	
67	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	1.00	67	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.71	9 71 0 29 X SQ= 2.23 P = 0.065 RV NO (NO)	
73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	1.00	73	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.55	8 57 0 46 X SQ= 4.40 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)	
75	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.89	75	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.51	8 54 1 51 X SQ= 3.30 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)	
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	1.00	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.76	4 22 0 70 X SQ= 7.71 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.56	8 43 0 55 X SQ= 7.22 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	

85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	1.00	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.51	9 51 0 54 X SQ= 6.85 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	1.00	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.61	0 31 9 49 X SQ= 3.78 P = 0.024 RV NO (NO)	
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	89	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.62	0 33 9 53 X SQ= 3.73 P = 0.025 RV NO (NO)	
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL (20)	1.00	92	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.89	9 11 0 93 X SQ= 39.54 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN (16)	1.00	95	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.93	0 95 9 7 X SQ= 50.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	99	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.54	8 42 0 36 X SQ= 4.60 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.60	0 59 9 40 X SQ= 9.54 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	1.00	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.71	0 52 9 21 X SQ= 14.59 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
108	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	1.00	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.71	0 65 9 26 X SQ= 15.36 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	116	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.69	0 32 B 71 X SQ= 2.14 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)	
118	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	1.00	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.66	9 31 0 60 X SQ= 12.22 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	1.00	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.51	0 54 9 52 X SQ= 6.72 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	1.00	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.67	0 56 9 28 X SQ= 12.43 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	1.00	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.61	0 57 9 37 X SQ= 9.89 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	1.00	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.55	0 48 9 40 X SQ= 7.66 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	1.00	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.74	9 25 0 71 X SQ= 17.32 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.72	0 23 9 58 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.105 RV NO (NO)	
153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	1.00	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.54	9 33 0 38 X SQ= 7.15 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	

158	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	1.00	158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.54	0 9	40 47
						X SQ=	5.33
						P =	0.009
						RV NO	(NO)
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	1.00	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.76	9 0	21 67
						X SQ=	18.73
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(NO)
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	1.00	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.60	0 9	58 39
						X SQ=	9.59
						P =	0.001
						RV YES	(NO)
170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	1.00	170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.58	0 9	39 54
						X SQ=	4.46
						P =	0.012
						RV NO	(NO)
176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	1.00	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.79	0 9	72 19
						X SQ=	21.66
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(NO)
179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	179	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.52	9 0	43 39
						X SQ=	5.67
						P =	0.009
						RV NO	(NO)
181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	181	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.69	0 9	21 46
						X SQ=	2.49
						P =	0.056
						RV NO	(NO)
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.65	9 0	46 25
						X SQ=	3.12
						P =	0.051
						RV NO	(NO)
185	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	1.00	185	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.51	0 9	21 22
						X SQ=	5.48
						P =	0.007
						RV NO	(NO)

186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	1.00	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.72	9 22 0 56 X SQ= 15.14 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	1.00	187	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.62	9 57 0 35 X SQ= 3.69 P = 0.025 RV NO (NO)
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE COMMUNIST (13)	1.00	194	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.96	9 4 0 101 X SQ= 66.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

2	POLITIES LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22)	2	POLITIES LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

22 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND
IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
UK	US								

93 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E
GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ
ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA
LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA
NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	RUMANIA	RWANDA
SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO
TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA							

21	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.86	21	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.69	3 29 19 64 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.118 RV NO (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.64	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.63	14 34 8 59 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.030 RV YES (NO)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.82	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.66	4 58 18 30 X SQ= 14.42 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.58	21 35 0 49 X SQ= 20.68 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

30	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	1.00	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.62	0 56 22 35 X SQ= 24.43 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.64	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.83	14 16 8 77 X SQ= 17.56 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.91	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.55	20 42 2 51 X SQ= 13.20 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.86	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.95	19 5 3 88 X SQ= 65.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.95	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.77	21 21 1 72 X SQ= 37.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	1.00	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.55	22 42 0 51 X SQ= 19.51 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.77	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.77	17 21 5 71 X SQ= 21.30 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.73	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.97	16 3 6 88 X SQ= 56.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.91	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.82	20 16 2 74 X SQ= 40.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.63	22 33 0 57 X SQ= 25.90 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.82	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.92	18 7 4 86 X SQ= 53.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.62	22 33 0 54 X SQ= 24.64 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.86	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.68	18 25 3 53 X SQ= 17.27 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
51	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.90	51	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.54	19 41 2 35 X SQ= 7.82 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.79	22 60 0 16 X SQ= 4.10 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	
53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (14)	0.55	53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.98	12 2 10 91 X SQ= 40.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.91	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.81	20 17 2 74 X SQ= 38.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.62	22 56 0 35 X SQ= 10.53 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.65	22 57 0 31 X SQ= 9.12 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
62	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.62	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 8 17 X SQ= 5.32 P = 0.009 RV NO (YES)	
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	1.00	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.74	22 24 0 68 X SQ= 37.29 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.95	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.68	21 59 1 28 X SQ= 5.53 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.77	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.62	17 35 5 57 X SQ= 9.49 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.86	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.51	19 45 3 47 X SQ= 8.65 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
70	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, AND LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (21)	0.50	70	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.88	11 10 11 73 X SQ= 13.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.57	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.90	12 9 9 81 X SQ= 21.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.86	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.62	18 34 3 56 X SQ= 13.85 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	1.00	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.51	21 44 0 46 X SQ= 16.28 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	1.00	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.96	22 4 0 87 X SQ= 86.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.55	81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.97	10 1 12 28 X SQ= 10.68 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	1.00	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.59	22 38 0 54 X SQ= 22.24 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	1.00	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.83	20 13 0 62 X SQ= 44.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
93	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	1.00	93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.64	0 32 21 57 X SQ= 8.98 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.91	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.56	20 31 2 39 X SQ= 12.90 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	1.00	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.66	22 45 0 23 X SQ= 8.30 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.77	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.95	17 5 5 88 X SQ= 54.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.95	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.55	21 29 1 35 X SQ= 14.92 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
100	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	1.00	100	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.66	22 42 0 22 X SQ= 8.44 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.91	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.72	20 21 2 55 X SQ= 25.53 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.91	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.55	20 39 2 47 X SQ= 12.89 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.91	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.66	20 23 2 45 X SQ= 19.48 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
106	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.91	106	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.53	20 32 2 28 X SQ= 8.24 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.91	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.71	20 26 2 63 X SQ= 25.18 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH (15)	0.50	110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.93	10 5 10 70 X SQ= 19.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.90	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.53	18 35 2 40 X SQ= 10.33 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)

115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.80	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.96	16 4 4 87 X SQ= 58.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	1.00	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.87	20 12 0 79 X SQ= 56.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.86	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.91	3 71 19 7 X SQ= 49.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.55	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	12 78 10 0 X SQ= 34.51 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	1.00	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.58	0 54 22 39 X SQ= 21.81 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.82	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.85	4 79 18 14 X SQ= 36.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	124	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.82	0 14 20 65 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.040 RV NO (NO)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.95	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.80	1 63 19 16 X SQ= 35.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.80	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	4 79 16 0 X SQ= 69.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.82	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.58	18 30 4 41 X SQ= 9.00 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	132	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.84	18 49 0 9 X SQ= 1.86 P = 0.105 RV NO (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.86	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.53	19 38 3 43 X SQ= 9.36 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.86	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.87	19 10 3 65 X SQ= 39.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	1.00	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.64	20 28 0 49 X SQ= 23.24 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.75	144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.86	2 32 6 5 X SQ= 10.34 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.79	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.89	15 8 4 63 X SQ= 32.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.86	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.60	19 23 3 35 X SQ= 12.14 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.91	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.51	2 38 20 36 X SQ= 10.78 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.82	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.57	4 43 18 32 X SQ= 8.93 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.95	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.57	1 33 21 44 X SQ= 9.50 P = 0.001 RV ND (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.86	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.82	19 15 3 69 X SQ= 34.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.91	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.55	20 38 2 46 X SQ= 12.89 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.95	170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.52	1 38 21 42 X SQ= 11.72 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.52	172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.89	11 10 10 78 X SQ= 15.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.82	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.87	18 10 4 68 X SQ= 37.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.91	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.60	20 31 2 47 X SQ= 15.99 P = 0. RV YES (ND)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.77	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.59	5 48 17 34 X SQ= 7.53 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	

179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.85	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.69	3 49 17 22 X SQ= 16.45 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.86	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.96	19 2 3 52 X SQ= 49.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.90	186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.56	2 29 19 37 X SQ= 6.79 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.91	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.81	2 64 20 15 X SQ= 36.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.77	189	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.98	5 2 17 91 X SQ= 9.82 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
190	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.69	190	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.91	11 21 5 2 X SQ= 1.91 P = 0.101 RV NO (YES)	
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.70	0 28 22 64 X SQ= 7.31 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.86	0 13 22 79 X SQ= 2.25 P = 0.070 RV NO (NO)	

3 POLITIES LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE (13)					3 POLITIES LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)				

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

13 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	PORTUGAL
SPAIN	SWITZERLAND	UK							

102 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI
CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY
ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN
KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA
TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA								

21	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	1.00	21	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.69	0 32 13 70 X SQ= 4.20 P = 0.018 RV NO (ND)
22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.62	22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.62	5 63 8 39 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.138 RV YES (ND)
24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.77	24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.50	10 51 3 51 X SQ= 2.36 P = 0.082 RV YES (ND)
25	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (17)	0.54	25	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.90	7 10 6 92 X SQ= 14.43 P = 0. RV YES (ND)

26	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	1.00	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.66	13 0 X SQ= 17.85 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	35 67
28	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	1.00	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.64	0 13 X SQ= 16.53 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	62 35
29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.53	12 0 X SQ= 9.83 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	44 49
30	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	1.00	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.56	0 13 X SQ= 12.28 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	56 44
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.69	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.85	4 9 X SQ= 17.35 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	86 15
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.69	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.79	9 4 X SQ= 11.74 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	21 81
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.92	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.51	12 1 X SQ= 7.04 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	50 52
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.77	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.86	10 3 X SQ= 24.19 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	14 88
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.92	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.71	12 1 X SQ= 17.06 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	30 72

37	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	1.00	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.50	13 51 0 51 X SQ= 9.74 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.69	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.71	9 29 4 72 X SQ= 6.78 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
40	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	1.00	40	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.60	13 58 0 39 X SQ= 6.44 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.62	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.89	8 11 5 89 X SQ= 17.55 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.85	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.75	11 25 2 74 X SQ= 15.94 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.58	13 42 0 57 X SQ= 13.03 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.69	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.84	9 16 4 86 X SQ= 16.41 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.56	13 42 0 54 X SQ= 12.33 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.75	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.61	9 34 3 53 X SQ= 4.17 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	

51	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.83	51	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.59	10 50 2 35 X SQ= 1.74 P = 0.124 RV NO (NO)	
52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.81	13 69 0 16 X SQ= 1.71 P = 0.118 RV NO (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.85	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.74	11 26 2 74 X SQ= 15.39 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.65	13 65 0 35 X SQ= 5.06 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.68	13 66 0 31 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	1.00	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.67	13 33 0 68 X SQ= 18.98 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
67	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	1.00	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.70	13 67 0 29 X SQ= 3.92 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.77	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.58	10 42 3 59 X SQ= 4.46 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	
69	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.85	69	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.52	11 53 2 48 X SQ= 3.61 P = 0.037 RV NO (NO)	

70	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, AND LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (21)	0.54	70	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.85	7 14 6 78 X SQ= 8.35 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.67	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.87	8 13 4 86 X SQ= 16.66 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.92	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.59	11 41 1 58 X SQ= 8.93 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	1.00	73	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.54	12 53 0 46 X SQ= 7.70 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	1.00	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.53	13 47 0 54 X SQ= 11.15 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	1.00	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.74	11 22 0 62 X SQ= 20.23 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
93	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	1.00	93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.67	0 32 12 66 X SQ= 4.06 P = 0.017 RV NO (NO)
94	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.85	94	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.51	11 40 2 39 X SQ= 3.93 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)
96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	1.00	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.70	13 54 0 23 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)

98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.62	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.86	8 14 5 88 X SQ= 14.09 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
99	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.92	99	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.52	12 38 1 35 X SQ= 5.79 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)
100	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	1.00	100	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.70	13 51 0 22 X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.85	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.65	11 30 2 55 X SQ= 9.34 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.85	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.58	11 32 2 45 X SQ= 6.63 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.85	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.64	11 35 2 63 X SQ= 9.38 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
111	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.82	111	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.52	9 44 2 40 X SQ= 2.33 P = 0.105 RV NO (NO)
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.73	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.88	8 12 3 88 X SQ= 20.80 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	1.00	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.79	11 21 0 79 X SQ= 26.42 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

118	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.85	118	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.56	2 38 11 49 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.070 RV NO (NO)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.77	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.82	3 71 10 16 X SQ= 17.21 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	1.00	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.53	0 54 13 48 X SQ= 10.94 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.77	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.78	3 80 10 22 X SQ= 14.94 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.92	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.72	1 63 11 24 X SQ= 16.25 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.67	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.91	4 79 8 8 X SQ= 21.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.85	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.54	11 37 2 43 X SQ= 5.14 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
133	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.92	133	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.70	1 28 12 64 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.107 RV NO (NO)	
134	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.77	134	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.52	10 47 3 43 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.136 RV NO (NO)	

137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.77	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.77	10	19	X SQ= 13.35 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
						3	65	
138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	1.00	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.57	11	37	X SQ= 10.49 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
						0	49	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.80	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.81	8	15	X SQ= 14.46 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
						2	65	
153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.77	153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.52	10	32	X SQ= 2.64 P = 0.071 RV YES (NO)
						3	35	
158	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.85	158	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.54	2	38	X SQ= 3.11 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)
						11	45	
161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.77	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.52	3	44	X SQ= 2.79 P = 0.073 RV YES (NO)
						10	40	
164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.92	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.62	1	33	X SQ= 3.45 P = 0.032 RV NO (NO)
						12	53	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.77	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.74	10	24	X SQ= 11.43 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
						3	69	
170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	1.00	170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.56	0	39	X SQ= 7.46 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
						13	50	

174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.69	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.78	9 4 X SQ= 10.36 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	19 68
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.85	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.54	11 2 X SQ= 5.30 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	40 47
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.85	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.56	2 11 X SQ= 5.99 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	51 40
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.73	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.61	3 8 X SQ= 3.28 P = 0.050 RV YES (NO)	49 31
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.77	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.83	10 3 X SQ= 16.20 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	11 52
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.85	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.73	2 11 X SQ= 14.01 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	64 24
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.85	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.79	11 2 X SQ= 19.91 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	21 79
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.72	0 13 X SQ= 3.40 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)	28 73

4	POLITIES LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA (51	4	POLITIES LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SCANDINAVIA (110)

SUBJECT ONLY

5 IN LEFT COLUMN

DENMARK	FINLAND	ICELAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN

110 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR
COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LED)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA
LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN
SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR
UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA

29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	29	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.51	5 51 0 49 X SQ= 2.84 P = 0.059 RV NO (NO)
30	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	1.00	30	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.52	0 56 5 52 X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.057 RV YES (NO)
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.80	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.82	1 89 4 20 X SQ= 7.54 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)
35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	1.00	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.83	5 19 0 91 X SQ= 15.13 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (381	0.80	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.69	4 34 1 75 X SQ= 3.16 P = 0.042 RV YES (NO)	
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.80	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.86	4 15 1 93 X SQ= 10.58 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	1.00	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.71	5 31 0 76 X SQ= 8.03 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (251	1.00	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.82	5 20 0 90 X SQ= 14.32 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (431	1.00	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.60	5 38 0 56 X SQ= 4.65 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (141	1.00	53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.92	5 9 0 101 X SQ= 29.61 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PROTESTANT, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (5)	1.00	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 0 25 X SQ= 23.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	1.00	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.62	5 41 0 68 X SQ= 5.36 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
66	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	1.00	66	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.51	5 52 0 49 X SQ= 2.77 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)	

69	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	1.00	69	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.54	5 0 X SQ= P = RV NO	59 50 2.43 0.066 (NO)
70	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, AND LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (21)	0.80	70	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.83	4 1 X SQ= P = RV YES	17 83 8.20 0.005 (NO)
71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.60	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.83	3 2 X SQ= P = RV YES	18 88 3.30 0.046 (NO)
73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	1.00	73	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.57	5 0 X SQ= P = RV NO	60 46 2.13 0.075 (NO)
85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	1.00	85	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.50	5 0 X SQ= P = RV NO	55 54 2.93 0.059 (NO)
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	1.00	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.69	5 0 X SQ= P = RV YES	28 62 7.11 0.004 (NO)
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.53	5 0 X SQ= P = RV NO	46 41 2.56 0.063 (NO)
98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	1.00	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.85	5 0 X SQ= P = RV YES	17 93 16.97 0. (NO)
101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	1.00	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.61	5 0 X SQ= P = RV YES	36 57 5.02 0.011 (NO)

105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	1.00	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.55	5 38 0 47 X SQ= 3.78 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)
107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	1.00	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.61	5 41 0 65 X SQ= 5.09 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)
110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH (15)	0.80	110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.88	4 11 1 79 X SQ= 11.66 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
111	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	1.00	111	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.53	5 48 0 42 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.064 RV NO (NO)
114	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	1.00	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.59	0 61 5 42 X SQ= 4.61 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.80	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.85	4 16 1 90 X SQ= 9.58 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	1.00	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.75	5 27 0 79 X SQ= 9.55 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARITUCLATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED (10)	1.00	120	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.95	0 90 5 5 X SQ= 37.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	1.00	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.75	0 83 5 27 X SQ= 10.06 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)

123	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (8)	0.80	123	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.96	1 106 4 4 X SQ= 32.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	1.00	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.88	0 83 5 11 X SQ= 21.19 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	1.00	127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.82	5 16 0 72 X SQ= 13.74 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
131	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	1.00	131	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.50	0 30 5 30 X SQ= 2.85 P = 0.057 RV YES (NO)	
134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	1.00	134	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.53	5 52 0 46 X SQ= 2.55 P = 0.063 RV NO (NO)	
136	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT (12)	0.80	136	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.91	4 8 1 84 X SQ= 16.15 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	1.00	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.74	5 24 0 68 X SQ= 9.09 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
142	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	1.00	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.73	5 25 0 66 X SQ= 8.47 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	1.00	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.79	5 18 0 67 X SQ= 11.56 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	1.00	153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.51	5 37 0 38 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.056 RV YES (NO)
158	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	1.00	158	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.56	0 40 5 51 X SQ= 2.18 P = 0.073 RV NO (NO)
161	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	1.00	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.51	0 47 5 45 X SQ= 3.12 P = 0.057 RV YES (NO)
168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	1.00	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.71	5 29 0 72 X SQ= 8.08 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.60	172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.83	3 18 2 86 X SQ= 3.18 P = 0.048 RV YES (NO)
174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	1.00	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.76	5 23 0 72 X SQ= 10.04 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	1.00	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.60	0 52 5 34 X SQ= 4.80 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)
181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	1.00	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.77	5 16 0 55 X SQ= 10.41 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	1.00	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.69	0 66 5 30 X SQ= 7.12 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)

5 POLITIES LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	5 POLITIES LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

18 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY
LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NORWAY	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK		

9 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	POLAND	RUMANIA	USSR	YUGOSLAVIA

88 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA
GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA
JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA
UAR	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN		

29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	29	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.78	17 7 0 2 X SQ= 1.56 P = 0.111 RV NO (YES)
30	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	1.00	30	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.67	0 3 18 6 X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.029 RV NO (YES)
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.72	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.89	5 8 13 1 X SQ= 6.69 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.83	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.67	15 3 3 6 X SQ= 4.69 P = 0.026 RV YES (YES)

50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.82	50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	1.00	14 3	0 9
						X SQ= 12.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.88	51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	1.00	15 2	0 9
						X SQ= 15.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (16)	0.67	18 0	3 6
						X SQ= 11.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
53	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (14)	0.50	53	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.89	9 9	1 8
						X SQ= 2.40 P = 0.091 RV YES (NO)	
57	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.56	57	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.89	8 10	1 8
						X SQ= 1.69 P = 0.110 RV NO (NO)	
66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.78	66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.62	14 4	3 5
						X SQ= 2.39 P = 0.078 RV YES (YES)	
70	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, AND LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (21)	0.61	70	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.89	11 7	1 8
						X SQ= 4.22 P = 0.019 RV YES (YES)	
71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.65	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.87	11 6	1 7
						X SQ= 4.03 P = 0.030 RV YES (YES)	
74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	1.00	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.56	18 0	4 5
						X SQ= 8.87 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	

81	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.67	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	6 12 X SQ= 1.84 P = 0.132 RV NO (NO)	0 8
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	1.00	89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	16 0 X SQ= 20.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	9
93	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	1.00	93	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	1.00	0 17 X SQ= 21.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	9 0
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.89	94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	1.00	16 2 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	0 9
95	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.89	95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN (16)	1.00	16 2 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	0 9
98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.72	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.89	13 5 X SQ= 6.69 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	1 8
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.89	101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	1.00	16 2 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	0 9
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.89	102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	1.00	16 2 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	0 9
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.89	105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	1.00	16 2 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	0 9

106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.89	106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	1.00	16 0 2 9 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.89	107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	1.00	16 0 2 9 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.89	108	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	1.00	16 0 2 9 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.75	115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	12 0 4 8 X SQ= 9.19 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	1.00	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	16 0 0 8 X SQ= 19.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
117	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	1.00	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.62	16 3 0 5 X SQ= 9.13 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.89	118	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	1.00	2 9 16 0 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.83	119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	3 9 15 0 X SQ= 13.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
122	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.83	122	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.56	3 5 15 4 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.072 RV YES (YES)

123	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.67	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	12 9 6 0 X SQ= 2.17 P = 0.071 RV NO (NO)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.94	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.80	1 4 16 1 X SQ= 8.23 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.76	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	4 5 13 0 X SQ= 6.45 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	0.50	127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	9 0 9 9 X SQ= 4.69 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.89	128	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	1.00	16 0 2 9 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.89	129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	1.00	16 0 2 9 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.83	134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	1.00	15 0 3 9 X SQ= 13.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
136	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT (12)	0.50	136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	9 0 9 9 X SQ= 4.69 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.83	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	15 0 3 9 X SQ= 13.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	1.00	138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	1.00	16 0 0 9 X SQ= 20.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.89	139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	1.00	2 9 16 0 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.61	142	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	1.00	11 0 7 9 X SQ= 6.92 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
144	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.50	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	2 9 2 0 X SQ= 2.17 P = 0.077 RV YES (YES)
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.87	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	13 0 2 9 X SQ= 13.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.89	160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	1.00	2 9 16 0 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.83	161	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	1.00	3 9 15 0 X SQ= 13.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.83	168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	15 0 3 9 X SQ= 13.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.89	169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	1.00	16 0 2 9 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

171	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.62	171	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	1.00	6 / 10	0 / 9
						X SQ= 2.62	
						P = 0.057	
						RV NO (NO)	
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.53	172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	8 / 9	0 / 9
						X SQ= 4.11	
						P = 0.023	
						RV NO (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.78	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	14 / 4	0 / 9
						X SQ= 11.59	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.89	175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	1.00	16 / 2	0 / 9
						X SQ= 16.13	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.89	176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	1.00	16 / 2	0 / 9
						X SQ= 16.13	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.78	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.78	4 / 14	7 / 2
						X SQ= 5.54	
						P = 0.011	
						RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.81	179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	3 / 13	9 / 0
						X SQ= 12.15	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.83	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	15 / 3	0 / 9
						X SQ= 13.67	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.88	186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	1.00	2 / 15	9 / 0
						X SQ= 15.33	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	

187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.89	187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	1.00	2 9 16 0 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.61	188	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	1.00	11 0 7 9 X SQ= 6.92 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE COMMUNIST (13)	1.00	0 9 18 0 X SQ= 22.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

6 POLITIES LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (22)						6 POLITIES LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)			

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

22 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	TRINIDAD
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

93 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA
DAHOMEY	DENMARK	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE
GUINEA	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
IVORY COAST	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG
MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER
NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SD AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND
TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA							

24 LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.64	24 LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.57	8 53 14 40 X SQ= 2.27 P = 0.099 RV YES (NO)	
28 TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.86	28 TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.51	19 43 3 45 X SQ= 8.60 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
29 LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.74	29 LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.51	14 42 5 44 X SQ= 2.93 P = 0.074 RV YES (NO)	
30 TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.77	30 TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.56	5 51 17 40 X SQ= 6.59 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	

37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.86	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.52	19 45 3 48 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.79	0 19 21 73 X SQ= 3.84 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)	
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.73	0 25 22 68 X SQ= 6.06 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.70	22 62 0 26 X SQ= 6.95 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	53	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.85	0 14 22 79 X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.068 RV NO (NO)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.62	22 56 0 35 X SQ= 10.53 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC (25)	0.68	57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.89	15 10 7 83 X SQ= 31.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	62	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.67	0 5 15 10 X SQ= 3.84 P = 0.042 RV NO (YES)	
67	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS (27)	0.85	67	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.87	3 77 17 12 X SQ= 39.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.73	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.61	16 36 6 56 X SQ= 6.78 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.82	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.50	18 46 4 46 X SQ= 6.06 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
71	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	1.00	71	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.76	0 21 22 68 X SQ= 4.96 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.91	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.64	20 32 2 57 X SQ= 19.24 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.95	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.55	21 41 1 51 X SQ= 16.54 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.65	0 26 22 48 X SQ= 8.90 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.95	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.85	21 7 1 40 X SQ= 37.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.50	21 7 0 7 X SQ= 10.19 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.86	79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	3 46 18 0 X SQ= 49.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.65	0 11 20 20 X SQ= 7.07 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.91	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.63	20 31 2 53 X SQ= 18.26 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
86	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.91	86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.61	20 56 2 36 X SQ= 5.92 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)	
92	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.95	92	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.79	1 19 21 72 X SQ= 2.22 P = 0.116 RV NO (NO)	
93	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.86	93	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.67	3 29 19 59 X SQ= 2.32 P = 0.114 RV NO (NO)	
94	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.74	94	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.51	14 37 5 36 X SQ= 2.36 P = 0.119 RV NO (NO)	
98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.76	0 22 22 71 X SQ= 5.00 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.87	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.69	2 48 14 22 X SQ= 14.60 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	0.50	100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.81	9 55 9 13 X SQ= 5.60 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	

102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.75	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.50	15 44 5 44 X SQ= 3.16 P = 0.050 RV YES (NO)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.76	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.59	13 30 4 43 X SQ= 5.57 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.67	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.64	14 32 7 58 X SQ= 5.57 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.78	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.63	4 57 14 33 X SQ= 8.71 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.86	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.54	19 41 3 48 X SQ= 9.97 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
118	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.82	118	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.54	4 36 18 42 X SQ= 4.49 P = 0.025 RV NO (NO)
120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	120	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.87	22 68 0 10 X SQ= 1.87 P = 0.112 RV NO (NO)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.95	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.57	1 53 21 40 X SQ= 17.60 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	124	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.83	0 14 18 67 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.067 RV NO (NO)

126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.80	18 65 0 16 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.74	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.54	14 34 5 40 X SQ= 3.61 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)	
132	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.72	132	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.93	13 54 5 4 X SQ= 3.91 P = 0.030 RV NO (YES)	
134	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.60	134	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.59	8 49 12 34 X SQ= 1.66 P = 0.140 RV YES (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.80	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.58	16 32 4 45 X SQ= 7.91 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.55	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.75	11 19 9 57 X SQ= 5.31 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.75	144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.80	1 33 3 8 X SQ= 3.44 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.93	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.63	1 41 14 24 X SQ= 13.37 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.73	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.78	4 51 11 14 X SQ= 12.90 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.70	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.66	14 26 6 50 X SQ= 6.94 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.91	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.58	2 32 20 45 X SQ= 6.62 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.85	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.52	17 41 3 45 X SQ= 7.68 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.85	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.73	17 22 3 60 X SQ= 20.64 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
171	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	1.00	171	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.85	0 12 20 70 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.117 RV NO (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.78	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.55	14 37 4 45 X SQ= 5.06 P = 0.018 RV YES (NO)	
178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.67	178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.55	7 46 14 37 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.089 RV YES (NO)	
181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.61	0 21 22 33 X SQ= 9.96 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.57	22 33 0 25 X SQ= 11.86 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.91	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.73	10 11 1 30 X SQ= 12.25 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
186	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.90	186	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.61	1 30 9 47 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.089 RV NO (NO)	
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.86	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.86	19 13 3 78 X SQ= 41.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.70	0 28 22 64 X SQ= 7.31 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.86	0 13 21 80 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.074 RV NO (NO)	

M

MATRIX

6 POLITIES
LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN,
CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (22)

6 POLITIES
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE
CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,
OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)

107 POLITIES
WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS
ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	.AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CEYLON
COSTA RICA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	.CYPRUS	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR
PANAMA	TRINIDAD	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA		.GREECE	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL
					.ITALY	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R
					.MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES
					.SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TURKEY	UGANDA
					.UK	US			

14 . 32

7 . 58

107 POLITIES
WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS
ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS,
ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS,
OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)

CUBA	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HAITI	MEXICO	.AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	BURMA
NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY				.BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROON	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
					.CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CZECHOS*KIA	DAHOMEY
					.ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA
					.HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST
					.JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LIBERIA	LIBYA
					.MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL
					.NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	POLAND	PORTUGAL
					.RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA
					.SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA
					.THAILAND	TUNISIA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA
					.VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA		

7 POLITIES
LOCATED IN CENTRAL AMERICA, RATHER THAN
IN SOUTH AMERICA (7)

7 POLITIES
LOCATED IN SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN
IN CENTRAL AMERICA (10)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

7 IN LEFT COLUMN

COSTA RICA	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA

10 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	ECUADOR	PARAGUAY	PERU	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA

98 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LED)	CUBA	CYPRUS
CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS
LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR
UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA		

21	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.86	21	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (32)	0.60	1 6 6 4 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.134 RV YES (YES)
22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.86	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.90	1 9 6 1 X SQ= 6.87 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
24	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.86	24	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.60	1 6 6 4 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.134 RV YES (YES)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.86	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.70	1 7 6 3 X SQ= 3.14 P = 0.050 RV YES (YES)

36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	1.00	36	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.60	0 7	4 6
						X SQ= 1.78	
						P = 0.103	
						RV NO	(YES)
40	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.71	40	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.80	2 5	8 2
						X SQ= 2.62	
						P = 0.058	
						RV YES	(YES)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.83	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.80	1 5	8 2
						X SQ= 3.81	
						P = 0.035	
						RV YES	(YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.71	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.89	2 5	8 1
						X SQ= 3.81	
						P = 0.035	
						RV YES	(YES)
114	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	1.00	114	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.50	0 5	4 4
						X SQ= 1.65	
						P = 0.105	
						RV YES	(YES)
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.56	0 6	4 5
						X SQ= 1.72	
						P = 0.103	
						RV NO	(YES)
157	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED (14)	0.71	157	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.80	5 2	2 8
						X SQ= 2.62	
						P = 0.058	
						RV YES	(YES)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.71	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.90	5 2	1 9
						X SQ= 4.38	
						P = 0.035	
						RV YES	(YES)

****

8 POLITIES
LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA,
OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (18)

8 POLITIES
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA
SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

18 IN LEFT COLUMN

BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHINA, PR	INDIA	INDONESIA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS
MALAYA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	THAILAND	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP		

97 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS*KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND
FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN
LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR
UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA			

24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.83	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.53	15 46 3 51 X SQ= 6.49 P = 0.009	RV YES (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.78	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.65	14 34 4 63 X SQ= 9.71 P = 0.001	RV YES (NO)
28	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.76	28	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.53	13 49 4 44 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.109	RV NO (NO)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.83	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.58	2 54 10 39 X SQ= 5.75 P = 0.011	RV YES (NO)

30	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.71	30	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.54	12 44 5 52 X SQ= 2.62 P = 0.070 RV YES (NO)	
31	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	1.00	31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.75	18 72 0 24 X SQ= 4.30 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
34	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.72	34	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.51	13 49 5 48 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.123 RV NO (NO)	
35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.75	0 24 18 73 X SQ= 4.23 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
36	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.89	36	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.59	2 40 16 57 X SQ= 4.72 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.83	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.63	3 61 15 36 X SQ= 11.34 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.80	0 19 18 76 X SQ= 3.02 P = 0.039 RV NO (NO)	
42	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.94	42	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.63	1 35 17 59 X SQ= 5.57 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)	
44	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.94	44	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.75	1 24 17 73 X SQ= 2.25 P = 0.074 RV NO (NO)	

47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.87	47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.51	1 24 7 23 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.059 RV YES (NO)
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.65	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.67	6 54 11 26 X SQ= 4.87 P = 0.025 RV YES (ND)
54	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.87	54	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.64	2 35 14 62 X SQ= 2.48 P = 0.085 RV NO (NO)
56	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.92	56	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.69	12 67 1 30 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.105 RV NO (NO)
63	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.94	63	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.53	1 45 17 51 X SQ= 9.10 P = 0.001 RV NO (ND)
67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.94	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.70	16 64 1 28 X SQ= 3.26 P = 0.038 RV NO (ND)
68	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.76	68	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.51	4 48 13 49 X SQ= 2.95 P = 0.065 RV NO (NO)
72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.75	72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.51	4 48 12 47 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.065 RV YES (NO)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.69	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.63	5 60 11 35 X SQ= 4.51 P = 0.026 RV YES (NO)

75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.72	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.59	5 57 13 39 X SQ= 4.89 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)	
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.69	9 40 0 18 X SQ= 2.40 P = 0.057 RV NO (NO)	
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.55	0 51 14 41 X SQ= 12.82 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.59	M 14 17 0 24 X SQ= 12.26 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
89	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.87	89	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.61	2 31 13 49 X SQ= 2.57 P = 0.077 RV NO (NO)	
93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.53	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.75	8 24 7 71 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.72	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.62	5 46 13 28 X SQ= 5.61 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.77	0 22 18 75 X SQ= 3.69 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.71	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.59	5 54 12 37 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	

108	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.57	108	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.69	6 59 8 27 X SQ= 2.47 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
116	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.88	116	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.68	2 30 15 64 X SQ= 1.95 P = 0.144 RV NO (NO)	
118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.61	118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.65	11 29 7 53 X SQ= 3.07 P = 0.062 RV YES (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.94	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.62	17 37 1 60 X SQ= 17.13 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.67	18 65 0 32 X SQ= 6.67 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.81	15 68 0 16 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.071 RV NO (NO)	
129	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.64	129	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.63	4 52 7 30 X SQ= 1.94 P = 0.107 RV YES (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.79	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.54	3 45 11 38 X SQ= 3.92 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)	
161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.71	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.55	10 37 4 46 X SQ= 2.47 P = 0.084 RV YES (NO)	

169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.69	169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.59	5 53 11 37 X SQ= 3.15 P = 0.056 RV YES (NO)	
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.60	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.78	6 66 9 19 X SQ= 7.19 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
179	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.77	179	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.54	10 42 3 36 X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.142 RV NO (NO)	
181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	181	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.68	0 21 10 45 X SQ= 2.95 P = 0.054 RV NO (NO)	
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.80	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.83	1 24 4 5 X SQ= 5.71 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
186	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.58	186	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.68	7 24 5 51 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.106 RV YES (NO)	
188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.94	188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.67	1 31 17 64 X SQ= 4.21 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	

MATRIX

8 POLITIES
LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA,
OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (18)

8 POLITIES
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA
SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)

84 POLITIES
WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN
UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)

BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	INDIA	INDONESIA	ALGERIA	CYPRUS	IRAQ	ISRAEL	JAMAICA
KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	MALAYA	MONGOLIA	JORDAN	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MOROCCO
PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP		SA'U ARABIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA
					UAR	YEMEN			

14 17

0 24

84 POLITIES
WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN
DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)

BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA
IVORY COAST	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER
NIGERIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	

9	POLITIES LOCATED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (9)	9	POLITIES LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

9 IN LEFT COLUMN

BURMA	CAMBODIA	INDONESIA	LAOS	MALAYA	PHILIPPINES	THAILAND	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	

106 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG
MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA
NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK
US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA				

29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	1.00	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.56	0 56 5 44 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)
37	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.78	37	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.58	2 62 7 44 X SQ= 3.07 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)
42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	1.00	42	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.65	0 36 9 67 X SQ= 3.17 P = 0.031 RV NO (NO)
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	44	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.76	0 25 9 81 X SQ= 1.50 P = 0.123 RV NO (NO)

54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	54	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.65	0 37 8 68 X SQ= 2.74 P = 0.051 RV NO (NO)	
63	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.89	63	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.57	1 45 8 60 X SQ= 2.28 P = 0.082 RV NO (NO)	
68	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	1.00	68	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.50	0 52 9 53 X SQ= 6.32 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.89	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.50	1 51 8 51 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.89	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.63	1 64 8 38 X SQ= 7.08 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.89	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.58	1 61 8 44 X SQ= 5.60 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.70	0 26 8 62 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.103 RV NO (NO)	
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.52	0 51 8 47 X SQ= 6.07 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.51	8 23 0 24 X SQ= 5.32 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	

85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.89	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.56	1 59 8 46 X SQ= 5.07 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.78	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.70	2 74 7 31 X SQ= 6.65 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
93	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.56	93	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.73	5 27 4 74 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.118 RV YES (NO)	
94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.78	94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.59	2 49 7 34 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.073 RV YES (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.62	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.78	3 64 5 18 X SQ= 4.35 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	
102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.78	102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.58	2 57 7 42 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.076 RV YES (NO)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	1.00	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.58	9 45 0 61 X SQ= 8.84 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.70	9 74 0 32 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.060 RV NO (ND)	
138	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.86	138	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.52	1 47 6 43 X SQ= 2.38 P = 0.111 RV YES (NO)	

169	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.75	169	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.57	2 6	56 42
						X SQ=	1.92
						P =	0.137
						RV YES	(NO)
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.62	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.75	3 5	69 23
						X SQ=	3.44
						P =	0.037
						RV YES	(NO)
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.75	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.80	1 3	24 6
						X SQ=	3.02
						P =	0.048
						RV YES	(NO)

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10 POLITIES
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)

10 POLITIES
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,
OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

33 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON
GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER
NIGERIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA
UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA							

82 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA
DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA
HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL
ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA
THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA								

22	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.79	22	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.51	26 42 7 40 X SQ= 6.30 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.67	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.61	11 50 22 32 X SQ= 6.15 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)
25	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	1.00	25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.79	0 17 33 65 X SQ= 6.47 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.91	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.55	3 45 30 37 X SQ= 18.45 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.85	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.71	5 51 28 21 X SQ= 26.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.91	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.67	30 26 3 54 X SQ= 29.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
31	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.97	31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.72	32 58 1 23 X SQ= 7.61 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.79	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.67	7 55 26 27 X SQ= 18.12 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.71	0 24 33 58 X SQ= 10.50 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.97	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.50	1 41 32 41 X SQ= 20.41 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.88	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.73	4 60 29 22 X SQ= 33.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.69	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.78	10 61 22 17 X SQ= 19.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.94	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.67	2 53 31 26 X SQ= 32.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.71	0 55 32 22 X SQ= 43.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.70	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.94	9 75 21 5 X SQ= 45.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
52	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.96	52	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.80	22 60 1 15 X SQ= 2.11 P = 0.108 RV NO (NO)	
54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.54	0 37 33 43 X SQ= 20.64 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.82	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.90	6 72 27 8 X SQ= 53.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.76	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.92	8 71 25 6 X SQ= 49.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
64	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	1.00	64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.82	0 46 8 10 X SQ= 19.48 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.73	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.64	8 49 22 27 X SQ= 10.89 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.79	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.56	7 45 26 36 X SQ= 9.81 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

69	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.79	69	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.70	7 26	57 24
						X SQ= 21.06	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
72	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE OATE OF INOEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.91	72	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.63	3 30	49 29
						X SQ= 24.77	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
73	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INOEPENOENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.91	73	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE OATE OF INOEPENOENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.79	3 30	62 16
						X SQ= 44.50	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZEO THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.60	0 31	26 39
						X SQ= 15.04	
						P = 0.	
						RV NO (NO)	
77	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZEO, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZEO, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.93	77	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZEO, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZEO, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.67	2 28	26 13
						X SQ= 22.89	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY OEPENOENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY OEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.56	26 0	23 18
						X SQ= 13.45	
						P = 0.	
						RV NO (YES)	
80	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE OATE OF INOEPENOENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY OEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.72	80	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INOEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.67	7 18	12 6
						X SQ= 4.87	
						P = 0.016	
						RV YES (YES)	
82	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MOOERNIZATION IS OEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNOEVELOPEO TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN OERIVED (55)	0.97	82	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN OERIVED, RATHER THAN OEVELOPEO TUTELARY OR UNOEVELOPEO TUTELARY (51)	0.68	1 31	50 24
						X SQ= 34.63	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
84	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MOOERNIZATION IS UNOEVELOPEO TUTELARY, RATHER THAN OEVELOPEO TUTELARY (24)	0.77	84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OEVELOPEO TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNOEVELOPEO TUTELARY (31)	1.00	M 7 24	24 0
						X SQ= 29.89	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	

85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.85	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.68	5 55 28 26 X SQ= 24.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.79	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.85	7 69 26 12 X SQ= 40.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.93	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.90	25 6 2 56 X SQ= 53.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.80	32 63 0 16 X SQ= 6.02 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.50	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.80	8 59 8 15 X SQ= 4.65 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.52	8 15 0 16 X SQ= 5.03 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)
98	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.94	98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.76	2 20 31 62 X SQ= 3.99 P = 0.034 RV NO (NO)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.83	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.50	4 37 20 37 X SQ= 6.96 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.88	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.62	3 40 22 25 X SQ= 15.83 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

106	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.52	106	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.69	10 42 11 19 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.115 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.91	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.54	3 43 29 36 X SQ= 17.24 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.77	0 15 29 51 X SQ= 6.21 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.74	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.51	23 38 8 39 X SQ= 4.58 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	
115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.74	0 20 33 58 X SQ= 8.66 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
116	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.97	116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.60	1 31 32 47 X SQ= 13.50 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.85	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.71	5 55 28 23 X SQ= 26.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.95	119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.69	18 56 1 25 X SQ= 4.00 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.82	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.67	27 27 6 55 X SQ= 20.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.61	33 50 0 32 X SQ= 15.95 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
125	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.78	125	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.58	25 39 7 28 X SQ= 2.94 P = 0.072 RV NO (NO)
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.76	32 51 0 16 X SQ= 7.44 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.68	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.60	9 39 19 26 X SQ= 5.02 P = 0.023 RV YES (NO)
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.57	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.68	12 44 16 21 X SQ= 4.06 P = 0.037 RV YES (NO)
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.83	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.62	10 20 2 33 X SQ= 6.45 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)
132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	132	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.81	29 38 0 9 X SQ= 4.60 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.61	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.86	19 10 12 64 X SQ= 22.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.73	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.52	22 35 8 38 X SQ= 4.57 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)

137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.58	0 29 28 40 X SQ= 14.84 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.82	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.62	5 43 23 26 X SQ= 14.02 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.53	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.77	M 17 17 15 56 X SQ= 7.73 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.73	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	8 0 22 70 X SQ= 16.83 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.63	0 23 28 39 X SQ= 12.07 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.55	148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	14 0 17 79 X SQ= 36.92 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
158	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.56	158	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.64	15 25 12 44 X SQ= 2.24 P = 0.108 RV YES (NO)	
161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.67	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.54	9 38 18 32 X SQ= 2.64 P = 0.074 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.78	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.82	M 21 13 6 59 X SQ= 28.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.61	169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.61	12 46 19 29 X SQ= 3.66 P = 0.053 RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.57	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.69	16 23 12 51 X SQ= 4.79 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)	
174	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.97	174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.61	1 27 29 43 X SQ= 11.25 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.73	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.61	8 43 22 27 X SQ= 8.81 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
176	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.87	176	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.66	26 46 4 24 X SQ= 3.59 P = 0.050 RV NO (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.77	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.60	24 29 7 44 X SQ= 10.91 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.79	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.51	19 33 5 34 X SQ= 5.29 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.77	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.98	7 48 24 1 X SQ= 46.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.96	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.89	24 1 1 8 X SQ= 20.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

187	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.81	187	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.60	21 45 5 30 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.061 RV NO (NO)	
188	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	1.00	188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.61	0 32 31 50 X SQ= 15.01 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	189	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.91	0 7 33 75 X SQ= 1.69 P = 0.107 RV NO (NO)	
192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.61	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.90	19 8 12 74 X SQ= 30.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.76	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.96	25 3 8 78 X SQ= 61.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.84	0 13 33 68 X SQ= 4.49 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	

M

MATRIX

10 POLITIES LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	10 POLITIES LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)
84 POLITIES WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	
ALGERIA, LIBERIA, LIBYA, MOROCCO, SUDAN, TUNISIA, UAR	BURMA, INDONESIA, KOREA, N, MONGOLIA, TRINIDAD, CAMBODIA, IRAQ, KOREA REP, PAKISTAN, VIETNAM, N, CEYLON, ISRAEL, LAOS, PHILIPPINES, VIETNAM REP, CYPRUS, JAMAICA, LEBANON, SA*U ARABIA, YEMEN, INDIA, JORDAN, MALAYA, SYRIA
7 . 24	
24 . 0	
84 POLITIES WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	
BURUNDI, CONGO(LEO), IVORY COAST, NIGERIA, TANGANYIKA, CAMEROUN, DAHOMEY, MALAGASY R, RWANDA, TOGO, CEN AFR REP, GABON, MALI, SENEGAL, UGANDA, CHAD, GHANA, MAURITANIA, SIERRE LEO, UPPER VOLTA, CONGO(BRA), GUINEA, NIGER, SOMALIA	

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MATRIX

10 POLITIES
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)

10 POLITIES
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,
OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)

128 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)

CAMEROUN	CONGO(LEO)	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MOROCCO	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA
NIGERIA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	UGANDA		BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	DENMARK
					ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR
					GREECE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA
					IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN
					LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
					NORWAY	PANAMA	PERU	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
					SYRIA	TRINIDAD	UK	VENEZUELA	

9 . 39

19 . 26

128 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)

BURUNDI	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CHINA, PR
GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	MALI	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS*KIA	DOMIN REP	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY
MAURITANIA	NIGER	RWANDA	SENEGAL	TANGANYIKA	KOREA, N	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY
TOGO	TUNISIA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA		PHILIPPINES	POLANO	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN
					TURKEY	USSR	US	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
					YUGOSLAVIA				

M

MATRIX

10 POLITIES
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)

10 POLITIES
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,
OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)

139 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
ONE-PARTY (34)

ALGERIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	DAHOMEY	GABON	ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CHINA, PR	CUBA
GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	LIBERIA	MALI	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	KOREA, N	MONGOLIA
MAURITANIA	NIGER	SENEGAL	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	USSR
UAR	UPPER VOLTA				VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA			

17 . 17

15 . 56

139 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)

BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	ETHIOPIA	AFGHANISTAN	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM
LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MOROCCO	NIGERIA	RWANDA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CANADA	CEYLON
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	UGANDA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK
					DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE
					GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS
					ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
					JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	LAOS	LEBANON
					LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
					NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU
					PHILIPPINES	SA'U ARABIA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD
					TURKEY	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA
					VIETNAM REP				

M

MATRIX

10 POLITIES
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)

10 POLITIES
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,
OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)

164 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)

ALGERIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CAMBODIA	CHINA, PR	CUBA	FRANCE	INDIA
DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	INDONESIA	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA, N	PAKISTAN
IVORY COAST	LIBYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	SA'U ARABIA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA		
NIGER	SENEGAL	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	UAR					
UPPER VOLTA									

21 . 13

6 . 59

164 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)

LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM
SUDAN					BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CEYLON
					CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK
					DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GERMANY, E
					GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS
					HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
					JAPAN	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA
					MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA
					NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES
					POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN
					SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UK
					US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	

11	POLITIES LOCATED IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (28)				11	POLITIES LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)					

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

28 IN LEFT COLUMN

BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
GUINEA	IVORY COAST	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA		

87 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
BURMA	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS
CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE
GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND
ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBYA
LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA*U ARABIA	SPAIN
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA			

22	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.79	22	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.53	22	46		
						6	41		
						X SQ=	4.77		
						P =	0.017		
						RV NO	(NO)		
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.71	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.61	8	53		
						20	34		
						X SQ=	7.65		
						P =	0.004		
						RV YES	(NO)		
25	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	1.00	25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.80	0	17		
						28	70		
						X SQ=	4.96		
						P =	0.011		
						RV NO	(NO)		
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.89	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.52	3	45		
						25	42		
						X SQ=	13.01		
						P =	0.		
						RV YES	(NO		

29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.96	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.71	1 55 27 22 X SQ= 35.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.93	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.65	26 30 2 55 X SQ= 25.66 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.86	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.67	4 58 24 29 X SQ= 21.33 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.96	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.72	1 63 27 24 X SQ= 37.93 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.75	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.78	7 64 21 18 X SQ= 23.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.96	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.64	1 54 27 30 X SQ= 28.59 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.67	0 55 27 27 X SQ= 33.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.81	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.94	5 79 21 5 X SQ= 57.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.80	18 64 0 16 X SQ= 2.96 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)	

54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.56	0 37 28 48 X SQ= 16.20 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.93	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.89	2 76 26 9 X SQ= 62.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.89	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.93	3 76 25 6 X SQ= 65.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
64	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	1.00	64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.75	0 46 3 15 X SQ= 4.75 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.88	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.67	3 54 22 27 X SQ= 20.82 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.86	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.56	4 48 24 38 X SQ= 13.06 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.86	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.70	4 60 24 26 X SQ= 24.20 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.96	70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.75	1 20 24 60 X SQ= 4.02 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.89	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.59	3 49 25 34 X SQ= 17.74 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.89	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.75	3 62 25 21 X SQ= 32.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.63	0 26 26 44 X SQ= 11.43 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	1.00	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.64	0 28 25 16 X SQ= 24.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.60	22 27 0 18 X SQ= 10.08 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.71	80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.59	6 13 15 9 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.067 RV YES (YES)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.96	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.63	1 50 26 29 X SQ= 26.28 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.92	84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	2 29 24 0 X SQ= 43.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.96	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.69	1 59 27 27 X SQ= 33.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.89	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.85	3 73 25 13 X SQ= 49.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.92	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.86	22 9 2 56 X SQ= 43.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
92	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.93	92	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.79	2 18 26 67 X SQ= 1.97 P = 0.099 RV NO (NO)	
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.81	27 68 0 16 X SQ= 4.56 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.55	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.78	5 62 6 17 X SQ= 3.94 P = 0.029 RV YES (NO)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.52	6 17 0 16 X SQ= 3.13 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
98	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.93	98	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.77	2 20 26 67 X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.095 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.90	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.50	2 39 18 39 X SQ= 8.89 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.86	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.59	3 40 19 28 X SQ= 11.85 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.89	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.51	3 43 24 41 X SQ= 11.92 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.79	0	15
						25	55
						X SQ=	4.85
						P =	0.009
						RV NO	(NO)
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.77	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.50	20	41
						6	41
						X SQ=	4.78
						P =	0.022
						RV YES	(NO)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.96	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.71	1	59
						27	24
						X SQ=	35.75
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
119	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.93	119	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.71	13	61
						1	25
						X SQ=	1.98
						P =	0.107
						RV NO	(NO)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.96	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.69	27	27
						1	60
						X SQ=	33.79
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.63	28	55
						0	32
						X SQ=	12.50
						P =	0.
						RV NO	(NO)
125	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.86	125	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.56	24	40
						4	31
						X SQ=	6.35
						P =	0.006
						RV NO	(NO)
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.77	28	55
						0	16
						X SQ=	5.95
						P =	0.005
						RV NO	(NO)
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.68	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.59	8	40
						17	28
						X SQ=	4.25
						P =	0.034
						RV YES	(NO)

129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.56	129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.66	11 14 X SQ= P = RV YES	45 23 2.88 0.060 (NO)
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.80	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.60	8 2 X SQ= P = RV YES	22 33 3.96 0.035 (NO)
132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	132	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.82	25 0 X SQ= P = RV NO	42 9 3.46 0.026 (NO)
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.59	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.83	16 11 X SQ= P = RV YES	13 65 16.13 0. (YES)
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.73	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.51	19 7 X SQ= P = RV YES	38 39 3.52 0.042 (NO)
137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.59	0 26 X SQ= P = RV NO	29 42 13.26 0. (NO)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.85	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.62	4 22 X SQ= P = RV YES	44 27 14.71 0. (NO)
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.52	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.74	14 13 X SQ= P = RV YES	20 58 5.15 0.017 (NO)
146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.81	146	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.96	5 22 X SQ= P = RV NO	3 70 3.77 0.032 (YES)

147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.65	0 23 25 42 X SQ= 10.10 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
148	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (14)	0.52	148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	14 0 13 83 X SQ= 44.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	1.00	157	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.81	0 14 25 59 X SQ= 4.14 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	
158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.61	158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.64	14 26 9 47 X SQ= 3.61 P = 0.051 RV YES (NO)	
161	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.67	161	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.53	8 39 16 34 X SQ= 2.17 P = 0.103 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.73	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.77	16 18 6 59 X SQ= 16.36 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.62	169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.60	10 48 16 32 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.071 RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.60	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.69	15 24 10 53 X SQ= 5.48 P = 0.017 RV YES (NO)	
174	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.96	174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.64	1 27 24 48 X SQ= 8.00 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	

175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.76	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.60	6 45 19 30 X SQ= 8.34 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
176	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.88	176	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.67	22 50 3 25 X SQ= 3.24 P = 0.043 RV NO (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.81	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.60	22 31 5 46 X SQ= 11.99 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
179	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.79	179	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.51	15 37 4 35 X SQ= 3.60 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.88	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.96	3 52 23 2 X SQ= 54.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.96	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.80	23 2 1 8 X SQ= 17.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	1.00	188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.63	0 32 26 55 X SQ= 11.59 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.54	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.85	14 13 12 74 X SQ= 14.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.89	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.97	25 3 3 83 X SQ= 79.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.85	0	13
						28	73

X SQ= 3.40
P = 0.036
RV NO (NO)

12	POLITIES LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA (5)	12	POLITIES LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA (110)

SUBJECT ONLY

5 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	LIBYA	MOROCCO	TUNISIA	UAR

110 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA
GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND
ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON
LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN
SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA
USSR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA

21	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (32)	0.60	21	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITO" _ SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.74	3 29 2 81 X SQ= 1.28 P = 0.131 RV YES (NO)
26	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	1.00	26	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.56	0 48 5 62 X SQ= 2.17 P = 0.074 RV NO (NO)
28	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	1.00	28	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.54	5 57 0 48 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.067 RV NO (NO)
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.53	0 55 5 49 X SQ= 3.43 P = 0.027 RV YES (NO)

49	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)	1.00	49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)	0.57	4 20 0 26 X SQ= 2.72 P = 0.046 RV YES (NO)	
50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	1.00	50	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.54	0 43 5 51 X SQ= 2.40 P = 0.067 RV NO (NO)	
58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)	1.00	58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.88	5 13 0 97 X SQ= 21.89 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
66	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	1.00	66	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.51	5 52 0 49 X SQ= 2.77 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)	
70	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, AND LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (21)	0.60	70	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.82	3 18 2 82 X SQ= 2.95 P = 0.053 RV YES (NO)	
73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	1.00	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.61	0 65 5 41 X SQ= 5.09 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.50	0 51 5 50 X SQ= 3.05 P = 0.058 RV YES (NO)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.52	5 26 0 24 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.061 RV NO (NO)	
87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	1.00	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.67	3 28 0 58 X SQ= 3.22 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)	

93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.80	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.73	4 28 1 77 X SQ= 4.25 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	
99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	99	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.56	4 46 0 36 X SQ= 1.49 P = 0.136 RV NO (NO)	
106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	1.00	106	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.65	0 52 2 28 X SQ= 1.30 P = 0.131 RV YES (NO)	
107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	1.00	107	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.57	0 46 5 60 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.075 RV NO (NO)	
111	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	1.00	111	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.54	4 49 0 42 X SQ= 1.70 P = 0.127 RV NO (NO)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	1.00	121	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.51	0 54 5 56 X SQ= 2.87 P = 0.059 RV NO (NO)	
125	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.75	125	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.66	1 63 3 32 X SQ= 1.34 P = 0.125 RV YES (NO)	
133	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.75	133	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.74	3 26 1 75 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.063 RV YES (NO)	
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (8)	1.00	146	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.95	3 5 0 92 X SQ= 23.85 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

164	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	1.00	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.69	5 0	29 65
						X SQ=	7.23
						P =	0.004
						RV YES (NO)	
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	1.00	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.80	5 0	22 86
						X SQ=	12.57
						P =	0.001
						RV YES (NO)	

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13 POLITIES
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR
THE MIDDLE EAST (16)

13 POLITIES
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR
THE MIDDLE EAST (99)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

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16 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	CYPRUS	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	JORDAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	MOROCCO
SA*U ARABIA	SYRIA	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR	YEMEN				

99 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI
CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CZECHOS*KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRELAND	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN
KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO
MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	UGANDA
USSR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA	

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26 LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67) — 0.81

26 LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67) — 0.55

	3	45
	13	54

X SQ= 3.02
P = 0.057
RV NO (NO)

28 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62) — 0.81

28 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62) — 0.52

	13	49
	3	45

X SQ= 3.61
P = 0.033
RV NO (NO)

33 LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85) — 0.94

33 LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85) — 0.71

	1	29
	15	70

X SQ= 2.69
P = 0.066
RV NO (NO)

39 LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76) — 0.87

39 LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76) — 0.63

	2	36
	14	62

X SQ= 2.63
P = 0.084
RV NO (NO)

41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDEROEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	41	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDEROEVELOPED (94)	0.81	0 19 15 79 X SQ= 2.25 P = 0.071 RV NO (NO)
42	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDEROEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.93	42	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.64	1 35 13 63 X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.75	0 25 16 74 X SQ= 3.79 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.87	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.56	2 53 13 41 X SQ= 7.95 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.94	50	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.51	1 42 15 41 X SQ= 9.01 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
54	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.87	54	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.64	2 35 14 62 X SQ= 2.48 P = 0.085 RV NO (NO)
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.67	16 63 0 31 X SQ= 5.81 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)
58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)	0.81	58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.95	13 5 3 94 X SQ= 54.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	63	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.53	0 46 16 52 X SQ= 10.72 P = 0. RV NO (NO)

64	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	1.00	64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.90	0 46 13 5 X SQ= 37.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.87	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.52	14 43 2 47 X SQ= 7.10 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)
67	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.93	67	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.71	13 67 1 28 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.107 RV NO (NO)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.81	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.52	3 49 13 46 X SQ= 4.68 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.69	0 26 11 59 X SQ= 3.20 P = 0.032 RV NO (NO)
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.68	10 39 0 18 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.052 RV NO (NO)
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.55	0 51 13 42 X SQ= 11.63 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.57	13 18 0 24 X SQ= 10.96 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
85	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.73	85	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.51	11 49 4 50 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.102 RV YES (NO)

91	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IOEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRAOITIONAL (31)	0.57	91	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IOEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.93	4 27 3 2 X SQ= 3.46 P = 0.040 RV NO (YES)	
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TILT LESS TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.83	15 80 0 16 X SQ= 1.73 P = 0.122 RV NO (NO)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.52	6 17 0 16 X SQ= 3.13 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MOOERATE, LIMITEO, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MOOERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.79	0 20 16 75 X SQ= 2.81 P = 0.041 RV NO (NO)	
119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	119	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.69	15 59 0 26 X SQ= 4.71 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MOOERATE (83)	1.00	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MOOERATE (83)	0.68	16 67 0 32 X SQ= 5.65 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TILT LESS TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.81	13 70 0 16 X SQ= 1.68 P = 0.119 RV NO (NO)	
164	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCEO OR MOOERATE (34)	0.70	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEAOERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.70	7 27 3 62 X SQ= 4.64 P = 0.029 RV YES (NO)	
172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	172	LEAN LESS TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.78	0 21 13 75 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)	

183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.80	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.83	1 4	24 5
						X SQ=	5.71
						P =	0.012
						RV YES	(NO)
187	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.93	187	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.61	13 1	53 34
						X SQ=	4.11
						P =	0.031
						RV NO	(NO)
192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.62	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.82	10 6	17 80
						X SQ=	12.90
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(NO)
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.71	0 16	28 70
						X SQ=	4.62
						P =	0.011
						RV NO	(NO)

14	POLITIES LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST (11)	14	POLITIES LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

11 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	CYPRUS	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	JORDAN	LEBANON	SA'U ARABIA	SYRIA	TURKEY
YEMEN									

104 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRELAND	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA
JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI
MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA
NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND
TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA						

39	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.91	39	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.64	1 37 10 66 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.097 RV ND (ND)
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	44	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.76	0 25 11 79 X SQ= 2.11 P = 0.071 RV ND (ND)
45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.80	45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.54	2 53 8 46 X SQ= 2.85 P = 0.052 RV YES (ND)
50	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.91	50	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.52	1 42 10 46 X SQ= 4.47 P = 0.021 RV ND (ND)

56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.69	11 68 0 31 X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.032 RV NO (NO)	
58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)	0.73	58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.90	8 10 3 94 X SQ= 25.42 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	63	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.55	0 46 11 57 X SQ= 6.48 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	
66	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.82	66	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.51	9 48 2 47 X SQ= 2.73 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)	
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.52	0 51 8 47 X SQ= 6.07 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.51	8 23 0 24 X SQ= 5.32 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
91	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (5)	0.75	91	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.94	1 30 3 2 X SQ= 8.89 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.54	4 19 0 16 X SQ= 1.50 P = 0.130 RV NO (NO)	
100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	0.62	100	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.78	3 61 5 17 X SQ= 4.36 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	

111	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.73	111	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.60	3 50 8 34 X SQ= 2.90 P = 0.056 RV YES (NO)	
115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	115	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.80	0 20 11 80 X SQ= 1.50 P = 0.126 RV NO (NO)	
118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.70	118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.63	7 33 3 57 X SQ= 2.89 P = 0.084 RV YES (NO)	
119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	119	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.71	10 64 0 26 X SQ= 2.55 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.82	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.57	9 45 2 59 X SQ= 4.49 P = 0.023 RV YES (NO)	
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.69	11 72 0 32 X SQ= 3.28 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	0.75	127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.80	3 18 1 71 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)	
129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	1.00	129	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.58	4 52 0 37 X SQ= 1.30 P = 0.148 RV NO (NO)	
132	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (9)	0.67	132	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.90	1 66 2 7 X SQ= 4.36 P = 0.036 RV YES (NO)	

139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	139	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.65	0 34 7 64 X SQ= 2.18 P = 0.093 RV NO (NO)	
153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.83	153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.55	1 41 5 33 X SQ= 1.97 P = 0.097 RV YES (NO)	
154	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.67	154	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.72	2 53 4 21 X SQ= 2.21 P = 0.073 RV YES (NO)	
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.83	0 25 4 5 X SQ= 8.68 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
186	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.71	186	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.67	5 26 2 54 X SQ= 2.73 P = 0.092 RV YES (NO)	
187	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.90	187	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.63	9 57 1 34 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.097 RV NO (NO)	
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.73	0 28 11 75 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.063 RV NO (NO)	

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15 POLITIES
LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN
IN NORTH AFRICA OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)

15 POLITIES
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN
IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

11 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	CYPRUS	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	JORDAN	LEBANON	SA'U ARABIA	SYRIA	TURKEY
YEMEN									

33 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON
GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER
NIGERIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA
UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA							

71 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA
CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS
HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP
LAOS	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YUGOSLAVIA									

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29 TEND TO BE THOSE
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS HIGH (56) — 0.64

29 TEND TO BE THOSE
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS LOW (49) — 0.85

	7 5
	4 28
X SQ=	7.49
P =	0.004
RV YES	(YES)

30 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS HIGH (56) — 0.60

30 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS HIGH (56) — 0.91

	6 30
	4 3
X SQ=	3.35
P =	0.040
RV NO	(YES)

37 TEND TO BE THOSE
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64) — 0.64

37 TEND TO BE THOSE
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY LOW (51) — 0.88

	7 4
	4 29
X SQ=	9.09
P =	0.002
RV YES	(YES)

40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.73	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.69	8 3 X SQ= P = RV YES	10 22 4.21 0.031 (NO)
43	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.56	43	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.94	4 5 X SQ= P = RV NO	2 31 5.66 0.013 (YES)
45	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.80	45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	2 8 X SQ= P = RV NO	0 32 3.03 0.052 (YES)
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.73	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.70	8 3 X SQ= P = RV YES	9 21 4.42 0.029 (NO)
50	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.91	50	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.57	1 10 X SQ= P = RV NO	10 13 2.60 0.060 (NO)
52	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.67	52	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.96	6 3 X SQ= P = RV NO	22 1 2.67 0.057 (YES)
54	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.82	54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	2 9 X SQ= P = RV NO	0 33 2.79 0.058 (YES)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.64	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.82	7 4 X SQ= P = RV YES	6 .27 6.15 0.008 (YES)
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.76	11 0 X SQ= P = RV YES	8 25 16.33 0. (YES)

58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)	0.73	58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.76	8 8 3 25 X SQ= 6.42 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.82	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.73	9 8 2 22 X SQ= 7.94 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
69	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.55	69	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.79	6 7 5 26 X SQ= 2.95 P = 0.057 RV YES (NO)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.73	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.91	8 3 3 30 X SQ= 14.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.64	75	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.94	4 2 7 30 X SQ= 3.93 P = 0.029 RV NO (YES)	
83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.73	83	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.97	3 1 8 32 X SQ= 3.30 P = 0.043 RV NO (YES)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.77	8 7 0 24 X SQ= 13.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.70	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.85	7 5 3 28 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.90	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.79	9 7 1 26 X SQ= 12.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.89	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.93	1 25 8 2 X SQ= 18.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.73	89	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.96	3 1 8 26 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.065 RV NO (YES)	
91	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (5)	0.75	91	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.96	1 25 3 1 X SQ= 9.66 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
100	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	0.62	100	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.82	3 9 5 2 X SQ= 2.24 P = 0.074 RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.60	107	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.91	4 3 6 29 X SQ= 3.18 P = 0.043 RV NO (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.55	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.85	6 5 5 28 X SQ= 4.89 P = 0.016 RV YES (YES)	
118	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.70	118	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.63	7 7 3 12 X SQ= 1.71 P = 0.128 RV YES (YES)	
127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	0.75	127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.89	3 3 1 25 X SQ= 5.74 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	1.00	129	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.57	4 12 0 16 X SQ= 2.57 P = 0.101 RV YES (NO)	

131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.80	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.83	1 10 4 2 X SQ= 3.74 P = 0.028 RV YES (YES)	
132	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (9)	0.67	132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	1 29 2 0 X SQ= 10.81 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
133	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	1.00	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.61	0 19 6 12 X SQ= 5.30 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
134	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.67	134	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.73	2 22 4 8 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.149 RV YES (NO)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.60	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	3 0 2 28 X SQ= 11.93 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.67	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.82	4 5 2 23 X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.031 RV YES (NO)	
139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.53	0 17 7 15 X SQ= 4.61 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.60	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.90	3 3 2 26 X SQ= 4.22 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	
147	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.67	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	1 0 2 28 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.097 RV NO (YES)	

148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.55	0 14 9 17 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)
154	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.67	154	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.75	2 9 4 3 X SQ= 1.43 P = 0.141 RV YES (YES)
157	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED (14)	0.50	157	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.97	2 1 2 28 X SQ= 4.45 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.60	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.89	3 3 2 24 X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.034 RV YES (YES)
164	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.60	164	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.78	2 21 3 6 X SQ= 1.40 P = 0.121 RV YES (NO)
168	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.62	168	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.97	3 1 5 30 X SQ= 4.82 P = 0.022 RV NO (YES)
170	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.86	170	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.57	1 16 6 12 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.088 RV YES (NO)
175	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.67	175	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.73	4 8 2 22 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.149 RV YES (NO)
178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.67	178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.77	2 24 4 7 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.051 RV YES (NO)

182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.77	4 7 0 24 X SQ= 6.59 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.96	0 24 4 1 X SQ= 16.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.71	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.75	5 7 2 21 X SQ= 3.50 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.76	0 25 11 8 X SQ= 16.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

16	POLITIES LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA [11]	16	POLITIES LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

11 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	CYPRUS	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	JORDAN	LEBANON	SA'U ARABIA	SYRIA	TURKEY
YEMEN									

18 IN RIGHT COLUMN

BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHINA, PR	INDIA	INDONESIA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS
MALAYA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	THAILAND	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP		

86 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURUNDI
CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA
CZECHOS*KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND
IRELAND	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
PERU	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN
SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA	USSR	UAR
UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA				

23	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.82	23	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (27)	0.50	2 9 9 9 X SQ= 1.74 P = 0.125 RV YES (YES)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.55	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.83	5 15 6 3 X SQ= 2.98 P = 0.048 RV YES (YES)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.73	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.78	3 14 8 4 X SQ= 5.25 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)

29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.64	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.83	7 2 4 10 X SQ= 3.53 P = 0.036 RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.64	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.83	7 3 4 15 X SQ= 4.75 P = 0.017 RV YES (YES)	
45	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.80	45	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.57	2 8 8 6 X SQ= 1.96 P = 0.104 RV YES (YES)	
58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)	0.73	58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.89	8 2 3 16 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
73	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.73	73	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.69	8 5 3 11 X SQ= 2.98 P = 0.054 RV YES (YES)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.90	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.50	9 9 1 9 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.048 RV YES (YES)	
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.67	0 6 10 12 X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.062 RV NO (NO)	
93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.90	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.53	1 8 9 7 X SQ= 3.19 P = 0.040 RV YES (YES)	
98	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.82	98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	2 0 9 18 X SQ= 1.25 P = 0.135 RV NO (YES)	

127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	0.75	127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.91	3 1 1 10 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)	
129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	1.00	129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.64	4 4 0 7 X SQ= 2.56 P = 0.077 RV YES (YES)	
138	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.67	138	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.79	4 3 2 11 X SQ= 2.05 P = 0.122 RV YES (YES)	
139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	139	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.64	0 5 7 9 X SQ= 1.61 P = 0.123 RV NO (NO)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.78	0 4 11 14 X SQ= 1.27 P = 0.143 RV NO (NO)	

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17 POLITIES
LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN
IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR
SOUTH AMERICA (11)

17 POLITIES
LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN,
CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA,
RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

11 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	CYPRUS	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	JORDAN	LEBANON	SA'U ARABIA	SYRIA	TURKEY
YEMEN									

22 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	TRINIDAD
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

82 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMERDUN
CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	HUNGARY
ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRELAND	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS
LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA
THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

30	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.60	30	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.77	6 5 4 17 X SQ= 2.74 P = 0.056 RV YES (YES)
45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.80	45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.64	2 14 8 8 X SQ= 3.64 P = 0.054 RV YES (YES)
46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.73	46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	8 22 3 0 X SQ= 3.71 P = 0.030 RV NO (YES)

50	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.91	50	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.56	1 10 10 8 X SQ= 4.44 P = 0.019 RV YES (YES)	
55	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.64	55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSANO (78)	1.00	7 22 4 0 X SQ= 6.01 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)	
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.77	11 17 0 5 X SQ= 1.44 P = 0.143 RV NO (NO)	
57	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	1.00	57	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC (25)	0.68	0 15 11 7 X SQ= 11.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
58	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)	0.73	58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	8 0 3 22 X SQ= 17.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	63	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KINO OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.73	0 16 11 6 X SQ= 12.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
67	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.89	67	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS (27)	0.85	8 3 1 17 X SQ= 11.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
68	LEAN TOWARO BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.64	68	LEAN TOWARO BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.73	4 16 7 6 X SQ= 2.68 P = 0.065 RV YES (YES)	
72	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE OATE OF INOEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.73	72	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE OATE OF INOEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.91	3 20 8 2 X SQ= 11.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZEO (52)	0.64	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.95	4 21 7 1 X SQ= 10.91 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZEO, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.67	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.95	2 21 4 1 X SQ= 8.53 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
78	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.67	78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	2 21 1 0 X SQ= 1.34 P = 0.125 RV NO (YES)	
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY OEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.86	6 3 0 18 X SQ= 11.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.91	0 20 8 2 X SQ= 17.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.73	83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	3 0 8 22 X SQ= 3.71 P = 0.030 RV NO (YES)	
91	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (5)	0.75	91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	1 3 3 0 X SQ= 1.47 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)	
96	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.50	96	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.83	4 15 4 3 X SQ= 1.66 P = 0.149 RV YES (YES)	
98	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.82	98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	2 0 9 22 X SQ= 1.66 P = 0.104 RV NO (YES)	

114	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.64	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.78	7 4 4 14 X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.048 RV YES (YES)	
117	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITEO (60)	0.55	117	LEAN MORE TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.86	6 19 5 3 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.082 RV NO (YES)	
118	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.70	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MDDERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.82	7 4 3 18 X SQ= 6.05 P = 0.013 RV YES (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.82	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.95	9 1 2 21 X SQ= 17.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MOOERATE (83)	0.55	11 12 0 10 X SQ= 5.18 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
124	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.56	124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	4 0 5 18 X SQ= 6.20 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	
127	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	0.75	127	TILT TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.74	3 5 1 14 X SQ= 1.64 P = 0.103 RV YES (NO)	
169	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.50	169	TILT TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.85	4 17 4 3 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.142 RV YES (YES)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIOENTIAL (63)	0.86	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.85	1 17 6 3 X SQ= 8.70 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	

171	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.71	171	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	1.00	2 0 5 20 X SQ= 2.71 P = 0.060 RV NO (YES)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.56	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.91	4 10 5 1 X SQ= 3.12 P = 0.050 RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.71	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.90	5 1 2 9 X SQ= 4.38 P = 0.035 RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.91	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.86	1 19 10 3 X SQ= 15.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.55	192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	5 0 6 22 X SQ= 8.52 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	

18	POLITIES LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)				18	POLITIES LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)						
												BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

33 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON
GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER
NIGERIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA
UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA							

18 IN RIGHT COLUMN

BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHINA, PR	INDIA	INDONESIA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS
MALAYA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	THAILAND	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP		

64 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA
CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND
IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JORDAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
SA'U ARABIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	USSR	UK	US
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA						

22	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.79	22	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.56	26 10 7 8 X SQ= 2.01 P = 0.112 RV NO (YES)
23	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.94	23	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (27)	0.50	2 9 31 9 X SQ= 10.82 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.67	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.83	11 15 22 3 X SQ= 9.74 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)

25	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	1.00	25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.78	0 4 33 14 X SQ= 5.18 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.91	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.78	3 14 30 4 X SQ= 21.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.91	30	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.71	30 12 3 5 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.102 RV NO (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.79	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.72	7 13 26 5 X SQ= 10.66 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.69	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.75	10 12 22 4 X SQ= 6.56 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.94	43	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.61	2 7 31 11 X SQ= 6.53 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.57	0 8 32 6 X SQ= 18.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.70	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.87	9 14 21 2 X SQ= 11.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
51	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.70	51	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.65	16 6 7 11 X SQ= 3.36 P = 0.053 RV YES (YES)	

54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	54	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.87	0 2 33 14 X SQ= 1.70 P = 0.102 RV NO (YES)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.82	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.75	6 12 27 4 X SQ= 12.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.76	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.92	8 12 25 1 X SQ= 14.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.73	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.62	8 8 22 5 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.043 RV YES (YES)
67	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.72	67	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.94	23 16 9 1 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.079 RV NO (NO)
69	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.79	69	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.53	7 8 26 9 X SQ= 2.44 P = 0.102 RV NO (YES)
71	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.97	71	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.75	1 4 32 12 X SQ= 3.53 P = 0.034 RV NO (YES)
73	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.91	73	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.69	3 5 30 11 X SQ= 2.42 P = 0.094 RV NO (YES)
75	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.94	75	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.72	2 5 30 13 X SQ= 2.83 P = 0.083 RV NO (YES)

77	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.93	77	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.73	2 3 28 8 X SQ= 1.56 P = 0.110 RV NO (YES)
83	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.97	83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.78	1 4 32 14 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.047 RV NO (YES)
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.77	84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	7 14 24 0 X SQ= 20.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
85	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.85	85	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.56	5 8 28 10 X SQ= 3.83 P = 0.041 RV NO (YES)
86	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.79	86	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.50	7 9 26 9 X SQ= 3.25 P = 0.057 RV YES (YES)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.93	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.80	25 2 2 8 X SQ= 15.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
92	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.88	92	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.67	4 6 29 12 X SQ= 2.12 P = 0.137 RV NO (YES)
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.76	32 13 0 4 X SQ= 5.36 P = 0.011 RV NO (YES)
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.67	8 8 0 4 X SQ= 1.58 P = 0.117 RV NO (YES)

105	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.88	105	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.62	3 5 22 8 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.094 RV NO (YES)	
107	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.91	107	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.71	3 5 29 12 X SQ= 1.96 P = 0.106 RV NO (YES)	
110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	110	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.86	0 2 29 12 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.101 RV NO (YES)	
115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	115	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.88	0 2 33 15 X SQ= 1.56 P = 0.111 RV NO (YES)	
117	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.85	117	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.59	5 7 28 10 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.077 RV NO (YES)	
124	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.87	124	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.67	4 5 28 10 X SQ= 1.68 P = 0.121 RV NO (YES)	
131	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.83	131	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.58	10 5 2 7 X SQ= 2.84 P = 0.089 RV YES (YES)	
132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	132	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.75	29 6 0 2 X SQ= 3.55 P = 0.042 RV NO (YES)	
133	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.61	133	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.71	19 5 12 12 X SQ= 3.28 P = 0.069 RV YES (YES)	

134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.73	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.62	22 6 8 10 X SQ= 4.22 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)
137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.80	0 3 28 12 X SQ= 3.33 P = 0.037 RV NO (YES)
146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.73	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	8 0 22 15 X SQ= 3.21 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)
157	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.97	157	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.79	1 3 28 11 X SQ= 1.80 P = 0.094 RV NO (YES)
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.89	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.50	3 7 24 7 X SQ= 5.60 P = 0.017 RV YES (YES)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.67	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.71	9 10 18 4 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.046 RV YES (YES)
164	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.78	164	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.53	21 7 6 8 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.085 RV YES (YES)
168	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.97	168	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.75	1 4 30 12 X SQ= 3.22 P = 0.040 RV NO (YES)
170	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.57	170	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.75	16 4 12 12 X SQ= 3.05 P = 0.060 RV YES (YES)

174	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.97	174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.73	1 4 29 11 X SQ= 3.40 P = 0.036 RV NO (YES)
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.87	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.60	26 6 4 9 X SQ= 8.45 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.77	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.91	7 10 24 1 X SQ= 13.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.96	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.80	24 1 1 4 X SQ= 12.29 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
186	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.75	186	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.58	7 7 21 5 X SQ= 2.77 P = 0.071 RV YES (YES)
192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.61	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.83	19 3 12 15 X SQ= 7.45 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.76	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.82	25 3 8 14 X SQ= 13.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.78	0 4 33 14 X SQ= 5.18 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)

19	POLITIES LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)				19	POLITIES LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)							
													BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

33 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON
GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER
NIGERIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA
UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA							

22 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	TRINIDAD
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

60 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEYLON
CHINA, PR	CYPRUS	CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY
ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN	JORDAN
KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA*U ARABIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
SYRIA	THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR	UK	US	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA

22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.79	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.55	26 10 7 12 X SQ= 5.10 P = 0.020 RV YES (YES)	
25	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	1.00	25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.82	0 4 33 18 X SQ= 4.06 P = 0.021 RV NO (YES)	
26	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.91	26	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.73	3 6 30 16 X SQ= 2.00 P = 0.134 RV NO (YES)	

28	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.57	28	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.86	17 19 13 3 X SQ= 3.95 P = 0.033 RV NO (YES)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.85	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.74	5 14 28 5 X SQ= 15.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.91	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.77	30 5 3 17 X SQ= 23.65 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.79	34	TILT LESS TOWARO BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.59	7 9 26 13 X SQ= 1.62 P = 0.139 RV NO (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.88	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.86	4 19 29 3 X SQ= 26.93 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.69	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.60	10 12 22 8 X SQ= 3.07 P = 0.050 RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.94	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.57	2 12 31 9 X SQ= 14.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS 8ELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.64	0 14 32 8 X SQ= 24.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.70	46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	9 22 21 0 X SQ= 23.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.73	0 6 33 16 X SQ= 7.49 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.82	55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	6 22 27 0 X SQ= 32.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.76	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.77	8 17 25 5 X SQ= 12.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
57	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	1.00	57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC (25)	0.68	0 15 33 7 X SQ= 27.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.76	58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	8 0 25 22 X SQ= 4.44 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.73	0 16 33 6 X SQ= 30.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.73	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.68	8 15 22 7 X SQ= 7.27 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
67	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.72	67	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS (27)	0.85	23 3 9 17 X SQ= 13.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.79	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.73	7 16 26 6 X SQ= 12.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.79	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.82	7 18 26 4 X SQ= 17.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.91	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.91	3 20 30 2 X SQ= 33.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.91	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.91	3 20 30 2 X SQ= 33.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.94	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.95	2 21 30 1 X SQ= 38.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.93	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.95	2 21 28 1 X SQ= 37.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.86	26 3 0 18 X SQ= 32.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
80	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.72	80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	1.00	7 2 18 0 X SQ= 1.69 P = 0.103 RV YES (NO)
81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED (11)	1.00	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	1 0 0 20 X SQ= 4.74 P = 0.048 RV YES (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.97	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.91	1 20 31 2 X SQ= 38.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

84	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.77	84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	7 2 24 0 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.068 RV YES (NO)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.79	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.91	7 20 26 2 X SQ= 22.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.93	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.75	25 3 2 9 X SQ= 15.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.96	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.54	1 7 26 6 X SQ= 10.83 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
93	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.67	93	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.86	11 3 22 19 X SQ= 1.76 P = 0.125 RV NO (NO)	
96	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.50	96	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.83	8 15 8 3 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.066 RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.62	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.87	8 2 5 14 X SQ= 5.62 P = 0.016 RV YES (YES)	
100	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.82	100	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	0.50	9 9 2 9 X SQ= 1.74 P = 0.125 RV YES (YES)	
102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.53	102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.75	15 15 17 5 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.082 RV YES (YES)	

105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.88	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.76	M 3 13 22 4 X SQ= 15.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.52	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.88	10 15 11 2 X SQ= 5.20 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.91	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.67	3 14 29 7 X SQ= 16.56 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.74	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.78	23 4 8 14 X SQ= 10.42 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.85	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.86	5 19 28 3 X SQ= 24.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.82	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.95	27 1 6 21 X SQ= 28.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.55	33 12 0 10 X SQ= 15.41 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.68	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.74	9 14 19 5 X SQ= 6.24 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.57	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.95	12 18 16 1 X SQ= 11.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.83	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.67	10 6 2 12 X SQ= 5.36 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)	
132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	132	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.72	29 13 0 5 X SQ= 6.33 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.61	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.85	19 3 12 17 X SQ= 8.82 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.73	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.60	22 8 8 12 X SQ= 4.25 P = 0.038 RV YES (YES)	
137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.78	0 4 28 14 X SQ= 4.30 P = 0.019 RV NO (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.82	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.80	5 16 23 4 X SQ= 15.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.53	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.95	17 1 15 20 X SQ= 11.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.90	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.55	3 11 26 9 X SQ= 9.48 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.94	144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.75	17 1 1 3 X SQ= 6.45 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)	

146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.73	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	8 22 X SQ= 4.52 P = 0.015 RV NO	0 20 (NO)
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.68	0 28 X SQ= 7.50 P = 0.003 RV NO	6 13 (YES)
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.75	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.73	9 3 X SQ= 4.45 P = 0.021 RV YES	4 11 (YES)
157	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.97	157	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.65	1 28 X SQ= 6.47 P = 0.005 RV NO	7 13 (YES)
161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.67	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.60	9 18 X SQ= 2.31 P = 0.084 RV YES	12 8 (YES)
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.78	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.91	21 6 X SQ= 20.29 P = 0. RV YES	2 20 (YES)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.61	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.85	12 19 X SQ= 8.82 P = 0.001 RV YES	17 3 (YES)
170	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.57	170	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.85	16 12 X SQ= 3.02 P = 0.059 RV NO	17 3 (YES)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.73	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.78	8 22 X SQ= 9.87 P = 0.001 RV YES	14 4 (YES)

178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.77	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.67	24 7 7 14 X SQ= 8.36 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.79	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.59	19 7 5 10 X SQ= 4.66 P = 0.021 RV YES (YES)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.77	182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	7 22 24 0 X SQ= 28.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.70	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.91	3 10 7 1 X SQ= 5.86 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	
188	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	1.00	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.86	0 19 31 3 X SQ= 38.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.61	192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	19 0 12 22 X SQ= 18.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.76	193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	25 0 8 22 X SQ= 27.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

M

MATRIX

19 POLITIES
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN
IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR
SOUTH AMERICA (33)

19 POLITIES
LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN,
CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA,
RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)

105 POLITIES
WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS
COMPETITIVE (43)

MALAGASY R	SIERRE LEO	UGANDA			ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COSTA RICA
					DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	PANAMA
					TRINIDAD	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA		

3 13

22 4

105 POLITIES
WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS
PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR
NON-COMPETITIVE (47)

ALGERIA	BURUNDI	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	EL SALVADOR	HAITI	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY
DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA				
IVORY COAST	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALI	MAURITANIA				
NIGER	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	TANGANYIKA				
TUNISIA	UPPER VOLTA							

20	POLITIES LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	20	POLITIES LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

18 IN LEFT COLUMN

BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHINA, PR	INDIA	INDONESIA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS
MALAYA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	THAILAND	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP		

22 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	TRINIDAD
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

75 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA
CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND
FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRAN
IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG
MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR
UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA					

23	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (27)	0.50	23	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.86	9 3 9 19 X SQ= 4.62 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.83	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.64	15 8 3 14 X SQ= 7.12 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.78	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.73	14 6 4 16 X SQ= 8.18 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	

29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.83	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.74	2 14 10 5 X SQ= 7.43 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.71	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.77	12 5 5 17 X SQ= 7.09 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
31	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	1.00	31	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.82	18 18 0 4 X SQ= 1.90 P = 0.114 RV NO (YES)	
34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.72	34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.59	13 9 5 13 X SQ= 2.76 P = 0.062 RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.83	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.86	3 19 15 3 X SQ= 16.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.76	50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.56	4 10 13 8 X SQ= 2.52 P = 0.086 RV YES (YES)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.65	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.78	6 14 11 4 X SQ= 4.83 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)	
55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.75	55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	12 22 4 0 X SQ= 3.78 P = 0.025 RV NO (YES)	
57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.94	57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC (25)	0.68	1 15 17 7 X SQ= 13.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.94	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.73	1 16 17 6 X SQ= 15.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
65	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (18)	0.67	65	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (25)	1.00	1 15 2 0 X SQ= 5.51 P = 0.020 RV YES (YES)	
67	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.94	67	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS (27)	0.85	16 3 1 17 X SQ= 19.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.76	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.73	4 16 13 6 X SQ= 7.43 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.53	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.82	8 18 9 4 X SQ= 3.77 P = 0.039 RV YES (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.75	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.91	4 20 12 2 X SQ= 14.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.69	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.91	5 20 11 2 X SQ= 12.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.72	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.95	5 21 13 1 X SQ= 17.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.73	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.95	3 21 8 1 X SQ= 13.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

78	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.60	78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	3 21 2 0 X SQ= 4.34 P = 0.031 RV NO (YES)
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.86	9 3 0 18 X SQ= 15.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.91	0 20 14 2 X SQ= 25.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.78	83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	4 0 14 22 X SQ= 3.24 P = 0.033 RV NO (YES)
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.50	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.91	9 20 9 2 X SQ= 6.38 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.87	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.54	2 7 13 6 X SQ= 3.55 P = 0.042 RV YES (YES)
93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.53	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.86	8 3 7 19 X SQ= 4.96 P = 0.025 RV YES (YES)
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.72	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.74	5 14 13 5 X SQ= 6.07 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)
96	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.53	96	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.83	9 15 8 3 X SQ= 2.47 P = 0.075 RV NO (YES)

99	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.56	99	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.87	8 2 10 14 X SQ= 2.77 P = 0.063 RV NO (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.71	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.75	5 15 12 5 X SQ= 5.96 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)
105	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.62	105	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.76	5 13 8 4 X SQ= 2.99 P = 0.061 RV YES (YES)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.55	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.88	5 15 6 2 X SQ= 4.08 P = 0.030 RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.71	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.67	5 14 12 7 X SQ= 3.83 P = 0.049 RV YES (YES)
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.57	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.90	6 19 8 2 X SQ= 7.15 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.65	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.78	11 4 6 14 X SQ= 4.83 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.59	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.86	7 19 10 3 X SQ= 6.90 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.61	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.82	11 4 7 18 X SQ= 6.06 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)

121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.94	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.95	17 1 1 21 X SQ= 28.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.55	18 12 0 10 X SQ= 8.62 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
124	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.67	124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	5 0 10 18 X SQ= 4.72 P = 0.013 RV NO (YES)	
125	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.93	125	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.67	14 12 1 6 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.095 RV NO (YES)	
128	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.64	128	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.74	4 14 7 5 X SQ= 2.64 P = 0.063 RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.64	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.95	4 18 7 1 X SQ= 9.34 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.79	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.80	3 16 11 4 X SQ= 9.21 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.64	139	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.95	5 1 9 20 X SQ= 3.70 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)	
142	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.82	142	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.55	2 11 9 9 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.066 RV YES (YES)	

154	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.62	154	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.73	10 4 6 11 X SQ= 2.70 P = 0.073 RV YES (YES)	
163	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.69	163	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.95	5 1 11 21 X SQ= 3.16 P = 0.065 RV NO (YES)	
164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.53	164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.91	7 2 8 20 X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.017 RV NO (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.69	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.85	5 17 11 3 X SQ= 8.66 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.75	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.85	4 17 12 3 X SQ= 10.81 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.67	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.78	5 14 10 4 X SQ= 4.92 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.60	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.89	6 16 9 2 X SQ= 6.74 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	
179	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.77	179	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.59	10 7 3 10 X SQ= 2.52 P = 0.071 RV YES (YES)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.64	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.91	4 10 7 1 X SQ= 4.91 P = 0.024 RV YES (YES)	

186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.58	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.90	7 1 5 9 X SQ= 3.62 P = 0.031 RV YES (YES)
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.94	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.86	1 19 17 3 X SQ= 22.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
192	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.83	192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	3 0 15 22 X SQ= 1.93 P = 0.083 RV NO (YES)
193	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.82	193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	3 0 14 22 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.074 RV NO (YES)
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.78	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	4 0 14 21 X SQ= 3.07 P = 0.037 RV NO (YES)

21 POLITIES WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (32)									21 POLITIES WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

32 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)
ETHIOPIA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	LIBYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NIGER
NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	SA'U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR
US	VENEZUELA								

83 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
CEYLON	CHILE	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA
GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST
JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UK	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA							

2 TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.91	2 TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.77	3 19 29 64 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.118 RV NO (NO)		
3 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	1.00	3 TENO LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EURDPE (102)	0.84	0 13 32 70 X SQ= 4.20 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)		
7 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN CENTRAL AMERICA (10)	0.86	7 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN CENTRAL AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN SOUTH AMERICA (7)	0.60	1 6 6 4 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.134 RV YES (YES)		
24 TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.78	24 TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.57	25 36 7 47 X SQ= 9.85 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)		

26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.84	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.52	5 43 27 40 X SQ= 10.99 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.80	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.52	24 38 6 42 X SQ= 8.10 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.72	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.53	23 39 9 44 X SQ= 4.80 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)	
36	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.78	36	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.58	7 35 25 48 X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.67	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.57	10 45 20 34 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
54	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.81	54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.62	6 31 26 50 X SQ= 3.13 P = 0.049 RV NO (NO)	
63	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.74	63	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.54	8 38 23 45 X SQ= 2.96 P = 0.058 RV NO (NO)	
64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	0.53	64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.81	8 38 9 9 X SQ= 5.48 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
65	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (18)	0.64	65	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (25)	0.69	5 20 9 9 X SQ= 3.03 P = 0.052 RV YES (YES)	

67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.52	67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.82	16 64 15 14 X SQ= 9.02 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.61	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.63	12 52 19 31 X SQ= 4.33 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.90	74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.72	3 23 28 59 X SQ= 3.31 P = 0.046 RV NO (NO)	
76	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.88	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.67	3 23 23 47 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.041 RV NO (NO)	
83	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.84	83	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.95	5 4 27 79 X SQ= 2.39 P = 0.113 RV NO (YES)	
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.75	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.50	21 40 7 40 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.027 RV YES (NO)	
119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.90	119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.68	26 48 3 23 X SQ= 4.12 P = 0.025 RV NO (NO)	
122	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.84	122	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.67	27 56 5 27 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.103 RV NO (NO)	
125	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.81	125	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.58	22 42 5 30 X SQ= 3.65 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)	

131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.73	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.62	11 19 4 31 X SQ= 4.46 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	
132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	132	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.84	19 48 0 9 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)	
157	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.96	157	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.82	1 13 25 59 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.104 RV NO (NO)	
166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.71	166	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.93	9 6 22 77 X SQ= 7.58 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
178	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.62	178	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.56	11 42 18 33 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.127 RV YES (NO)	
192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.55	192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.84	14 13 17 69 X SQ= 9.08 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	

22 POLITIES
WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS
VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)

22 POLITIES
WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS
SMALL (47)

PREDICATE ONLY

68 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP
CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE
GABON	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ITALY	IVORY COAST
JAPAN	LAOS	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEW ZEALAND
NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SD AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TURKEY	UGANDA
USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA		

47 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS
CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	GERMANY, E	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBERIA
LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SWITZERLAND
SYRIA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP			

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23 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION IS
VERY LARGE OR LARGE (27)

23 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION IS
MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

27 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CANADA	CHINA, PR	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN
ITALY	JAPAN	KOREA REP	MEXICO	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	RUMANIA	SPAIN
THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK	US	YUGOSLAVIA			

88 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA
CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GABON
GERMANY, E	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRAQ
IRELAND	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA
LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA	NIGER	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN		

10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.93	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.65
					2 31 25 57 X SQ= 6.51 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)
16	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	0.82	16	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (11)	0.50
					2 9 9 9 X SQ= 1.74 P = 0.125 RV YES (YES)
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.82	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.77
					2 31 9 9 X SQ= 10.82 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.75	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.68
					9 9 3 19 X SQ= 4.62 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)

21	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (32)	0.52	21	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.80	14 18 13 70 X SQ= 8.64 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.96	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.52	26 42 1 46 X SQ= 18.21 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.63	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.65	17 31 10 57 X SQ= 5.45 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.72	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.52	18 38 7 42 X SQ= 3.66 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.74	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.89	20 10 7 78 X SQ= 38.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
34	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	1.00	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.60	27 35 0 53 X SQ= 27.79 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.81	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.82	22 16 5 71 X SQ= 34.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
40	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	1.00	40	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.53	27 44 0 39 X SQ= 17.66 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.52	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.74	14 22 13 63 X SQ= 5.20 P = 0.018 RV YES (NO)

43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.78	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.60	21 34 6 51 X SQ= 10.24 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.77	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.58	20 35 6 48 X SQ= 8.23 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.69	27 57 0 26 X SQ= 9.41 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
55	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.89	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.63	24 54 3 32 X SQ= 5.38 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.96	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.65	24 55 1 30 X SQ= 7.87 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.71	66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.51	17 40 7 42 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.066 RV YES (NO)
67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.89	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.68	24 56 3 26 X SQ= 3.42 P = 0.044 RV NO (NO)
72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.64	72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.58	16 36 9 50 X SQ= 2.98 P = 0.069 RV YES (NO)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.74	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.52	20 42 7 45 X SQ= 4.54 P = 0.026 RV YES (NO)

78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.50	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.96	6 22 6 1 X SQ= 7.62 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	1.00	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.63	5 14 0 24 X SQ= 4.82 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.78	83	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.97	6 3 21 85 X SQ= 7.70 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
84	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.87	84	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.51	7 24 1 23 X SQ= 2.36 P = 0.068 RV NO (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.81	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.56	22 38 5 49 X SQ= 10.34 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
87	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.89	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.59	2 29 17 41 X SQ= 5.00 P = 0.014 RV NO (NO)	
114	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.76	114	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.51	19 42 6 41 X SQ= 4.06 P = 0.037 RV NO (NO)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.79	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.53	19 41 5 46 X SQ= 6.54 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.56	118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.66	15 25 12 48 X SQ= 2.89 P = 0.067 RV YES (NO)	

127	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.95	127	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.72	1 20 20 52 X SQ= 3.70 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)	
138	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.65	138	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.55	13 35 7 42 X SQ= 1.71 P = 0.139 RV YES (NO)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.83	0 14 27 69 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.74	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.58	6 47 17 34 X SQ= 6.09 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
182	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.88	182	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.63	15 40 2 23 X SQ= 2.75 P = 0.076 RV NO (NO)	
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.92	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.70	2 26 24 62 X SQ= 4.06 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)	

24 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION IS
VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)

24 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION IS
SMALL (54)

PREDICATE ONLY

61 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CANADA
CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GERMANY, E
GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ITALY	JAPAN
KOREA, N	KOREA REP	MALAYA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU
PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA*U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	TANGANYIKA
THAILAND	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YUGOSLAVIA									

54 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS
DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GABON	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI
HONDURAS	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NORWAY
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TOGO	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	YEMEN						

25 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS
VERY HIGH OR HIGH (17)

25 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS
MEDIUM OR LOW (98)

PREDICATE ONLY

17 IN LEFT COLUMN

BELGIUM	CEYLON	EL SALVADOR	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	HAITI	INDIA	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN
KOREA REP	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	UK			

98 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA
FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND
INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LIBERIA
LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN
SWEDEN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR
US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA		

26 POLITIES WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)									26 POLITIES WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

48 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CEYLON	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA
DENMARK	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HAITI	HUNGARY	INDIA
INDONESIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG
MALAYA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA
SPAIN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	UK	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA		

67 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA
CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA
FINLAND	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HONDURAS	ICELAND	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST
JORDAN	LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA
USSR	UAR	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YEMEN			

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.71	2	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.88
3	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.73	3	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	1.00
8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.71	8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.94
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.94	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.55

14	8	
34	59	
X SQ=	4.31	
P =	0.030	
RV NO	(YES)	
13	0	
35	67	
X SQ=	17.85	
P =	0.	
RV NO	(YES)	
14	4	
34	63	
X SQ=	9.71	
P =	0.001	
RV NO	(YES)	
3	30	
45	37	
X SQ=	18.45	
P =	0.	
RV NO	(YES)	

13	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.94	13	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.81	3 45	13 54
						X SQ=	3.02
						P =	0.057
						RV NO	(NO)
16	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	0.82	16	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (11)	0.67	3 14	8 4
						X SQ=	5.25
						P =	0.018
						RV YES	(YES)
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.82	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.88	3 14	30 4
						X SQ=	21.73
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
19	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.67	19	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.65	3 6	30 16
						X SQ=	2.00
						P =	0.134
						RV YES	(NO)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.70	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.80	14 6	4 16
						X SQ=	8.18
						P =	0.004
						RV YES	(YES)
22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.67	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.78	16 32	52 15
						X SQ=	20.89
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.69	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.58	33 15	28 39
						X SQ=	7.11
						P =	0.005
						RV YES	(YES)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.60	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.68	19 28	43 20
						X SQ=	7.38
						P =	0.006
						RV YES	(YES)
29	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.65	29	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.54	26 14	30 35
						X SQ=	2.82
						P =	0.072
						RV YES	(NO)

30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.70	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.64	14 33 X SQ= 11.26 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	42 24	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.73	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.60	35 13 X SQ= 10.70 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	27 40	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.58	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.79	28 20 X SQ= 15.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	14 53	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.69	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.54	33 15 X SQ= 4.85 P = 0.022 RV YES (YES)	31 36	
39	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.55	39	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.75	21 26 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.043 RV NO (YES)	17 50	
40	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.84	40	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.52	37 7 X SQ= 10.86 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	34 32	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.68	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.65	32 15 X SQ= 10.40 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	23 42	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.80	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.69	35 9 X SQ= 23.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	20 45	
51	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.51	51	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.70	22 21 X SQ= 2.97 P = 0.061 RV NO (YES)	38 16	

54	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSANO (76)	0.52	54	TEND MORE TO 8E THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSANO (76)	0.78	22 15 24 52 X SQ= 6.90 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)	
55	TENO MORE TO 8E THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSANO (78)	0.89	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSANO (78)	0.55	41 37 5 30 X SQ= 13.12 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
56	TEND MORE TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.91	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.6D	39 40 4 27 X SQ= 10.95 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.96	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.76	2 16 46 51 X SQ= 6.81 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
63	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREOOMINANTLY SOME KINO OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.54	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.7D	26 20 22 46 X SQ= 5.62 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
67	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.85	67	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.65	40 40 7 22 X SQ= 4.80 P = 0.017 RV NO (YES)	
68	LEAN TOWARO BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.55	68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.61	26 26 21 41 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.090 RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO 8E THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.70	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (5D)	0.54	33 31 14 36 X SQ= 5.50 P = 0.013 RV YES (YES)	
71	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE OATE OF INOEPENOENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.70	71	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE OATE OF INDEPENOENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.88	13 8 31 59 X SQ= 4.28 P = 0.027 RV NO (YES)	

74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.62	74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.88	18 8 29 58 X SQ= 9.19 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.71	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.58	34 28 14 38 X SQ= 7.93 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.51	76	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.86	18 8 19 51 X SQ= 12.46 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.77	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.70	10 9 3 21 X SQ= 6.31 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.59	82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.60	26 25 18 37 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.076 RV YES (YES)	
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.83	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.57	15 16 3 21 X SQ= 6.37 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.69	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.59	33 27 15 39 X SQ= 7.56 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.84	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.51	6 25 32 26 X SQ= 9.18 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.72	92	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.89	13 7 34 59 X SQ= 4.37 P = 0.025 RV NO (YES)	

95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.70	95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.97	32 63 14 2 X SQ= 14.20 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.86	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.63	38 29 6 17 X SQ= 5.26 P = 0.015 RV NO (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.70	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.89	6 17 14 2 X SQ= 11.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.74	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.54	28 22 10 26 X SQ= 5.66 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
101	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.51	101	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.65	22 19 21 36 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.105 RV YES (YES)	
107	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.50	107	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.65	24 22 24 41 X SQ= 1.97 P = 0.124 RV YES (YES)	
110	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.74	110	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.90	9 6 26 54 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.077 RV NO (YES)	
114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.53	114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.64	22 39 25 22 X SQ= 2.51 P = 0.082 RV YES (YES)	
117	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.64	117	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.52	28 32 16 35 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.121 RV YES (NO)	

122	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.65	122	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.78	31 52 17 15 X SQ= 1.76 P = 0.143 RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.51	125	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.73	20 44 19 16 X SQ= 4.11 P = 0.032 RV NO (YES)	
130	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.93	130	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.79	3 9 38 33 X SQ= 2.30 P = 0.116 RV NO (YES)	
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.87	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.61	6 23 40 36 X SQ= 7.45 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
135	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.78	135	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.91	29 48 8 5 X SQ= 1.73 P = 0.133 RV NO (YES)	
137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.59	137	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.79	18 11 26 42 X SQ= 3.75 P = 0.045 RV NO (YES)	
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.86	0 8 42 50 X SQ= 4.56 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	
148	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.96	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.81	2 12 45 51 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.023 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.68	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.62	26 16 12 26 X SQ= 6.19 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	

158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.77	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.55	9 31 31 25 X SQ= 9.06 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
160	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.60	160	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.75	16 14 24 43 X SQ= 1.95 P = 0.122 RV NO (YES)	
164	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.77	164	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.57	10 24 33 32 X SQ= 3.32 P = 0.055 RV NO (YES)	
168	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.57	168	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.76	20 14 27 45 X SQ= 3.43 P = 0.059 RV NO (YES)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.80	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.54	9 30 37 26 X SQ= 10.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
172	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.72	172	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.87	13 8 33 55 X SQ= 3.20 P = 0.051 RV NO (YES)	
174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.59	174	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.82	18 10 26 46 X SQ= 5.40 P = 0.014 RV NO (YES)	
176	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.61	176	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.80	27 45 17 11 X SQ= 3.52 P = 0.045 RV NO (YES)	
182	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.90	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.55	28 27 3 22 X SQ= 9.39 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	

185	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.76	185	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.52	M	5 16 16 15 X SQ= 2.95 P = 0.083 RV YES (YES)
187	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.55	187	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.74		24 42 20 15 X SQ= 3.22 P = 0.058 RV NO (YES)
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.92	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.65		4 23 44 42 X SQ= 9.67 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.90	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.65		5 23 43 43 X SQ= 7.68 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.77	194	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.97		11 2 36 65 X SQ= 9.47 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)

M

MATRIX

26 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS
VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)

26 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS
LOW (67)

185 POLITIES
WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY
IN POLITICS IS
INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN
SUPPORTIVE (21)

EL SALVADOR	HAITI	KOREA REP	PAKISTAN	THAILAND	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BURMA	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS
					IRAQ	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU
					SUDAN	SYRIA	TOGO	TURKEY	UAR
					YEMEN				

5 16

16 15

185 POLITIES
WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY
IN POLITICS IS
SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN
INTERVENTIVE (31)

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA
HUNGARY	INDONESIA	KOREA, N	LEBANON	POLAND	GHANA	GUINEA	IRAN	JORDAN	LIBERIA
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	MONGOLIA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA	USSR
YUGOSLAVIA									

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27 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS
MEDIUM (31)

27 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS
VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR LOW (84)

SUBJECT ONLY

****

31 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	AUSTRIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
FRANCE	GREECE	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	KOREA, N	MALAYA	NEPAL	NIGERIA
PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SPAIN	THAILAND	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YUGOSLAVIA									

84 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
HAITI	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN
JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
PERU	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA
TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US
UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YEMEN						

5	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.50	5	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	0.85	7 11 7 2 X SQ= 2.24 P = 0.103 RV YES (YES)
6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.94	6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.76	2 20 29 64 X SQ= 3.36 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)
8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.68	8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.90	10 8 21 76 X SQ= 7.23 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.90	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.64	3 30 28 54 X SQ= 6.28 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)

16	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	0.83	16	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (11)	0.53	2 9 10 8 X SQ= 2.54 P = 0.064 RV YES (YES)
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.77	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.79	3 30 10 8 X SQ= 10.91 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.83	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.71	10 8 2 20 X SQ= 8.09 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.65	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.68	11 57 20 27 X SQ= 8.53 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.74	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.55	23 38 8 46 X SQ= 6.50 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)
25	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	1.00	25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.80	0 17 31 67 X SQ= 5.84 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)
28	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.60	28	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.62	12 50 18 30 X SQ= 3.62 P = 0.051 RV YES (NO)
30	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.63	30	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.54	11 45 19 38 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.136 RV YES (NO)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.77	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.55	24 38 7 46 X SQ= 8.19 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)

36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.52	36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.69	16 26 15 58 X SQ= 3.33 P = 0.051 RV YES (NO)	
40	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.83	40	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.58	24 47 5 34 X SQ= 4.68 P = 0.023 RV NO (NO)	
43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.65	43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.57	20 35 11 46 X SQ= 3.26 P = 0.057 RV YES (NO)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.79	45	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.59	22 33 6 48 X SQ= 10.45 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.75	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.51	7 36 21 35 X SQ= 4.40 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.64	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.72	10 50 18 19 X SQ= 9.90 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
53	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.97	53	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.85	1 13 30 71 X SQ= 2.14 P = 0.108 RV NO (NO)	
55	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.83	55	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.64	24 54 5 30 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.068 RV NO (NO)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.89	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.66	24 55 3 28 X SQ= 4.09 P = 0.027 RV NO (NO)	

58	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.94	58	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.81	2 16 29 68 X SQ= 1.85 P = 0.148 RV NO (NO)
64	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.89	64	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.65	16 30 2 16 X SQ= 2.51 P = 0.070 RV NO (NO)
65	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (25)	0.82	65	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (18)	0.50	9 16 2 16 X SQ= 2.22 P = 0.086 RV YES (NO)
66	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.68	66	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.51	17 40 8 41 X SQ= 1.97 P = 0.115 RV YES (NO)
67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.90	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.67	27 53 3 26 X SQ= 4.73 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)
78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.50	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.89	4 24 4 3 X SQ= 3.66 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)
80	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.75	80	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.63	6 13 2 22 X SQ= 2.40 P = 0.111 RV YES (NO)
81	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.94	81	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.71	1 10 15 25 X SQ= 2.05 P = 0.140 RV NO (NO)
85	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.68	85	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.53	21 39 10 44 X SQ= 3.11 P = 0.059 RV YES (NO)

92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.60	92	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.90	12 8 18 75 X SQ= 11.94 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.62	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.63	11 40 18 23 X SQ= 4.27 P = 0.026 RV YES (NO)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.76	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.86	4 19 13 3 X SQ= 13.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.75	99	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.52	18 32 6 30 X SQ= 2.99 P = 0.055 RV NO (NO)	
100	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.92	100	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.67	23 41 2 20 X SQ= 4.49 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
102	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.58	102	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.60	13 46 18 31 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.134 RV YES (NO)	
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.54	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.71	11 41 13 17 X SQ= 3.51 P = 0.045 RV YES (NO)	
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.52	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.72	14 51 15 20 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.037 RV YES (NO)	
114	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.57	114	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.62	13 48 17 30 X SQ= 2.23 P = 0.129 RV YES (NO)	

118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.59	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.68	17 23 12 48 X SQ= 4.86 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.69	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.60	8 40 18 27 X SQ= 5.17 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.58	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.67	11 45 15 22 X SQ= 3.85 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)	
133	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.83	133	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.68	5 24 25 51 X SQ= 1.81 P = 0.149 RV NO (NO)	
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.89	0 8 27 65 X SQ= 1.90 P = 0.104 RV NO (NO)	
147	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.88	147	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.69	3 20 23 44 X SQ= 2.81 P = 0.064 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.71	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.55	17 25 7 31 X SQ= 3.63 P = 0.050 RV YES (NO)	
158	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.80	158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.51	5 35 20 36 X SQ= 5.38 P = 0.017 RV NO (NO)	
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.54	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.77	14 16 12 55 X SQ= 7.33 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	

169	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.58	169	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.60	13 45 18 30 X SQ= 2.21 P = 0.133 RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.77	170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.56	7 32 23 40 X SQ= 3.15 P = 0.049 RV NO (NO)	
175	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.64	175	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.57	10 41 18 31 X SQ= 2.84 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.54	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.82	13 59 15 13 X SQ= 10.91 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.68	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.55	19 34 9 42 X SQ= 3.50 P = 0.047 RV YES (NO)	
182	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.86	182	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.63	18 37 3 22 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.059 RV NO (NO)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.87	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.53	2 19 14 17 X SQ= 5.88 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.54	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.72	14 17 12 44 X SQ= 4.29 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
192	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.87	192	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.72	4 23 27 59 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.137 RV NO (NO)	

194 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101) 0.67

194 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101) 0.96

10	3
20	81

X SQ= 16.55
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

****

28 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS HIGH (62)

28 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS LOW (48)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

62 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CANADA	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR
COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HONDURAS
ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA REP
LAOS	LEBANON	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
NEPAL	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	SYRIA	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR	UPPER VOLTA
VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP								

48 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
GREECE	HAITI	HUNGARY	IRELAND	ITALY	JAPAN	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NIGERIA
NORWAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
TANGANYIKA	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA		

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

ETHIOPIA	GHANA	KOREA, N	TOGO	USSR

2	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.94	2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.62	4 18 58 30 X SQ= 14.42 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
3	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	1.00	3	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.73	0 13 62 35 X SQ= 16.53 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.69	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.94	19 3 43 45 X SQ= 8.60 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)

8	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.79	8	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, DR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.92	13 4 49 44 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.109 RV NO (NO)	
13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.79	13	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.94	13 3 49 45 X SQ= 3.61 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
19	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.53	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.81	17 13 19 3 X SQ= 3.95 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
21	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.61	21	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.87	24 6 38 42 X SQ= 8.10 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
24	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.55	24	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.60	28 29 34 19 X SQ= 1.95 P = 0.127 RV YES (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.69	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.58	19 28 43 20 X SQ= 7.38 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
31	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.87	31	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.67	53 32 8 16 X SQ= 5.27 P = 0.019 RV NO (YES)	
34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.53	34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.65	29 31 33 17 X SQ= 2.78 P = 0.083 RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.79	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.58	M 13 28 49 20 X SQ= 14.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

39	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.74	39	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.55	16 21 46 26 X SQ= 3.45 P = 0.044 RV NO (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.86	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.56	8 27 51 21 X SQ= 20.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDEROEVELOPED (57)	0.59	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.62	24 30 35 18 X SQ= 4.21 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)	M
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.59	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.65	24 30 35 16 X SQ= 5.29 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)	
48	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (24)	0.50	48	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (30)	0.77	20 10 20 3 X SQ= 1.90 P = 0.115 RV YES (NO)	
49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)	0.65	49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)	0.81	20 3 11 13 X SQ= 7.11 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.84	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.55	10 26 52 21 X SQ= 16.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.76	58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.94	15 3 47 45 X SQ= 5.12 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.69	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.56	19 27 43 21 X SQ= 6.28 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)	

65	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (18)	0.52	65	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (25)	0.79	14 11 15 3 X SQ= 2.42 P = 0.099 RV YES (NO)
67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.61	67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.87	35 41 22 6 X SQ= 7.47 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)
70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.87	70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.69	7 14 49 31 X SQ= 4.18 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)
71	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.92	71	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.70	5 14 56 32 X SQ= 7.42 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)
74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.93	74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.54	4 22 56 26 X SQ= 20.29 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.92	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.54	4 22 49 19 X SQ= 22.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.52	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.84	25 3 23 16 X SQ= 5.95 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)
78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.93	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.57	M 25 3 2 4 X SQ= 6.35 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)
79	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.67	79	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.88	32 15 16 2 X SQ= 1.94 P = 0.119 RV NO (NO)

82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.60	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.61	23 28 34 18 X SQ= 3.51 P = 0.048 RV YES (YES)	
84	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.68	84	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.61	23 7 11 11 X SQ= 2.90 P = 0.076 RV YES (YES)	
85	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.54	85	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.62	28 30 33 18 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.122 RV YES (YES)	
87	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.56	87	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.76	19 10 24 31 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.069 RV NO (YES)	
89	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.71	89	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.55	14 19 34 23 X SQ= 1.85 P = 0.130 RV NO (YES)	
95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.93	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.78	56 36 4 10 X SQ= 3.93 P = 0.040 RV NO (YES)	
96	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.69	96	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.84	34 31 15 6 X SQ= 1.65 P = 0.138 RV NO (NO)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.79	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.62	15 6 4 10 X SQ= 4.61 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.60	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.82	19 28 28 6 X SQ= 12.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

110	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.89	110	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.76	6	9	
						49	28	
						X SQ=	2.02	
						P =	0.148	
						RV NO	(YES)	
115	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.92	115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.67	5	15	
						56	30	
						X SQ=	9.11	
						P =	0.002	
						RV NO	(YES)	
116	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.79	116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.58	13	19	
						48	26	
						X SQ=	4.43	
						P =	0.032	
						RV NO	(YES)	
119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.82	119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.60	46	24	
						10	16	
						X SQ=	4.73	
						P =	0.021	
						RV NO	(YES)	
120	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.95	120	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.82	53	33	
						3	7	
						X SQ=	2.50	
						P =	0.088	
						RV NO	(YES)	
122	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.82	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.56	51	27	
						11	21	
						X SQ=	7.66	
						P =	0.005	
						RV NO	(YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.73	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.51	41	19	
						15	20	
						X SQ=	4.92	
						P =	0.018	
						RV YES	(YES)	
132	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.80	132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	37	29	
						9	0	
						X SQ=	4.73	
						P =	0.010	
						RV NO	(NO)	
133	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.65	133	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.80	19	9	
						36	36	
						X SQ=	1.93	
						P =	0.122	
						RV NO	(YES)	

136	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.98	136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.75	1 11 47 33 X SQ= 8.71 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
146	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.89	146	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.98	6 1 48 41 X SQ= 1.53 P = 0.132 RV NO (NO)	
147	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.81	147	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.64	9 14 38 25 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.093 RV NO (YES)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.68	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.79	M 14 26 30 7 X SQ= 14.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.51	158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.70	27 12 26 28 X SQ= 3.29 P = 0.057 RV YES (YES)	
164	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.61	164	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.77	22 9 35 30 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.125 RV NO (NO)	
168	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.72	168	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.58	16 18 42 25 X SQ= 1.66 P = 0.143 RV NO (YES)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.52	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.77	28 10 26 34 X SQ= 7.48 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
174	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.79	174	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.61	11 17 41 27 X SQ= 2.73 P = 0.074 RV NO (YES)	

181	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MOOERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.85	181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MOOERN, RATHER THAN MOOERN (55)	0.53	6 15 35 17 X SQ= 7.61 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
182	LEAN MORE TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MOOERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.76	182	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.57	35 17 11 13 X SQ= 2.33 P = 0.085 RV NO (YES)	
185	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.52	185	TILT TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.72	15 5 14 13 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.137 RV YES (NO)	
187	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.71	187	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.56	36 25 15 20 X SQ= 1.73 P = 0.142 RV NO (YES)	
192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.67	192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.87	20 6 41 42 X SQ= 5.02 P = 0.022 RV NO (YES)	
194	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.95	194	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.83	3 8 58 40 X SQ= 2.89 P = 0.057 RV NO (YES)	

M

MATRIX

28 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS HIGH (62)

28 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS LOW (48)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

AUSTRALIA	CANADA	CHILE	CUBA	ICELAND	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CYPRUS
ISRAEL	JAMAICA	LEBANON	MALAYA	NEW ZEALAND	CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E
SO AFRICA	TRINIDAD	VENEZUELA			GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	IRELAND	ITALY
					JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NORWAY	POLAND
					RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK
					US	URUGUAY	YUGOSLAVIA		

13 . 28

49 . 20

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	AFGHANISTAN	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CEN AFR REP	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	GABON	HAITI
DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	LIBERIA	NIGERIA	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SOMALIA
HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	UGANDA	VIETNAM, N	YEMEN
IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBYA					
MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA					
MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	PAKISTAN					
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	SA*U ARABIA					
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SYRIA	THAILAND	TUNISIA					
TURKEY	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP						

M

MATRIX

28 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS HIGH (62)

28 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS LOW (48)

43 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR
UNDERDEVELOPED (55)

AUSTRALIA	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHILE	CHINA, PR	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURMA
COLOMBIA	CUBA	ECUADOR	ICELAND	INDIA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE
IRAQ	ISRAEL	JAMAICA	LIBYA	MALAYA	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	IRELAND
MEXICO	NEW ZEALAND	PAKISTAN	PERU	PHILIPPINES	ITALY	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NORWAY
SO AFRICA	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	VENEZUELA		POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN
					SWITZERLAND	UK	US	URUGUAY	YUGOSLAVIA

24 30

35 18

43 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	CEYLON	CHAD	AFGHANISTAN	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
CONGO(BRA)	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	GABON	HAITI	LIBERIA
HONDURAS	INDONESIA	IRAN	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA
KOREA REP	LAOS	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	UGANDA	VIETNAM, N	YEMEN		
MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER					
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SYRIA					
THAILAND	TUNISIA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP					

MATRIX

28 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS HIGH (62)

28 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS LOW (48)

78 POLITIES
THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED
THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER
THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)

ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	ARGENTINA	CYPRUS	URUGUAY
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR			
EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	INDIA	JAMAICA			
LEBANON	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY			
PERU	PHILIPPINES	TRINIDAD	UAR	VENEZUELA			

25 3

2 4

78 POLITIES
THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED
WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER
THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)

CHINA, PR	TURKEY	BULGARIA	JAPAN	RUMANIA	YUGOSLAVIA

M

MATRIX

28 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS HIGH (62)

28 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS LOW (48)

97 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN
TOTALITARIAN (23)

ALGERIA	EL SALVADOR	GUINEA	INDONESIA	IRAN	AFGHANISTAN	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	LIBERIA
JORDAN	KOREA REP	LADS	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	SUDAN				
PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	SA'U ARABIA	THAILAND	UAR					

15 6

4 10

97 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN
AUTHORITARIAN (16)

ALBANIA	CHINA, PR	CUBA	MONGOLIA	BULGARIA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	POLAND
				PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA

M

MATRIX

28 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS HIGH (62)

28 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS LOW (48)

153 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
STABLE (42)

ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	CANADA	CHINA, PR	GUINEA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK
ICELAND	INDIA	ISRAEL	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	HUNGARY	IRELAND
NEW ZEALAND	PHILIPPINES	SO AFRICA	TUNISIA		JAPAN	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NORWAY
					POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN
					SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	UK	US	VIETNAM, N
					YUGOSLAVIA				

14 . 26

30 . 7

153 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)

BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	COSTA RICA	ARGENTINA	CAMBODIA	CONGO(LEO)	FRANCE	GREECE
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	IRAQ	ITALY	SOMALIA			
IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON					
MALAGASY R	MALAYA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PAKISTAN					
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO					
SYRIA	THAILAND	TURKEY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP					

29	POLITIES WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	29	POLITIES WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

56 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CUBA
CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY
ICELAND	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA REP
LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA
PERU	POLAND	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TUNISIA	TURKEY
USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA				

49 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON
CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA
GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	LAOS	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALI
MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA	

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

COSTA RICA	MALAYA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	TRINIDAD	VIETNAM REP

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

CHINA, PR	KOREA, N	VIETNAM, N

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.62	2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	21 0 35 49 X SQ= 20.68 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
5	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	0.71	5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	1.00	17 0 7 2 X SQ= 1.56 P = 0.111 RV YES (NO)
6	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.75	6	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.90	14 5 42 44 X SQ= 2.93 P = 0.074 RV NO (YES)

8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.96	8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.80	2 10 54 39 X SQ= 5.75 P = 0.011 RV NO (YES)	
9	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	1.00	9	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.90	0 5 56 44 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.020 RV NO (YES)	
10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.91	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.57	5 28 51 21 X SQ= 26.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.58	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.87	7 4 5 28 X SQ= 7.49 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
16	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (11)	0.78	16	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	0.71	7 4 2 10 X SQ= 3.53 P = 0.036 RV YES (YES)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.74	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.85	5 28 14 5 X SQ= 15.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.87	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.67	2 10 14 5 X SQ= 7.43 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.64	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.63	36 18 20 31 X SQ= 6.88 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
25	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.79	25	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.92	12 4 44 45 X SQ= 2.61 P = 0.100 RV NO (YES)	

26	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.54	26	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.71	26 14 30 35 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.072 RV NO (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.82	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.90	10 43 46 5 X SQ= 50.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.59	31	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	1.00	33 48 23 0 X SQ= 22.98 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.79	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.76	44 12 12 37 X SQ= 28.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.57	35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	24 0 32 49 X SQ= 24.85 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.68	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.96	38 2 18 47 X SQ= 42.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.91	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.84	51 8 5 41 X SQ= 56.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.58	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.92	32 4 23 45 X SQ= 26.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.91	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.67	50 16 5 32 X SQ= 34.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.63	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.96	34 2 20 46 X SQ= 35.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.82	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.90	45 5 10 43 X SQ= 49.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.55	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	25 0 31 49 X SQ= 26.30 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.76	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.85	42 7 13 40 X SQ= 35.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.57	55 20 0 26 X SQ= 38.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
51	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.72	51	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.53	38 18 15 16 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.108 RV NO (YES)
53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.75	53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	14 0 42 49 X SQ= 12.05 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.61	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.96	34 2 22 47 X SQ= 34.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.96	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.67	54 16 2 33 X SQ= 45.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.95	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.57	52 21 3 28 X SQ= 30.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.71	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.94	39 3 16 46 X SQ= 42.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	M
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.69	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.65	37 16 17 30 X SQ= 10.04 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.66	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.78	37 11 19 38 X SQ= 18.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.79	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.73	44 13 12 36 X SQ= 26.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.69	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.95	17 2 37 42 X SQ= 9.60 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.70	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.78	37 11 16 38 X SQ= 21.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.87	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.69	46 15 7 34 X SQ= 31.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.54	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	25 0 29 49 X SQ= 27.49 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.85	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.82	47 9 8 40 X SQ= 44.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.51	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	25 0 24 39 X SQ= 25.34 P = 0. * RV YES (YES)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.70	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.79	16 8 7 31 X SQ= 12.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.56	79	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.88	15 30 12 4 X SQ= 6.70 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.79	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.84	41 7 11 38 X SQ= 36.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.63	11 14 0 24 X SQ= 11.21 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.82	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.81	46 9 10 39 X SQ= 39.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.96	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.67	54 16 2 32 X SQ= 43.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.89	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.68	5 25 40 12 X SQ= 25.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.63	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.95	29 2 17 40 X SQ= 30.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.73	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.68	37 10 14 21 X SQ= 11.20 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.90	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.57	46 13 5 17 X SQ= 18.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.64	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.85	5 17 9 3 X SQ= 6.73 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.67	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.65	35 9 17 17 X SQ= 6.26 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.63	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.85	31 6 18 33 X SQ= 18.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.75	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.65	39 16 13 30 X SQ= 14.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.73	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.81	32 7 12 29 X SQ= 20.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.79	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.53	34 14 9 16 X SQ= 6.86 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)

107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.64	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.83	35 8 20 38 X SQ= 20.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.82	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.51	42 19 9 20 X SQ= 9.96 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
111	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.66	111	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.55	31 20 16 24 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.059 RV YES (YES)	
114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.50	114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.70	26 32 26 14 X SQ= 3.10 P = 0.064 RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.57	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	31 0 23 48 X SQ= 36.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.87	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.79	47 10 7 38 X SQ= 42.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.59	119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.97	33 33 23 1 X SQ= 13.84 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.82	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	46 34 10 0 X SQ= 5.14 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.87	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.84	7 41 49 8 X SQ= 50.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.52	122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	27 49 29 0 X SQ= 32.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.58	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.91	20 40 28 4 X SQ= 22.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.65	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.60	32 14 17 21 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.73	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.51	36 17 13 18 X SQ= 4.42 P = 0.024 RV YES (YES)	
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.86	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.56	7 20 43 25 X SQ= 9.35 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
135	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.95	135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.80	42 32 2 8 X SQ= 3.41 P = 0.042 RV NO (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.57	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.98	26 1 20 41 X SQ= 27.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.79	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.79	37 9 10 33 X SQ= 26.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.80	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.57	10 19 41 25 X SQ= 5.13 P = 0.015 RV NO (YES)	

140	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.94	140	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.81	3 8 45 35 X SQ= 2.20 P = 0.107 RV NO (YES)
141	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.83	141	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.95	8 2 40 39 X SQ= 2.01 P = 0.100 RV NO (NO)
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.54	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.80	21 8 25 33 X SQ= 5.54 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)
144	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.58	144	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.90	11 19 8 2 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)
146	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.96	146	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.86	2 6 47 36 X SQ= 1.80 P = 0.137 RV NO (YES)
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.51	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	22 0 21 37 X SQ= 23.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.69	0 14 55 31 X SQ= 17.40 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.64	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.71	M 30 7 17 17 X SQ= 6.32 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)
154	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.72	154	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.50	34 12 13 12 X SQ= 2.57 P = 0.072 RV YES (NO)

158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.70	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.64	15 23 35 13 X SQ= 8.42 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.85	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.62	8 23 44 14 X SQ= 18.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.55	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.96	28 2 23 43 X SQ= 26.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.75	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.64	38 16 13 29 X SQ= 13.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.76	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.55	M 12 23 38 19 X SQ= 7.91 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
171	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.82	171	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.93	9 3 40 41 X SQ= 1.82 P = 0.127 RV NO (YES)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.76	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.76	37 10 12 31 X SQ= 21.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.71	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.74	M 15 32 36 11 X SQ= 17.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.62	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.82	18 28 29 6 X SQ= 13.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.60	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	21 32 X SQ= 6.34 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	0 14
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.64	32 0 X SQ= 28.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	14 25
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	183	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.78	0 2 X SQ= 2.57 P = 0.064 RV YES (NO)	25 7
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.50	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.83	25 25 X SQ= 9.76 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	35 7
188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.59	188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.87	23 33 X SQ= 8.77 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	6 41
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.89	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	6 50 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.029 RV NO (NO)	0 49
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.87	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.60	7 49 X SQ= 9.13 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	19 28
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.98	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.54	1 55 X SQ= 34.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	26 22

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MATRIX

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS HIGH (56)

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS LOW (49)

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY
SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	EL SALVADOR	HONDURAS	YUGOSLAVIA
BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CUBA			
CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	FRANCE			
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND			
IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO			
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA			
POLAND	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND			
UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA				

39 3

16 46

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)

ECUADOR	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	JAPAN	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA
JORDAN	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBYA	MOROCCO	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON
PERU	SO AFRICA	SYRIA	TUNISIA	TURKEY	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY
UAR					ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
					HAITI	INDIA	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	LAOS
					LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA
					NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	RWANDA
					SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN
					TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA
					YEMEN				

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MATRIX

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS HIGH (56)

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS LOW (49)

97 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN
TOTALITARIAN (23)

IRAN	JORDAN	KOREA REP	NICARAGUA	UAR	AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP
					EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GHANA	GUINEA	INDONESIA
					LAOS	LIBERIA	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SA'U ARABIA
					SUDAN	THAILAND			

5 . 17

9 . 3

97 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN
AUTHORITARIAN (16)

BULGARIA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	ALBANIA	MONGOLIA	YUGOSLAVIA
POLAND	RUMANIA	SPAIN	USSR				

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MATRIX

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS HIGH (56)

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS LOW (49)

153 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
STABLE (42)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	ALBANIA	GUINEA	INDIA	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA
CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	TANGANYIKA	YUGOSLAVIA			
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	JAPAN					
LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY					
POLAND	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN					
SWITZERLAND	TUNISIA	USSR	UK	US					

30 . 7

17 . 17

153 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	CHILE	ECUADOR	FRANCE	BOLIVIA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CONGO(LEO)	EL SALVADOR
GREECE	IRAQ	ITALY	JORDAN	KOREA REP	GHANA	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	IVORY COAST	LAOS
LEBANON	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PERU	SYRIA	MALAGASY R	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
TURKEY	VENEZUELA				SOMALIA	THAILAND			

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MATRIX

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS HIGH (56)

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS LOW (49)

170 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	DOMIN REP	BOLIVIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CONGO(BRA)	CYPRUS
ECUADOR	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	TUNISIA	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA
US	VENEZUELA				GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST
					LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MAURITANIA	NIGER	PAKISTAN
					RWANDA	SENEGAL	UPPER VOLTA		

12 23

38 19

170 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CEYLON
CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	CHAD	CONGO(LEO)	ETHIOPIA	INDIA	LAOS
GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRAN	MALI	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NIGERIA	SIERRE LEO
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	SOMALIA	THAILAND	UGANDA	YUGOSLAVIA	
JORDAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MOROCCO					
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND	RUMANIA					
SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TURKEY					
USSR	UK	URUGUAY							

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MATRIX

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS HIGH (56)

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS LOW (49)

178 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)

BULGARIA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
GREECE	HUNGARY	ISRAEL	LEBANON	NEW ZEALAND	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR
PANAMA	POLAND	RUMANIA	SPAIN	TUNISIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI
					HONDURAS	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	MALI	MAURITANIA
					MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NIGER	PAKISTAN	RWANDA
					SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO
					UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA			

15 . 32

36 . 11

178 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	AFGHANISTAN	BOLIVIA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	ETHIOPIA
CANADA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	INDIA	LAOS	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	NIGERIA
FRANCE	GERMAN FR	ICELAND	IRAN	IRELAND	YUGOSLAVIA				
ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	LIBYA					
LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NICARAGUA					
NORWAY	PERU	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND					
TURKEY	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY					
VENEZUELA									

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MATRIX

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS HIGH (56)

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS LOW (49)

187 POLITIES
WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE
IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)

ARGENTINA	BULGARIA	COLOMBIA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA
ECUADOR	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	IRAN	IRAQ	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
JORDAN	KOREA REP	LEBANON	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
POLAND	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SYRIA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDONESIA
TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	VENEZUELA	IVORY COAST	LAOS	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL
					NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA
					SUDAN	THAILAND	TOGO	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA

25 . 35

25 . 7

187 POLITIES
WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE
IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	DENMARK	CEYLON	INDIA	MALAGASY R	MAURITANIA	SIERRE LEO
FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	TANGANYIKA	UGANDA			
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN					
LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY					
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK	US	URUGUAY					

30	POLITIES WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	30	POLITIES WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

56 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI
HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA
LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	RUMANIA
RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA
TURKEY	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA				

57 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN
JORDAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
TRINIDAD	USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA			

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

SA'U ARABIA VIETNAM, N

2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.61	0 22 56 35 X SQ= 24.43 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	1.00	5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	0.75	0 18 3 6 X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.029 RV YES (NO)
6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.91	6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.70	5 17 51 40 X SQ= 6.59 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)

8	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.79	8	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.91	12 5 44 52 X SQ= 2.62 P = 0.070 RV NO (YES)	
10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.54	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.95	30 3 26 54 X SQ= 29.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
11	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.54	11	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.96	26 2 3C 55 X SQ= 25.66 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.83	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.57	6 4 30 3 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)	
17	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	0.55	17	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.81	6 4 5 17 X SQ= 2.74 P = 0.056 RV YES (YES)	
18	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.71	18	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.62	30 3 12 5 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.102 RV YES (NO)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.86	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.85	30 3 5 17 X SQ= 23.65 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.71	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.77	12 5 5 17 X SQ= 7.09 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
22	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.68	22	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.51	38 29 18 28 X SQ= 2.71 P = 0.085 RV NO (YES)	

24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.59	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.63	23 36 33 21 X SQ= 4.67 P = 0.024 RV YES (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.75	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.58	14 33 42 24 X SQ= 11.26 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.81	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.90	10 46 43 5 X SQ= 50.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.71	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.77	16 44 40 13 X SQ= 24.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.58	0 24 56 33 X SQ= 27.47 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.96	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.70	2 40 54 17 X SQ= 50.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.80	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.91	11 52 45 5 X SQ= 55.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.89	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.57	6 32 50 24 X SQ= 24.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.59	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.87	22 48 32 7 X SQ= 23.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.65	0 19 56 36 X SQ= 20.97 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.96	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.62	2 34 54 21 X SQ= 40.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.86	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.85	8 47 48 8 X SQ= 53.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.85	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.84	8 47 44 9 X SQ= 47.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.87	47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.51	1 24 7 23 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.059 RV YES (NO)
48	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (24)	0.68	48	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (30)	0.72	7 23 15 9 X SQ= 6.93 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)	0.62	49	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)	1.00	15 9 25 0 X SQ= 9.12 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.74	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.59	11 32 32 22 X SQ= 9.68 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.51	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.74	20 40 21 14 X SQ= 5.37 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)

53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.75	0 14 56 43 X SQ= 13.52 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.96	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.61	2 35 53 22 X SQ= 39.65 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.58	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.96	23 55 32 2 X SQ= 37.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.52	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.93	25 53 27 4 X SQ= 24.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.96	57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.60	2 23 54 34 X SQ= 20.09 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.75	58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.95	14 3 42 54 X SQ= 7.13 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.93	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.75	4 42 52 14 X SQ= 50.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
66	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.55	66	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.61	M 22 34 27 22 X SQ= 2.03 P = 0.120 RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.75	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.65	14 37 41 20 X SQ= 16.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.64	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.74	20 42 35 15 X SQ= 14.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.92	70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.69	4 17 45 38 X SQ= 6.97 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.72	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.67	15 37 39 18 X SQ= 15.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.63	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.80	20 44 34 11 X SQ= 19.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.53	0 26 56 29 X SQ= 31.98 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.82	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.93	10 52 46 4 X SQ= 60.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.51	0 26 42 27 X SQ= 25.95 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.86	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.85	6 22 36 4 X SQ= 29.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
79	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.89	79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.55	31 17 4 14 X SQ= 7.81 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	

80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.73	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.92	8 11 22 1 X SQ= 12.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.84	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.78	8 43 41 12 X SQ= 37.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
83	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.87	83	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.96	7 2 49 55 X SQ= 2.01 P = 0.094 RV NO (YES)	
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.56	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.92	18 11 23 1 X SQ= 6.73 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.71	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.77	16 44 40 13 X SQ= 24.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.57	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.91	24 52 32 5 X SQ= 27.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.63	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.89	26 5 15 41 X SQ= 23.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.96	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.67	2 31 45 15 X SQ= 37.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.60	93	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.82	21 10 32 45 X SQ= 5.06 P = 0.019 RV NO (YES)	

94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.69	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.74	11 40 25 14 X SQ= 14.93 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.50	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.91	17 49 17 5 X SQ= 16.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.74	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.64	17 5 6 9 X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.038 RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.60	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.69	14 34 21 15 X SQ= 6.05 P = 0.013 RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.84	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.64	7 34 36 19 X SQ= 20.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.66	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.75	17 42 33 14 X SQ= 16.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.83	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.75	7 36 34 12 X SQ= 27.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.57	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.80	15 37 20 9 X SQ= 10.63 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.87	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.70	7 39 46 17 X SQ= 33.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.51	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.81	22 43 23 10 X SQ= 9.93 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
111	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.52	111	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.65	23 30 25 16 X SQ= 2.20 P = 0.101 RV YES (YES)	
114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.67	114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.52	35 26 17 28 X SQ= 3.23 P = 0.052 RV YES (YES)	
115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.64	0 20 54 35 X SQ= 21.68 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.98	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.56	M 1 31 53 24 X SQ= 36.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.76	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.85	13 47 41 8 X SQ= 39.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.54	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.70	M 22 17 19 40 X SQ= 4.70 P = 0.022 RV YES (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.77	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.84	M 43 9 13 48 X SQ= 39.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.56	56 25 0 32 X SQ= 41.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.86	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.58	M	43 20 7 28 X SQ= 19.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.67		50 32 0 16 X SQ= 17.55 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.68	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.69		13 35 28 16 X SQ= 10.98 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.56	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.75	M	18 38 23 13 X SQ= 7.70 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.57	133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.87		22 7 29 45 X SQ= 9.79 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.76		0 12 46 38 X SQ= 10.52 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.96	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.54		2 27 44 23 X SQ= 25.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.78	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.76		10 38 36 12 X SQ= 26.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.50	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.82		23 10 23 47 X SQ= 10.87 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)

140	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.80	140	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.93
141	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.95	141	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.83
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.90	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.50
146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.84	146	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.98
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.53
148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.73	148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.65	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.62
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.57	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.70
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.60	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.89

```
      9    4
     35   50
X SQ=   2.54
P =     0.075
RV NO  (YES)

      2    9
     41   44
X SQ=   2.45
P =     0.104
RV NO  (NO )

      4   26
     38   26
X SQ=  15.70
P =     0.
RV YES (YES)

      7    1
     38   53
X SQ=   4.50
P =     0.022
RV NO  (YES)

      0   23
     40   26
X SQ=  22.93
P =     0.
RV NO  (YES)

     14    0
     38   57
X SQ=  15.28
P =     0.
RV NO  (YES)

     11   30
     20   18
X SQ=   4.48
P =     0.023
RV YES (YES)

M    24   16
     18   37
X SQ=   5.92
P =     0.012
RV YES (YES)

     26    6
     17   48
X SQ=  24.19
P =     0.
RV YES (YES)
```

166	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.95	166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.79	3 12 52 45 X SQ= 4.60 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.96	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.58	2 32 47 23 X SQ= 32.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.67	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.76	16 42 33 13 X SQ= 18.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
170	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.51	170	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.70	23 16 24 38 X SQ= 3.18 P = 0.065 RV NO (YES)
172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.92	172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.70	4 17 48 39 X SQ= 7.45 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.98	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.51	1 27 45 26 X SQ= 26.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.78	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.77	10 41 36 12 X SQ= 28.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.71	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.69	35 17 14 37 X SQ= 14.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.85	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.66	33 17 6 33 X SQ= 20.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.61	0 21 21 33 X SQ= 9.50 P = 0. RV ND (NO)
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.53	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.97	21 33 24 1 X SQ= 20.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
186	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.56	186	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.74	17 12 22 34 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.111 RV NO (YES)
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.88	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.58	43 21 6 29 X SQ= 20.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.87	188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.56	7 25 47 32 X SQ= 11.44 P = 0. RV ND (YES)
189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.88	0 7 56 50 X SQ= 5.37 P = 0.013 RV ND (YES)
192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.61	192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.91	21 5 33 52 X SQ= 12.39 P = 0. RV ND (YES)
193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.53	193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.96	26 2 29 55 X SQ= 26.31 P = 0. RV ND (YES)

M

MATRIX

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS HIGH (56)

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)

66 POLITIES
THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	HONDURAS	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	LIBYA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DENMARK
MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA	RUMANIA	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GREECE
SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SYRIA	THAILAND	TUNISIA	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JORDAN
TURKEY	YEMEN				LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA
					PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	SPAIN
					SWEDEN	UAR	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	

22 34

27 22

66 POLITIES
THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)

ALBANIA	BOLIVIA	CAMEROUN	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	AUSTRALIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA
CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	ECUADOR	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	HUNGARY	JAMAICA
GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	IVORY COAST	LADS	JAPAN	LEBANON	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALI	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PERU	SO AFRICA	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD
SIERRE LEO	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UK	US			
UPPER VOLTA	YUGOSLAVIA								

M

MATRIX

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS HIGH (56)

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)

101 POLITIES
WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER
OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)

BOLIVIA	INDIA	MALAGASY R	MOROCCO	SIERRE LEO	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CEYLON
TUNISIA	TURKEY				COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND
					FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND
					ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG
					MALAYA	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY
					PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD
					UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	

7 . 34

36 . 19

101 POLITIES
WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER
OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC,
PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR
NON-POLYARCHIC (57)

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CUBA
CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	CZECHOS'KIA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY
ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	JORDAN	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL
HONDURAS	INDONESIA	IRAN	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	USSR	UAR	
LAOS	LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA					
NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	RUMANIA	SENEGAL					
SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP					
YUGOSLAVIA									

M

MATRIX

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS HIGH (56)

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)

116 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)

TURKEY

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL
CANADA	CHILE	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL
ITALY	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBURG	MEXICO
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	SO AFRICA
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK	US	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA				

1 . 31

53 . 24

116 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA	BULGARIA	CEYLON	COLOMBIA	CUBA	COSTA RICA
BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	JAMAICA	JORDAN	MALAYA
GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU
HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	POLAND	TRINIDAD	USSR	UAR	
IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	LADS	LIBERIA	LIBYA					
MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO					
NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	RUMANIA	RWANDA					
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA					
TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA					
UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN							

M

MATRIX

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS HIGH (56)

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)

118 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BURMA	CHINA, PR	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CUBA	CYPRUS
ETHIOPIA	GHANA	GUINEA	INDONESIA	IRAN	CZECHOS*KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	JORDAN	LEBANON
IRAQ	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	SPAIN
MONGOLIA	RUMANIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	USSR	UAR			
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

22 . 17

19 . 40

118 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED (60)

BOLIVIA	CAMBODIA	CONGO(LEO)	GUATEMALA	HAITI	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CEYLON
HONDURAS	INDIA	IVORY COAST	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	SENEGAL	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR
TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA		GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
					JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO
					NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA
					PERU	PHILIPPINES	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
					TRINIDAD	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA

M

MATRIX

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS HIGH [56]

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)

121 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT (54)

AFGHANISTAN	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEYLON	CYPRUS	JORDAN	LEBANON	MALAYA
CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	SO AFRICA	
DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA					
HAITI	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ					
IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	MALAGASY R					
MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NIGER					
RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN					
SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	UGANDA					
UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN							

43 . 9

13 . 48

121 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR
NEGLIGIBLE (61)

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL
LIBERIA	LIBYA	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA	RUMANIA	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CUBA
TUNISIA	TURKEY	YUGOSLAVIA			COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
					EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
					GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL
					ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO
					NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
					PERU	POLAND	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	SWEDEN
					SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	USSR	UAR	UK

M

MATRIX

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS HIGH (56)

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)

125 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)

AFGHANISTAN	BOLIVIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	BRAZIL	CEYLON	COLOMBIA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	GERMANY, E	JAPAN	JORDAN	LEBANON	MALAYA
DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	MEXICO	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA	PERU	POLAND	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	USSR
IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	KOREA REP	LAOS					
MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER					
RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN					
SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	TURKEY	UGANDA					
UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA							

43 . 20

7 . 28

125 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)

BURUNDI	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	NICARAGUA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CHILE
TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA				COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMAN FR
					GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
					JAMAICA	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY
					PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD
					UAR	UK	URUGUAY		

M

MATRIX

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS HIGH (56)

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)

129 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED (56)

BOLIVIA	CAMEROUN	CONGO(LEO)	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL
INDIA	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	DENMARK
NICARAGUA	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SYRIA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE
TOGO	TURKEY	UGANDA			GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL
					ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG
					MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY
					PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
					TRINIDAD	UK	VENEZUELA		

18 38

23 13

129 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)

ALBANIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	BULGARIA	CANADA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY
CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	GABON	GHANA	MEXICO	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	SPAIN
GUINEA	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	MALI	MONGOLIA	USSR	UAR	US		
NIGER	RUMANIA	SENEGAL	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA					
UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA							

M

MATRIX

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS HIGH (56)

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)

158 POLITIES
WHERE PERSONALISMO IS
PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)

BOLIVIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	GABON	GHANA	COSTA RICA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FRANCE	GREECE
GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	LAOS	JAPAN	LEBANON	PANAMA	PERU	UAR
LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA	NICARAGUA	NIGER	URUGUAY				
SYRIA	THAILAND	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP						

24 . 16

18 . 37

158 POLITIES
WHERE PERSONALISMO IS
NEGLIGIBLE (56)

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	CHINA, PR	GUINEA	INDIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA
KOREA, N	MALAGASY R	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	RUMANIA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMANY, E
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	GERMAN FR	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL
TURKEY	UGANDA	YUGOSLAVIA			ITALY	JAMAICA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO
					NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PARAGUAY
					PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	SO AFRICA	SPAIN
					SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	USSR	UK
					US	VENEZUELA			

M

MATRIX

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS HIGH (56)

30 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)

175 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS
FULLY EFFECTIVE OR
PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)

BOLIVIA	CAMEROUN	HONDURAS	INDIA	LIBYA	.ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL
MALAGASY R	MOROCCO	SIERRE LEO	TURKEY	UGANDA	.CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA
					.CYPRUS	DENMARK	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE
					.GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL
					.ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG
					.MALAYA	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA
					.NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN
					.SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	UK	US	URUGUAY
					.VENEZUELA				

10 . 41

36 . 12

175 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS
LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR
WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	.BULGARIA	CZECHOS'KIA	EL SALVADOR	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY
CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	.JORDAN	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	SPAIN
ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	.USSR	UAR			
INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	LAOS	LIBERIA					
MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA					
NIGER	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA					
TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TUNISIA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP					
YUGOSLAVIA									

31 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)

31 POLITIES
WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)

PREDICATE ONLY

90 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS
CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GABON	GHANA	GREECE
GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND
IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA
MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER
NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA
TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA

24 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CHILE	DENMARK	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
ICELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
TRINIDAD	UK	US	URUGUAY						

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

SA'U ARABIA

32 POLITIES
WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (10)

32 POLITIES
WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)

PREDICATE ONLY

10 IN LEFT COLUMN

CANADA	CHINA, PR	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	INDIA	ITALY	JAPAN	USSR	UK	US

105 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS
HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN
KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI
MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA
NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA
SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA
TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA					

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33 POLITIES
WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)

33 POLITIES
WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

30 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	FRANCE
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	INDIA	INOONESIA	ITALY	JAPAN	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	PAKISTAN	POLAND
RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TURKEY	USSR	UK	US	YUGOSLAVIA

85 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
CEYLON	CHAO	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY
DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GABON	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA
JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN					

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2 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.53
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN
WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,
NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)

2 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.91
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN
WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,
NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)

14 8
16 77
X SQ= 17.56
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

10 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.97
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,
OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)

10 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.62
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,
OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)

1 32
29 53
X SQ= 11.14
P = 0.
RV NO (NO)

13 LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.97
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR
THE MIDDLE EAST (99)

13 LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.82
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR
THE MIDDLE EAST (99)

1 15
29 70
X SQ= 2.69
P = 0.066
RV NO (NO)

18 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.83
LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR
SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN
NORTH AFRICA OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)

18 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.71
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN
IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR
SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)

1 32
5 13
X SQ= 4.69
P = 0.017
RV YES (ND)

22	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.77	22	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.53	23 45 7 40 X SQ= 4.23 P = 0.030 RV NO (NO)	
23	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (27)	0.67	23	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.92	20 7 10 78 X SQ= 38.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.93	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.61	28 33 2 52 X SQ= 24.31 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.67	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.67	20 28 10 57 X SQ= 9.03 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.66	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.64	10 52 19 29 X SQ= 6.51 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.86	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.59	25 31 4 45 X SQ= 15.62 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.80	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.60	6 50 24 33 X SQ= 12.71 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.53	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.90	14 76 16 8 X SQ= 22.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.53	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.91	16 8 14 77 X SQ= 23.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.77	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.78	23 19 7 66 X SQ= 25.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.87	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.55	26 38 4 47 X SQ= 14.16 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.64	38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	10 0 18 85 X SQ= 29.02 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
39	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	1.00	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.89	29 9 0 76 X SQ= 73.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
40	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	1.00	40	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.51	30 41 0 39 X SQ= 20.58 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.50	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.95	15 4 15 79 X SQ= 29.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.80	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.85	24 12 6 70 X SQ= 40.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.97	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.68	29 26 1 56 X SQ= 34.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.60	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.92	18 7 12 78 X SQ= 31.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.86	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.62	25 30 4 50 X SQ= 18.30 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.67	30 54 0 26 X SQ= 11.03 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.67	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNORED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.80	20 17 10 66 X SQ= 19.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.97	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.63	28 51 1 30 X SQ= 10.30 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.76	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.72	22 24 7 61 X SQ= 18.45 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
67	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.87	67	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.68	26 54 4 25 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.057 RV NO (NO)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.79	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.64	22 30 6 53 X SQ= 13.48 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.89	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.52	25 40 3 43 X SQ= 12.92 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.59	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.89	17 9 12 75 X SQ= 25.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.93	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.59	27 35 2 50 X SQ= 21.46 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.71	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.87	17 9 7 63 X SQ= 28.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.60	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.96	4 24 6 1 X SQ= 10.72 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.61	81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.93	9 2 14 26 X SQ= 5.86 P = 0.014 RV NO (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.88	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.65	23 28 3 52 X SQ= 20.38 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.93	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.62	28 32 2 52 X SQ= 24.88 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
87	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.96	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.52	1 30 25 33 X SQ= 13.67 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.65	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.77	17 16 9 53 X SQ= 13.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.93	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.66	26 41 2 21 X SQ= 5.91 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)

97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN [16]	0.80	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN [23]	0.72	2 21 8 8 X SQ= 6.42 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD [50]	0.83	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT [36]	0.55	25 25 5 31 X SQ= 10.48 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC [41]	0.59	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC [57]	0.65	17 24 12 45 X SQ= 3.84 P = 0.043 RV YES (NO)	
102	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC [59]	0.67	102	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC [49]	0.50	20 39 10 39 X SQ= 1.80 P = 0.136 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE [43]	0.67	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE [47]	0.60	18 25 9 38 X SQ= 4.49 P = 0.023 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS [46]	0.60	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL [65]	0.65	18 28 12 53 X SQ= 4.83 P = 0.018 RV YES (NO)	
110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW [80]	0.67	110	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW [80]	0.90	8 7 16 64 X SQ= 5.77 P = 0.019 RV NO (YES)	
114	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE [61]	0.71	114	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE [61]	0.51	20 41 8 39 X SQ= 2.66 P = 0.078 RV NO (NO)	
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT [20]	0.54	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE [91]	0.94	15 5 13 78 X SQ= 28.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.68	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.84	19 13 9 70 X SQ= 25.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.82	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.55	23 37 5 46 X SQ= 10.43 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.83	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.58	5 49 25 36 X SQ= 13.35 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.62	126	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.92	16 67 10 6 X SQ= 10.81 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	132	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.84	18 49 0 9 X SQ= 1.86 P = 0.105 RV NO (NO)	
135	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.96	135	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.82	24 53 1 12 X SQ= 2.00 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.54	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.80	15 14 13 55 X SQ= 9.00 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.69	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.58	18 30 8 41 X SQ= 4.51 P = 0.023 RV YES (NO)	
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.89	0 8 28 64 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.101 RV NO (NO)	

147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.54	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.85	13 10 11 56 X SQ= 12.11 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.82	0 14 30 66 X SQ= 4.54 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.79	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.63	23 19 6 32 X SQ= 11.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	1.00	157	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.80	0 14 29 55 X SQ= 5.31 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.83	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.52	5 35 24 32 X SQ= 8.81 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
164	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.79	164	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.60	6 28 23 42 X SQ= 2.59 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)	
166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.70	166	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.93	9 6 21 78 X SQ= 8.21 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.59	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.78	17 17 12 60 X SQ= 11.29 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
170	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.80	170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.54	6 33 24 39 X SQ= 4.94 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)	

174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.52	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.82	15 13 14 58 X SQ= 9.81 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.69	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.56	20 31 9 40 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.70	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.59	9 44 21 30 X SQ= 6.28 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.50	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.85	14 7 14 41 X SQ= 9.39 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.62	14 41 0 25 X SQ= 6.05 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.55	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.74	13 53 16 19 X SQ= 6.35 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.93	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.70	2 25 28 58 X SQ= 5.44 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.93	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.69	2 26 28 58 X SQ= 5.79 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.77	194	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.93	7 6 23 78 X SQ= 4.24 P = 0.038 RV NO (YES)	

34 POLITIES
WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM,
OR LOW (62)

34 POLITIES
WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY LOW (53)

PREDICATE ONLY

62 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CANADA	CEYLON
CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL
ITALY	JAPAN	KOREA REP	MALAYA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY
PAKISTAN	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA*U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

53 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA
CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI
HONDURAS	ICELAND	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA
LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA
UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN							

35 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)

35 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)

PREDICATE ONLY

24 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
USSR	UK	US	VENEZUELA						

91 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GREECE
GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST
JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO
TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN
YUGOSLAVIA									

36	POLITIES WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	36	POLITIES WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

42 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA
DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL
ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND
RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA								

73 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R
MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA
VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN							

2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22)	0.50	2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.99	21 1 21 72 X SQ= 37.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
7	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN CENTRAL AMERICA (10)	1.00	7	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN CENTRAL AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN SOUTH AMERICA (7)	0.54	0 7 4 6 X SQ= 1.78 P = 0.103 RV YES (NO)	
8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.95	8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.78	2 16 40 57 X SQ= 4.72 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.98	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.56	1 32 41 41 X SQ= 20.41 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.75	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.80	3 8 1 32 X SQ= 3.30 P = 0.043 RV YES (NO)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.87	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.68	1 32 7 15 X SQ= 6.64 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
20	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.78	20	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.52	2 16 7 15 X SQ= 1.39 P = 0.149 RV YES (NO)	
21	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.83	21	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.66	7 25 35 48 X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.67	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.55	28 33 14 40 X SQ= 4.11 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.67	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.73	M 28 20 14 53 X SQ= 15.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.68	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.71	13 49 28 20 X SQ= 14.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.95	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.72	38 18 2 47 X SQ= 42.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.95	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.76	2 54 40 17 X SQ= 50.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.57	31	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	1.00	18 72 24 0 X SQ= 48.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.55	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.90	23 7 19 66 X SQ= 25.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.86	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.64	36 26 6 47 X SQ= 24.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.68	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.86	28 10 13 63 X SQ= 32.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.95	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.53	38 33 2 37 X SQ= 23.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.52	41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	19 0 21 73 X SQ= 38.36 P = 0. RV ND (YES)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.82	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.96	33 3 7 69 X SQ= 68.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.80	41 14 0 57 X SQ= 63.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.60	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	25 0 17 73 X SQ= 52.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.95	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.76	39 16 2 52 X SQ= 49.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.62	42 42 0 26 X SQ= 18.96 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.61	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.69	25 18 16 40 X SQ= 7.59 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
51	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.73	51	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.54	30 30 11 26 X SQ= 3.07 P = 0.059 RV NO (YES)	
53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.67	53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	14 0 28 73 X SQ= 24.68 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.81	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.96	34 3 8 68 X SQ= 67.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.51	42 36 0 35 X SQ= 27.73 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.98	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.56	41 38 1 30 X SQ= 20.33 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
57	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.69	57	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.84	13 12 29 61 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.099 RV NO (YES)	

58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.75		0 18 42 55 X SQ= 10.48 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
62	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.72	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00		5 0 13 12 X SQ= 2.25 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.83	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.84	M	34 12 7 61 X SQ= 45.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
67	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.83	67	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.68		34 46 7 22 X SQ= 2.33 P = 0.117 RV NO (NO)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.64	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.65	M	27 25 15 47 X SQ= 8.19 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.76	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.56		32 32 10 40 X SQ= 9.61 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.68	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.87		13 8 28 56 X SQ= 4.62 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.67	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.65		27 25 13 46 X SQ= 9.45 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.87	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.58		35 30 5 41 X SQ= 19.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.62	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.99	25 1 15 72 X SQ= 51.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.98	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.70	40 22 1 51 X SQ= 45.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.69	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.98	25 1 11 59 X SQ= 48.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.90	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.68	9 19 1 40 X SQ= 9.57 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
78	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.64	78	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.90	9 19 5 2 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.090 RV NO (YES)
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.86	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.64	6 13 1 23 X SQ= 4.01 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.68	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	11 0 23 17 X SQ= 5.23 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.85	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.74	34 17 6 49 X SQ= 32.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.51	6 25 0 24 X SQ= 3.41 P = 0.030 RV NO (NO)

85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.90	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.69	38 22 4 50 X SQ= 35.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.92	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.55	M 3 28 35 23 X SQ= 19.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.68	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.88	26 7 12 50 X SQ= 29.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.75	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.60	30 21 10 31 X SQ= 9.61 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.76	95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.91	31 64 10 6 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.047 RV NO (YES)	
96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	1.00	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.54	40 27 0 23 X SQ= 22.36 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	1.00	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.79	M 0 23 10 6 X SQ= 16.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.86	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.63	32 18 5 31 X SQ= 19.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.70	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.78	28 13 12 45 X SQ= 20.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.76	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.59	32 27 10 39 X SQ= 11.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.76	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.73	29 14 9 38 X SQ= 19.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.76	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.80	32 14 10 55 X SQ= 31.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.74	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.54	25 28 9 33 X SQ= 5.68 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)
114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.55	114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.63	18 43 22 25 X SQ= 2.71 P = 0.074 RV YES (NO)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.70	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.94	28 4 12 67 X SQ= 48.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.90	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.66	36 24 4 47 X SQ= 30.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.57	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.97	18 56 24 2 X SQ= 33.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.76	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	32 58 10 0 X SQ= 12.81 P = 0. RV NO (YES)

121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.90	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.68	M 4 50 38 23 X SQ= 34.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.62	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.92	16 67 26 6 X SQ= 35.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.81	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	34 73 8 0 X SQ= 12.15 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.74	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.85	M 9 55 25 10 X SQ= 30.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.53	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	18 65 16 0 X SQ= 33.09 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.69	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.61	M 27 21 12 33 X SQ= 7.18 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.89	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.63	4 25 34 42 X SQ= 7.41 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)
134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.68	134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.52	26 31 12 34 X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.064 RV YES (NO)
135	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.97	135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.79	32 45 1 12 X SQ= 4.13 P = 0.027 RV NO (NO)

136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.70	136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	12 0 28 57 X SQ= 16.84 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.65	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.95	26 3 14 54 X SQ= 37.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.77	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.70	31 17 9 40 X SQ= 19.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
139	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.79	139	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.60	9 25 33 38 X SQ= 3.05 P = 0.058 RV NO (NO)
140	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.95	140	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.82	2 11 38 49 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.070 RV NO (NO)
141	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.82	141	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.93	7 4 32 55 X SQ= 1.93 P = 0.108 RV NO (YES)
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.56	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.77	17 13 22 44 X SQ= 3.74 P = 0.043 RV NO (YES)
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.87	0 8 39 53 X SQ= 3.92 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.57	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.96	21 2 16 51 X SQ= 29.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.79	0 14 42 54 X SQ= 8.14 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.78	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.79	M 29 13 8 30 X SQ= 16.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.83	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.60	7 33 34 22 X SQ= 16.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.67	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.59	13 34 26 24 X SQ= 5.00 P = 0.022 RV YES (YES)
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.90	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.51	M 4 30 36 29 X SQ= 15.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
166	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.79	166	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.92	9 6 33 66 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.082 RV NO (YES)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.68	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.91	28 6 13 59 X SQ= 37.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.76	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.58	M 31 27 10 38 X SQ= 10.44 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.88	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.56	5 34 36 27 X SQ= 17.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

171	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.80	171	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.94	8 4 32 58 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.057 RV NO (YES)
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.63	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.91	15 6 26 62 X SQ= 10.95 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.63	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.97	26 2 15 57 X SQ= 40.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.78	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.68	32 19 9 40 X SQ= 18.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.67	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.62	13 40 27 24 X SQ= 7.71 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.68	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.74	12 40 25 14 X SQ= 13.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.50	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	21 0 21 34 X SQ= 21.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.58	21 34 0 25 X SQ= 11.05 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.92	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.50	1 20 11 20 X SQ= 5.04 P = 0.017 RV YES (NO)

187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.65	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.85	14 52 26 9 X SQ= 24.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.83	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	7 0 35 73 X SQ= 10.20 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.67	190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	14 18 7 0 X SQ= 5.22 P = 0.010 RV NO (YES)	
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.98	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.63	1 26 41 45 X SQ= 15.18 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.98	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.62	1 27 41 45 X SQ= 15.81 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
194	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.80	194	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.93	8 5 33 68 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.063 RV NO (YES)	

M

MATRIX

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

26 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS
VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)

AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CUBA	CYPRUS	ALBANIA	BURUNDI	CEYLON	CHINA, PR	DOMIN REP
CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	EL SALVADOR	HAITI	INDIA	INDONESIA	KOREA, N
GREECE	HUNGARY	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	KOREA REP	NEPAL	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES
JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	THAILAND	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
NETHERLANDS	POLAND	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWITZERLAND					
TRINIDAD	UK	YUGOSLAVIA							

28 . 20

14 . 53

26 POLITIES
WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS
LOW (67)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	CANADA	CHILE	FINLAND	AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA
ICELAND	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	COLOMBIA
USSR	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA		CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR
					ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
					HONDURAS	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN
					LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI
					MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA
					NIGER	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	SA'U ARABIA
					SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA
					TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA
					UAR	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN		

M

MATRIX

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PRECOMINANTLY
SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BRAZIL	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	COMIN REP	EL SALVADOR
CANADA	CHILE	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	HONDURAS	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL			
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA					
LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND					
RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK					
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA						

34 . 12

7 . 61

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PRECOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)

CYPRUS	ISRAEL	JAPAN	LEBANON	MALAYA	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA
SO AFRICA	TRINIDAD				BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON
					CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY
					ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA
					GUINEA	HAITI	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN
					IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP
					LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI
					MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER
					NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
					SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA
					TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY

M

MATRIX

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
HOMOGENEOUS (52)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	CHILE	CUBA	.ALBANIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA
DENMARK	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	.DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	HAITI	HONDURAS	JURDAN
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA	.KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MEXICO
JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	.MCNGOLIA	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY	PORTUGAL	RWANDA
NORWAY	POLAND	SWEDEN	UK	US	.SA'U ARABIA	SOMALIA	TUNISIA	UAR	YEMEN
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

27 . 25

15 . 47

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR
STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)

BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	.AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA
FINLAND	ISRAEL	MALAYA	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	.CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
SPAIN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	USSR	YUGOSLAVIA	.CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON
					.GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA
					.IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	LAOS	LIBERIA
					.MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER
					.NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PERU	PHILIPPINES
					.SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA
					.THAILAND	TOGO	TURKEY	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA
					.VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP			
					.UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
					.YEMEN				

MATRIX

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

87 POLITIES
WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION
IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)

ISRAEL	MALAYA	VENEZUELA			ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN
					CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY
					GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	INDONESIA
					MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	RWANDA
					SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA
					TUNISIA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	

3	28
35	23

87 POLITIES
WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION
IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA
CHILE	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	HONDURAS
FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	MEXICO
ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	JAPAN	LEBANON	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	SA'U ARABIA	SYRIA
LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND	THAILAND	TURKEY	VIETNAM, N		
RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND					
USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY	YUGOSLAVIA					

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MATRIX

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

97 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN
TOTALITARIAN (23)

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP
EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GHANA	GUINEA	INDONESIA
IRAN	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA
NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	SA'U ARABIA
SUDAN	THAILAND	UAR		

0 . 23

10 . 6

97 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN
AUTHORITARIAN (16)

BULGARIA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	ALBANIA	CHINA, PR	KOREA, N	MONGOLIA	PORTUGAL
POLAND	RUMANIA	SPAIN	USSR	YUGOSLAVIA	VIETNAM, N				

M

MATRIX

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

119 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)

ARGENTINA	BULGARIA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS*KIA	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL
GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA
LEBANON	MALAYA	POLAND	RUMANIA	SO AFR'CA	CONGO(LEO)	OOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
SPAIN	USSR	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA		GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS
					INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST
					JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA
					LIBYA	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
					NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA
					PARAGUAY	PERU	PORTUGAL	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL
					SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TUNISIA
					TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP

19 . 55

23 . 3

119 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CHILE	COSTA RICA	MALAGASY R	PHILIPPINES
DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE			
ICELAND	IRELAND	JAMAICA	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS			
NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD			
UK	US	URUGUAY					

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MATRIX

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

121 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT (54)

CYPRUS	LEBANON	MALAYA	SO AFRICA		AFGHANISTAN	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
					CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)
					CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
					GUINEA	HAITI	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN
					IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP
					LAOS	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA
					NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES
					RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
					SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO
					UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN

4 . 50

38 . 23

121 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR
NEGLIGIBLE (61)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	COLOMBIA
CANADA	CHILE	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	COSTA RICA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA
FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MEXICO	MOROCCO
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PORTUGAL
JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR		
NORWAY	POLAND	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN					
SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	USSR	UK	US					
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA							

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MATRIX

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

125 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)

GERMANY, E	JAPAN	LEBANON	MALAYA	POLAND	AFGHANISTAN	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CAMBODIA
SO AFRICA	SPAIN	USSR	YUGOSLAVIA		CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR
					COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR
					EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA
					GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA
					IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA REP
					LAOS	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO
					NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA
					PARAGUAY	PERU	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL
					SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND
					TOGO	TURKEY	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP

9 . 55

24 . 11

125 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CHILE	BURUNDI	COSTA RICA	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R
CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMAN FR	GREECE	NICARAGUA	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA
ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	UAR				
LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN					
SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	UK	URUGUAY						

M

MATRIX

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

128 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CHILE	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMEROUN	CEYLON	COLOMBIA
DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	CONGO(LEO)	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS
ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	INDIA	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MOROCCO	NIGERIA
JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	PANAMA	PERU	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SYRIA
NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	UGANDA				
UK	VENEZUELA								

27 . 21

11 . 34

128 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)

BULGARIA	CANADA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	ALBANIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
POLAND	RUMANIA	SPAIN	USSR	US	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP
YUGOSLAVIA					GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N
					MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NICARAGUA
					NIGER	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	RWANDA
					SENEGAL	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY
					UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	

M

MATRIX

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

153 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
STABLE (42)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	ALBANIA	CHINA, PR	GUINEA	INDIA	KOREA, N
CZECHCS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	LIBERIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELANC	ISRAEL	JAPAN	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	VIETNAM, N		
LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLANC					
RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND					
USSR	UK	US	YUGOSLAVIA						

29 . 13

8 . 30

153 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)

ARGENTINA	CHILE	FRANCE	GREECE	ITALY	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CONGO(LEO)
LEBANCN	MALAYA	VENEZUELA			COSTA RICA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GHANA	GUATEMALA
					HONDURAS	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA REP
					LAOS	MALAGASY R	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PAKISTAN
					PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
					SOMALIA	SYRIA	THAILANC	TURKEY	VIETNAM REP

M

MATRIX

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

164 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)

CUBA	FRANCE	JAMAICA	YUGOSLAVIA	ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
				CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON
				GHANA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST
				JORDAN	KOREA, N	LIBYA	MALI	MAURITANIA
				MOROCCO	NIGER	PAKISTAN	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL
				TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N

4 . 30

36 . 29

164 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	ALBANIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	COLOMBIA
CANADA	CHILE	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	COSTA RICA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	HAITI	HONDURAS	KOREA REP	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN	LEBANON	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
POLAND	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SUDAN	THAILAND	TURKEY	VIETNAM REP	
SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	UK	US	URUGUAY					
VENEZUELA									

M

MATRIX

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

169 POLITIES
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CHILE	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEYLON
CYPRUS	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	INDIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R
JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	NIGERIA	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO
SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	UK	US	URUGUAY	SOMALIA	TURKEY			
VENEZUELA									

31 . 27

10 . 38

169 POLITIES
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)

BULGARIA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP
POLAND	RUMANIA	SPAIN	USSR	YUGOSLAVIA	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA
					GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	INDONESIA
					IRAN	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS
					LIBERIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NIGER	PAKISTAN
					PARAGUAY	PORTUGAL	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SUDAN
					TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	UAR
					UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP		

37 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)

37 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY LOW (51)

PREDICATE ONLY

64 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND
FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRAQ	IRELAND
ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA*U ARABIA	SO AFRICA
SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA						

51 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	BOLIVIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAN	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI
MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	RWANDA	SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YEMEN									

38 POLITIES
WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS
IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (10)

38 POLITIES
WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS
IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)

PREDICATE ONLY

10 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	CANADA	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	INDIA	ITALY	JAPAN	USSR	UK	US

103 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
FINLAND	GABON	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND
INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP
LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO
MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND
TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA							

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

CHINA, PR GERMANY, E

39	POLITIES WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	39	POLITIES WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

38 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CZECHOS'KIA
DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	ITALY	JAPAN	MEXICO
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK	US	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA		

76 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
CEYLON	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	ICELAND
IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS
LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA
UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN				

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

GERMANY, E

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.55	2	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.93	17 5 21 71 X SQ= 21.30 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.95	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.59	2 31 36 45 X SQ= 13.87 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
13	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.95	13	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.82	2 14 36 62 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.084 RV NO (NO)	

18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.75	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.72	2 31 6 12 X SQ= 4.65 P = 0.017 RV YES (ND)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.75	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.66	2 31 6 16 X SQ= 3.22 P = 0.049 RV YES (ND)	
22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.82	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.51	31 37 7 39 X SQ= 10.06 P = 0.001 RV YES (ND)	
23	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (27)	0.58	23	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.93	22 5 16 71 X SQ= 34.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.87	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.64	33 27 5 49 X SQ= 24.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.55	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.66	21 26 17 50 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.043 RV YES (ND)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.57	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.64	16 46 21 26 X SQ= 3.45 P = 0.044 RV YES (ND)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.89	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.66	32 23 4 45 X SQ= 26.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.84	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.68	6 50 32 24 X SQ= 24.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

32	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.74	32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	10 0 28 76 X SQ= 18.76 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.76	33	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	1.00	29 0 9 76 X SQ= 73.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	1.00	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.70	38 23 0 53 X SQ= 46.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.50	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.95	19 4 19 72 X SQ= 28.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.74	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.83	28 13 10 63 X SQ= 32.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.89	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.62	34 29 4 47 X SQ= 24.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.76	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.91	28 7 9 67 X SQ= 47.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.95	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.75	36 18 2 55 X SQ= 46.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.55	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.96	21 3 17 73 X SQ= 37.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.86	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.69	32 22 5 49 X SQ= 27.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.63	38 45 0 26 X SQ= 16.31 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.55	50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.63	21 22 17 38 X SQ= 2.56 P = 0.095 RV YES (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.63	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.84	24 12 14 62 X SQ= 23.26 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.97	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.58	36 42 1 30 X SQ= 16.37 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.78	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.79	29 16 8 60 X SQ= 31.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
67	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.84	67	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.68	31 48 6 23 X SQ= 2.47 P = 0.108 RV NO (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.59	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.62	22 29 15 47 X SQ= 3.74 P = 0.044 RV YES (NO)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.70	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.51	26 37 11 39 X SQ= 3.87 P = 0.043 RV YES (NO)	

72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.73	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.66	27 25 10 49 X SQ= 13.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.86	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.55	32 33 5 41 X SQ= 16.15 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.54	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.93	20 5 17 70 X SQ= 29.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.95	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.66	35 26 2 50 X SQ= 34.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.62	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.92	20 5 12 58 X SQ= 29.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.82	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.67	9 19 2 39 X SQ= 7.31 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
78	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.60	78	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.95	9 19 6 1 X SQ= 4.56 P = 0.027 RV NO (YES)	
80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	1.00	80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.60	3 16 0 24 X SQ= 2.00 P = 0.079 RV YES (NO)	
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.66	81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.95	10 1 19 20 X SQ= 4.66 P = 0.016 RV NO (YES)	

82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.85	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.70	29 21 5 50 X SQ= 26.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.52	5 26 0 24 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.061 RV NO (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.92	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.68	35 24 3 51 X SQ= 34.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.91	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.52	3 28 31 26 X SQ= 15.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.68	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.83	23 10 11 50 X SQ= 22.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.69	94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.53	25 26 11 29 X SQ= 3.49 P = 0.052 RV YES (NO)	
95	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.78	95	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.90	29 66 8 7 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.139 RV NO (YES)	
96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.92	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.62	33 33 3 20 X SQ= 8.20 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.73	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.74	3 20 8 7 X SQ= 5.34 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	

99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.78	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.58	29 20 8 28 X SQ= 10.08 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.59	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.68	22 19 15 41 X SQ= 6.15 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.71	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.54	27 32 11 37 X SQ= 5.08 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.73	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.66	24 19 9 37 X SQ= 11.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.66	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.71	25 21 13 51 X SQ= 12.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.71	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.52	22 31 9 33 X SQ= 3.43 P = 0.048 RV YES (NO)
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.53	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.99	19 1 17 73 X SQ= 39.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.69	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.91	25 7 11 67 X SQ= 39.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.89	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.62	32 28 4 46 X SQ= 23.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.55	119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.85	21 52 17 9 X SQ= 9.38 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.79	120	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.97	30 59 8 2 X SQ= 6.31 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.84	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.63	6 48 32 28 X SQ= 20.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.50	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.84	19 64 19 12 X SQ= 13.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.56	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.74	14 49 18 17 X SQ= 7.45 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
130	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.76	130	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.92	8 4 25 45 X SQ= 2.90 P = 0.058 RV NO (YES)	
132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	132	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.82	25 42 0 9 X SQ= 3.46 P = 0.026 RV NO (NO)	
134	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.67	134	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.50	24 33 12 33 X SQ= 1.99 P = 0.144 RV YES (NO)	
135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.79	32 45 0 12 X SQ= 6.09 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	

137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.59	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.85	20 9 14 53 X SQ= 18.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.76	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.63	25 23 8 40 X SQ= 11.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.76	141	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.95	8 3 26 60 X SQ= 5.98 P = 0.015 RV NO (YES)	
144	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.53	144	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.89	9 24 8 3 X SQ= 5.40 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)	
145	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.60	145	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.86	12 18 8 3 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.085 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.53	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.89	17 6 15 51 X SQ= 17.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.80	0 14 38 57 X SQ= 6.93 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.77	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.68	27 14 8 30 X SQ= 14.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.78	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.55	8 32 29 26 X SQ= 9.10 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.81	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.56	7 27 30 34 X SQ= 5.46 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)	
166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.74	166	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.93	10 5 28 70 X SQ= 6.84 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.59	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.82	22 12 15 56 X SQ= 17.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.70	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.53	26 32 11 36 X SQ= 4.32 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	
170	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.73	170	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.55	10 29 27 35 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.090 RV NO (NO)	
171	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.81	171	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.92	7 5 29 60 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.109 RV NO (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.51	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.85	19 9 18 53 X SQ= 13.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.73	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.61	27 24 10 38 X SQ= 9.56 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.70	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.62	11 41 26 25 X SQ= 8.70 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	

179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.57	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.65	15 36 20 19 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.049 RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.53	181	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.90	17 4 19 35 X SQ= 10.92 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.58	19 35 0 25 X SQ= 9.74 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.56	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.77	16 49 20 15 X SQ= 9.08 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.92	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.68	3 24 35 50 X SQ= 6.98 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.95	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.65	2 26 36 49 X SQ= 10.17 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
194	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.82	194	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.93	7 5 31 70 X SQ= 2.54 P = 0.102 RV NO (YES)	

40 POLITIES
WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH,
MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)

40 POLITIES
WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS
IS VERY LOW (39)

PREDICATE ONLY

71 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CANADA	CEYLON
CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA
FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA
MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA
THAILAND	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP
YUGOSLAVIA									

39 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS
DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	GABON	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	ICELAND	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	LAOS
LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN	

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

ALGERIA	JAMAICA	KOREA, N	TRINIDAD	VIETNAM, N

41 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS DEVELOPED (19)

41 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED,
OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

19 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	ITALY
LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	USSR	UK	US	

94 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI
CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN
IRAQ	IRELAND	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON
LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL
NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA
TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY
VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA						

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ISRAEL VENEZUELA

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2 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22) — 0.84

2 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.94

16 6
3 88
X SQ= 56.20
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

3 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102) — 0.58

3 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102) — 0.95

8 5
11 89
X SQ= 17.55
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

6 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93) — 1.00

6 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93) — 0.78

0 21
19 73
X SQ= 3.84
P = 0.022
RV NO (NO)

8	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	1.00	8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.81	0 18 19 76 X SQ= 3.02 P = 0.039 RV NO (NO)
10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.65	0 33 19 61 X SQ= 7.80 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
13	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	1.00	13	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.84	0 15 19 79 X SQ= 2.25 P = 0.071 RV NO (NO)
26	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.58	26	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.62	11 36 8 58 X SQ= 1.76 P = 0.132 RV YES (NO)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.83	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.63	3 57 15 33 X SQ= 11.41 P = 0. RV YES (ND)
29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.58	19 35 0 49 X SQ= 18.87 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
30	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	1.00	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.61	0 56 19 36 X SQ= 20.97 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.84	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.92	3 86 16 7 X SQ= 52.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.79	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.84	15 15 4 79 X SQ= 29.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.95	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.55	18 42 1 52 X SQ= 13.96 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	1.00	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.97	19 3 0 91 X SQ= 88.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	1.00	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.78	19 21 0 73 X SQ= 38.36 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
37	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	1.00	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.54	19 43 0 51 X SQ= 16.66 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.94	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.79	17 20 1 74 X SQ= 33.33 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
40	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	1.00	40	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.56	19 50 0 39 X SQ= 11.20 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.95	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.93	18 7 1 87 X SQ= 64.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.61	19 34 0 54 X SQ= 21.15 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.79	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.64	15 28 4 50 X SQ= 9.80 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (14)	0.63	53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.98	12 2 7 92 X SQ= 48.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	1.00	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.82	19 17 0 75 X SQ= 44.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.65	19 58 0 31 X SQ= 7.66 P = 0.001 RV ND (ND)	
58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.81	0 18 19 76 X SQ= 3.02 P = 0.039 RV NO (ND)	
62	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PROTESTANT, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (5)	0.50	62	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.95	4 1 4 20 X SQ= 5.44 P = 0.013 RV YES (YES)	
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	1.00	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.71	18 27 0 67 X SQ= 29.04 P = 0. RV YES (ND)	
67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.95	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.69	18 61 1 27 X SQ= 3.99 P = 0.022 RV NO (ND)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.68	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.59	13 38 6 55 X SQ= 3.78 P = 0.042 RV YES (ND)	
71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.59	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.88	10 11 7 81 X SQ= 17.36 P = 0. RV YES (ND)	

72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.88	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.61	15 36 2 56 X SQ= 11.99 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	1.00	73	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.51	17 47 0 45 X SQ= 12.22 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.95	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.91	18 8 1 85 X SQ= 60.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.56	19 41 0 52 X SQ= 17.65 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED (11)	0.56	81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.97	10 1 8 31 X SQ= 15.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.63	18 32 0 54 X SQ= 21.06 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	1.00	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.58	19 39 0 54 X SQ= 19.04 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	1.00	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.57	0 29 19 39 X SQ= 10.31 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.84	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.77	16 17 3 57 X SQ= 22.16 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.84	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.54	16 33 3 38 X SQ= 7.15 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	1.00	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.67	19 46 0 23 X SQ= 6.93 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	1.00	97	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.64	0 23 3 13 X SQ= 2.40 P = 0.061 RV YES (NO)
98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.74	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.91	14 8 5 86 X SQ= 38.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.54	19 30 0 35 X SQ= 15.39 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.84	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.70	16 23 3 54 X SQ= 16.47 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.84	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.53	16 41 3 46 X SQ= 7.20 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.84	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.64	16 25 3 44 X SQ= 11.92 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.84	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.69	16 28 3 62 X SQ= 16.24 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.93	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.53	14 37 1 41 X SQ= 8.93 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.84	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.96	16 4 3 86 X SQ= 61.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.84	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.84	16 14 3 76 X SQ= 33.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.89	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.54	17 41 2 49 X SQ= 10.45 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.79	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.86	4 68 15 11 X SQ= 29.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	1.00	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTFREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.57	0 54 19 40 X SQ= 18.67 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.79	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.83	4 78 15 16 X SQ= 27.41 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.88	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.77	2 62 15 19 X SQ= 23.24 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.76	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.96	4 78 13 3 X SQ= 49.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.74	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.56	14 32 5 40 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.038 RV YES (ND)	
133	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.89	133	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.69	2 26 17 58 X SQ= 2.32 P = 0.090 RV NO (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.79	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.51	15 40 4 42 X SQ= 4.51 P = 0.022 RV YES (ND)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.79	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.83	15 13 4 63 X SQ= 25.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.84	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.61	16 30 3 46 X SQ= 10.46 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
139	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.84	139	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.63	3 31 16 53 X SQ= 2.24 P = 0.106 RV NO (ND)	
144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.62	144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.84	3 31 5 6 X SQ= 5.33 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.72	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.87	13 9 5 61 X SQ= 23.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.84	0 14 19 75 X SQ= 2.18 P = 0.071 RV NO (ND)	

153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.89	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.59	17 24 2 35 X SQ= 11.84 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	1.00	154	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.59	19 35 0 24 X SQ= 9.34 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	1.00	157	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.82	0 14 19 63 X SQ= 2.72 P = 0.065 RV NO (NO)
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.95	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.52	1 39 18 36 X SQ= 11.70 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.74	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.55	5 42 14 34 X SQ= 4.00 P = 0.039 RV YES (NO)
164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.94	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.58	1 33 17 46 X SQ= 6.93 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.79	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.79	15 18 4 67 X SQ= 21.33 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.84	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.53	16 40 3 45 X SQ= 7.19 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
170	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.95	170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.54	1 37 18 44 X SQ= 9.02 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)

172	TENO TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.53	172	TENO TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.87	10 11 9 77 X SQ= 13.51 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.79	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.85	15 12 4 67 X SQ= 28.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.84	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.58	16 33 3 46 X SQ= 9.40 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
178	TENO TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS 8ICAMERAL (51)	0.74	178	TEND TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.57	5 47 14 36 X SQ= 4.54 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)
179	TEND TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.78	179	TEND TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.68	4 48 14 23 X SQ= 10.38 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
181	TENO TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE 8UREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.84	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE 8UREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.93	16 4 3 51 X SQ= 38.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
186	LEAN MORE TOWARD 8EING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.83	186	LEAN LESS TOWARD 8EING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.59	3 28 15 40 X SQ= 2.72 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)
187	TENO TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.84	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.77	3 62 16 18 X SQ= 23.27 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
189	TEND LESS TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.79	189	TEND MORE TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.97	4 3 15 91 X SQ= 5.88 P = 0.015 RV NO (YES)

192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.71	0 27 19 65 X SQ= 5.86 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.70	0 28 19 65 X SQ= 6.11 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)

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42 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)

42 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR
VERY UNDERDEVELDPED (76)

PREDICATE ONLY

****

36 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	COLOMBIA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA
DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY
JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY	YUGOSLAVIA				

76 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON
CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA
LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER
NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN				

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ISRAEL	SA'U ARABIA	VENEZUELA

43	POLITIES WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	43	POLITIES WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

55 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CANADA	CHILE	CHINA, PR
COLOMBIA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PERU	PHILIPPINES
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	USSR
UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA					

57 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
HAITI	HONDURAS	INDONESIA	IRAN	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA
MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO
TUNISIA	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN			

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

COSTA RICA LEBANON SA'U ARABIA

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.60	2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	22 0 33 57 X SQ= 25.90 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
7	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN CENTRAL AMERICA (10)	0.89	7	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN CENTRAL AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN SOUTH AMERICA (7)	0.71	1 5 8 2 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.035 RV YES (YES)	
10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.96	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.54	2 31 53 26 X SQ= 32.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

11	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATEO ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.98	11	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.53	1 27 54 30 X SQ= 28.59 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
15	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATEO IN THE MIOOLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL ANO SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.67	15	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATEO IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL ANO SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIOOLE EAST (33)	0.86	4 5 2 31 X SQ= 5.66 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
18	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATEO IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.78	18	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATEO IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL ANO SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.74	2 31 7 11 X SQ= 6.53 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
19	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATEO IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.86	19	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATEO IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN IHE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.77	2 31 12 9 X SQ= 14.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
24	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEOIUM (61)	0.73	24	TEND TO 8E THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.65	40 20 15 37 X SQ= 14.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
26	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.58	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION OENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.74	32 15 23 42 X SQ= 10.40 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
28	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.56	28	TEND TO 8E THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.66	24 35 30 18 X SQ= 4.21 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)	
29	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.90	29	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE OEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.81	45 10 5 43 X SQ= 49.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEOIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.85	30	TENO TO 8E THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.86	8 48 47 8 X SQ= 53.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.56	31	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	1.00	31 57 24 0 X SQ= 29.12 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
32	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.82	32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	10 0 45 57 X SQ= 9.25 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.53	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.98	29 1 26 56 X SQ= 34.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.87	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.77	48 13 7 44 X SQ= 44.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.75	36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	1.00	41 0 14 57 X SQ= 63.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.91	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.81	50 11 5 46 X SQ= 55.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.81	38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	10 0 43 57 X SQ= 9.66 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.67	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.96	36 2 18 55 X SQ= 46.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.94	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.65	50 19 3 35 X SQ= 38.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.55	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	25 0 30 57 X SQ= 30.78 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.83	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.83	45 9 9 44 X SQ= 44.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.52	55 27 0 25 X SQ= 31.87 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.56	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.71	M 30 12 24 30 X SQ= 5.94 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.74	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.54	39 19 14 22 X SQ= 6.15 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)	
53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.75	53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	14 0 41 57 X SQ= 14.34 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.62	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.96	34 2 21 53 X SQ= 39.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.96	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.58	53 23 2 32 X SQ= 35.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.94	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.53	51 25 3 28 X SQ= 26.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.72	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.89	M 39 6 15 51 X SQ= 41.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.91	64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	0.68	39 6 4 13 X SQ= 20.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.62	66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.56	33 22 20 28 X SQ= 2.75 P = 0.077 RV YES (YES)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.57	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.68	M 31 18 23 39 X SQ= 6.49 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.69	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.58	37 24 17 33 X SQ= 6.78 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.72	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.90	15 5 38 45 X SQ= 4.40 P = 0.025 RV NO (YES)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.66	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.71	35 16 18 39 X SQ= 13.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.81	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.65	43 19 10 36 X SQ= 22.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.51	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	26 0 27 57 X SQ= 33.95 P = 0. RV NO (YES)

75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.91	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.81
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.55	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.75	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.77
78	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.68	78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00
79	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.62	79	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.80
80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	1.00	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.72
81	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.72	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.78	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.81
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.57

49	11	X SQ= 54.15	RV YES (YES)
5	46	P = 0.	
26	0	X SQ= 33.23	RV YES (YES)
21	47	P = 0.	
15	11	X SQ= 13.63	RV YES (YES)
5	36	P = 0.	
15	11	X SQ= 2.74	RV NO (NO)
7	0	P = 0.067	
15	33	X SQ= 1.69	RV NO (YES)
9	8	P = 0.147	
10	9	X SQ= 13.12	RV YES (YES)
0	23	P = 0.	
11	0	X SQ= 2.11	RV NO (NO)
29	10	P = 0.092	
40	10	X SQ= 33.79	RV YES (YES)
11	42	P = 0.	
11	18	X SQ= 9.30	RV YES (NO)
0	24	P = 0.	

85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.84	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.79	46 12 9 45 X SQ= 41.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.91	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.58	50 24 5 33 X SQ= 27.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.93	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.68	3 28 42 13 X SQ= 32.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.65	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.98	30 1 16 45 X SQ= 38.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.73	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.68	37 12 14 26 X SQ= 13.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.96	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.56	49 16 2 20 X SQ= 27.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.86	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.83	2 20 12 4 X SQ= 14.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.76	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.67	38 11 12 22 X SQ= 13.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.63	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.82	32 8 19 37 X SQ= 18.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.74	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.65	39 18 14 34 X SQ= 14.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.72	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.81	M 34 8 13 34 X SQ= 23.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.76	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.53	35 17 11 19 X SQ= 6.06 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.69	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.85	37 8 17 46 X SQ= 29.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.71	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.56	32 21 13 27 X SQ= 6.02 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.62	115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	20 0 32 56 X SQ= 23.95 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.60	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	M 31 0 21 56 X SQ= 43.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.85	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.73	44 15 8 41 X SQ= 34.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.69	118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.50	17 21 38 21 X SQ= 2.89 P = 0.063 RV YES (YES)	

119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.55	119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.98	30 41 25 1 X SQ= 20.38 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.82	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	45 42 10 0 X SQ= 6.66 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.84	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.75	9 43 46 14 X SQ= 36.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.51	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.95	27 54 28 3 X SQ= 26.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.85	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	47 57 8 0 X SQ= 6.87 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.60	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.86	19 43 28 7 X SQ= 19.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.66	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	31 50 16 0 X SQ= 17.99 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.65	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.64	31 16 17 28 X SQ= 6.23 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.69	129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.50	33 22 15 22 X SQ= 2.62 P = 0.089 RV YES (YES)	

132	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.97	132	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.82	33 33 1 7 X SQ= 2.67 P = 0.063 RV ND (YES)
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.86	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.58	7 22 43 31 X SQ= 8.31 P = 0.002 RV ND (YES)
135	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.95	135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.78	41 36 2 10 X SQ= 4.19 P = 0.028 RV ND (YES)
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.57	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	28 0 21 47 X SQ= 35.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.77	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.79	37 10 11 38 X SQ= 28.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
139	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.80	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.54	11 22 43 26 X SQ= 6.41 P = 0.010 RV ND (YES)
140	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.92	140	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.81	4 9 46 38 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.140 RV ND (YES)
141	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.81	141	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.96	9 2 39 45 X SQ= 3.56 P = 0.051 RV ND (YES)
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.60	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.80	19 9 29 36 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.045 RV ND (YES)

146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.84	0 8 49 41 X SQ= 6.67 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.52	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	23 0 21 44 X SQ= 28.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.74	0 14 54 40 X SQ= 13.87 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.72	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.74	34 8 13 23 X SQ= 14.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.80	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.64	10 28 40 16 X SQ= 16.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.84	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.56	8 25 43 20 X SQ= 15.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.78	166	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.95	12 3 43 53 X SQ= 5.10 P = 0.013 RV NO (YES)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.63	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.98	32 1 19 51 X SQ= 41.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.75	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.65	38 18 13 34 X SQ= 14.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.78	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.55	11 27 40 22 X SQ= 10.55 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.80	171	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.96	10 2 39 49 X SQ= 4.97 P = 0.014 RV NO (YES)	
172	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.72	172	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.89	15 6 39 47 X SQ= 3.61 P = 0.050 RV NO (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.56	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	28 0 22 48 X SQ= 34.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.78	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.79	39 10 11 38 X SQ= 29.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.73	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.73	14 37 37 14 X SQ= 18.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.64	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.83	17 34 30 7 X SQ= 17.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.60	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	21 0 31 22 X SQ= 10.50 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.97	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.52	31 22 1 24 X SQ= 18.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

187	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.58	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.88	21 43 29 6 X SQ= 20.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.62	188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.82	21 10 34 45 X SQ= 4.49 P = 0.033 RV NO (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.87	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	7 0 48 57 X SQ= 5.72 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.95	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.58	3 23 52 32 X SQ= 18.18 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.98	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.53	1 27 53 30 X SQ= 28.09 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
194	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.83	194	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.93	9 4 45 53 X SQ= 1.65 P = 0.145 RV NO (YES)	

M

MATRIX

43 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR
UNDERDEVELOPED (55)

43 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)

50 POLITIES
WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS
COMPLETE (43)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CHILE	CAMEROUN	CHAD	DOMIN REP	MALAGASY R	MALI
COLOMBIA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	ECUADOR	FINLAND	MAURITANIA	NIGER	PANAMA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
GERMAN FR	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ITALY	TANGANYIKA	UGANDA			
JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO					
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	SWEDEN					
SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	UK	US	URUGUAY					

30 12

24 30

50 POLITIES
WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS
INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR
INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CHINA, PR	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	CAMBODIA
CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	CONGO(LEO)	ETHIOPIA	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI
IRAQ	ISRAEL	LIBYA	PAKISTAN	PERU	INDONESIA	IRAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	LAOS	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL
TURKEY	USSR	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA		NIGERIA	PARAGUAY	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND
					TUNISIA	UAR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN

M

MATRIX

43 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR
UNDERDEVELOPED (55)

43 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY
SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	HONDURAS	NICARAGUA	PANAMA
BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CUBA	PARAGUAY				
CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E					
GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND					
ITALY	JAMAICA	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS					
NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL					
RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK					
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA						

39 . 6

15 . 51

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)

BURMA	CHINA, PR	CYPRUS	ECUADOR	INDIA	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI
IRAQ	ISRAEL	JAPAN	LIBYA	MALAYA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN_AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD
PAKISTAN	PERU	SO AFRICA	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON
					GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	INDONESIA
					IRAN	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP
					LAOS	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA
					MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA
					RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN
					SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA
					UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
					YEMEN				

M

MATRIX

43 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR
UNDERDEVELOPED (55)

43 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
HOMOGENEOUS (52)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	ALBANIA	BURUNDI	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	HAITI
COLOMBIA	CUBA	DENMARK	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	HONDURAS	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	MALAGASY R
GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	MONGOLIA	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY	RWANDA	SOMALIA
ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	TUNISIA	UAR	YEMEN		
MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND					
PORTUGAL	SWEDEN	UK	US	URUGUAY					
VENEZUELA									

31 . 18

23 . 39

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR
STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)

BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURMA	CANADA	CYPRUS	AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CZECHOS'KIA	ECUADOR	FINLAND	INDIA	IRAQ	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
ISRAEL	MALAYA	PAKISTAN	PERU	PHILIPPINES	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA
RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	GUINEA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IVORY COAST	LAOS
TURKEY	USSR	YUGOSLAVIA			LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL
					NIGER	NIGERIA	PANAMA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
					SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO
					UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	

M

MATRIX

43 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR
UNDERDEVELOPED (55)

43 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)

105 POLITIES
WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS
COMPETITIVE (43)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BOLIVIA	CEYLON	DOMIN REP	HONDURAS	MALAGASY R
CANADA	CHILE	DENMARK	ECUADOR	FINLAND	PANAMA	SIERRE LEO	UGANDA		
FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	INDIA					
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN					
LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY					
PHILIPPINES	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY					
UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA						

34 8

13 34

105 POLITIES
WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS
PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR
NON-COMPETITIVE (47)

BULGARIA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS*KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
LIBYA	PAKISTAN	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR
SPAIN	USSR	YUGOSLAVIA			ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI
					IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LADS	LIBERIA
					MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NICARAGUA	NIGER
					PARAGUAY	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	TANGANYIKA
					TUNISIA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	

M

MATRIX

43 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR
UNDERDEVELOPED (55)

43 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)

116 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL
CANADA	CHILE	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL
ITALY	JAPAN	LUXEMBURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	TURKEY	UK	US	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA				

31 . 0

21 . 56

116 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)

BULGARIA	BURMA	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CUBA	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI
CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	ECUADOR	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD
INDIA	IRAQ	JAMAICA	LIBYA	MALAYA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR
PAKISTAN	PERU	POLAND	RUMANIA	TRINIDAD	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
USSR					HAITI	HONDURAS	INDONESIA	IRAN	IVORY COAST
					JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R
					MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL
					NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
					RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN
					SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA
					UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
					YEMEN				

44 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE [25]

44 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW NINETY PERCENT [90]

PREDICATE ONLY

25 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND	RUMANIA
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	USSR	UK	US					

90 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GREECE
GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	ITALY
IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA
TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA

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45  POLITIES                                                    45  POLITIES
    WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS                                      WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
    FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE  (55)                                    BELOW FIFTY PERCENT  (54)


                                                                                                  BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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55 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CANADA	CEYLON
CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDONESIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA
JAPAN	KOREA REP	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	USSR	UK
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA					

54 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS
INDIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	LAOS	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI
MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY
UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN						

6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

CHINA, PR	KOREA, N	LEBANON	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA	VIETNAM, N

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 2  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.60          2  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                         1.00        22    0
    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                  LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                            33   54
    WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                                  WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                         X SQ=  24.64
    NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)                        NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)               P =    0.
                                                                                                                 RV NO  (YES)

10  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                         1.00         10  TEND TO BE THOSE                         0.59         0   32
    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,                    LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR                          55   22
    OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (82)                          CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (33)                    X SQ=  43.32
                                                                                                                 P =    0.
                                                                                                                 RV YES (YES)

13  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                    0.96         13  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.76         2   13
    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR                  LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA DR            53   41
    THE MIDDLE EAST  (99)                                      THE MIDDLE EAST  (99)                             X SQ=   7.95
                                                                                                                 P =    0.002
                                                                                                                 RV ND  (YES)
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14	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.96	14	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.85	2 8 53 46 X SQ= 2.85 P = 0.052 RV NO (YES)	
16	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	0.80	16	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (11)	0.57	2 8 8 6 X SQ= 1.96 P = 0.104 RV YES (YES)	
17	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.87	17	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	0.50	2 8 14 8 X SQ= 3.64 P = 0.054 RV YES (YES)	
21	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.82	21	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.63	10 20 45 34 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.033 RV NO (YES)	
22	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.51	22	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.70	28 38 27 16 X SQ= 3.54 P = 0.050 RV NO (YES)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.67	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.61	37 21 18 33 X SQ= 7.71 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.64	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.83	35 9 20 45 X SQ= 23.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.56	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.69	24 35 30 16 X SQ= 5.29 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.86	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.75	M 42 13 7 40 X SQ= 35.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.85	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.83	8 44 47 9 X SQ= 47.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.82	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.72	45 15 10 39 X SQ= 30.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.56	35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	24 0 31 54 X SQ= 27.73 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.71	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.96	39 2 16 52 X SQ= 49.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.87	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.72	48 15 7 39 X SQ= 37.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.59	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.91	32 5 22 49 X SQ= 27.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.89	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.58	47 22 6 31 X SQ= 23.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.64	41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	19 0 34 54 X SQ= 21.15 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.66	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.98	35 1 18 52 X SQ= 45.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.83	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.83	45 9 9 44 X SQ= 44.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.57	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.67	30 13 23 27 X SQ= 4.40 P = 0.023 RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.65	54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	36 0 19 54 X SQ= 49.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.63	55 20 0 34 X SQ= 47.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.56	53 24 0 30 X SQ= 38.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.80	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.94	43 3 11 51 X SQ= 57.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.98	64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	0.85	43 3 1 17 X SQ= 42.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.65	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.57	34 22 18 29 X SQ= 4.28 P = 0.03D RV YES (YES)	
67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.81	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.62	43 31 10 19 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.048 RV NO (YES)	

68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.64	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.74	35 14 20 40 X SQ= 14.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.78	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.69	43 17 12 37 X SQ= 22.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.71	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.90	15 5 37 44 X SQ= 4.41 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.69	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.74	36 14 16 40 X SQ= 18.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.83	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.67	43 18 9 36 X SQ= 24.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.52	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	26 0 28 53 X SQ= 31.14 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.89	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.79	49 11 6 42 X SQ= 48.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.57	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	26 0 20 48 X SQ= 34.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.85	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.79	17 10 3 37 X SQ= 21.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.52	79	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.83	12 35 11 7 X SQ= 5.73 P = 0.010 RV NO (YES)	
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.87	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.64	7 12 1 21 X SQ= 4.87 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.81	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.82	42 9 10 40 X SQ= 36.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.60	10 16 0 24 X SQ= 9.26 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.80	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.77	44 12 11 41 X SQ= 33.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.89	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.57	49 23 6 30 X SQ= 23.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.91	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.67	4 27 40 13 X SQ= 28.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.62	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.91	28 4 17 41 X SQ= 25.65 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
92	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.78	92	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.92	12 4 42 49 X SQ= 3.45 P = 0.055 RV NO (YES)	

94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.67	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.56	36 14 18 18 X SQ= 3.45 P = 0.044 RV YES (YES)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.78	95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	42 51 12 0 X SQ= 10.69 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.91	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.55	48 14 5 17 X SQ= 18.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.71	97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	M 5 17 12 0 X SQ= 15.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.71	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.66	34 11 14 21 X SQ= 8.94 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.62	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.80	33 8 20 32 X SQ= 14.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.69	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.58	37 20 17 28 X SQ= 6.38 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.72	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.76	34 9 13 29 X SQ= 18.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.65	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.82	36 9 19 41 X SQ= 22.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.74	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.58	M 32 21 11 29 X SQ= 8.63 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.56	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.70	23 35 29 15 X SQ= 5.89 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)
115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.61	115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	20 0 31 54 X SQ= 23.68 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.57	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.96	29 2 22 52 X SQ= 33.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.82	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE (INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.69	M 42 17 9 37 X SQ= 25.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.55	119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.97	30 38 25 1 X SQ= 18.89 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.82	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	45 39 10 0 X SQ= 6.14 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.85	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.76	M 8 41 47 13 X SQ= 39.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.58	122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	23 54 32 0 X SQ= 41.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.61	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.87	17 45 27 7 X SQ= 21.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.60	128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.56	29 17 19 22 X SQ= 1.82 P = 0.135 RV YES (YES)	
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.89	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.51	6 23 47 24 X SQ= 15.34 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.75	136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	12 0 36 43 X SQ= 10.30 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.54	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.95	26 2 22 41 X SQ= 23.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.71	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.71	35 12 14 30 X SQ= 14.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
141	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.82	141	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.95	9 2 41 40 X SQ= 2.65 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)	
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.58	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.80	21 8 29 32 X SQ= 3.97 P = 0.040 RV NO (YES)	
144	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.57	144	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.89	12 17 9 2 X SQ= 3.73 P = 0.034 RV NO (YES)	

146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.81
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.53	147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.97
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.71
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.70	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.82
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.80	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.54
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.73	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.62
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.90	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.63
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.58	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.92
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.69	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.56

0	8
51	35
X SQ=	8.12
P =	0.001
RV NO	(YES)
22	1
25	37
X SQ=	18.60
P =	0.
RV NO	(YES)
0	14
55	35
X SQ=	15.79
P =	0.
RV NO	(YES)
32	5
14	23
X SQ=	16.60
P =	0.
RV YES	(YES)
M 37	13
9	15
X SQ=	7.70
P =	0.004
RV YES	(YES)
M 14	24
37	15
X SQ=	9.18
P =	0.001
RV YES	(YES)
M 5	26
47	15
X SQ=	27.49
P =	0.
RV YES	(YES)
30	4
22	44
X SQ=	24.94
P =	0.
RV YES	(YES)
36	21
16	27
X SQ=	5.61
P =	0.015
RV YES	(YES)

170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.71	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.52	15 23 37 21 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.023 RV YES (YES)	
172	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.72	172	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.88	15 6 38 44 X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.051 RV NO (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.71	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.67	36 14 15 29 X SQ= 12.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.64	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.62	18 30 32 18 X SQ= 5.86 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.63	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.77	17 30 29 9 X SQ= 12.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.61	181	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.95	20 1 31 18 X SQ= 6.07 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.97	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.57	31 18 1 24 X SQ= 21.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.57	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.85	21 39 28 7 X SQ= 16.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.58	188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.83	23 9 32 43 X SQ= 6.54 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	

189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.87	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	7 48	0 54
						X SQ=	5.38
						P =	0.013
						RV NO	(YES)
192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.98	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.50	1 54	26 26
						X SQ=	30.39
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.96	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.54	2 52	25 29
						X SQ=	23.90
						P =	0.
						RV NO	(YES)
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.83	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	9 45	0 54
						X SQ=	7.76
						P =	0.003
						RV NO	(YES)

46 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)

46 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)

PREDICATE ONLY

84 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA
DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE
GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND
ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA
LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK	US
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA						

26 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON
IVORY COAST	LAOS	MALI	NEPAL	NIGER	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN				

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

GUINEA	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	VIETNAM, N

M

MATRIX

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE [55]

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)

29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS HIGH (56)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	ECUADOR	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	LIBYA
BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CUBA	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA	PERU	SO AFRICA	SYRIA
CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	FRANCE	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR		
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND					
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN					
KOREA REP	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND					
NORWAY	PANAMA	POLAND	RUMANIA	SPAIN					
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	USSR	UK	US					
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

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29 POLITIES
WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
IS LOW (49)

ALBANIA	BURMA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	INDONESIA	AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
THAILAND	YUGOSLAVIA				CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
					DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
					GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA
					IVORY COAST	LAOS	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA
					NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	RWANDA
					SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN
					TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN

M

**********MATRIX**********

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY
SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	EL SALVADOR	HONDURAS	NICARAGUA
BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA			
CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND			
FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY			
ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA	LUXEMBOURG			
MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PANAMA			
PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA			
SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK	US			
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA					

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63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)

ALBANIA	BURMA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	INDONESIA	AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
ISRAEL	JAPAN	KOREA REP	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	CAMEROON	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LED)
VIETNAM REP					DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
					GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	INDIA	IRAN
					IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	LAOS	LIBYA
					MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO
					NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU
					RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
					SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO
					TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA
					YEMEN				

M

MATRIX

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)

97 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN
TOTALITARIAN (23)

BURMA	INDONESIA	KOREA REP	PARAGUAY	THAILAND	AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	EL SALVADOR
					ETHIOPIA	GHANA	GUINEA	IRAN	JORDAN
					LAOS	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PAKISTAN	SA'U ARABIA
					SUDAN	UAR			

5 17

12 0

97 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN
AUTHORITARIAN (16)

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E
HUNGARY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN
USSR	YUGOSLAVIA			

M

MATRIX

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)

111 POLITIES
WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION
IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BURMA	CANADA	CEYLON	AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	GHANA
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	GUINEA	HONDURAS	INDIA	IVORY COAST	LIBYA
FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	MALAGASY R	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA
MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	TURKEY				
POLAND	SWEDEN	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	UK					
US	VENEZUELA								

32 21

11 29

111 POLITIES
WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION
IS LOW (42)

ARGENTINA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CHILE	CYPRUS	BOLIVIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)

M

MATRIX

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)

117 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED (60)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA
BURMA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	HONDURAS	INDIA	IRAN	MALAYA	MOROCCO
COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	NICARAGUA	PERU	SO AFRICA	SYRIA	TUNISIA
FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	TURKEY	UAR			
INDONESIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA					
JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND					
NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	SWEDEN					
SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	USSR	UK	US					
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

42 . 17

9 . 37

117 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	AFGHANISTAN	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
PARAGUAY	RUMANIA	THAILAND	VIETNAM REP		CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA
					GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	IRAQ
					IVORY COAST	JORDAN	LAOS	LIBYA	MALAGASY R
					MALI	MAURITANIA	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA
					PAKISTAN	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
					SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA
					UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN			

M

MATRIX

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)

121 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT (54)

BURMA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	INDONESIA	KOREA REP	AFGHANISTAN	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
PHILIPPINES	THAILAND	VIETNAM REP			CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA
					GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	INDIA
					IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	LAOS
					MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	NEPAL
					NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
					SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN
					SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA
					YEMEN				

8 . 41

47 . 13

121 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR
NEGLIGIBLE (61)

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA
BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	HONDURAS	LIBYA	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA	PERU
CUBA	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR		
FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE					
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY					
JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS					
NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	POLAND					
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND					
TRINIDAD	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY					
VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA								

M

MATRIX

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)

154 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)

ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	GHANA	GUINEA	INDIA	IVORY COAST
CANADA	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	NICARAGUA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA
FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	HUNGARY	ICELAND	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	TURKEY		
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG					
MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PARAGUAY					
PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN					
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	USSR	UK	US					
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

37 . 13

9 . 15

154 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
UNSTABLE (25)

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	GREECE	BOLIVIA	CONGO(LEO)	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA
KOREA REP	PANAMA	THAILAND	VENEZUELA		HONDURAS	IRAQ	JORDAN	LAOS	NEPAL
					PAKISTAN	PERU	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SYRIA

M

MATRIX

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)

158 POLITIES
WHERE PERSONALISMO IS
PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	BOLIVIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
COSTA RICA	FRANCE	GREECE	INDONESIA	JAPAN	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
PANAMA	THAILAND	URUGUAY	VIETNAM REP		GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	IVORY COAST
					LAOS	MALI	MAURITANIA	NICARAGUA	NIGER
					PERU	SYRIA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	

14 24

37 15

158 POLITIES
WHERE PERSONALISMO IS
NEGLIGIBLE (56)

ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	ALGERIA	GUINEA	INDIA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
CANADA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	MOROCCO	NIGERIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	SO AFRICA	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA
ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO					
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES					
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN					
SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	USSR	UK	US					
VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA								

M

MATRIX

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)

45 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)

164 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)

CUBA	FRANCE	INDONESIA	JAMAICA	YUGOSLAVIA	ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
					CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
					GUINEA	INDIA	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	LIBYA
					MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	PAKISTAN
					SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	UAR
					UPPER VOLTA				

5 . 26

47 . 15

164 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HAITI
BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	HONDURAS	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	NICARAGUA	PERU
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	TURKEY
FINLAND	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY					
ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN					
KOREA REP	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND					
NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND					
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND					
THAILAND	TRINIDAD	UK	US	URUGUAY					
VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP								

47 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN
BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)

47 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT,
RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)

PREDICATE ONLY

25 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND	RUMANIA
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	USSR	UK	US					

30 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA
CYPRUS	DOMIN REP	GREECE	INDONESIA	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	KOREA REP	MEXICO	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA

54 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS
INDIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	LAOS	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI
MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY
UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN						

6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

CHINA, PR	KOREA, N	LEBANON	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA	VIETNAM, N

48 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT,
RATHER THAN BETWEEN
TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (30)

48 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT,
RATHER THAN BETWEEN
FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (24)

PREDICATE ONLY

30 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA
CYPRUS	DOMIN REP	GREECE	INDONESIA	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	KOREA REP	MEXICO	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA

24 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	CAMBODIA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GHANA	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA
IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU
SO AFRICA	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR						

51 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	IVORY COAST	JAPAN	LAOS	LUXEMBOURG	MALI	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NORWAY	POLAND	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	USSR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA
YEMEN									

10 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

CHINA, PR	GUINEA	KOREA, N	LEBANON	LIBERIA	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	SYRIA	VIETNAM, N

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49 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT,
RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)

49 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN
BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)

PREDICATE ONLY

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24 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	CAMBODIA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GHANA	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA
IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU
SO AFRICA	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR						

26 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON
IVORY COAST	LAOS	MALI	NEPAL	NIGER	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN				

55 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CANADA	CEYLON
CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDONESIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA
JAPAN	KOREA REP	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	USSR	UK
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA					

10 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

CHINA, PR	GUINEA	KOREA, N	LEBANON	LIBERIA	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	SYRIA	VIETNAM, N

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50 POLITIES
WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS
COMPLETE (43)

50 POLITIES
WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS
INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR
INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

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43 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS
DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	GERMAN FR	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA
JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER
NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	UGANDA
UK	US	URUGUAY							

56 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CHINA, PR
CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY
INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA
LIBYA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	PERU	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR
UAR	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA				

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

GREECE

13 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	CEN AFR REP	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	GABON	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	IVORY COAST	NICARAGUA
RWANDA	SENEGAL	UPPER VOLTA							

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

CEYLON TOGO

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2 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.58
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN
WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,
NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)

2 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.95
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN
WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,
NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)

IB 3
25 53
X SQ= 17.27
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

5 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE,
RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)

5 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.75
LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN
IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)

14 3
0 9
X SQ= 12.92
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

8	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.91	8	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.77	4	13	
						39	43	
						X SQ=	2.40	
						P =	0.106	
						RV NO	(NO)	
13	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.98	13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.73	1	15	
						42	41	
						X SQ=	9.01	
						P =	0.001	
						RV NO	(YES)	
15	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.91	15	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.57	1	10	
						10	13	
						X SQ=	2.60	
						P =	0.060	
						RV NO	(NO)	
17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.91	17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	0.56	1	10	
						10	8	
						X SQ=	4.44	
						P =	0.019	
						RV YES	(YES)	
20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.71	20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.62	4	13	
						10	8	
						X SQ=	2.52	
						P =	0.086	
						RV YES	(YES)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.56	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.71	19	40	
						24	16	
						X SQ=	6.41	
						P =	0.008	
						RV YES	(YES)	
25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.74	25	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.93	11	4	
						32	52	
						X SQ=	5.08	
						P =	0.021	
						RV NO	(YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.74	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.59	11	32	
						32	22	
						X SQ=	9.68	
						P =	0.001	
						RV YES	(YES)	
32	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.84	32	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.95	7	3	
						36	53	
						X SQ=	2.11	
						P =	0.097	
						RV NO	(YES)	

36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.58	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.71	25 16 18 40 X SQ= 7.59 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.74	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.52	32 27 11 29 X SQ= 5.89 P = 0.013 RV YES (YES)	
38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.81	38	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.96	8 2 35 52 X SQ= 4.25 P = 0.021 RV NO (YES)	
39	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.51	39	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.69	21 17 22 38 X SQ= 2.56 P = 0.095 RV NO (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.53	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.77	23 12 20 41 X SQ= 8.46 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.71	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.56	30 24 12 30 X SQ= 5.94 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.70	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.54	30 23 13 27 X SQ= 4.40 P = 0.023 RV YES (YES)	
47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.60	47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.70	18 7 12 16 X SQ= 3.46 P = 0.052 RV YES (YES)	
48	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (30)	0.75	48	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (24)	0.50	12 16 4 16 X SQ= 1.81 P = 0.127 RV YES (NO)	

49	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)	0.67	49	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)	0.67	4 16 8 8 X SQ= 2.38 P = 0.081 RV YES (YES)
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.56	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.78	24 12 19 42 X SQ= 10.18 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
57	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.70	57	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.84	13 9 30 47 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.142 RV NO (YES)
58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.95	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.73	2 15 41 41 X SQ= 6.89 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)
62	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.72	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 13 9 X SQ= 1.50 P = 0.136 RV NO (NO)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.63	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.73	M 27 15 16 40 X SQ= 11.02 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
67	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.63	67	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.81	26 42 15 10 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.098 RV NO (YES)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.74	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.56	32 24 11 31 X SQ= 8.12 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.57	76	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.82	18 7 24 31 X SQ= 4.47 P = 0.029 RV NO (YES)

78	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.93	78	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.62	13 10 1 6 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.086 RV NO (YES)
81	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.65	81	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.90	9 2 17 18 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.082 RV NO (YES)
82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.62	82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.58	26 20 16 28 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.061 RV YES (YES)
83	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.98	83	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.86	1 8 42 48 X SQ= 2.89 P = 0.073 RV NO (NO)
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.62	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.86	6 24 10 4 X SQ= 8.80 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.73	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.91	27 4 10 41 X SQ= 32.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	91	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.69	10 11 0 5 X SQ= 2.12 P = 0.121 RV NO (NO)
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.63	0 20 43 34 X SQ= 17.86 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.95	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.55	2 28 41 23 X SQ= 24.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.78	37 11 0 38 X SQ= 48.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.65	98	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.87	15 7 28 49 X SQ= 5.82 P = 0.014 RV NO (YES)
99	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.83	99	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.53	24 26 5 23 X SQ= 5.75 P = 0.014 RV NO (NO)
100	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.93	100	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.69	27 35 2 16 X SQ= 5.03 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.80	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.85	32 7 8 39 X SQ= 33.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.91	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.71	39 15 4 36 X SQ= 33.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.85	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.81	M 33 7 6 30 X SQ= 30.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.95	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.72	35 9 2 23 X SQ= 30.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.79	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.83	34 9 9 44 X SQ= 34.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.93	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.64	40 16 3 28 X SQ= 28.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.77	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.60	30 17 9 25 X SQ= 9.58 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.53	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.85	23 8 20 44 X SQ= 13.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.74	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.58	32 22 11 30 X SQ= 8.63 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.95	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.69	2 38 35 17 X SQ= 33.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.62	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.96	14 53 23 2 X SQ= 35.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
121	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.67	121	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.52	14 29 29 27 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.067 RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.51	122	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.82	22 46 21 10 X SQ= 9.46 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.81	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	35 56 8 0 X SQ= 8.97 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	

124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	124	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.73	0 12 39 32 X SQ= 10.33 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.62	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.82	15 36 24 8 X SQ= 14.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.59	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	23 44 16 0 X SQ= 19.80 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.75	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.65	30 13 10 24 X SQ= 10.82 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.80	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.57	32 16 8 21 X SQ= 9.55 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
130	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.73	130	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.97	10 1 27 39 X SQ= 7.55 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)
132	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.98	132	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.76	40 16 1 5 X SQ= 5.02 P = 0.014 RV NO (YES)
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.83	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.72	34 13 7 33 X SQ= 23.93 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.71	40 25 0 10 X SQ= 10.83 P = 0. RV NO (YES)

137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.64	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.93	25 3 14 39 X SQ= 26.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.79	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.72	33 11 9 28 X SQ= 18.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.86	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.54	6 22 37 26 X SQ= 9.38 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.76	141	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	1.00	10 0 31 43 X SQ= 9.69 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.56	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.78	18 9 23 32 X SQ= 3.53 P = 0.039 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.52	147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.89	19 4 21 33 X SQ= 10.66 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.86	148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	6 0 37 51 X SQ= 5.45 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	
153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.71	153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.51	22 20 9 21 X SQ= 2.72 P = 0.091 RV YES (YES)	
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.98	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.61	1 25 40 16 X SQ= 29.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.73	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.76	11 31 30 10 X SQ= 17.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
163	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.95	163	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.78	2 10 39 36 X SQ= 3.86 P = 0.030 RV NO (YES)	
164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.80	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.58	8 19 33 26 X SQ= 4.14 P = 0.036 RV NO (YES)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.69	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.92	29 4 13 44 X SQ= 32.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.93	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.77	39 11 3 37 X SQ= 41.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.63	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.96	16 2 27 48 X SQ= 14.28 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.62	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.95	26 2 16 42 X SQ= 29.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.86	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.73	36 12 6 32 X SQ= 27.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.64	42 16 0 28 X SQ= 36.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.67	178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.54	14 25 28 21 X SQ= 3.12 P = 0.056 RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.86	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.82	5 37 31 8 X SQ= 34.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.55	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.92	18 3 15 34 X SQ= 15.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.60	182	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.87	15 34 10 5 X SQ= 4.85 P = 0.017 RV NO (YES)	
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	1.00	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.64	10 5 0 9 X SQ= 7.73 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.98	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.83	1 29 40 6 X SQ= 47.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.89	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.96	4 51 31 2 X SQ= 61.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.68	190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	15 12 7 0 X SQ= 3.06 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.76	0 13 43 42 X SQ= 9.75 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

M

MATRIX

5D POLITIES
WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS
COMPLETE (43)

5D POLITIES
WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS
INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR
INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY
SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CHILE	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	PARAGUAY	POLAND
GERMAN FR	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA
LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY					
PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK					
US	URUGUAY								

27 . 15

16 . 4D

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)

CAMEROUN	CHAD	CYPRUS	ECUADOR	INDIA	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA
JAPAN	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	CAMBODIA	CHINA, PR	CONGO(LEO)	ETHIOPIA	GHANA
NIGER	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	GUINEA	HAITI	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ
UGANDA					ISRAEL	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS
					LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
					NEPAL	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	SA'U ARABIA
					SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TUNISIA
					TURKEY	UAR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN

M

MATRIX

50 POLITIES
WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS
COMPLETE (43)

50 POLITIES
WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS
INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR
INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)

105 POLITIES
WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS
COMPETITIVE (43)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CHILE	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	FRANCE	ISRAEL
COSTA RICA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	TURKEY	VENEZUELA			
GERMAN FR	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ITALY					
JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA					
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES					
SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	UGANDA					
UK	US	URUGUAY							

33 . 7

6 . 30

105 POLITIES
WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS
PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR
NON-COMPETITIVE (47)

CHAD	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	SOMALIA	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA
TANGANYIKA					CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E	GHANA
					GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	JORDAN	KOREA, N
					LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MONGOLIA	PAKISTAN
					PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN
					TUNISIA	USSR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA

51 POLITIES
WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS
COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)

51 POLITIES
WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS
INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR
INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)

PREDICATE ONLY

60 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CHAD
CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMAN FR	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LAOS	LEBANON
LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PERU	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY

37 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E
GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	MONGOLIA
NEPAL	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SPAIN	SUDAN	THAILAND
TUNISIA	USSR	UAR	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

GREECE

13 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	CEN AFR REP	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	GABON	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	IVORY COAST	NICARAGUA
RWANDA	SENEGAL	UPPER VOLTA							

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

CEYLON IRAQ TOGO YEMEN

52 POLITIES
WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS
COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR
INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)

52 POLITIES
WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS
INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (16)

PREDICATE ONLY

82 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CANADA	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	HAITI	ICELAND	INDIA
INDONESIA	IRAN	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON
LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NEPAL
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND
PORTUGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA
THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

16 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	JORDAN	KOREA, N
MONGOLIA	PARAGUAY	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	UAR	VIETNAM, N				

13 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	CEN AFR REP	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	GABON	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	IVORY COAST	NICARAGUA
RWANDA	SENEGAL	UPPER VOLTA							

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

CEYLON	IRAQ	TOGO	YEMEN

53 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
THREE HUNDRED OR MORE
PER THOUSAND (14)

53 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED
PER THOUSAND (101)

PREDICATE ONLY

14 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	ICELAND	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK	US						

101 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GABON	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY
INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN
KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA
TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN
YUGOSLAVIA									

54 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
ONE HUNDRED OR MORE
PER THOUSAND (37)

54 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED
PER THOUSAND (76)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

37 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS
CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND
ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PANAMA	POLAND
RUMANIA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY			

76 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN
IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN
PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA
SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA
UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA				

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

KOREA, N VIETNAM, N

2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22)	0.54	2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.97	20 2 17 74 X SQ= 38.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
3	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.70	3	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.97	11 2 26 74 X SQ= 15.39 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
8	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.95	8	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.82	2 14 35 62 X SQ= 2.48 P = 0.085 RV NO (NO)	

9	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	1.00	9	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.89	0 8 37 68 X SQ= 2.74 P = 0.051 RV NO (NO)
10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	10	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATEO ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.57	0 33 37 43 X SQ= 20.64 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
11	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATEO ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	1.00	11	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.63	0 28 37 48 X SQ= 16.20 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
13	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATEO ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.95	13	LEAN LESS TOWARO BEING THOSE LOCATEO ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.82	2 14 35 62 X SQ= 2.48 P = 0.085 RV NO (NO)
22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.51	22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.66	18 50 19 26 X SQ= 2.38 P = 0.102 RV YES (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION OENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.59	26	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION OENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.68	22 24 15 52 X SQ= 6.90 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.72	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.71	10 52 26 21 X SQ= 16.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.94	29	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE OEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.68	34 22 2 47 X SQ= 34.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.95	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.71	2 53 35 22 X SQ= 39.65 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.59	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.97	15 73 22 2 X SQ= 44.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.54	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.87	20 10 17 66 X SQ= 19.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.84	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.61	31 30 6 46 X SQ= 17.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.62	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.99	23 1 14 75 X SQ= 51.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.92	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.89	34 8 3 68 X SQ= 67.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.97	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.63	36 28 1 48 X SQ= 34.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.67	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.82	24 14 12 62 X SQ= 23.26 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.53	41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	19 0 17 75 X SQ= 44.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.86	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.93	31 5 5 69 X SQ= 65.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.94	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.72	34 21 2 53 X SQ= 39.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.68	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	25 0 12 76 X SQ= 62.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.74	36 19 0 54 X SQ= 49.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.67	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.69	24 19 12 42 X SQ= 10.18 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.58	37 42 0 31 X SQ= 19.83 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.65	57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.84	13 12 24 64 X SQ= 4.34 P = 0.029 RV NO (YES)	
58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.76	0 18 37 58 X SQ= 8.73 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
62	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.72	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 13 12 X SQ= 2.25 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.89	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.82	32 14 4 62 X SQ= 47.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.92	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.63	33 3	45 26
						X SQ= 8.30 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.70	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.67	26 11	25 50
						X SQ= 12.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.81	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.57	30 7	32 43
						X SQ= 13.28 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.58	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.91	15 21	6 62
						X SQ= 13.78 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.74	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.65	26 9	26 49
						X SQ= 13.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.94	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.57	33 2	32 43
						X SQ= 24.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.67	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.97	24 12	2 73
						X SQ= 52.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.97	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.65	36 1	26 49
						X SQ= 36.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.77	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.97	24 7	2 62
						X SQ= 54.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.66	7 21 0 40 X SQ= 8.60 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	1.00	80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.59	3 16 0 23 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.084 RV YES (NO)
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.69	81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.95	10 1 22 18 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.037 RV NO (NO)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.91	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.72	32 19 3 50 X SQ= 35.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.97	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.69	36 23 1 52 X SQ= 41.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	1.00	86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.51	37 38 0 37 X SQ= 25.07 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.97	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.57	1 30 33 23 X SQ= 23.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.71	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.86	25 8 10 50 X SQ= 29.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.75	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.56	27 24 9 30 X SQ= 7.02 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)

95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.76	95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.93	28 67 9 5 X SQ= 5.13 P = 0.015 RV NO (YES)	
96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	1.00	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.56	36 29 0 23 X SQ= 19.33 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	1.00	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.82	0 23 9 5 X SQ= 16.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.85	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.62	29 19 5 31 X SQ= 16.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.72	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.75	26 15 10 45 X SQ= 18.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.76	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.55	28 31 9 38 X SQ= 8.02 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.77	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.70	27 16 8 37 X SQ= 16.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.76	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.75	28 18 9 54 X SQ= 23.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.81	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.54	M 22 31 5 37 X SQ= 8.69 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.63	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.68	13 48 22 23 X SQ= 7.70 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.68	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.90	25 7 12 65 X SQ= 36.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.84	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.60	31 29 6 43 X SQ= 16.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.59	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.93	15 57 22 4 X SQ= 30.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.73	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	27 61 10 0 X SQ= 15.53 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.95	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.66	2 50 35 26 X SQ= 34.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.73	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.93	10 71 27 5 X SQ= 50.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.78	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	29 76 8 0 X SQ= 14.55 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.82	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.83	5 59 23 12 X SQ= 34.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.57	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	12 71 16 0 X SQ= 44.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.68	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.56	23 25 11 32 X SQ= 3.93 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)	
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.94	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.60	2 27 33 41 X SQ= 11.57 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
135	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.96	135	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.81	27 50 1 12 X SQ= 2.72 P = 0.057 RV NO (NO)	
136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.66	136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	12 0 23 60 X SQ= 20.54 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.66	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.90	23 6 12 54 X SQ= 29.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.78	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.66	28 20 8 39 X SQ= 15.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
140	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.95	140	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.82	2 11 35 50 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.122 RV NO (NO)	
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.53	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.78	17 13 19 45 X SQ= 5.20 P = 0.022 RV NO (YES)	

146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.87	0 8 34 56 X SQ= 3.11 P = 0.048 RV NO (NO)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.58	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.93	19 4 14 51 X SQ= 24.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	M
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.80	0 14 37 57 X SQ= 6.73 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.79	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.70	27 13 7 31 X SQ= 17.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.78	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.55	8 32 28 26 X SQ= 8.56 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.66	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.55	12 33 23 27 X SQ= 3.02 P = 0.058 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.94	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.52	2 30 33 32 X SQ= 16.55 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.69	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.87	25 9 11 59 X SQ= 31.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.75	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.54	27 31 9 37 X SQ= 7.11 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	

170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.83	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.52	6 33 30 31 X SQ= 10.37 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
171	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.81	171	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.92	7 5 29 59 X SQ= 1.95 P = 0.112 RV NO (YES)
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.68	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.87	12 9 25 61 X SQ= 4.70 P = 0.021 RV NO (YES)
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.61	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.90	22 6 14 56 X SQ= 27.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.78	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.63	28 23 8 39 X SQ= 13.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.69	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.70	10 40 22 17 X SQ= 11.08 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.54	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.97	20 1 17 36 X SQ= 21.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.59	17 36 0 25 X SQ= 8.46 P = 0.001 RV NO (ND)
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.70	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.82	M 10 54 23 12 X SQ= 23.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.86	189	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.97	5 32	2 74
						X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.037 RV NO (YES)	
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.64	0 37	27 47
						X SQ= 15.91 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.63	0 37	28 47
						X SQ= 16.48 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.78	194	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.96	8 28	3 73
						X SQ= 7.26 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	

M

MATRIX

54 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
ONE HUNDRED OR MORE
PER THOUSAND (37)

54 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED
PER THOUSAND (76)

111 POLITIES
WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION
IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	CANADA	COSTA RICA	DENMARK	.AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	.CEYLON	COLOMBIA	ODMIN REP	GHANA	GUINEA
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	.HONDURAS	INDIA	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	LIBYA
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND	SWEDEN	.MALAGASY R	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	PHILIPPINES
UK	US				.SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA
					.THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
					.VENEZUELA				

22 . 31

5 . 37

111 POLITIES
WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION
IS LOW (42)

ARGENTINA	BELGIUM	CHILE	CYPRUS	PANAMA	.BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
					.CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
					.GABON	GUATEMALA	HAITI	INDONESIA	IRAN
					.IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON
					.LIBERIA	MALAYA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER
					.NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	SA'U ARABIA	SO AFRICA
					.SPAIN	SYRIA	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP
					.YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA			

M

MATRIX

54 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
ONE HUNDRED OR MORE
PER THOUSAND (37)

54 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED
PER THOUSAND (76)

119 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)

ARGENTINA	BULGARIA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL
GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA
MONGOLIA	PANAMA	POLAND	RUMANIA	USSR	CONGO(LEO)	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
					GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS
					INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST
					JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA
					LIBYA	MALAYA	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO
					NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY
					PERU	PORTUGAL	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA
					SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND
					TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	VENEZUELA
					VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

15 . 57

22 . 4

119 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CHILE	JAMAICA	MALAGASY R	PHILIPPINES	TRINIDAD
COSTA RICA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR				
GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS				
NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK				
US	URUGUAY							

M

MATRIX

54 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
ONE HUNDRED OR MORE
PER THOUSAND (37)

54 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED
PER THOUSAND (76)

147 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CHILE	BRAZIL	JAMAICA	PERU	TRINIDAD
DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMAN FR	ICELAND	ISRAEL				
ITALY	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND				
NORWAY	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK					

19 . 4

14 . 51

147 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
OTHER THAN
CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)

BULGARIA	CANADA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CZECHOS*KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	MONGOLIA	PANAMA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA
POLAND	RUMANIA	USSR	US		CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
					EL SALVADOR	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	HONDURAS
					IVORY COAST	LAOS	LEBANON	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
					MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA
					NIGER	NIGERIA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL
					RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN
					SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA
					UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP
					YUGOSLAVIA				

M

MATRIX

54 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
ONE HUNDRED OR MORE
PER THOUSAND (37)

54 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED
PER THOUSAND (76)

187 POLITIES
WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE
IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)

ARGENTINA	BULGARIA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA
HUNGARY	MONGOLIA	POLAND	RUMANIA	USSR	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA
					CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
					ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
					HAITI	HONDURAS	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ
					IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON
					LIBERIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA
					PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	PORTUGAL	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL
					SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA
					THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR
					VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA	

10 . 54

23 . 12

187 POLITIES
WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE
IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	DENMARK	CEYLON	INDIA	JAMAICA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	TANGANYIKA
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	TRINIDAD	UGANDA			
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND					
UK	US	URUGUAY							

55 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
TEN OR MORE
PER THOUSAND (78)

55 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
LESS THAN TEN
PER THOUSAND (35)

PREDICATE ONLY

78 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK
DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA
HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA		

35 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA
GABON	GUINEA	IRAN	IVORY COAST	LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA
NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN
TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN					

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

KOREA, N VIETNAM, N

56	POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)			56	POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)								

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

79 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK
DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND
INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN
LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA
TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA	

31 IN RIGHT COLUMN

BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LED)	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA
GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	IVORY COAST	LAOS	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALI
NIGER	NIGERIA	PERU	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA
UPPER VOLTA									

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CHINA, PR	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.72	2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	22 0 57 31 X SQ= 9.12 P = 0. RV ND (ND)
8	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.85	8	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.97	12 1 67 30 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.105 RV ND (ND)
10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.90	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.81	8 25 71 6 X SQ= 49.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.80	13	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	1.00	16 0 63 31 X SQ= 5.81 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.58	15	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	1.00	11 0 8 25 X SQ= 16.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
17	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.61	17	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	1.00	11 0 17 5 X SQ= 1.44 P = 0.143 RV NO (NO)	
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.60	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.96	8 25 12 1 X SQ= 14.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.68	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.83	8 25 17 5 X SQ= 12.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
22	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.56	22	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.74	44 23 35 8 X SQ= 2.47 P = 0.086 RV NO (NO)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.59	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.71	47 9 32 22 X SQ= 7.09 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.81	25	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.97	15 1 64 30 X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.037 RV NO (NO)	
26	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.51	26	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.87	39 4 40 27 X SQ= 10.95 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.71	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.90	52 3 21 28 X SQ= 30.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.68	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.87	25 27 53 4 X SQ= 24.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
32	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.89	32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	9 0 70 31 X SQ= 2.48 P = 0.059 RV NO (NO)	
33	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.65	33	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.97	28 1 51 30 X SQ= 10.30 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.67	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.84	53 5 26 26 X SQ= 21.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.70	35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	24 0 55 31 X SQ= 10.33 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.52	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.97	41 1 38 30 X SQ= 20.33 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.76	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.87	60 4 19 27 X SQ= 33.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.87	38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	10 0 68 31 X SQ= 2.97 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)	

39	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.54	39	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.97	36 1 42 30 X SQ= 16.37 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.78	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.71	59 9 17 22 X SQ= 20.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.75	41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	19 0 58 31 X SQ= 7.66 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
42	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.54	42	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.97	35 1 41 30 X SQ= 16.22 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.67	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.90	51 3 25 28 X SQ= 26.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.69	45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	53 0 24 30 X SQ= 38.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.92	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.67	70 10 6 20 X SQ= 37.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.82	52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	59 21 13 0 X SQ= 3.03 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)	
54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.53	54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	37 0 42 31 X SQ= 19.83 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.86	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.77	68 7 11 24 X SQ= 38.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.68	57	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	1.00	25 0 54 31 X SQ= 10.96 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.77	58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	18 0 61 31 X SQ= 6.86 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.59	63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	46 0 32 31 X SQ= 29.26 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.73	66	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	1.00	57 0 21 28 X SQ= 41.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.58	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.87	46 4 33 27 X SQ= 16.66 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.71	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.87	56 4 23 27 X SQ= 27.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.72	70	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	1.00	21 0 54 28 X SQ= 8.20 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.56	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.74	43 8 34 23 X SQ= 6.84 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	

73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 [65]	0.73	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.74	56 8 21 23 X SQ= 18.26 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.67	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	26 0 52 30 X SQ= 11.41 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.72	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.87	57 4 22 26 X SQ= 28.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.60	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	26 0 39 29 X SQ= 14.10 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.62	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.86	M 24 4 15 24 X SQ= 13.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
79	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.64	79	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.85	25 22 14 4 X SQ= 2.33 P = 0.093 RV NO (NO)
80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.62	80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.70	13 6 8 14 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.062 RV YES (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.62	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.80	45 6 27 24 X SQ= 13.65 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.89	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.87	M 24 3 3 21 X SQ= 26.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.71	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.94	55 2 23 29 X SQ= 33.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.83	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.74	65 8 13 23 X SQ= 30.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.82	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.80	11 20 50 5 X SQ= 26.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.53	89	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.92	31 2 35 23 X SQ= 10.29 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
91	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.73	91	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.95	11 20 4 1 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.138 RV NO (YES)	
92	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.82	92	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.94	14 2 63 29 X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.145 RV NO (NO)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.83	95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	65 29 13 0 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.79	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.54	58 6 15 7 X SQ= 4.80 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
97	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.54	97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	15 7 13 0 X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.031 RV NO (NO)	

99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.63	99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.69	43 4 25 9 X SQ= 3.48 P = 0.063 RV YES (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.53	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.86	38 3 34 19 X SQ= 8.97 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.60	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.78	38 5 25 18 X SQ= 8.55 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.53	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.82	41 5 37 23 X SQ= 8.74 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.68	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.68	44 9 21 19 X SQ= 8.69 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.74	115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	20 0 56 31 X SQ= 8.38 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.59	116	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.97	31 1 45 30 X SQ= 13.08 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.72	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.84	M 55 5 21 26 X SQ= 26.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.68	119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.94	52 17 25 1 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)	

121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GRDUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.71	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NDN-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.84	23 56 X SQ= P = RV YES	26 5 24.85 0. (YES)
122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATIDN BY NDN-ASSDCIATIONAL GRDUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MDDERATE (83)	0.59	122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GRDUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MDDERATE (B3)	1.00	47 32 X SQ= P = RV NO	31 0 15.80 0. (NO)
125	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANDMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.52	125	TEND MDRE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANDMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.87	34 31 X SQ= P = RV ND	27 4 9.52 0.001 (NO)
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATIDN BY ANOMIC GRDUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.75	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATIDN BY ANDMIC GRDUPS IS FREQUENT, DCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	49 16 X SQ= P = RV NO	31 0 7.47 0.001 (NO)
129	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MDDERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.68	129	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.50	43 20 X SQ= P = RV YES	13 13 1.90 0.147 (NO)
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.81	133	TEND TO BE THDSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATIDN BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.54	14 58 X SQ= P = RV YES	15 13 9.81 0.001 (YES)
137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED DR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.55	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	29 36 X SQ= P = RV ND	0 28 16.13 0. (ND)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.63	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.75	41 24 X SQ= P = RV YES	7 21 9.89 0.001 (ND)
144	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THDSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.66	144	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.92	19 10 X SQ= P = RV NO	12 1 2.09 0.127 (ND)

147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.63	147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.96	22 1 38 25 X SQ= 8.37 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
148	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.99	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.55	1 13 75 16 X SQ= 30.73 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.57	153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.71	35 4 26 10 X SQ= 2.72 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.69	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.72	21 18 46 7 X SQ= 10.71 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.76	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.58	17 14 53 10 X SQ= 7.90 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.64	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.61	47 11 27 17 X SQ= 3.92 P = 0.043 RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.70	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.63	21 17 50 10 X SQ= 7.83 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.61	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.69	43 8 27 18 X SQ= 5.98 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.60	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.70	28 21 42 9 X SQ= 6.41 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	

182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.90	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.71	43 8 5 20 X SQ= 27.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.58	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.91	M 5 20 7 2 X SQ= 7.31 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
187	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.57	187	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.83	41 20 31 4 X SQ= 4.33 P = 0.027 RV NO (NO)
188	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.66	188	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.83	27 5 52 24 X SQ= 2.16 P = 0.101 RV NO (NO)
189	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.91	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	7 0 72 31 X SQ= 1.63 P = 0.109 RV NO (NO)
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.97	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.81	2 25 76 6 X SQ= 68.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.87	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	10 0 68 31 X SQ= 2.97 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)

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MATRIX

56 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)

56 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
NON-LITERATE (31)

77 POLITIES
THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED,
RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED,
THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)

ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	BOLIVIA	ECUADOR	GUATEMALA	PERU
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	DOMIN REP				
EL SALVADOR	HONDURAS	INDIA	JAMAICA	LEBANON				
MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES				
TRINIDAD	UAR	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA					

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77 POLITIES
THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED,
RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED,
THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)

BURMA	CAMBODIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
JORDAN	LIBYA	MALAYA	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA
PAKISTAN	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SYRIA	TUNISIA	HAITI	IVORY COAST	LAOS	MALAGASY R	MALI
					NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SUDAN
					TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	

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MATRIX

56 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)

56 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
NON-LITERATE (31)

84 POLITIES
WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN
UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)

ALGERIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	LAOS	LIBERIA	SUDAN
INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAQ	ISRAEL	JAMAICA			
JORDAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	MALAYA	MONGOLIA			
MOROCCO	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	SA'U ARABIA	SYRIA			
TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UAR	YEMEN				

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84 POLITIES
WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN
DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)

MAURITANIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
			CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA
			IVORY COAST	MALAGASY R	MALI	NIGER	NIGERIA
			RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA
			UPPER VOLTA				

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MATRIX

56 POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)

56 POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)

117 POLITIES WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)

ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	ECUADOR	GUATEMALA	PERU	SO AFRICA
BRAZIL	BURMA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE					
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP					
EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE					
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA					
IRAN	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA					
JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO					
MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY					
PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND					
SYRIA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR					
UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZLELA					

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117 POLITIES WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CUBA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
CZECHOS*KIA	GERMANY, E	IRAQ	JORDAN	LIBYA	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	GUINEA	HAITI	IVORY COAST	LAOS	LIBERIA
RUMANIA	SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	THAILAND	MALAGASY R	MALI	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA
YEMEN					SIERRE LEO	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA
					UPPER VOLTA				

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MATRIX

56 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)

56 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
NON-LITERATE (31)

183 POLITIES
WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY
IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL,
RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)

ALGERIA	BURMA	MAURITANIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
					CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	GABON	IVORY COAST	MALAGASY R
					MALI	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO
					SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA

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183 POLITIES
WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY
IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN
POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)

AFGHANISTAN	CAMBODIA	IRAN	JORDAN	NEPAL	ETHIOPIA	LAOS
SA'U ARABIA	THAILAND					

57 POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC (25)	57 POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

25 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR
FRANCE	HONDURAS	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES
POLAND	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA					

90 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY
DENMARK	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA
GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST
JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA
NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PERU	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA
SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA

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3 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.68	3 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.94	8 5 17 85 X SQ= 11.14 P = 0.001 RV ND (YES)	
5 TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	0.89	5 TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	D.56	8 10 1 8 X SQ= 1.69 P = 0.110 RV ND (NO)	
6 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (22)	0.60	6 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.92	15 7 10 83 X SQ= 31.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
8 LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.96	8 LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, DR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.81	1 17 24 73 X SQ= 2.25 P = 0.074 RV NO (NO)	

10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.63	0 33 25 57 X SQ= 11.13 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
13	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	1.00	13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.82	0 16 25 74 X SQ= 3.79 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)
14	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	1.00	14	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.88	0 11 25 79 X SQ= 2.11 P = 0.071 RV NO (NO)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.94	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.71	1 17 15 7 X SQ= 13.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.90	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.56	19 37 2 47 X SQ= 12.74 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.92	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.61	2 54 23 34 X SQ= 20.09 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
34	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.68	34	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.50	17 45 8 45 X SQ= 1.88 P = 0.120 RV YES (NO)
36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.52	36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.68	M 13 29 12 61 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.099 RV YES (NO)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.96	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.56	24 40 1 50 X SQ= 19.03 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.52	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.72	13 25 12 64 X SQ= 4.00 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.75	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.58	18 37 6 51 X SQ= 6.93 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.88	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.61	22 33 3 51 X SQ= 16.39 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.69	25 59 0 26 X SQ= 8.39 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.73	47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.58	6 19 16 14 X SQ= 3.74 P = 0.032 RV YES (YES)	
48	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (30)	0.84	48	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (24)	0.60	16 14 3 21 X SQ= 8.04 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
50	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.59	50	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.61	13 30 9 47 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.142 RV YES (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.52	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.73	13 24 12 64 X SQ= 4.34 P = 0.029 RV YES (NO)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.60	25 53 0 35 X SQ= 12.60 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.84	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.65	21 31 4 58 X SQ= 17.09 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.92	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.54	23 41 2 48 X SQ= 14.91 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.88	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.65	22 30 3 56 X SQ= 19.87 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.96	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.52	24 41 1 45 X SQ= 16.70 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.58	25 37 0 52 X SQ= 24.55 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	78	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.63	16 12 0 7 X SQ= 5.25 P = 0.009 RV NO (YES)
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.93	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.92	1 48 14 4 X SQ= 39.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.96	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.67	24 27 1 54 X SQ= 27.59 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	83	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.90	0 9 25 81 X SQ= 1.50 P = 0.123 RV NO (NO)

85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MIO- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.72	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MIO- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.53	18 42 7 47 X SQ= 3.87 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)
86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	1.00	86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.57	25 51 0 38 X SQ= 14.15 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
87	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.89	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.59	2 29 17 41 X SQ= 5.00 P = 0.014 RV NO (NO)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.72	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.74	13 20 5 57 X SQ= 11.80 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
93	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.87	93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.66	3 29 21 57 X SQ= 3.13 P = 0.046 RV NO (NO)
94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.71	94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.50	17 34 7 34 X SQ= 2.33 P = 0.097 RV YES (NO)
96	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.87	96	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.70	21 46 3 20 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.106 RV NO (NO)
102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.72	102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.51	18 41 7 42 X SQ= 3.10 P = 0.066 RV YES (NO)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.73	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.60	16 27 6 41 X SQ= 6.00 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)

107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.68	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.66	M 17 29 8 57 X SQ= 8.02 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.67	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.62	7 54 14 33 X SQ= 4.57 P = 0.026 RV YES (NO)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.57	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.78	13 19 10 69 X SQ= 9.21 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.91	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.56	21 39 2 49 X SQ= 14.37 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.96	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.59	1 53 24 37 X SQ= 21.51 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.64	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.82	9 74 16 16 X SQ= 18.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	124	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.82	0 14 20 65 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.040 RV NO (NO)
125	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.55	125	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.70	9 55 11 24 X SQ= 3.22 P = 0.065 RV YES (NO)
129	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.78	129	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.54	18 38 5 32 X SQ= 3.21 P = 0.051 RV NO (NO)

138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.82	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.60	18 30 4 45 X SQ= 10.29 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
139	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.83	139	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.63	4 30 20 51 X SQ= 2.64 P = 0.082 RV NO (NO)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.52	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.75	12 18 11 55 X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.84	0 14 25 71 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.037 RV NO (NO)	
164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.92	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.57	2 32 23 42 X SQ= 8.79 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.79	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.52	19 39 5 43 X SQ= 6.26 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.58	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.68	14 25 10 53 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.030 RV YES (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.74	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.56	17 34 6 43 X SQ= 5.14 P = 0.017 RV YES (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.71	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.57	7 46 17 34 X SQ= 4.85 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	

182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.59	19 36 0 25 X SQ= 9.50 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
185	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.70	185	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.67	7 14 3 28 X SQ= 3.12 P = 0.069 RV YES (NO)
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.84	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.87	21 11 4 77 X SQ= 45.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
190	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.95	190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.65	21 11 1 6 X SQ= 4.25 P = 0.030 RV NO (YES)
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.69	0 27 25 61 X SQ= 8.46 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.69	0 28 25 61 X SQ= 8.80 P = 0. RV NO (NO)

M

MATRIX

57 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
CATHOLIC (25)

57 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN
CATHOLIC (90)

36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CHILE	CUBA	AUSTRALIA	BULGARIA	CANADA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA
FRANCE	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	POLAND	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE
SPAIN	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA			HUNGARY	ICELAND	ISRAEL	JAMAICA	JAPAN
					LEBANON	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY
					RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD
					USSR	UK	US	YUGOSLAVIA	

13 . 29

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36 POLITIES
WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)

BRAZIL	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA
HONDURAS	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON
PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL				CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY
					ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA
					GUINEA	HAITI	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN
					IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP
					LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI
					MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER
					NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
					SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA
					TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY
					UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
					YEMEN				

M

MATRIX

57 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
CATHOLIC (25)

57 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN
CATHOLIC (90)

107 POLITIES
WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS
ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CHILE	AUSTRALIA	BOLIVIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CYPRUS
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	DOMIN REP	FRANCE	HONDURAS	DENMARK	ECUADOR	FINLAND	GERMAN FR	GREECE
IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	ICELAND	INDIA	ISRAEL	JAMAICA	JAPAN
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA				LEBANON	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
					NORWAY	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD
					TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	

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107 POLITIES
WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS
ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS,
ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS,
OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)

CUBA	EL SALVADOR	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	BURMA
POLAND	PORTUGAL	SPAIN			BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
					CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY
					ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUATEMALA
					GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN
					IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP
					LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA
					MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN
					RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA
					SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND
					TUNISIA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
					VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

58 POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)	58 POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

18 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	LIBYA	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	PAKISTAN
SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SYRIA	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR	YEMEN		

97 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI
CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA
JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	SPAIN
SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	UGANDA	USSR	UK
US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	2	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.77	0 22 18 75 X SQ= 3.69 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)	
6	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	1.00	6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.77	0 22 18 75 X SQ= 3.69 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)	
13	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (16)	0.72	13	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.97	13 3 5 94 X SQ= 54.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
14	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.56	14	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.97	8 3 10 94 X SQ= 25.42 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.50	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.89	8 3 8 25 X SQ= 6.42 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)	
16	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (11)	0.80	16	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	0.84	8 3 2 16 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
22	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.83	22	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.55	15 53 3 44 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)	
25	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	1.00	25	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.82	0 17 18 80 X SQ= 2.44 P = 0.070 RV NO (NO)	
26	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.89	26	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.53	2 46 16 51 X SQ= 6.81 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
28	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.83	28	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.51	15 47 3 45 X SQ= 5.12 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.82	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.56	14 42 3 54 X SQ= 7.13 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
31	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	1.00	31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.75	17 73 0 24 X SQ= 3.94 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	
36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	1.00	36	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.57	0 42 18 55 X SQ= 10.48 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

37	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.61	37	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.59	7 57 11 40 X SQ= 1.69 P = 0.131 RV YES (NO)	
42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	1.00	42	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.62	0 36 17 59 X SQ= 7.84 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.76	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.54	4 51 13 44 X SQ= 4.11 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.74	0 25 18 72 X SQ= 4.51 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.94	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.59	1 54 17 37 X SQ= 15.31 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.88	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.50	2 41 15 41 X SQ= 6.89 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
51	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.60	51	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.66	6 54 9 28 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.082 RV YES (NO)	
54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.61	0 37 18 58 X SQ= 8.73 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
55	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.50	55	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.73	9 69 9 26 X SQ= 2.64 P = 0.092 RV YES (NO)	

72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.83	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.53	3 49 15 44 X SQ= 6.48 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
73	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.61	73	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.62	7 58 11 35 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.073 RV YES (NO)	
74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.73	0 26 18 69 X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.83	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.61	3 59 15 37 X SQ= 10.52 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.68	0 26 14 56 X SQ= 4.59 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	
77	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.86	77	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.53	2 26 12 29 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.68	10 39 0 18 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.052 RV NO (NO)	
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.56	0 51 15 40 X SQ= 14.03 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.80	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.52	12 19 3 21 X SQ= 3.46 P = 0.037 RV YES (NO)	

89	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.94	89	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.59	1 32 15 47 X SQ= 5.46 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
91	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.70	91	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.92	7 24 3 2 X SQ= 1.43 P = 0.119 RV NO (YES)	
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.83	17 78 0 16 X SQ= 2.14 P = 0.073 RV NO (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.62	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.81	5 62 8 15 X SQ= 8.25 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.52	8 15 0 16 X SQ= 5.03 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.67	102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.58	5 54 10 39 X SQ= 2.27 P = 0.096 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.90	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.52	1 42 9 38 X SQ= 4.84 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.94	107	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.52	1 45 16 49 X SQ= 8.80 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
114	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.78	114	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.52	14 47 4 43 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.067 RV NO (NO)	

115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.78	0 / 18	20 / 73
						X SQ= 3.38	
						P = 0.039	
						RV NO (NO)	
116	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.94	116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.67	1 / 17	31 / 62
						X SQ= 4.40	
						P = 0.021	
						RV NO (NO)	
119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.69	16 / 0	58 / 26
						X SQ= 5.18	
						P = 0.006	
						RV NO (NO)	
121	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.67	121	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.57	12 / 6	42 / 55
						X SQ= 2.46	
						P = 0.078	
						RV YES (NO)	
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.67	18 / 0	65 / 32
						X SQ= 6.67	
						P = 0.003	
						RV NO (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.81	16 / 0	67 / 16
						X SQ= 2.39	
						P = 0.067	
						RV NO (NO)	
142	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	1.00	142	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.66	0 / 9	30 / 57
						X SQ= 3.05	
						P = 0.053	
						RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.87	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.57	1 / 7	41 / 31
						X SQ= 4.06	
						P = 0.024	
						RV YES (NO)	
154	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.62	154	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.72	3 / 5	52 / 20
						X SQ= 2.59	
						P = 0.100	
						RV YES (NO)	

164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.85	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.73	M 11 23 2 63 X SQ= 14.30 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.67	169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.58	5 53 10 38 X SQ= 2.30 P = 0.095 RV YES (NO)	
172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.78	0 21 15 73 X SQ= 2.84 P = 0.040 RV NO (NO)	
174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.68	0 28 12 60 X SQ= 3.84 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	
175	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.75	175	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.55	3 48 9 40 X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.069 RV YES (NO)	
179	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.86	179	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.52	12 40 2 37 X SQ= 4.22 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.64	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.68	7 24 4 52 X SQ= 3.02 P = 0.049 RV YES (NO)	
187	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.94	187	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.60	16 50 1 34 X SQ= 6.02 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.94	188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.67	1 31 17 64 X SQ= 4.21 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	

192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.78	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.86	14	13
						4	82
						X SQ=	30.75
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.86	0	13
						18	83
						X SQ=	1.57
						P =	0.125
						RV NO	(NO)

M

MATRIX

58 POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)

58 POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)

164 POLITIES WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)

ALGERIA	INDONESIA	JORDAN	LIBYA	MAURITANIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR
MORDCCO	PAKISTAN	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	TUNISIA	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE
UAR					GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	INDIA	IVORY COAST
					JAMAICA	KOREA, N	MALI	NIGER	TANGANYIKA
					UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA		

11 . 23

2 . 63

164 POLITIES WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)

SOMALIA	TURKEY	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM
		BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CEYLON
		CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK
		DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GERMANY, E
		GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS
		HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
		JAPAN	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG
		MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS
		NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
		PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
		SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN
		SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	UK	US
		URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP		

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59 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
MIXED - CHRISTIAN, NON-LITERATE (13)

59 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN
MIXED - CHRISTIAN, NON-LITERATE (100)

SUBJECT ONLY

****

13 IN LEFT COLUMN

BOLIVIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	ECUADOR	GABON	GUATEMALA	HAITI	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	PERU
SO AFRICA	TOGO	UGANDA							

100 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N
KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA
MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN
SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR
UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI RWANDA

2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	2	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.78	0 22 13 78 X SQ= 2.29 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)
8	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	1.00	8	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.82	0 18 13 82 X SQ= 1.60 P = 0.124 RV NO (NO)
10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.62	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.77	8 23 5 77 X SQ= 6.76 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)

15	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	1.00	15	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.68	0 11 8 23 X SQ= 2.03 P = 0.086 RV NO (NO)	
17	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	1.00	17	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.61	0 11 5 17 X SQ= 1.44 P = 0.143 RV NO (NO)	
23	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	1.00	23	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.73	0 27 13 73 X SQ= 3.25 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)	
24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.69	24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.57	4 57 9 43 X SQ= 2.22 P = 0.085 RV YES (ND)	
26	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.92	26	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.55	1 45 12 55 X SQ= 5.18 P = 0.014 RV NO (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.77	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.59	3 53 10 37 X SQ= 4.52 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.77	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.55	10 44 3 54 X SQ= 3.52 P = 0.039 RV YES (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.77	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.59	3 59 10 41 X SQ= 4.63 P = 0.018 RV YES (ND)	
35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	35	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.76	0 24 13 76 X SQ= 2.66 P = 0.067 RV NO (ND)	

36	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.92	36	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.59	1 41 12 59 X SQ= 4.13 P = 0.029 RV NO (ND)	
37	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.69	37	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.60	4 60 9 40 X SQ= 2.90 P = 0.072 RV YES (ND)	
40	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.62	40	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.69	5 66 8 29 X SQ= 3.60 P = 0.057 RV YES (ND)	
41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	41	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.81	0 19 13 79 X SQ= 1.83 P = 0.120 RV NO (ND)	
42	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.92	42	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.64	1 35 12 62 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.057 RV NO (ND)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.77	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.54	3 52 10 45 X SQ= 3.14 P = 0.044 RV YES (ND)	
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.58	0 55 12 40 X SQ= 12.07 P = 0. RV YES (ND)	
51	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.89	51	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.59	8 52 1 36 X SQ= 1.94 P = 0.147 RV ND (ND)	
54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.62	0 37 13 61 X SQ= 5.76 P = 0.004 RV ND (ND)	

55	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.54	55	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.73	6 7 X SQ= P = RV YES	72 26 2.90 0.056 (NO)
67	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS (27)	0.58	67	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.77	5 7 X SQ= P = RV YES	73 22 5.01 0.016 (NO)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.85	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.61	2 11 X SQ= P = RV YES	60 39 7.77 0.003 (NO)
70	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	1.00	70	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.77	0 12 X SQ= P = RV NO	21 72 2.12 0.071 (NO)
71	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	1.00	71	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.78	0 13 X SQ= P = RV NO	21 75 2.26 0.069 (NO)
74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	74	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.74	0 12 X SQ= P = RV NO	26 73 2.78 0.065 (NO)
75	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.67	75	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.58	4 8 X SQ= P = RV YES	58 42 1.73 0.130 (NO)
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.68	0 12 X SQ= P = RV NO	26 56 3.79 0.018 (NO)
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.86	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.65	1 6 X SQ= P = RV YES	30 16 4.56 0.016 (NO)

85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED [54]	0.92	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.60	1 59 12 40 X SQ= 10.45 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
86	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.54	86	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.71	6 70 7 29 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.112 RV YES (NO)
87	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.62	87	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.70	5 24 3 55 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.111 RV YES (NO)
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.80	0 20 13 78 X SQ= 2.00 P = 0.120 RV NO (NO)
93	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.92	93	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.67	1 31 12 64 X SQ= 2.32 P = 0.103 RV NO (NO)
99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.75	99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.62	2 48 6 30 X SQ= 2.62 P = 0.064 RV YES (NO)
110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	110	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.82	0 15 13 67 X SQ= 1.62 P = 0.120 RV NO (NO)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.85	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.62	2 51 11 31 X SQ= 8.16 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
114	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.77	114	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.55	10 51 3 42 X SQ= 1.46 P = 0.149 RV NO (NO)

115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	115	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.79	0 20 13 76 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.074 RV NO (NO)
116	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.92	116	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.68	1 31 12 65 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.103 RV NO (NO)
118	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.90	118	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.57	1 39 9 51 X SQ= 2.89 P = 0.047 RV NO (NO)
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.68	13 68 0 32 X SQ= 4.33 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)
125	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.85	125	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.62	11 52 2 32 X SQ= 1.65 P = 0.131 RV NO (NO)
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.81	13 68 0 16 X SQ= 1.74 P = 0.118 RV NO (NO)
137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.65	0 29 11 55 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.017 RV NO (NO)
153	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.75	153	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.56	2 40 6 32 X SQ= 1.61 P = 0.141 RV YES (NO)
154	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.62	154	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.72	3 52 5 20 X SQ= 2.59 P = 0.100 RV YES (NO)

158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.73	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.62	8 3 X SQ= P = RV YES (NO)	32 53 3.59 0.047
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.73	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.66	8 3 X SQ= P = RV YES (NO)	30 59 4.78 0.019
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.62	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.82	8 5 X SQ= P = RV YES (NO)	18 81 9.81 0.002

60	POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS MIXED - LITERATE NON-CHRISTIAN, NON-LITERATE (7)	60	POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MIXED - LITERATE NON-CHRISTIAN, NON-LITERATE (103)

SUBJECT ONLY

7 IN LEFT COLUMN

CHAD	GUINEA	LAOS	MALI	NIGER	SUDAN	UPPER VOLTA

103 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA .	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	NORWAY
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND
TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA							

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

KOREA REP VIETNAM REP

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

CHINA, PR KOREA, N VIETNAM, N

10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.86	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.74	6 27 1 76 X SQ= 8.40 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
19	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	1.00	19	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.55	6 27 0 22 X SQ= 2.81 P = 0.071 RV NO (NO)
22	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	1.00	22	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.58	7 60 0 43 X SQ= 3.20 P = 0.041 RV NO (NO)

24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.86	24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.53	1 55 6 48 X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.058 RV YES (ND)	
26	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	1.00	26	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.58	0 43 7 60 X SQ= 3.20 P = 0.041 RV ND (NO)	
28	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.86	28	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.54	6 53 1 46 X SQ= 1.59 P = 0.129 RV ND (NO)	
29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	1.00	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.57	0 55 7 42 X SQ= 6.30 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
30	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.56	7 45 0 57 X SQ= 6.11 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
34	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	1.00	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.56	0 58 7 45 X SQ= 6.23 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
37	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	1.00	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.62	0 64 7 39 X SQ= 8.00 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
39	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	1.00	39	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.64	0 37 7 65 X SQ= 2.40 P = 0.093 RV NO (NO)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.86	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.67	1 67 6 33 X SQ= 5.74 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	

43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.54	0 54 7 46 X SQ= 5.62 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	1.00	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.80	0 80 6 20 X SQ= 15.49 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	1.00	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.73	0 75 7 28 X SQ= 12.84 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
67	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS (27)	0.57	67	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.74	3 72 4 25 X SQ= 1.83 P = 0.093 RV YES (NO)	
69	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	1.00	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.58	0 60 7 43 X SQ= 6.78 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	1.00	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.63	0 64 7 37 X SQ= 8.42 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.60	0 61 7 41 X SQ= 7.23 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	1.00	77	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.53	0 28 7 32 X SQ= 3.86 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	
80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.86	80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.53	1 18 6 16 X SQ= 2.11 P = 0.099 RV YES (NO)	

82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.54	0 51 7 44 X SQ= 5.52 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)
85	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.86	85	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.55	1 56 6 46 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.052 RV YES (NO)
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.86	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.71	1 72 6 30 X SQ= 7.01 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.86	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.68	6 25 1 54 X SQ= 5.98 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	89	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.61	0 33 7 51 X SQ= 2.78 P = 0.046 RV NO (NO)
96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	1.00	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.77	0 64 3 19 X SQ= 5.45 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.61	0 59 7 38 X SQ= 7.52 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	1.00	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.54	0 43 6 37 X SQ= 4.48 P = 0.026 RV YES (NO)
107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	1.00	107	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.54	0 46 6 54 X SQ= 3.18 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)

108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.83	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.71	1 64 5 26 X SQ= 5.34 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
117	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	1.00	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.60	0 60 7 40 X SQ= 7.28 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
118	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	1.00	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.65	3 32 0 60 X SQ= 2.88 P = 0.047 RV YES (NO)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	1.00	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.59	7 42 0 61 X SQ= 7.06 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
125	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	1.00	125	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.61	7 54 0 35 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.045 RV NO (NO)	
129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	1.00	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.67	0 56 5 28 X SQ= 6.36 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.83	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.74	5 24 1 70 X SQ= 6.56 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	1.00	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.55	0 48 6 39 X SQ= 4.81 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.71	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.72	5 26 2 68 X SQ= 3.99 P = 0.027 RV YES (NO)	

148	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (14)	0.57	148	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.90	4 10 3 88 X SQ= 8.73 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.83	158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.60	5 34 1 52 X SQ= 2.79 P = 0.080 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.83	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.70	5 26 1 62 X SQ= 5.12 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	168	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.64	0 34 7 61 X SQ= 2.32 P = 0.092 RV NO (NO)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.86	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.60	1 57 6 38 X SQ= 3.85 P = 0.041 RV YES (NO)	
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	1.00	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.57	0 51 6 39 X SQ= 5.16 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
178	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.83	178	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.53	5 44 1 50 X SQ= 1.73 P = 0.108 RV YES (NO)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.83	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.71	1 50 5 20 X SQ= 5.23 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.83	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.78	5 22 1 80 X SQ= 8.47 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	

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193  TENO TO BE THOSE                          0.86
     WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
     IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS  (28)
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193  TENO TO BE THOSE                          0.79          6   21
     WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM                 1   81
     IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS  (86)          X SO=  11.62
                                                    P =     0.001
                                                    RV YES (NO )
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61 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
MIXED - CHRISTIAN,
LITERATE NON-CHRISTIAN,
NON-LITERATE (8)

61 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN
MIXED - CHRISTIAN,
LITERATE NON-CHRISTIAN,
NON-LITERATE (104)

SUBJECT ONLY

****

8 IN LEFT COLUMN

CAMEROUN	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GHANA	IVORY COAST	NIGERIA	SIERRE LEO	TANGANYIKA

104 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS
HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA
JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER
NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA
SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND
TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA						

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

KOREA REP VIETNAM REP

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

VIETNAM, N

10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	1.00	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.76	8 25 0 79 X SQ= 17.13 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
26	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.87	26	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.58	1 44 7 60 X SQ= 1.65 P = 0.141 RV NO (NO)
29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	1.00	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.57	0 55 8 41 X SQ= 7.56 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)

30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.87	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.54	7 47 1 56 X SQ= 3.67 P = 0.029 RV YES (NO)
33	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	1.00	33	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.71	0 30 8 74 X SQ= 1.85 P = 0.106 RV NO (NO)
34	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.75	34	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.55	2 57 6 47 X SQ= 1.59 P = 0.146 RV YES (NO)
37	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	1.00	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.62	0 64 8 40 X SQ= 9.11 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
39	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	1.00	39	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.63	0 38 8 65 X SQ= 3.00 P = 0.049 RV NO (NO)
40	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.62	40	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.66	3 66 5 34 X SQ= 1.52 P = 0.134 RV YES (NO)
43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.54	0 55 8 46 X SQ= 6.75 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.54	0 53 8 46 X SQ= 6.48 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.75	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.80	2 80 6 20 X SQ= 9.43 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)

54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	54	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.64	0 8 X SQ= P = RV NO	37 66 2.85 0.050 (NO)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.87	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.73	1 7 X SQ= P = RV YES	75 28 9.87 0.001 (NO)
69	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	1.00	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.59	0 8 X SQ= P = RV YES	61 42 8.26 0.001 (NO)
72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.87	72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.50	1 7 X SQ= P = RV YES	51 50 2.90 0.063 (NO)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.87	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.63	1 7 X SQ= P = RV YES	64 37 5.99 0.007 (NO)
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.60	0 8 X SQ= P = RV YES	62 41 8.60 0.001 (NO)
77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	1.00	77	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.53	0 7 X SQ= P = RV NO	28 32 3.86 0.019 (NO)
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.53	0 7 X SQ= P = RV YES	51 45 5.39 0.013 (NO)
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.62	0 7 X SQ= P = RV YES	28 17 7.10 0.003 (NO)

85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	1.00	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.57	0 59 8 44 X SQ= 7.62 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.87	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.72	1 74 7 29 X SQ= 9.38 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.86	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.69	6 25 1 56 X SQ= 6.26 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	89	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.62	0 33 7 53 X SQ= 2.66 P = 0.048 RV NO (NO)	
107	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.87	107	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.55	1 45 7 55 X SQ= 2.01 P = 0.134 RV NO (NO)	
117	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	1.00	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.59	0 60 8 41 X SQ= 8.31 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	1.00	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.59	8 43 0 61 X SQ= 8.08 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.62	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.74	5 24 3 70 X SQ= 3.30 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)	
137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	137	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.67	0 29 8 58 X SQ= 2.43 P = 0.057 RV NO (NO)	

163	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED (13)	0.57	163	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.91	4 3	8 82
						X SQ=	9.85
						P =	0.004
						RV YES	(NO)
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.86	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.70	6 1	27 62
						X SQ=	6.54
						P =	0.006
						RV YES	(NO)
168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	168	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.65	0 8	34 62
						X SQ=	2.75
						P =	0.051
						RV NO	(NO)
174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	174	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.69	0 8	28 62
						X SQ=	2.13
						P =	0.101
						RV NO	(NO)
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.86	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.73	1 6	52 19
						X SQ=	7.64
						P =	0.004
						RV YES	(NO)
188	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	1.00	188	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.69	0 7	32 71
						X SQ=	1.75
						P =	0.104
						RV NO	(NO)
192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.86	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.80	6 1	21 82
						X SQ=	11.78
						P =	0.001
						RV YES	(NO)
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	1.00	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.82	8 0	19 84
						X SQ=	22.57
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(NO)

62	POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS PROTESTANT, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (5)				62	POLITIES WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)			

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

5 IN LEFT COLUMN

DENMARK	FINLAND	ICELAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN

25 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR
FRANCE	HONDURAS	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES
POLAND	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA					

85 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY
ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI
HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN
KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA
MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	RUMANIA
RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA
THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US
UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA					

2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22)	1.00	2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.68	5 8 0 17 X SQ= 5.32 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)
6	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	1.00	6	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (22)	0.60	0 15 5 10 X SQ= 3.84 P = 0.042 RV YES (NO)
31	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.80	31	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.68	1 17 4 8 X SQ= 2.25 P = 0.128 RV YES (NO)

35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	1.00	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.72	5 7 0 18 X SQ= 6.25 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.80	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.83	4 4 1 20 X SQ= 5.44 P = 0.013 RV YES (YES)	
42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	1.00	42	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.50	5 12 0 12 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.059 RV YES (NO)	
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	1.00	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.76	5 6 0 19 X SQ= 7.35 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	1.00	50	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.59	5 13 0 9 X SQ= 1.50 P = 0.136 RV NO (NO)	
53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (14)	1.00	53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.96	5 1 0 24 X SQ= 18.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
67	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	1.00	67	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.57	5 13 0 10 X SQ= 1.75 P = 0.128 RV NO (NO)	
71	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.60	71	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.80	3 5 2 20 X SQ= 1.67 P = 0.102 RV YES (NO)	
74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	1.00	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.64	5 9 0 16 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	

76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	1.00	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.64	5 9 0 16 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)
98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	1.00	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.80	5 5 0 20 X SQ= 8.67 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	1.00	101	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.54	5 13 0 11 X SQ= 2.00 P = 0.126 RV NO (NO)
110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH (15)	0.80	110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.76	4 5 1 16 X SQ= 3.42 P = 0.034 RV YES (NO)
115	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.80	115	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.70	4 7 1 16 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.062 RV YES (NO)
116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	1.00	116	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.57	5 13 0 10 X SQ= 1.75 P = 0.128 RV NO (NO)
120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARITUCLATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED (10)	1.00	120	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.96	0 24 5 1 X SQ= 18.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
123	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (8)	0.80	123	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.92	1 23 4 2 X SQ= 9.37 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	1.00	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.80	0 16 5 4 X SQ= 7.91 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)

127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	1.00	127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.83	5 4 0 19 X SQ= 9.34 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	1.00	134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.50	5 12 0 12 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.059 RV YES (NO)	
136	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT (12)	0.80	136	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.82	4 4 1 18 X SQ= 4.80 P = 0.017 RV YES (YES)	
137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	1.00	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.64	5 8 0 14 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
142	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	1.00	142	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.52	5 12 0 11 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.125 RV NO (NO)	
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	1.00	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.68	5 7 0 15 X SQ= 5.16 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	1.00	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.57	5 9 0 12 X SQ= 3.26 P = 0.042 RV YES (NO)	
158	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	1.00	158	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.54	0 11 5 13 X SQ= 2.00 P = 0.126 RV NO (NO)	
161	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	1.00	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.54	0 13 5 11 X SQ= 2.96 P = 0.048 RV YES (NO)	

168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	1.00	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.54	5 11 0 13 X SQ= 2.96 P = 0.048 RV YES (NO)	
170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	1.00	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.58	0 14 5 10 X SQ= 3.54 P = 0.042 RV YES (NO)	
172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.60	172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.92	3 2 2 22 X SQ= 4.54 P = 0.024 RV YES (YES)	
174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	1.00	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.70	5 7 0 16 X SQ= 5.52 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	1.00	179	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.55	0 10 5 12 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.124 RV NO (NO)	
181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	1.00	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.76	5 6 0 19 X SQ= 7.35 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	1.00	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.55	0 11 5 9 X SQ= 2.93 P = 0.046 RV YES (NO)	

MATRIX

62 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PROTESTANT, RATHER THAN
CATHOLIC (5)

62 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN
PROTESTANT (25)

126 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR
INFREQUENT (83)

BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA COSTA RICA EL SALVADOR
HONDURAS ITALY MEXICO NICARAGUA PANAMA
PARAGUAY PHILIPPINES POLAND PORTUGAL SPAIN
URUGUAY

D 16

5 4

126 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)

DENMARK FINLAND ICELAND NORWAY SWEDEN AUSTRIA BELGIUM IRELAND LUXEMBOURG

****

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY
SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

46 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA				

68 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON
CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAPAN
JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI
MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN		

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

USSR

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.52	2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	22 0 24 68 X SQ= 37.29 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.65	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.91	16 6 30 62 X SQ= 10.26 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.98	8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.75	1 17 45 51 X SQ= 9.10 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)

9	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.98	9	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.88	1 8 45 60 X SQ= 2.28 P = 0.082 RV ND (NO)	
10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.51	0 33 46 35 X SQ= 29.10 P = 0. RV ND (YES)	
13	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	1.00	13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.76	0 16 46 52 X SQ= 10.72 P = 0. RV ND (NO)	
22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.50	22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.65	23 44 23 24 X SQ= 1.88 P = 0.126 RV YES (ND)	
24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.63	24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.54	29 31 17 37 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.086 RV YES (NO)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.57	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.68	26 22 20 46 X SQ= 5.62 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.59	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.67	19 43 27 21 X SQ= 6.28 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.93	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.74	39 16 3 46 X SQ= 42.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.91	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.79	4 52 42 14 X SQ= 50.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.78	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.63	36 25 10 43 X SQ= 17.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.74	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.90	34 7 12 61 X SQ= 45.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.98	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.74	45 18 1 50 X SQ= 53.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.64	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.88	29 8 16 60 X SQ= 31.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.84	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.50	38 32 7 32 X SQ= 12.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.60	41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	18 0 27 67 X SQ= 29.04 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.71	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.95	M 32 3 13 63 X SQ= 51.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.87	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.77	39 15 6 51 X SQ= 41.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.50	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.99	23 1 23 67 X SQ= 36.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.93	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.82	43 11 3 51 X SQ= 57.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.59	46 37 0 26 X SQ= 22.71 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.64	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.71	27 16 15 40 X SQ= 11.02 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.70	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.94	32 4 14 62 X SQ= 47.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.53	46 31 0 35 X SQ= 33.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC (25)	0.54	57	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	1.00	25 0 21 68 X SQ= 44.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.72	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.60	33 24 13 36 X SQ= 9.31 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.76	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.75	35 17 11 50 X SQ= 26.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.87	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.64	40 24 6 43 X SQ= 26.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.66	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.90	15 6 29 54 X SQ= 7.71 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.80	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.76	35 16 9 50 X SQ= 30.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.95	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.67	42 22 2 44 X SQ= 39.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.57	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	26 0 20 66 X SQ= 45.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.78	46 15 0 52 X SQ= 63.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.60	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	26 0 17 53 X SQ= 40.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.79	17 11 0 41 X SQ= 29.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.70	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.91	6 43 14 4 X SQ= 23.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.96	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.88	44 7 2 53 X SQ= 70.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.88	0 / 46	8 / 60
						X SQ= 4.16	
						P = 0.021	
						RV NO (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.83	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.69	38 / 8	21 / 46
						X SQ= 26.71	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.98	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.55	45 / 1	30 / 37
						X SQ= 32.05	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.95	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.59	2 / 37	29 / 20
						X SQ= 25.49	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.71	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.89	27 / 11	6 / 50
						X SQ= 33.58	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
93	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.80	93	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.66	9 / 36	22 / 42
						X SQ= 2.02	
						P = 0.132	
						RV NO (NO)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.71	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.59	32 / 13	19 / 27
						X SQ= 7.04	
						P = 0.006	
						RV YES (YES)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.78	95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.92	36 / 10	59 / 5
						X SQ= 3.30	
						P = 0.049	
						RV NO (YES)	
96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.93	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.55	42 / 3	24 / 20
						X SQ= 15.50	
						P = 0.	
						RV NO (YES)	

97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.77	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.80	M	3 20 10 5 X SQ= 9.34 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.73	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.57		30 19 11 25 X SQ= 6.64 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.62	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.75		28 13 17 39 X SQ= 12.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.72	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.57		33 26 13 35 X SQ= 7.85 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.72	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.74		31 12 12 34 X SQ= 17.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.77	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.50		33 19 10 19 X SQ= 5.17 P = 0.020 RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.70	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.78		32 14 14 50 X SQ= 23.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.75	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.56		27 26 9 33 X SQ= 7.46 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.60	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.66		17 43 25 22 X SQ= 5.83 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)

116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.63	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.93	27 5 16 62 X SQ= 36.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.86	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.67	37 22 6 45 X SQ= 27.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.52	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.96	M 22 51 24 2 X SQ= 27.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.98	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.78	1 53 45 15 X SQ= 60.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.70	122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	14 68 32 0 X SQ= 62.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.70	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.85	M 11 52 26 9 X SQ= 28.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.61	128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.56	27 21 17 27 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.100 RV YES (YES)
130	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.79	130	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.92	9 3 33 37 X SQ= 2.16 P = 0.117 RV NO (YES)
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.89	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.59	5 24 40 35 X SQ= 9.68 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)

137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.53	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.89	23 6 20 47 X SQ= 18.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.77	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.72	33 15 10 38 X SQ= 20.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.78	139	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.61	10 23 35 36 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.090 RV NO (NO)	
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.77	141	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.98	10 1 34 52 X SQ= 8.42 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.57	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.78	19 11 25 40 X SQ= 4.16 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)	
145	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.66	145	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.92	19 11 10 1 X SQ= 1.77 P = 0.128 RV NO (NO)	
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.86	0 8 43 48 X SQ= 4.90 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.55	147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.91	19 4 23 43 X SQ= 13.75 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.78	0 14 46 49 X SQ= 9.83 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.68	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.66	28 13 13 25 X SQ= 7.86 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.73	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.56	12 28 33 22 X SQ= 7.20 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	M
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.91	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.57	4 30 42 23 X SQ= 22.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.58	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.87	26 8 19 52 X SQ= 21.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.76	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.60	34 24 11 36 X SQ= 11.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
172	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.73	172	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.86	12 9 33 54 X SQ= 1.84 P = 0.140 RV NO (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.73	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.65	32 19 12 36 X SQ= 12.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.64	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.64	16 37 29 21 X SQ= 7.00 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.61	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.71	16 35 25 14 X SQ= 8.27 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	

181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.59	181	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.93	19 2 27 27 X SQ= 8.81 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.52	27 27 0 25 X SQ= 16.83 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
186	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.75	186	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.58	9 21 27 29 X SQ= 1.97 P = 0.115 RV NO (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.59	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.81	17 48 24 11 X SQ= 15.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.54	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.89	25 7 21 59 X SQ= 23.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.87	189	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.99	6 1 40 67 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.017 RV NO (YES)	
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.59	0 27 46 39 X SQ= 22.61 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.58	0 28 46 39 X SQ= 23.36 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

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M

MATRIX

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY
SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)

42 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CYPRUS	JAPAN	SO AFRICA
BULGARIA	CANADA	COLOMBIA	CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK			
FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE			
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG			
MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND			
RUMANIA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK	US			
URUGUAY	YUGOSLAVIA						

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42 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR
VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)

CHILE	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA
HONDURAS	JAMAICA	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON
PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	SPAIN			CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY
					ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA
					GUINEA	HAITI	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN
					IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP
					LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R
					MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
					NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU
					RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN
					SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD
					TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA
					VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN		

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M

MATRIX

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY
SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)

97 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN
TOTALITARIAN (23)

EL SALVADOR	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY			AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP
					ETHIOPIA	GHANA	GUINEA	INDONESIA	IRAN
					JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA	NEPAL
					PAKISTAN	SA'U ARABIA	SUDAN	THAILAND	UAR

3 20

10 5

97 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN
AUTHORITARIAN (16)

BULGARIA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	ALBANIA	CHINA, PR	KOREA, N	MONGOLIA	VIETNAM, N
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	YUGOSLAVIA					

M

MATRIX

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY
SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)

119 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	COLOMBIA	CUBA	.AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA
CZECHOS*KIA	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	GERMANY, E	HONDURAS	.CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHINA, PR	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS
HUNGARY	ITALY	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	.ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	.HAITI	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ
VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA				.ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N
					.KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA
					.MALAYA	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL
					.NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL
					.SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND
					.TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	VIETNAM, N
					.VIETNAM REP				

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119 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CHILE	.MALAGASY R	TRINIDAD
COSTA RICA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	.	
GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	JAMAICA	LUXEMBOURG	.	
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	SWEDEN	.	
SWITZERLAND	UK	US	URUGUAY		.	

M

MATRIX

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY
SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)

125 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)

BRAZIL	COLOMBIA	EL SALVADOR	GERMANY, E	HONDURAS	AFGHANISTAN	BOLIVIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
MEXICO	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	POLAND	SPAIN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)
YUGOSLAVIA					CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON
					GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	INDIA
					INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JAPAN
					JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	MALAYA
					MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER
					NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	RWANDA	SA*U ARABIA
					SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN
					SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	TURKEY	UGANDA
					UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP			

11 . 52

26 . 9

125 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CHILE	BURUNDI	ISRAEL	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R
COSTA RICA	CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMAN FR	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UAR	
GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA					
LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY					
PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK					
URUGUAY									

M

MATRIX

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY
SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN [46]

63 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN [68]

158 POLITIES
WHERE PERSONALISMO IS
PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE [40]

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	BOLIVIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON
EL SALVADOR	FRANCE	GREECE	HONDURAS	NICARAGUA	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR
PANAMA	URUGUAY				GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST
					JAPAN	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	MALI
					MAURITANIA	NIGER	PERU	SYRIA	THAILAND
					UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP		

12 28

33 22

158 POLITIES
WHERE PERSONALISMO IS
NEGLIGIBLE [56]

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	CHINA, PR	GUINEA	INDIA
CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	ISRAEL	KOREA, N	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MONGOLIA
GERMAN FR	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	MOROCCO	NIGERIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
JAMAICA	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	SO AFRICA	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
NORWAY	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	UGANDA	VIETNAM, N			
RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK					
US	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA							

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64 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN
MUSLIM (46)

64 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
MUSLIM, RATHER THAN
CHRISTIAN (1B)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

46 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELANO	IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA				

1B IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	LIBYA	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	PAKISTAN
SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SYRIA	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR	YEMEN		

51 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

ALBANIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
HAITI	INDIA	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA
MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PERU	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO
SO AFRICA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	UGANDA	USSR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP									

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.52	2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	22 0 24 18 X SQ= 11.08 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.65	6	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	1.00	16 0 30 18 X SQ= 6.60 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)
10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.56	0 8 46 10 X SQ= 19.48 P = 0. RV NO (YES)

13	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	1.00	13	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (16)	0.72	0 13 46 5 X SQ= 37.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
14	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	1.00	14	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.56	0 8 46 10 X SQ= 19.48 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.94	20	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	1.00	1 2 16 0 X SQ= 5.89 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)	
21	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.83	21	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (32)	0.50	8 9 38 9 X SQ= 5.48 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.50	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.83	23 15 23 3 X SQ= 4.66 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)	
25	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.78	25	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	1.00	10 0 36 18 X SQ= 3.14 P = 0.050 RV NO (NO)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.57	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.89	26 2 20 16 X SQ= 9.07 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.59	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.83	19 15 27 3 X SQ= 7.57 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.93	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.50	39 9 3 9 X SQ= 11.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.91	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.82	4 14 42 3 X SQ= 29.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.78	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.50	36 9 10 9 X SQ= 3.69 P = 0.036 RV YES (NO)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.74	36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	1.00	34 0 12 18 X SQ= 25.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.98	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.61	45 7 1 11 X SQ= 25.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
38	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.84	38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	7 0 38 18 X SQ= 1.77 P = 0.099 RV NO (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.64	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.78	29 4 16 14 X SQ= 7.57 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.71	42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	1.00	32 0 13 17 X SQ= 22.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.87	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.76	39 4 6 13 X SQ= 20.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.50	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	23 0 23 18 X SQ= 11.96 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.93	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.94	43 1 3 17 X SQ= 42.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.69	46 11 0 5 X SQ= 11.71 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.64	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.88	27 2 15 15 X SQ= 11.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
51	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.71	51	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.60	30 6 12 9 X SQ= 3.44 P = 0.059 RV YES (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.70	54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	32 0 14 18 X SQ= 22.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.50	46 9 0 9 X SQ= 22.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.76	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.61	35 7 11 11 X SQ= 6.37 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.87	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.50	40 9 6 9 X SQ= 7.90 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.80	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.83	35 3 9 15 X SQ= 18.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 [65]	0.95	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.61	42 7 2 11 X SQ= 21.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN [26]	0.57	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	26 0 20 18 X SQ= 14.87 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.83	46 3 0 15 X SQ= 45.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.60	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	26 0 17 14 X SQ= 13.22 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.86	17 2 0 12 X SQ= 20.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE [18]	0.70	79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	6 10 14 0 X SQ= 10.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.96	82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	44 0 2 15 X SQ= 46.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.83	0 3 46 15 X SQ= 4.75 P = 0.020 RV NO (YES)	
85	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.83	85	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.53	38 9 8 8 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	

86	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.98	86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.65	45 11 1 6 X SQ= 10.64 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.95	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.54	2 7 37 6 X SQ= 12.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.71	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.94	27 1 11 15 X SQ= 16.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.71	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.62	32 5 13 8 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.049 RV YES (NO)	
95	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.78	95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	36 17 10 0 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.050 RV NO (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.93	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.62	42 5 3 8 X SQ= 16.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.77	97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	3 8 10 0 X SQ= 8.87 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.73	99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.57	30 6 11 8 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.054 RV YES (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.62	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.77	28 3 17 10 X SQ= 4.74 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	

102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.72	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.67	33 5 13 10 X SQ= 5.56 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.72	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.90	31 1 12 9 X SQ= 10.61 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.70	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.94	32 1 14 16 X SQ= 17.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.67	110	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.94	12 1 24 16 X SQ= 3.33 P = 0.041 RV NO (NO)	
113	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.81	113	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME (27)	0.50	8 9 34 9 X SQ= 4.52 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)	
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.60	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.78	17 14 25 4 X SQ= 5.61 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.56	115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	19 0 24 18 X SQ= 9.58 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.63	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.94	27 1 16 17 X SQ= 14.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.86	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.56	37 8 6 10 X SQ= 9.30 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	

118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.72	118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.56	13 9 33 7 X SQ= 2.93 P = 0.068 RV YES (NO)
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.52	119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	22 16 24 0 X SQ= 11.51 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.98	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.67	1 12 45 6 X SQ= 29.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.70	122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	14 18 32 0 X SQ= 22.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.70	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.81	11 13 26 3 X SQ= 9.98 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.57	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	21 16 16 0 X SQ= 7.97 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.89	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.57	5 6 40 8 X SQ= 5.16 P = 0.015 RV NO (YES)
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.53	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.89	23 1 20 8 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.77	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.75	33 2 10 6 X SQ= 6.16 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)

141	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.77	141	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	1.00	10 0 34 11 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.104 RV NO (NO)
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.57	142	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	1.00	19 0 25 9 X SQ= 4.33 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)
144	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.50	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	10 5 10 0 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.061 RV YES (NO)
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.64	0 4 43 7 X SQ= 12.00 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
147	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.55	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	19 0 23 6 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.068 RV NO (NO)
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.68	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.87	28 1 13 7 X SQ= 6.47 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.80	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.62	33 3 8 5 X SQ= 4.33 P = 0.023 RV YES (NO)
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.91	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.85	4 11 42 2 X SQ= 26.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.58	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.93	26 1 19 14 X SQ= 9.90 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)

169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.76	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.67	34 11 X SQ= 7.06 P = 0.005 RV YES	5 10 (NO)
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.73	172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	12 33 X SQ= 3.47 P = 0.027 RV NO	0 15 (NO)
174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.52	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	21 23 X SQ= 7.24 P = 0.002 RV NO	0 12 (NO)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.73	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.75	32 12 X SQ= 7.24 P = 0.005 RV YES	3 9 (NO)
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.61	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.86	16 25 X SQ= 7.33 P = 0.004 RV YES	12 2 (NO)
181	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.59	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	19 27 X SQ= 2.33 P = 0.075 RV NO	0 6 (NO)
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.60	27 0 X SQ= 8.32 P = 0.003 RV NO	6 4 (YES)
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.75	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.64	9 27 X SQ= 4.01 P = 0.029 RV YES	7 4 (NO)
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.59	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.94	17 24 X SQ= 11.52 P = 0. RV YES	16 1 (NO)

188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.54	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.94	25 21	1 17
						X SQ=	10.83
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(NO)
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.78	0 46	14 4
						X SQ=	41.36
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	93	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.89	0 46	2 16
						X SQ=	2.24
						P =	0.076
						RV NO	(YES)
194	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.84	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	7 38	0 18
						X SQ=	1.77
						P =	0.099
						RV NO	(NO)

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65 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN
MUSLIM (25)

65 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
MUSLIM, RATHER THAN
CATHOLIC (18)

PREDICATE ONLY

****

25 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR
FRANCE	HONDURAS	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES
POLAND	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA					

18 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	LIBYA	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	PAKISTAN
SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SYRIA	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR	YEMEN		

72 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP
CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	ECUADOR
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI
HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS
LEBANON	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER
NIGERIA	NORWAY	PERU	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	UGANDA	USSR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

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 66  POLITIES                                                          66  POLITIES
     THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS  (57)                                THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS  (49)


                                                                                                          BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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      57 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN ALGERIA     ARGENTINA   AUSTRIA     BELGIUM     BRAZIL      BULGARIA    BURMA       CAMBODIA    CHILE
COLOMBIA    COSTA RICA  CUBA        DENMARK     DOMIN REP   EL SALVADOR FINLAND     FRANCE      GREECE      HONDURAS
ICELAND     INDIA       INDONESIA   IRAN        IRAQ        IRELAND     ISRAEL      ITALY       JORDAN      LIBYA
LUXEMBOURG  MAURITANIA  MEXICO      MONGOLIA    MOROCCO     NICARAGUA   NORWAY      PAKISTAN    PANAMA      PARAGUAY
PHILIPPINES POLAND      PORTUGAL    RUMANIA     SA'U ARABIA SENEGAL     SOMALIA     SPAIN       SWEDEN      SYRIA
THAILAND    TUNISIA     TURKEY      UAR         URUGUAY     VENEZUELA   YEMEN

      49 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA     AUSTRALIA   BOLIVIA     CAMEROUN    CANADA      CEYLON      CHAD        CONGO(BRA)  CONGO(LEO)  CYPRUS
CZECHOS'KIA DAHOMEY     ECUADOR     ETHIOPIA    GABON       GERMANY, E  GERMAN FR   GHANA       GUATEMALA   GUINEA
HAITI       HUNGARY     IVORY COAST JAMAICA     JAPAN       LAOS        LEBANON     LIBERIA     MALAGASY R  MALAYA
MALI        NEPAL       NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NIGER       NIGERIA     PERU        SIERRE LEO  SO AFRICA   SUDAN
SWITZERLAND TANGANYIKA  TOGO        TRINIDAD    UGANDA      UK          US          UPPER VOLTA YUGOSLAVIA

       3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CEN AFR REP KOREA REP   VIETNAM REP

       6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI     CHINA, PR   KOREA, N    RWANDA      USSR        VIETNAM, N

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  5  LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE                0.82          5  LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE                0.56        14    4
     LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE,                   LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN                3    5
     RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE  (18)                         IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE  (9)            X SQ=   2.39
                                                                                                           P =    0.078
                                                                                                           RV YES (YES)

 10  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                  0.86         10  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                  0.55         8   22
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,                  LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN )N NORTH AFRICA,           49   27
     OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (82)                        OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (82)             X SQ=  10.89
                                                                                                           P =    0.001
                                                                                                           RV NO  (YES)

 13  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                  0.75         13  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                  0.96        14    2
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR                LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR         43   47
     THE MIDDLE EAST  (99)                                    THE MIDDLE EAST  (99)                         X SQ=   7.10
                                                                                                           P =    0.005
                                                                                                           RV NO  (YES)
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14	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.84	14	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.96	9 2 48 47 X SQ= 2.73 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.53	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.92	9 2 8 22 X SQ= 7.94 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.50	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.81	8 22 8 5 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.043 RV YES (YES)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.65	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.76	8 22 15 7 X SQ= 7.27 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
23	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.70	23	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.86	17 7 40 42 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.066 RV NO (YES)
25	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.91	25	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.78	5 11 52 38 X SQ= 2.85 P = 0.060 RV NO (YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.70	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.64	37 17 16 30 X SQ= 10.04 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
30	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.61	30	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.55	22 27 34 22 X SQ= 2.03 P = 0.120 RV YES (YES)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.65	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.59	37 20 20 29 X SQ= 5.22 P = 0.019 RV YES (YES)

37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.70	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.53	40 23 17 26 X SQ= 4.98 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.75	40	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.53	42 25 14 22 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	
43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.60	43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.58	33 20 22 28 X SQ= 2.75 P = 0.077 RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.61	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.62	34 18 22 29 X SQ= 4.28 P = 0.030 RV YES (YES)	
47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.65	47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.67	12 12 22 6 X SQ= 3.48 P = 0.043 RV YES (YES)	
48	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (30)	0.61	48	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (24)	0.62	22 6 14 10 X SQ= 1.63 P = 0.141 RV YES (NO)	
49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)	0.74	49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)	0.64	14 10 5 18 X SQ= 5.10 P = 0.017 RV YES (YES)	
55	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.82	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.55	47 27 10 22 X SQ= 8.10 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.57	57 21 0 28 X SQ= 41.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.56	57	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	1.00	25 32 X SQ= 25.74 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	0 49
58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.68	58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	18 39 X SQ= 16.47 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	0 49
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.58	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.73	33 24 X SQ= 9.31 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	13 36
64	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.65	64	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	1.00	33 18 X SQ= 4.76 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	13 0
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.60	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.71	34 23 X SQ= 9.05 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	14 35
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.75	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.69	43 14 X SQ= 19.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	15 34
72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.56	72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.62	32 25 X SQ= 2.61 P = 0.079 RV YES (YES)	18 29
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.72	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.53	41 16 X SQ= 5.80 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	22 25
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.67	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.54	38 19 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.047 RV YES (YES)	22 26

77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.58	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.71	19 9 14 22 X SQ= 4.20 P = 0.026 RV YES (YES)
79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.52	79	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.89	15 31 14 4 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)
81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.91	81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.58	3 8 29 11 X SQ= 5.74 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)
82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.60	82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.59	32 19 21 27 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.071 RV YES (YES)
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.86	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.67	M 18 9 3 18 X SQ= 11.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.68	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.63	38 18 18 31 X SQ= 8.96 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.86	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.51	48 24 8 25 X SQ= 14.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
87	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.77	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.54	10 18 33 21 X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.037 RV NO (YES)
91	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.71	91	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.95	10 18 4 1 X SQ= 1.83 P = 0.138 RV NO (YES)

111	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.67	111	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.53	33 20 16 23 X SQ= 3.26 P = 0.058 RV YES (YES)	
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.51	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.72	26 33 27 13 X SQ= 4.36 P = 0.025 RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.69	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.56	38 21 17 27 X SQ= 5.73 P = 0.016 RV YES (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.68	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.57	18 28 39 21 X SQ= 6.01 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)	
125	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.55	125	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.71	26 32 21 13 X SQ= 1.83 P = 0.135 RV NO (YES)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.64	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.63	13 17 23 10 X SQ= 3.45 P = 0.044 RV YES (YES)	
138	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.65	138	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.57	28 20 15 26 X SQ= 3.36 P = 0.056 RV YES (YES)	
148	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.98	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.79	1 10 53 37 X SQ= 7.87 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
171	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.81	171	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.94	9 3 38 44 X SQ= 2.39 P = 0.120 RV NO (YES)	

172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.88	172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.71	6 14 45 35 X SQ= 3.42 P = 0.046 RV NO (YES)
182	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.86	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.54	30 20 5 17 X SQ= 7.07 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.55	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.85	5 17 6 3 X SQ= 3.64 P = 0.038 RV YES (YES)
188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.58	188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.83	24 8 33 39 X SQ= 6.48 P = 0.010 RV NO (YES)
189	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.98	189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.88	1 6 56 43 X SQ= 3.15 P = 0.047 RV NO (YES)
190	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.96	190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.57	24 8 1 6 X SQ= 6.75 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INOIGENOUS (86)	0.96	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.55	2 22 54 27 X SQ= 23.02 P = 0. RV NO (YES)

M

MATRIX

66 POLITIES
THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)

66 POLITIES
THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)

84 POLITIES
WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN
UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)

ALGERIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	INDIA	INDONESIA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	JAMAICA	LAOS	LEBANON
IRAQ	ISRAEL	JORDAN	LIBYA	MONGOLIA	LIBERIA	MALAYA	SUDAN	TRINIDAD	
MOROCCO	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	SA'U ARABIA	SYRIA					
TUNISIA	UAR	YEMEN							

18 9

3 18

84 POLITIES
WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN
DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)

MAURITANIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	CAMEROUN	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY
			GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	MALAGASY R
			MALI	NIGER	NIGERIA	SIERRE LEO	TANGANYIKA
			TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA		

67 POLITIES
THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)

67 POLITIES
THAT ARE RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS (27)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

82 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA
DAHOMEY	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA
HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST
JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MONGOLIA
MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND
TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

27 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHAD	COLOMBIA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	NIGER
PANAMA	PERU	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	TRINIDAD	US	VENEZUELA			

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CHILE	MALAGASY R	NEPAL	PARAGUAY

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

SA*U ARABIA YEMEN

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.74	2	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.97	21 1 59 28 X SQ= 5.53 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
3	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.84	3	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	1.00	13 0 67 29 X SQ= 3.92 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	
6	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.96	6	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (22)	0.59	3 17 77 12 X SQ= 39.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.80	8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.97	16 1 64 28 X SQ= 3.26 P = 0.038 RV NO (ND)
13	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.84	13	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.97	13 1 67 28 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.107 RV NO (ND)
17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	0.73	17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.94	8 1 3 17 X SQ= 11.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
18	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.59	18	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.90	23 9 16 1 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.079 RV NO (ND)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.88	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.65	23 9 3 17 X SQ= 13.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.84	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.94	16 1 3 17 X SQ= 19.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
21	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.80	21	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (32)	0.52	16 15 64 14 X SQ= 9.02 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
23	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.70	23	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.90	24 3 56 26 X SQ= 3.42 P = 0.044 RV NO (ND)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.50	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.76	40 7 40 22 X SQ= 4.80 P = 0.017 RV YES (NO)

28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.54	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.79	35 41	22 6
						X SQ=	7.47
						P =	0.004
						RV YES	(NO)
31	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.75	31	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.90	60 20	26 3
						X SQ=	1.94
						P =	0.117
						RV NO	(ND)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.62	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.66	50 30	10 19
						X SQ=	5.67
						P =	0.016
						RV YES	(NO)
35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.72	35	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.93	22 58	2 27
						X SQ=	4.13
						P =	0.021
						RV NO	(NO)
36	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.57	36	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.76	34 46	7 22
						X SQ=	2.33
						P =	0.117
						RV NO	(NO)
39	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.61	39	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.79	31 48	6 23
						X SQ=	2.47
						P =	0.108
						RV NO	(NO)
41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.77	41	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.96	18 61	1 27
						X SQ=	3.99
						P =	0.022
						RV NO	(NO)
42	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.61	42	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.82	31 48	5 23
						X SQ=	3.33
						P =	0.061
						RV NO	(NO)
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.58	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.66	43 31	10 19
						X SQ=	3.76
						P =	0.048
						RV YES	(NO)

47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.56	47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.90	24 1 19 9 X SQ= 5.12 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.62	50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.60	26 15 42 10 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.098 RV YES (NO)	
51	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.58	51	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.76	39 19 28 6 X SQ= 1.77 P = 0.148 RV NO (NO)	
53	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.84	53	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.97	13 1 67 28 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.107 RV NO (NO)	
54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.58	54	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.90	33 3 45 26 X SQ= 8.30 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
62	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.72	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 13 10 X SQ= 1.75 P = 0.128 RV NO (NO)	
65	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (18)	0.52	65	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (25)	0.83	13 10 14 2 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.076 RV YES (NO)	
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.72	70	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	1.00	21 0 54 29 X SQ= 8.51 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.61	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.66	30 19 46 10 X SQ= 4.72 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	

74	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.68	74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.96	25 1 54 27 X SQ= 7.40 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
76	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.62	76	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.96	25 1 41 26 X SQ= 9.48 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZEO, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.76	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.64	10 16 31 9 X SQ= 8.61 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
78	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZEO THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.59	78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	10 16 7 0 X SQ= 6.08 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	
79	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.92	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.50	35 13 3 13 X SQ= 12.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
82	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPEO TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.57	82	TILT TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPEO TUTELARY (51)	0.63	32 17 42 10 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.115 RV YES (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.65	85	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MIO- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.76	52 7 28 22 X SQ= 12.71 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.76	92	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.97	19 1 60 28 X SQ= 4.68 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
95	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.81	95	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.96	64 26 15 1 X SQ= 2.57 P = 0.065 RV NO (NO)	

99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.68	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.72	44 5 21 13 X SQ= 7.71 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
106	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.56	106	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.80	33 16 26 4 X SQ= 2.72 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)	
110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.77	110	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.96	14 1 48 27 X SQ= 3.74 P = 0.031 RV NO (NO)	
115	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.76	115	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.93	18 2 58 27 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.056 RV NO (NO)	
116	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.66	116	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.83	26 5 50 24 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.100 RV NO (NO)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.51	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.85	35 4 34 22 X SQ= 8.34 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
123	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.90	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	72 29 8 0 X SQ= 1.83 P = 0.106 RV NO (NO)	
125	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.59	125	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.81	40 21 28 5 X SQ= 3.07 P = 0.055 RV NO (NO)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.76	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	52 26 16 0 X SQ= 5.80 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	

129	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.53	129	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.75	35 18 31 6 X SQ= 2.66 P = 0.089 RV NO (NO)	
137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.64	137	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.87	25 3 44 21 X SQ= 3.70 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)	
139	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.60	139	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.82	29 5 44 23 X SQ= 3.41 P = 0.059 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.62	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.73	M 38 4 23 11 X SQ= 4.82 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)	
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.77	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.60	47 6 14 9 X SQ= 6.17 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.64	158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.58	25 14 44 10 X SQ= 2.72 P = 0.092 RV YES (NO)	
169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.50	169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.70	37 19 37 8 X SQ= 2.55 P = 0.076 RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.73	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.64	20 16 53 9 X SQ= 9.22 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
176	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.68	176	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.87	49 21 23 3 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.070 RV NO (NO)	

181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.65	181	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.90	19 35	2 18
						X SQ=	3.40
						P =	0.042
						RV NO	(NO)
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.72	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.69	10 26	9 4
						X SQ=	5.28
						P =	0.018
						RV YES	(NO)
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.84	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	13 67	0 28
						X SQ=	3.75
						P =	0.020
						RV ND	(NO)

M

MATRIX

67 POLITIES
THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)

67 POLITIES
THAT ARE RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS (27)

153 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
STABLE (42)

ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	MEXICO	SO AFRICA	US
CANADA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND			
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GUINEA	HUNGARY	ICELAND			
INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	JAPAN	KOREA, N			
LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND			
NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA			
SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA			
USSR	UK	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA				

39 . 3

23 . 11

153 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)

ARGENTINA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA
FRANCE	GHANA	GREECE	IRAQ	ITALY	HONDURAS	MALAYA	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PERU
IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	VENEZUELA				
PAKISTAN	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SYRIA					
THAILAND	TURKEY	VIETNAM REP							

68 POLITIES THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	68 POLITIES THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

52 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA
DENMARK	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY
ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBYA
LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PARAGUAY	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SOMALIA	SWEDEN	TUNISIA	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA	YEMEN								

62 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP
CEYLON	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND
GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST
LAOS	LIBERIA	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PERU	PHILIPPINES	RUMANIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWITZERLAND
SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CHINA, PR

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.67	2	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.92	17 5 35 57 X SQ= 9.49 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)
6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.69	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.90	16 6 36 56 X SQ= 6.78 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)
8	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.92	8	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.79	4 13 48 49 X SQ= 2.95 P = 0.065 RV NO (NO)

9	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	1.00	9	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.85	0	9
						52	53
						X SQ=	6.32
						P =	0.004
						RV NO	(NO)
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.87	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.58	7	26
						45	36
						X SQ=	9.81
						P =	0.001
						RV NO	(YES)
17	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.80	17	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	0.54	4	7
						16	6
						X SQ=	2.68
						P =	0.065
						RV YES	(YES)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.70	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.81	7	26
						16	6
						X SQ=	12.36
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.80	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.68	4	13
						16	6
						X SQ=	7.43
						P =	0.004
						RV YES	(YES)
22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.52	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.68	25	42
						27	20
						X SQ=	3.74
						P =	0.038
						RV YES	(YES)
26	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.50	26	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.66	26	21
						26	41
						X SQ=	2.41
						P =	0.090
						RV YES	(YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.77	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.67	37	19
						11	38
						X SQ=	18.32
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.73	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.67	14	41
						37	20
						X SQ=	16.02
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)

36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.52	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.76	27 15 25 47 X SQ= 8.19 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.77	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.61	40 24 12 38 X SQ= 15.26 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
39	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.57	39	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.76	22 15 29 47 X SQ= 3.74 P = 0.044 RV NO (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.50	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.82	M 25 11 25 50 X SQ= 11.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.63	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.63	31 23 18 39 X SQ= 6.49 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.71	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.67	35 20 14 40 X SQ= 14.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.51	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.82	26 11 25 50 X SQ= 12.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.92	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.55	46 33 4 27 X SQ= 16.66 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.60	57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.94	21 4 31 58 X SQ= 17.09 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.67	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.82	35 11 17 50 X SQ= 26.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.71	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.60	34 23 14 35 X SQ= 9.05 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.51	70	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	1.00	21 0 22 62 X SQ= 34.86 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.65	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.68	31 20 17 42 X SQ= 10.11 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.81	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.60	39 25 9 37 X SQ= 16.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.62	74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.90	20 6 32 54 X SQ= 11.11 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.73	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.62	38 23 14 38 X SQ= 12.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.56	76	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.88	20 6 25 45 X SQ= 11.33 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.68	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.75	M 17 11 8 33 X SQ= 10.51 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)

78	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.94	78	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.69	17 11 1 5 X SQ= 2.28 P = 0.078 RV NO (YES)
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.54	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.88	11 38 13 5 X SQ= 12.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.71	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.73	36 15 15 40 X SQ= 18.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
83	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.98	83	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.89	1 7 51 55 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)
84	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.73	84	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.50	11 20 4 20 X SQ= 1.56 P = 0.141 RV YES (NO)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.73	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.65	M 37 22 14 40 X SQ= 13.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.86	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.50	44 31 7 31 X SQ= 14.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.83	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.52	7 24 35 22 X SQ= 10.62 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.56	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.82	24 9 19 42 X SQ= 13.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

93	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.80	93	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.64	10 21 40 38 X SQ= 2.51 P = 0.090 RV NO (YES)	
94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.66	94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.55	31 20 16 24 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.059 RV YES (YES)	
96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.85	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.63	39 27 7 16 X SQ= 4.52 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)	
99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.68	99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.52	28 21 13 23 X SQ= 2.88 P = 0.079 RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.57	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.70	25 16 19 37 X SQ= 5.94 P = 0.013 RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.70	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.58	35 24 15 33 X SQ= 7.29 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.61	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.64	27 16 17 29 X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.020 RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.57	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.71	M 29 17 22 42 X SQ= 7.73 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.72	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.56	29 24 11 31 X SQ= 6.70 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	

114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.67	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.75	16 44 32 15 X SQ= 16.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.70	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.58	M 35 25 15 35 X SQ= 7.72 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.58	119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.88	28 45 20 6 X SQ= 9.93 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.81	120	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.98	39 50 9 1 X SQ= 5.94 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.77	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.66	12 41 40 21 X SQ= 19.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.54	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.94	M 24 58 28 4 X SQ= 29.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.85	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	44 62 8 0 X SQ= 8.04 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.61	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.82	M 16 47 25 10 X SQ= 17.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.61	128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.56	27 21 17 27 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.100 RV YES (YES)

129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.73	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.50	32 24 12 24 X SQ= 4.07 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)	
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.86	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.60	7 22 42 33 X SQ= 7.29 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.65	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.64	30 18 16 32 X SQ= 7.05 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.80	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.58	10 23 39 32 X SQ= 4.54 P = 0.022 RV NO (YES)	
141	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.83	141	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.94	8 3 40 46 X SQ= 1.74 P = 0.121 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.60	147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.87	17 6 25 41 X SQ= 7.50 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
148	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.94	148	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.02	3 11 46 49 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.084 RV NO (NO)	
158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.67	158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.50	14 26 29 26 X SQ= 2.27 P = 0.099 RV YES (YES)	
163	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.94	163	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.82	3 9 46 41 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.121 RV NO (YES)	

164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.82	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.51	9 24 40 25 X SQ= 8.95 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.71	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.59	35 23 14 33 X SQ= 8.55 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.64	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.60	30 21 17 31 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)	
178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.60	178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.59	19 33 28 23 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.076 RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.56	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.68	19 32 24 15 X SQ= 4.30 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)	
182	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.88	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.53	30 24 4 21 X SQ= 9.35 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
187	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.53	187	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.75	24 41 21 14 X SQ= 4.01 P = 0.035 RV NO (YES)	
188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.58	188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.83	22 10 30 50 X SQ= 7.76 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.88	189	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.98	6 1 46 61 X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.046 RV NO (YES)	

192 TENO MORE TO BE THOSE 0.88
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN
MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)

193 TENO MORE TO BE THOSE 0.94
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)

192 TENO LESS TO BE THOSE 0.65
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN
MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)

	6	21
	46	39

X SQ= 7.15
P = 0.004
RV NO (YES)

193 TENO LESS TO BE THOSE 0.59
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)

	3	25
	49	36

X SQ= 16.83
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

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MATRIX

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
HOMOGENEOUS (52)

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR
STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)

42 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BRAZIL	COLOMBIA	.BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA
DENMARK	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	.FINLAND	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SWITZERLAND	USSR
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	JAPAN	.YUGOSLAVIA				
LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY					
POLAND	SWEDEN	UK	US	URUGUAY					

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42 POLITIES
WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS
IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR
VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)

ALBANIA	BURUNDI	CHILE	COSTA RICA	CUBA	.AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA
DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	HAITI	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	.CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBYA	.CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON
MALAGASY R	MONGOLIA	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY	PORTUGAL	.GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA
RWANDA	SOMALIA	TUNISIA	UAR	YEMEN	.IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	LAOS	LIBERIA
					.MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL
					.NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PERU
					.PHILIPPINES	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SPAIN	SUDAN
					.SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD
					.TURKEY	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP

MATRIX

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
HOMOGENEOUS (52)

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR
STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)

77 POLITIES
THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED,
RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED,
THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	ECUADOR
CUBA	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	GUATEMALA	INDIA	PANAMA	PERU	PHILIPPINES
LEBANON	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY	UAR	TRINIDAD				
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

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77 POLITIES
THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED,
RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED,
THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)

BURUNDI	HAITI	JORDAN	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
RWANDA	SOMALIA	TUNISIA			CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	GABON	GHANA
					GUINEA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST
					LAOS	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO
					NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
					SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA
					UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP		

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MATRIX

68 POLITIES THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)

68 POLITIES THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)

85 POLITIES WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BRAZIL	ALGERIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	CYPRUS
CHILE	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DENMARK	FRANCE	CZECHOS'KIA	FINLAND	GUATEMALA	INDIA	IRAQ
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	ISRAEL	MOROCCO	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	RUMANIA
IRELAND	ITALY	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TURKEY
KOREA REP	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	USSR	YUGOSLAVIA			
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL					
SWEDEN	TUNISIA	UAR	UK	US					
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

37 . 22

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85 POLITIES WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)

BURUNDI	COLOMBIA	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	HAITI	AFGHANISTAN	BOLIVIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
HONDURAS	JAMAICA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	NICARAGUA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
PARAGUAY	RWANDA	SOMALIA	YEMEN		DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
					GUINEA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IVORY COAST	LAOS
					LIBERIA	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	NEPAL
					NIGER	NIGERIA	PANAMA	PERU	SENEGAL
					SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO
					TRINIDAD	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP

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MATRIX

68 POLITIES THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)

68 POLITIES THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)

107 POLITIES WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CYPRUS
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FRANCE	ECUADOR	FINLAND	INDIA	ISRAEL	MALAYA
GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	ICELAND	IRELAND	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD
ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	TURKEY	UGANDA			
MALAGASY R	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALANC	NORWAY	SWEDEN					
UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA						

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107 POLITIES WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)

ALBANIA	BURUNDI	CUBA	EL SALVADOR	GERMANY, E	AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA
HAITI	HUNGARY	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
LIBYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SOMALIA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ
TUNISIA	UAR				IVORY COAST	LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO
					NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	RUMANIA
					SENEGAL	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA
					TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	USSR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
					VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

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MATRIX

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
HOMOGENEOUS (52)

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR
STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)

117 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED (60)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	ALGERIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BURMA	CANADA
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	CEYLON	CYPRUS	ECUADOR	FINLAND	GUATEMALA
FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	ISRAEL	MALAYA
ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	MOROCCO	PANAMA	PERU	PHILIPPINES	SO AFRICA
LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	USSR
NICARAGUA	NORWAY	POLAND	SWEDEN	TUNISIA					
UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA					

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117 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)

ALBANIA	BURUNDI	CUBA	GERMANY, E	HAITI	AFGHANISTAN	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
JORDAN	KOREA, N	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MONGOLIA	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY
PARAGUAY	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SOMALIA	YEMEN	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	IRAQ
					IVORY COAST	LAOS	LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA
					NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	RUMANIA
					SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND
					TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP

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MATRIX

68 POLITIES THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)

68 POLITIES THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)

122 POLITIES WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)

ALBANIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	EL SALVADOR	HAITI	AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BURMA
HONDURAS	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON
KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MEXICO	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY
MONGOLIA	NICARAGUA	POLAND	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA
SOMALIA	TUNISIA	UAR	YEMEN		GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ
					ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	LAOS	LIBERIA	MALAYA
					MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER
					NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	PHILIPPINES	RUMANIA
					SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN
					SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO
					TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UPPER VOLTA
					VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA		

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122 POLITIES WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	BULGARIA	CZECHOS'KIA	FINLAND	PANAMA
CUBA	COSTA RICA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FRANCE				
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND				
IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND				
NORWAY	PARAGUAY	PORTUGAL	SWEDEN	UK				
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA						

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MATRIX

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
HOMOGENEOUS (52)

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR
STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)

125 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)

BRAZIL	COLOMBIA	EL SALVADOR	GERMANY, E	HAITI	AFGHANISTAN	BOLIVIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
HONDURAS	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LEBANON	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
MEXICO	PARAGUAY	POLAND	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
SOMALIA					GUATEMALA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN
					IRAQ	IVORY COAST	LAOS	MALAYA	MALI
					MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA
					PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PERU	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
					SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND
					TOGO	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UPPER VOLTA
					VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

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125 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BURUNDI	CHILE	COSTA RICA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CZECHOS'KIA	FINLAND	ISRAEL
DENMARK	GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	LIBERIA	PHILIPPINES	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD
ITALY	JAMAICA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R					
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PORTUGAL					
SWEDEN	TUNISIA	UAR	UK	URUGUAY					

M

MATRIX

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
HOMOGENEOUS (52)

68 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR
STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)

179 POLITIES
WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)

ALBANIA	CUBA	EL SALVADOR	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP
HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	JORDAN	KOREA, N	CONGO(BRA)	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY	POLAND	GHANA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN
PORTUGAL	SA'U ARABIA	TUNISIA	UAR		IVORY COAST	LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO
					NEPAL	PAKISTAN	RUMANIA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA
					SPAIN	TANGANYIKA	USSR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
					VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

19 . 32

24 . 15

179 POLITIES
WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BRAZIL	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CYPRUS
DENMARK	DOMIN REP	GERMAN FR	ICELAND	IRELAND	ECUADOR	FINLAND	ISRAEL	MALAYA	NIGERIA
ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	TRINIDAD	TURKEY
LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY					
SWEDEN	UK	US	VENEZUELA						

69 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
HOMOGENEOUS OR
WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)

69 POLITIES
THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY
STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)

PREDICATE ONLY

64 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CHILE	COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA	CUBA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE
HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N
KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA
NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SOMALIA	SPAIN
SWEDEN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN						

50 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BURMA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD
CONGO(BRAZ	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA
GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	LAOS	LIBERIA	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	PHILIPPINES	SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	USSR	UPPER VOLTA	YUGOSLAVIA

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CHINA, PR

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 70  POLITIES                                                    70  POLITIES
     THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY,                                 THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY,
     AND LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS  (21)                            OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS  (85)


                                                                                                          BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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      21 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA   AUSTRIA     COSTA RICA  DENMARK     FRANCE      GREECE      ICELAND     IRELAND     ITALY       JORDAN
LIBYA       LUXEMBOURG  MONGOLIA    NORWAY      POLAND      PORTUGAL    SOMALIA     SWEDEN      TUNISIA     UAR
URUGUAY

      85 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN ALBANIA     ALGERIA     AUSTRALIA   BELGIUM     BOLIVIA     BRAZIL      BULGARIA    BURMA       CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN    CANADA      CEN AFR REP CEYLON      CHAD        COLOMBIA    CONGO(BRA)  CONGO(LEO)  CUBA        CYPRUS
CZECHOS*KIA DAHOMEY     DOMIN REP   ECUADOR     EL SALVADOR ETHIOPIA    FINLAND     GABON       GERMANY, E  GERMAN FR
GHANA       GUATEMALA   GUINEA      HAITI       HONDURAS    HUNGARY     INDIA       INDONESIA   IRAN        IRAQ
ISRAEL      IVORY COAST JAMAICA     JAPAN       LAOS        LEBANON     LIBERIA     MALAGASY R  MALAYA      MALI
MAURITANIA  MEXICO      MOROCCO     NEPAL       NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NICARAGUA   NIGER       NIGERIA     PAKISTAN
PANAMA      PERU        PHILIPPINES RUMANIA     SENEGAL     SIERRE LEO  SO AFRICA   SPAIN       SUDAN       SWITZERLAND
SYRIA       TANGANYIKA  THAILAND    TOGO        TRINIDAD    TURKEY      UGANDA      USSR        UK          US
UPPER VOLTA VENEZUELA   VIETNAM, N  VIETNAM REP YUGOSLAVIA

       3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CHILE       KOREA REP   PARAGUAY

       6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE INSUFFICIENTLY ASCERTAINED

BURUNDI     CHINA, PR   KOREA, N    RWANDA      SA*U ARABIA YEMEN

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  2  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.52          2  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.87        11   11
     LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          10   73
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (22)                      WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                   X SQ=  13.37
                                                              NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)         P =    0.
                                                                                                          RV YES (YES)

  3  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                   0.67          3  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                  0.93         7    6
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          14   78
     WEST EUROPE  (102)                                       WEST EUROPE  (102)                          X SQ=   8.35
                                                                                                          P =    0.004
                                                                                                          RV ND  (YES)

  5  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.92          5  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.53        11    7
     LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE,                   LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN                 1    8
     RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE  (18)                         IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE  (9)          X SQ=   4.22
                                                                                                          P =    0.019
                                                                                                          RV YES (YES)
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11	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.95	11	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.71	1 24 20 60 X SQ= 4.02 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.67	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.61	7 49 14 31 X SQ= 4.18 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.89	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.53	17 37 2 42 X SQ= 9.60 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.81	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.54	4 45 17 38 X SQ= 6.97 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.62	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.67	13 28 8 56 X SQ= 4.62 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.62	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.72	13 23 8 59 X SQ= 7.01 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.75	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.54	15 38 5 45 X SQ= 4.40 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.75	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.54	15 37 5 44 X SQ= 4.41 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.71	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.75	15 21 6 62 X SQ= 13.78 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.66	21 54 0 28 X SQ= 8.20 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.71	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.65	15 29 6 54 X SQ= 7.71 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
73	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.76	73	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.54	16 44 5 38 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.083 RV NO (NO)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.57	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.83	12 14 9 68 X SQ= 12.18 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
75	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.76	75	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.52	16 43 5 40 X SQ= 3.13 P = 0.051 RV NO (NO)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.60	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.80	12 14 8 57 X SQ= 10.51 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.71	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.55	15 34 6 42 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.047 RV YES (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.90	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.56	19 37 2 47 X SQ= 12.74 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
87	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.84	87	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.59	3 26 16 38 X SQ= 2.96 P = 0.057 RV NO (NO)	

89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.67	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.71	12 20 6 50 X SQ= 7.41 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
94	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.74	94	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.53	14 35 5 31 X SQ= 1.80 P = 0.123 RV NO (NO)	
96	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.89	96	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.72	17 46 2 18 X SQ= 1.61 P = 0.139 RV NO (NO)	
99	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.80	99	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.51	16 31 4 30 X SQ= 4.14 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)	
100	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.90	100	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.68	18 41 2 19 X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.079 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.72	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.64	13 27 5 47 X SQ= 6.14 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.76	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.51	16 39 5 40 X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.047 RV YES (NO)	
105	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.65	105	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.56	13 28 7 35 X SQ= 1.81 P = 0.129 RV YES (NO)	
110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH (15)	0.50	110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.91*	8 7 8 67 X SQ= 12.79 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.74	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.67	5 14 X SQ= P = RV YES	53 26 8.92 0.002 (NO)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.60	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.77	12 8 X SQ= P = RV YES	19 63 8.64 0.002 (NO)
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.50	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.81	10 10 X SQ= P = RV YES	59 14 6.26 0.009 (NO)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.86	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.51	3 18 X SQ= P = RV YES	43 41 7.86 0.003 (NO)
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.67	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.81	7 14 X SQ= P = RV YES	68 16 16.41 0. (NO)
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.82	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.76	3 14 X SQ= P = RV YES	56 18 17.95 0. (NO)
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.53	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.75	10 9 X SQ= P = RV YES	18 53 4.01 0.048 (NO)
138	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.72	138	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.53	13 5 X SQ= P = RV YES	34 38 2.67 0.069 (NO)
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.53	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.79	8 7 X SQ= P = RV YES	14 54 5.19 0.020 (NO)

148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.86	0 11 20 70 X SQ= 1.81 P = 0.115 RV NO (NO)	
161	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.70	161	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.51	6 36 14 34 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.128 RV YES (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.55	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.72	11 22 9 56 X SQ= 3.99 P = 0.034 RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.85	170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.57	3 32 17 43 X SQ= 4.07 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.58	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.69	8 52 11 23 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)	
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.70	0 25 21 58 X SQ= 6.76 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	

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MATRIX

70 POLITIES
THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY,
AND LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (21)

JORDAN POLAND SOMALIA

70 POLITIES
THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY,
OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)

125 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)

AFGHANISTAN	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	COLOMBIA
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUATEMALA
GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JAPAN	LAOS
LEBANON	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO
MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PERU	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA
SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO
TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP
YUGOSLAVIA				

3 . 56

15 . 18

125 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)

AUSTRALIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CZECHOS'KIA	FINLAND
GERMAN FR	ISRAEL	JAMAICA	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	PHILIPPINES	SWITZERLAND
TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	UK		

AUSTRIA COSTA RICA DENMARK GREECE ICELAND
IRELAND ITALY LIBYA LUXEMBOURG NORWAY
PORTUGAL SWEDEN TUNISIA UAR URUGUAY

71 POLITIES WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	71 POLITIES WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

21 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	AUSTRIA	CHINA, PR	DENMARK	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	IRAN	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	NEPAL
NETHERLANDS	NORWAY	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR	UK
US									

90 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI
CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LED)
COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS*KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GABON
GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA
LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA
NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	RUMANIA	RWANDA
SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

GERMANY, E GERMAN FR KOREA, N KOREA REP

2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22)	0.57	2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.90	12 9 9 81 X SQ= 21.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
3	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.62	3	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.96	8 4 13 86 X SQ= 16.66 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	0.92	5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.54	11 6 1 7 X SQ= 4.03 P = 0.030 RV YES (YES)

6	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	1.00	6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.76
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.95	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.64
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.75	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.80
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.80	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.73
20	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	1.00	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.65
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.81	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.56
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.62	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.66
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.74	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.64
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.79	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.54

0	22
21	68
X SQ=	4.96
P =	0.007
RV NO	(NO)
1	32
20	58
X SQ=	6.32
P =	0.004
RV NO	(NO)
3	8
1	32
X SQ=	3.30
P =	0.043
RV YES	(NO)
1	32
4	12
X SQ=	3.53
P =	0.034
RV YES	(NO)
4	12
0	22
X SQ=	3.78
P =	0.025
RV YES	(NO)
17	40
4	50
X SQ=	7.68
P =	0.003
RV YES	(NO)
13	31
8	59
X SQ=	4.28
P =	0.027
RV YES	(NO)
5	56
14	32
X SQ=	7.42
P =	0.004
RV YES	(NO)
15	38
4	45
X SQ=	5.55
P =	0.011
RV YES	(NO)

30	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.67	30	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.53	7	47	X SQ= 1.99 P = 0.144 RV YES (NO)
						14	41	
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.62	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.83	13	15	X SQ= 16.15 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
						8	75	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.86	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.54	18	41	X SQ= 9.47 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
						3	49	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.52	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.88	11	11	X SQ= 14.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
						10	79	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.62	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.70	13	27	X SQ= 6.20 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)
						8	63	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.67	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.74	14	23	X SQ= 11.17 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
						7	67	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.57	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.75	12	22	X SQ= 6.55 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)
						9	65	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.76	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.57	16	37	X SQ= 6.38 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)
						5	50	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.57	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.88	12	11	X SQ= 18.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
						9	79	

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.75	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.57	15 37 5 49 X SQ= 5.42 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.57	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.74	12 23 9 66 X SQ= 6.30 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.95	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.66	19 58 1 30 X SQ= 5.39 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
62	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.62	62	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.91	3 2 5 20 X SQ= 1.67 P = 0.102 RV NO (YES)	
63	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.60	63	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.64	12 32 8 58 X SQ= 3.12 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
69	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.70	69	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.51	14 46 6 44 X SQ= 1.65 P = 0.144 RV NO (NO)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.57	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.86	12 12 9 76 X SQ= 16.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.76	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.51	16 44 5 45 X SQ= 3.88 P = 0.030 RV YES (NO)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.92	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.85	12 12 1 69 X SQ= 31.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	1.00	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.90	0 28 4 3 X SQ= 12.86 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED (11)	0.50	81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.86	6 5 6 32 X SQ= 4.99 P = 0.016 RV YES (YES)	
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.59	12 37 0 53 X SQ= 12.45 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.57	83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	9 0 12 90 X SQ= 36.42 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.76	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.55	16 40 5 49 X SQ= 5.45 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	1.00	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.54	0 31 19 36 X SQ= 11.81 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.63	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.73	12 20 7 53 X SQ= 7.00 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (5)	1.00	91	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.94	0 31 3 2 X SQ= 13.20 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
93	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.89	93	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.68	2 28 17 60 X SQ= 2.54 P = 0.090 RV NO (NO)	

98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.57	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.89	12 10 9 80 X SQ= 19.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
101	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.57	101	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.62	12 28 9 46 X SQ= 1.77 P = 0.137 RV YES (NO)	
105	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.67	105	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.57	12 30 6 39 X SQ= 2.22 P = 0.112 RV YES (NO)	
107	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.57	107	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.62	12 33 9 53 X SQ= 1.73 P = 0.143 RV YES (NO)	
110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH (15)	0.53	110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.92	9 6 8 70 X SQ= 17.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.76	111	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.51	13 39 4 37 X SQ= 2.62 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)	
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.53	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.90	10 9 9 80 X SQ= 16.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.63	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.79	12 19 7 70 X SQ= 11.41 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.71	120	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.95	15 71 6 4 X SQ= 7.17 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	

121	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.71	121	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.51	6 15 X SQ= P = RV YES	46 44 2.63 0.089 (NO)
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.58	126	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.91	11 8 X SQ= P = RV NO	70 7 10.22 0.002 (YES)
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.90	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.66	2 19 X SQ= P = RV NO	27 53 3.66 0.032 (NO)
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.55	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.77	11 9 X SQ= P = RV YES	17 57 6.27 0.011 (NO)
138	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.67	138	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.54	12 6 X SQ= P = RV YES	35 41 1.72 0.127 (NO)
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.56	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.82	9 7 X SQ= P = RV YES	13 58 8.04 0.003 (NO)
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.84	0 19 X SQ= P = RV NO	14 73 2.26 0.069 (NO)
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.78	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.57	14 4 X SQ= P = RV YES	25 33 5.30 0.015 (NO)
158	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.82	158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.51	3 14 X SQ= P = RV NO	37 39 4.27 0.029 (NO)

168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.52	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.73	11 22 10 60 X SQ= 3.91 P = 0.036 RV YES (NO)
170	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.95	170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.51	1 38 20 40 X SQ= 11.61 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.80	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.58	4 47 16 34 X SQ= 7.82 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.63	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.82	10 10 6 46 X SQ= 10.24 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.86	0 25 5 4 X SQ= 12.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
187	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.52	187	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.70	10 53 11 23 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.074 RV YES (NO)
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.95	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.71	1 26 19 63 X SQ= 3.92 P = 0.023 RV NO (NO)
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.95	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.70	1 27 20 62 X SQ= 4.59 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)

72	POLITIES WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	72	POLITIES WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

52 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA
CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
FRANCE	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	IRAN	ITALY	JAPAN	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG
MEXICO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR	UK	US
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

59 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	FINLAND	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA
INDONESIA	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBYA
MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES
POLAND	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO
TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA	

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	KOREA, N	KOREA REP

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.65	2	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.95	18 3 34 56 X SQ= 13.85 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.62	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.97	20 2 32 57 X SQ= 19.24 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
8	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.92	8	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.80	4 12 48 47 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.065 RV NO (YES)

9	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.98	9	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.86	1 8 51 51 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.035 RV NO (YES)
10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.94	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.51	3 30 49 29 X SQ= 24.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
11	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.94	11	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.58	3 25 49 34 X SQ= 17.74 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
13	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.94	13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.78	3 13 49 46 X SQ= 4.68 P = 0.016 RV NO (YES)
17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.87	17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	0.80	3 8 20 2 X SQ= 11.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.87	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.94	3 30 20 2 X SQ= 33.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.83	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.86	4 12 20 2 X SQ= 14.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.63	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.59	33 24 19 35 X SQ= 4.87 P = 0.022 RV YES (YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.77	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.70	37 16 11 38 X SQ= 21.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.71	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.68	15 39 37 18 X SQ= 15.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.52	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.78	27 13 25 46 X SQ= 9.45 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.81	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.66	42 20 10 39 X SQ= 22.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.52	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.83	27 10 25 49 X SQ= 13.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.79	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.51	41 27 11 28 X SQ= 8.97 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.51	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.86	26 8 25 49 X SQ= 15.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.69	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.68	35 18 16 39 X SQ= 13.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.72	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.71	36 16 14 40 X SQ= 18.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)	0.79	49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)	0.64	11 13 3 23 X SQ= 5.68 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	

54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.50	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.84	26 9 26 49 X SQ= 13.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.90	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.52	47 28 5 30 X SQ= 20.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.84	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.60	43 34 8 23 X SQ= 6.84 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.69	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.85	35 9 16 50 X SQ= 30.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.64	66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.54	32 25 18 29 X SQ= 2.61 P = 0.079 RV YES (YES)	
67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.61	67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.82	30 46 19 10 X SQ= 4.72 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.61	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.71	31 17 20 42 X SQ= 10.11 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.73	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.61	37 23 14 36 X SQ= 11.11 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.84	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.71	43 17 8 42 X SQ= 31.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.55	76	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.89	18 6 22 48 X SQ= 12.15 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.90	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.81	19 9 2 39 X SQ= 28.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.75	79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	6 43 18 0 X SQ= 40.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.98	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.88	42 7 1 52 X SQ= 69.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.83	83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	9 0 43 59 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.65	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.62	34 22 18 36 X SQ= 7.21 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.96	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.62	50 22 2 36 X SQ= 38.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.93	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.62	3 28 38 17 X SQ= 25.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.62	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.88	26 6 16 44 X SQ= 22.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

91	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (5)	0.50	91	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.93	3 28 3 2 X SQ= 4.65 P = 0.024 RV YES (YES)	
93	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.84	93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.61	8 22 42 35 X SQ= 5.67 P = 0.010 RV NO (YES)	
96	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.81	96	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.67	38 26 9 13 X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.146 RV NO (YES)	
98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.65	98	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.93	18 4 34 55 X SQ= 11.78 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
101	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.51	101	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.67	25 15 24 31 X SQ= 2.59 P = 0.096 RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.66	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.55	33 25 17 30 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.049 RV YES (YES)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.67	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.70	29 13 14 31 X SQ= 11.04 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.59	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.73	30 15 21 41 X SQ= 9.97 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.71	110	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.94	12 3 30 48 X SQ= 7.17 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	

116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.50	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.90	25 6 25 52 X SQ= 18.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.76	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.64	38 21 12 37 X SQ= 15.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.65	119	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.84	34 37 18 7 X SQ= 3.41 P = 0.061 RV NO (YES)	
120	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.85	120	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.95	44 42 8 2 X SQ= 1.95 P = 0.103 RV NO (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.85	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.75	8 44 44 15 X SQ= 36.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
124	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.93	124	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.81	3 10 40 43 X SQ= 1.94 P = 0.134 RV NO (NO)	
125	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.53	125	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.74	23 39 20 14 X SQ= 3.36 P = 0.054 RV NO (YES)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.72	126	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.94	31 50 12 3 X SQ= 7.30 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.65	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.60	28 19 15 28 X SQ= 4.54 P = 0.022 RV YES (YES)	

129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.77	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.53	33 22 10 25 X SQ= 7.25 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
131	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.64	131	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.59	13 16 23 11 X SQ= 2.46 P = 0.080 RV YES (YES)	
134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.53	134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.66	23 33 26 17 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.069 RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.70	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.69	32 15 14 33 X SQ= 12.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.81	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.57	9 23 39 31 X SQ= 5.65 P = 0.011 RV NO (YES)	
141	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.82	141	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.94	8 3 37 47 X SQ= 2.16 P = 0.108 RV NO (YES)	
142	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.58	142	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.77	19 11 26 37 X SQ= 3.13 P = 0.075 RV NO (YES)	
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.84	0 8 46 42 X SQ= 6.07 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.59	147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.89	17 5 24 41 X SQ= 9.18 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	

148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.75	0 49 X SQ= 11.81 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	14 43
160	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.61	160	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.80	19 30 X SQ= 3.11 P = 0.070 RV NO (YES)	9 36
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.92	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.62	4 44 X SQ= 27.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	29 18
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.68	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.57	34 16 X SQ= 5.35 P = 0.017 RV YES (YES)	23 30
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.66	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.62	31 16 X SQ= 6.50 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	19 31
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.68	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.69	16 34 X SQ= 12.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	35 16
179	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.52	179	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.66	21 23 X SQ= 2.27 P = 0.092 RV YES (YES)	29 15
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.54	31 0 X SQ= 22.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	21 25
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.86	0 5 X SQ= 12.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	25 4

188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.61	188	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	1.00	31 0 20 58 X SQ= 46.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
190	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.89	190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS COMMON LAW, RATHER THAN CIVIL LAW (7)	1.00	31 0 4 3 X SQ= 9.13 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.98	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.55	1 26 50 32 X SQ= 24.51 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.94	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.57	3 25 49 33 X SQ= 18.22 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

73	POLITIES WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	73	POLITIES WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

65 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA
CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRAN
IRAQ	IRELAND	ITALY	JAPAN	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
SA'U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR	UK
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA					

46 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA
JORDAN	LAOS	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA
PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP				

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

GERMANY, E GERMAN FR KOREA, N KOREA REP

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.68	2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	21 0 44 46 X SQ= 16.28 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.69	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.96	20 2 45 44 X SQ= 10.23 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.92	8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.76	5 11 60 35 X SQ= 4.51 P = 0.026 RV NO (YES)

10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.95	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.65	3 30 62 16 X SQ= 44.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.73	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.91	8 3 3 30 X SQ= 14.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
16	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (11)	0.62	16	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	0.79	8 3 5 11 X SQ= 2.98 P = 0.054 RV YES (YES)
18	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.62	18	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.73	3 30 5 11 X SQ= 2.42 P = 0.094 RV YES (NO)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.87	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.94	3 30 20 2 X SQ= 33.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.80	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.85	5 11 20 2 X SQ= 12.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.60	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.61	39 18 26 28 X SQ= 3.90 P = 0.035 RV YES (YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.75	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.83	46 7 15 34 X SQ= 31.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.69	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.76	20 34 44 11 X SQ= 19.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.68	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.67	44 15 21 31 X SQ= 11.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.54	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.89	35 5 30 41 X SQ= 19.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.82	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.80	53 9 12 37 X SQ= 39.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.78	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.60	51 17 14 25 X SQ= 14.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.73	41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	17 0 47 45 X SQ= 12.22 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.52	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.98	33 1 30 44 X SQ= 28.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.69	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.78	43 10 19 36 X SQ= 22.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.65	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	23 0 42 46 X SQ= 18.43 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.70	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.80	43 9 18 36 X SQ= 24.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.92	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.50	59 21 5 21 X SQ= 22.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.82	53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	12 0 53 46 X SQ= 7.70 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.51	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.96	33 2 32 43 X SQ= 24.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.89	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.62	58 17 7 28 X SQ= 30.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.87	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.52	56 21 8 23 X SQ= 18.26 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.63	57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.98	24 1 41 45 X SQ= 16.70 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
58	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.89	58	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.76	7 11 58 35 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.073 RV NO (YES)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.66	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.96	42 2 22 44 X SQ= 39.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.65	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.61	41 16 22 25 X SQ= 5.80 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)

68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.61	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.80	39 9 25 37 X SQ= 16.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.73	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.72	47 13 17 33 X SQ= 20.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
70	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.73	70	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.88	16 5 44 38 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.083 RV NO (NO)	
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.63	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	24 0 40 45 X SQ= 19.51 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.80	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.80	51 9 13 37 X SQ= 36.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.51	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	24 0 25 45 X SQ= 27.08 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.83	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.82	20 8 4 37 X SQ= 25.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.64	79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	10 39 18 0 X SQ= 31.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.88	82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	49 0 7 46 X SQ= 74.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.86	83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	9 0 56 46 X SQ= 5.20 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.52	7 22 0 24 X SQ= 4.74 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.70	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.76	45 11 19 35 X SQ= 21.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.95	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.76	61 11 3 35 X SQ= 57.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.94	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.85	3 28 50 5 X SQ= 51.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.55	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.95	30 2 25 35 X SQ= 21.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
91	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (5)	0.57	91	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.97	3 28 4 1 X SQ= 9.47 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
93	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.79	93	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.62	13 17 49 28 X SQ= 2.87 P = 0.081 RV NO (YES)
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.79	95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.98	49 44 13 1 X SQ= 6.49 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)

96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.82	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.59	47 17 10 12 X SQ= 4.55 P = 0.035 RV NO (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.57	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.92	10 12 13 1 X SQ= 6.40 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.66	98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	22 0 43 46 X SQ= 17.35 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
101	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.52	101	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.68	28 12 30 25 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.142 RV NO (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.63	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.72	32 10 19 26 X SQ= 8.98 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.54	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.75	34 11 29 33 X SQ= 7.77 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.71	110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	15 0 37 41 X SQ= 12.05 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.50	114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.68	30 30 30 14 X SQ= 2.73 P = 0.073 RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.73	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.70	45 14 17 32 X SQ= 17.26 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.67	119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.88	43 28 21 4 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.047 RV NO (NO)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.84	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	54 32 10 0 X SQ= 4.03 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.78	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.83	14 38 51 8 X SQ= 37.93 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.54	122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	35 46 30 0 X SQ= 26.80 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.55	125	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.77	29 33 24 10 X SQ= 4.12 P = 0.032 RV NO (YES)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.72	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	38 43 15 0 X SQ= 12.36 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.62	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.62	33 14 20 23 X SQ= 4.28 P = 0.032 RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.72	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.54	38 17 15 20 X SQ= 5.04 P = 0.017 RV YES (YES)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.65	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.65	14 15 26 8 X SQ= 4.22 P = 0.035 RV YES (YES)	

133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.91	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.56	5 53	24 19
						X SQ=	24.61
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.55	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.73	26 32	30 11
						X SQ=	6.74
						P =	0.007
						RV YES	(YES)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.65	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.72	36 19	11 28
						X SQ=	11.22
						P =	0.001
						RV YES	(YES)
139	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.76	139	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.59	14 44	18 26
						X SQ=	2.54
						P =	0.087
						RV NO	(YES)
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.58	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.82	23 32	7 31
						X SQ=	4.61
						P =	0.024
						RV NO	(NO)
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.80	0 55	8 33
						X SQ=	9.29
						P =	0.001
						RV NO	(YES)
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.61	147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.92	19 30	3 35
						X SQ=	9.23
						P =	0.001
						RV NO	(YES)
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.69	0 61	14 31
						X SQ=	19.24
						P =	0.
						RV NO	(YES)
153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.58	153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.67	32 23	7 14
						X SQ=	2.83
						P =	0.073
						RV YES	(NO)

157	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.80	157	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.92	11 3 45 36 X SQ= 1.75 P = 0.144 RV NO (NO)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.57	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.67	33 12 25 24 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.034 RV YES (NO)
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.90	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.73	6 27 52 10 X SQ= 36.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.63	169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.56	38 19 22 24 X SQ= 2.98 P = 0.071 RV YES (YES)
170	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.68	170	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.50	19 20 40 20 X SQ= 2.46 P = 0.095 RV YES (YES)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.63	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.63	35 15 21 26 X SQ= 5.37 P = 0.014 RV YES (YES)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.63	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.69	22 29 37 13 X SQ= 8.67 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
179	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.50	179	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.68	27 23 27 11 X SQ= 1.98 P = 0.125 RV YES (NO)
181	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.67	181	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.93	19 1 38 14 X SQ= 2.98 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)

182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.64	38 14 0 25 X SQ= 33.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.89	0 25 6 3 X SQ= 15.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
186	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.57	186	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.76	20 9 26 29 X SQ= 2.78 P = 0.068 RV NO (YES)
188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.52	188	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	1.00	31 0 33 45 X SQ= 28.13 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
190	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.86	190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS COMMON LAW, RATHER THAN CIVIL LAW (7)	1.00	31 0 5 2 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.030 RV YES (NO)
192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.94	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.51	4 23 60 22 X SQ= 26.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.95	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.56	3 25 62 20 X SQ= 33.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.84	194	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.98	10 1 54 45 X SQ= 3.99 P = 0.024 RV NO (NO)

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74 POLITIES
THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)

74 POLITIES
THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

26 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND
PORTUGAL	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLANC	UK	US				

87 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA
GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN
JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI
MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN
SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR
UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA			

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ISRAEL SO AFRICA

2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22)	0.85	2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	22 0 4 87 X SQ= 86.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	0.82	5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	1.00	18 0 4 5 X SQ= 8.87 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
6	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	1.00	6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.75	0 22 26 65 X SQ= 6.63 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)

8	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	1.00	8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.79	0 18 26 69 X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)
10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.63	0 32 26 55 X SQ= 11.59 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
13	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	1.00	13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.83	0 15 26 72 X SQ= 3.78 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)
21	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.88	21	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.68	3 28 23 59 X SQ= 3.31 P = 0.046 RV NO (NO)
24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.69	24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.52	18 42 8 45 X SQ= 2.74 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.69	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.67	18 29 8 58 X SQ= 9.19 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.85	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.68	4 56 22 26 X SQ= 20.29 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.63	25 29 0 49 X SQ= 27.49 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
30	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	1.00	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.66	0 56 26 29 X SQ= 31.98 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.69	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.95	8 82 18 4 X SQ= 48.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.65	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.86	17 12 9 75 X SQ= 25.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.92	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.59	24 36 2 51 X SQ= 18.85 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.81	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.98	21 2 5 85 X SQ= 71.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.96	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.83	25 15 1 72 X SQ= 51.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	1.00	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.59	26 36 0 51 X SQ= 25.46 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.80	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.80	20 17 5 70 X SQ= 29.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.69	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.99	18 1 8 85 X SQ= 60.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.92	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.87	24 11 2 74 X SQ= 54.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.68	26 27 0 57 X SQ= 33.95 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.85	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.97	22 3 4 84 X SQ= 71.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.65	26 28 0 53 X SQ= 31.14 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.72	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.65	18 25 7 47 X SQ= 8.99 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (14)	0.50	53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.99	13 1 13 86 X SQ= 39.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.92	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.86	24 12 2 73 X SQ= 52.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.59	26 50 0 35 X SQ= 13.79 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.63	26 52 0 30 X SQ= 11.41 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
62	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.64	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 9 16 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.014 RV NO (YES)	

63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	1.00	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.77	26 20 0 66 X SQ= 45.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.96	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.67	25 54 1 27 X SQ= 7.40 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.77	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.63	20 32 6 54 X SQ= 11.11 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.85	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.51	22 42 4 44 X SQ= 9.03 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.54	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.88	12 9 14 68 X SQ= 12.18 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.50	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.89	12 9 12 76 X SQ= 16.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.75	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.61	18 33 6 52 X SQ= 8.44 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	1.00	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.53	24 40 0 45 X SQ= 19.51 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.62	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	10 0 16 24 X SQ= 9.26 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)

82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.69	26 24 0 54 X SQ= 34.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	83	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.90	0 9 26 78 X SQ= 1.68 P = 0.115 RV NO (NO)	
85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	1.00	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.62	26 33 0 53 X SQ= 28.00 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	1.00	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.51	0 30 26 31 X SQ= 17.40 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.83	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.83	20 12 4 57 X SQ= 31.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
93	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.84	93	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.67	4 27 21 56 X SQ= 1.82 P = 0.135 RV ND (NO)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.77	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.54	20 30 6 35 X SQ= 5.91 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	1.00	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.63	26 40 0 23 X SQ= 10.97 P = 0. RV ND (NO)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	1.00	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.70	0 23 6 10 X SQ= 7.52 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	

98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.65	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.95	17 4 9 83 X SQ= 44.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.96	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.59	24 24 1 35 X SQ= 19.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
100	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	1.00	100	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.62	26 36 0 22 X SQ= 11.47 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.77	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.71	20 20 6 50 X SQ= 16.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.77	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.54	20 37 6 43 X SQ= 6.24 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.77	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.65	20 22 6 41 X SQ= 11.40 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.77	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.70	20 25 6 58 X SQ= 16.01 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH (15)	0.52	110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.94	11 4 10 68 X SQ= 23.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.90	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.54	19 33 2 39 X SQ= 11.40 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.67	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.95	16 4 8 81 X SQ= 43.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.83	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.88	20 10 4 75 X SQ= 44.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.92	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.58	22 36 2 49 X SQ= 16.35 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.73	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.90	7 65 19 7 X SQ= 36.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.62	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	16 72 10 0 X SQ= 26.78 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	1.00	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.61	0 53 26 34 X SQ= 27.43 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.81	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.87	5 76 21 11 X SQ= 42.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.69	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	18 87 8 0 X SQ= 24.32 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.87	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.81	3 60 20 14 X SQ= 32.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.70	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	7 74 16 0 X SQ= 56.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.69	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.56	18 29 8 37 X SQ= 3.82 P = 0.038 RV YES (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.73	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.51	19 37 7 39 X SQ= 3.72 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.73	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.87	19 9 7 61 X SQ= 30.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.83	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.63	20 27 4 45 X SQ= 13.35 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
141	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.77	141	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.93	6 5 20 66 X SQ= 3.40 P = 0.063 RV NO (YES)	
144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.50	144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.85	6 28 6 5 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.044 RV YES (YES)	
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.89	0 8 24 66 X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.116 RV NO (NO)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.65	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.89	15 7 8 59 X SQ= 24.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.88	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.67	23 17 3 35 X SQ= 19.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.92	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.56	2 38 24 30 X SQ= 15.95 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.69	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.55	8 38 18 31 X SQ= 3.55 P = 0.041 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.96	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.54	1 33 25 38 X SQ= 13.38 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.73	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.83	19 13 7 65 X SQ= 26.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.77	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.54	20 36 6 42 X SQ= 6.24 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.96	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.51	1 38 25 36 X SQ= 16.31 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.75	171	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.95	6 4 18 72 X SQ= 5.85 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)	
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.56	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.88	11 10 14 72 X SQ= 10.35 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	

174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.69	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.89	18 8 8 64 X SQ= 30.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.77	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.60	20 29 6 43 X SQ= 8.85 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.65	178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.57	9 43 17 33 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.070 RV YES (NO)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.71	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.68	7 44 17 21 X SQ= 9.12 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.73	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	19 0 7 48 X SQ= 43.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.66	7 48 0 25 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.092 RV NO (NO)	
185	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	1.00	185	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.53	0 21 6 24 X SQ= 3.03 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.77	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.81	6 59 20 14 X SQ= 25.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.81	189	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.98	5 2 21 85 X SQ= 7.18 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	

190 TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.69
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN
COMMON LAW (32)

192 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN
MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)

193 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)

190 TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.91 11 21
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM 5 2
IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN X SQ= 1.91
COMMON LAW (32) P = 0.101
RV NO (YES)

192 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.68 0 27
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM 26 58
IS OTHER THAN X SQ= 9.26
MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86) P = 0.
RV NO (NO)

193 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.69 0 27
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM 26 59
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86) X SQ= 9.11
P = 0.
RV NO (NO)

****

75 POLITIES
THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR
SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)

75 POLITIES
THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND
ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

62 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CEYLON
CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND
INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA								

52 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST
JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA
MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YEMEN								

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

SO AFRICA

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.65	2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	22 0 40 52 X SQ= 20.64 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.66	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.98	21 1 41 51 X SQ= 16.54 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.92	8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.75	5 13 57 39 X SQ= 4.89 P = 0.019 RV NO (YES)

10	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.97	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.58	2 30 60 22 X SQ= 38.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
11	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	1.00	11	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (28)	0.52	0 27 62 25 X SQ= 39.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.67	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.81	4 7 2 30 X SQ= 3.93 P = 0.029 RV YES (NO)	
17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.84	17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	0.87	4 7 21 1 X SQ= 10.91 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
18	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL ANO SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.71	18	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.70	2 30 5 13 X SQ= 2.83 P = 0.083 RV YES (NO)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.91	19	TENO TO 8E THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.97	2 30 21 1 X SQ= 38.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
20	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.81	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.93	5 13 21 1 X SQ= 17.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.61	24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.58	38 22 24 30 X SQ= 3.36 P = 0.060 RV YES (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.55	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.73	34 14 28 38 X SQ= 7.93 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	

29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.84	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.83	47 8 9 40 X SQ= 44.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.84	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.92	10 46 52 4 X SQ= 60.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.63	31	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	1.00	39 51 23 0 X SQ= 21.52 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
32	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.84	32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	10 0 52 52 X SQ= 7.29 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)
33	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.56	33	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.96	27 2 35 50 X SQ= 21.46 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.74	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.71	46 15 16 37 X SQ= 21.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.61	35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	24 0 38 52 X SQ= 23.22 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.65	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.98	40 1 22 51 X SQ= 45.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.92	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.88	57 6 5 46 X SQ= 70.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.83	38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	10 0 50 52 X SQ= 7.58 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.57	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.96	35 2 26 50 X SQ= 34.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.85	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.60	50 20 9 30 X SQ= 21.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.58	42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	1.00	35 0 25 51 X SQ= 40.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.82	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.90	49 5 11 46 X SQ= 54.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.60	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	25 0 37 52 X SQ= 24.55 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.82	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.87	49 6 11 42 X SQ= 48.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.55	62 21 0 26 X SQ= 42.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.57	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.74	32 11 24 31 X SQ= 8.12 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	

51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.71	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.52	40 19 16 21 X SQ= 4.68 P = 0.021 RV YES (YES)	
53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.77	53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	14 0 48 52 X SQ= 11.37 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.58	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.98	36 1 26 49 X SQ= 36.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.70	62 15 0 35 X SQ= 59.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.93	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.54	57 22 4 26 X SQ= 28.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.75	63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	46 0 15 52 X SQ= 63.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.63	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.58	38 19 22 26 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.047 RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.62	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.73	38 14 23 38 X SQ= 12.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.74	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.63	45 19 16 33 X SQ= 14.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

70	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.73	70	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.89	16 5 43 40 X SQ= 3.13 P = 0.051 RV NO (NO)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.72	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.84	43 8 17 42 X SQ= 31.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.85	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.74	51 13 9 37 X SQ= 36.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.56	79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	14 34 18 0 X SQ= 23.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.80	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.67	8 11 2 22 X SQ= 5.02 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.83	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.96	48 2 10 45 X SQ= 61.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.53	10 21 0 24 X SQ= 7.42 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.79	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.78	49 11 13 40 X SQ= 34.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.95	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.69	59 16 3 35 X SQ= 48.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.88	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.66	6 25 44 13 X SQ= 25.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.65	89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	32 0 17 45 X SQ= 41.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.71	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.73	42 9 17 24 X SQ= 14.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
95	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.81	95	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.92	50 45 12 4 X SQ= 1.95 P = 0.110 RV NO (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.92	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.58	54 13 5 18 X SQ= 23.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.71	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.82	5 18 12 4 X SQ= 8.83 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.67	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.58	36 13 18 18 X SQ= 3.97 P = 0.040 RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.62	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.87	36 5 22 34 X SQ= 21.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.72	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.68	43 15 17 32 X SQ= 15.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.72	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.89	39	4
						15	32
						X SQ= 29.93	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.76	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.61	41	11
						13	17
						X SQ= 9.15	
						P = 0.002	
						RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.69	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.92	42	4
						19	45
						X SQ= 38.68	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.78	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.55	47	18
						13	22
						X SQ= 10.30	
						P = 0.001	
						RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.69	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.58	34	19
						15	26
						X SQ= 5.98	
						P = 0.012	
						RV YES (YES)	
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.57	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.71	25	35
						33	14
						X SQ= 7.54	
						P = 0.004	
						RV YES (YES)	
115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.66	115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	20	0
						39	51
						X SQ= 18.91	
						P = 0.	
						RV NO (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.53	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	31	0
						28	51
						X SQ= 34.76	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.88	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.86	52	7
						7	44
						X SQ= 57.95	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	

118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.69	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.57	19 21 43 16 X SQ= 5.52 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.60	119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.97	37 36 25 1 X SQ= 15.05 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.84	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	52 37 10 0 X SQ= 4.98 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.90	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.90	6 47 56 5 X SQ= 70.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.52	122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	30 52 32 0 X SQ= 34.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.57	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.87	22 41 29 6 X SQ= 18.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.69	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	35 47 16 0 X SQ= 15.40 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.64	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.69	37 11 21 24 X SQ= 7.91 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.72	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.60	42 14 16 21 X SQ= 8.27 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	

133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.86	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.56	8 21 49 27 X SQ= 10.07 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.78	136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	12 0 43 42 X SQ= 8.54 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.53	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	29 0 26 42 X SQ= 29.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.77	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.88	43 5 13 36 X SQ= 36.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.77	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.53	14 20 47 23 X SQ= 5.34 P = 0.019 RV NO (YES)	
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.83	141	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.97	10 1 49 38 X SQ= 3.54 P = 0.046 RV NO (NO)	
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.56	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.89	26 4 33 33 X SQ= 10.21 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
146	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.97	146	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.85	2 6 56 35 X SQ= 2.68 P = 0.063 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.57	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	23 0 31 36 X SQ= 18.42 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.62	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.69	33 8 20 18 X SQ= 5.73 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.67	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.57	20 20 40 15 X SQ= 4.21 P = 0.031 RV YES (YES)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.87	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.68	8 26 52 12 X SQ= 28.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.53	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.98	32 1 28 44 X SQ= 28.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.75	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.73	45 12 15 33 X SQ= 22.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
171	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.84	171	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.96	9 2 47 43 X SQ= 2.38 P = 0.106 RV NO (NO)	
172	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.75	172	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.87	15 6 46 41 X SQ= 1.67 P = 0.147 RV NO (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.72	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.80	42 8 16 33 X SQ= 24.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.64	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.73	21 32 38 12 X SQ= 12.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.61	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.83	21 30 33 6 X SQ= 15.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.67	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	20 0 41 14 X SQ= 4.69 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.98	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.63	41 14 1 24 X SQ= 31.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.53	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.87	26 39 29 6 X SQ= 15.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.52	188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.96	30 2 32 48 X SQ= 24.59 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.89	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	7 0 55 52 X SQ= 4.45 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)	
192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.97	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.50	2 25 60 25 X SQ= 30.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.53	0 27 62 24 X SQ= 40.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

76 POLITIES
THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN,
RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN
SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED
THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)

76 POLITIES
THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR
PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A
COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN
BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)

PREDICATE ONLY

26 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	POLAND
PORTUGAL	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK	US				

70 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON
CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
PERU	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA
TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ISRAEL

18 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CHINA, PR	ETHIOPIA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA
NEPAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA		

77 POLITIES
THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED,
RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED,
THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)

77 POLITIES
THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED,
RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED,
THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)

PREDICATE ONLY

28 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS
DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	INDIA	JAMAICA	LEBANON	MEXICO	NICARAGUA
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	TRINIDAD	UAR	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA		

41 IN RIGHT COLUMN

BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	GABON
GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	LAOS	LIBYA
MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	RWANDA	SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP									

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ISRAEL SO AFRICA

44 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY
JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR
UK	US	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA						

78	POLITIES THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	78	POLITIES THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

28 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS
DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	INDIA	JAMAICA	LEBANON	MEXICO	NICARAGUA
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	TRINIDAD	UAR	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA		

7 IN RIGHT COLUMN

BULGARIA	CHINA, PR	JAPAN	RUMANIA	TURKEY	USSR	YUGOSLAVIA

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ISRAEL	SO AFRICA

78 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA
CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE
GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDONESIA
IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO
TUNISIA	UGANDA	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN		

6	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (22)	0.75	6	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	1.00	21 / 7	0 / 7
						X SQ= 10.19	
						P = 0.001	
						RV YES (YES)	
17	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.91	17	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	1.00	2 / 21	1 / 0
						X SQ= 1.34	
						P = 0.125	
						RV YES (NO)	
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.87	20	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	1.00	3 / 21	2 / 0
						X SQ= 4.34	
						P = 0.031	
						RV YES (NO)	

22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.50	22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.86	14 6 14 1 X SQ= 1.64 P = 0.114 RV YES (NO)	
23	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.79	23	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (27)	0.86	6 6 22 1 X SQ= 7.62 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.54	24	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	1.00	13 7 15 0 X SQ= 4.56 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.89	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.67	25 2 3 4 X SQ= 6.35 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)	
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.86	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.86	4 6 24 1 X SQ= 10.72 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.50	34	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	1.00	14 7 14 0 X SQ= 3.94 P = 0.027 RV YES (NO)	
36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.68	36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.71	9 5 19 2 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.090 RV YES (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.68	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.86	9 6 19 1 X SQ= 4.56 P = 0.027 RV YES (NO)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.78	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.71	6 5 21 2 X SQ= 4.11 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	

43	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.58	43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	1.00	15 7 11 0 X SQ= 2.74 P = 0.067 RV NO (NO)	
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.57	0 3 28 4 X SQ= 8.23 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
47	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	1.00	47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.60	0 3 17 2 X SQ= 7.27 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.57	50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.86	13 1 10 6 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.086 RV YES (NO)	
52	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.87	52	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.57	20 4 3 3 X SQ= 1.41 P = 0.120 RV NO (YES)	
57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC (25)	0.57	57	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	1.00	16 0 12 7 X SQ= 5.25 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
67	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS (27)	0.62	67	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	1.00	10 7 16 0 X SQ= 6.08 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.61	68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.83	17 1 11 5 X SQ= 2.28 P = 0.078 RV YES (NO)	
71	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	1.00	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.57	0 4 28 3 X SQ= 12.86 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	83	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (9)	0.57	0 28	4 3
						X SQ= 12.86 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
85	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.54	85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	1.00	15 13	7 0
						X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.031 RV NO (NO)	
87	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.69	87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	1.00	5 11	0 7
						X SQ= 1.26 P = 0.147 RV NO (NO)	
92	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.89	92	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL (20)	0.71	3 25	5 2
						X SQ= 8.52 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.82	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.71	5 23	5 2
						X SQ= 5.47 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.76	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.71	19 6	2 5
						X SQ= 3.55 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)	
95	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.96	95	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN (16)	0.71	27 1	2 5
						X SQ= 13.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.83	97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	1.00	5 1	0 5
						X SQ= 4.65 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.76	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.86	5 16	6 1
						X SQ= 6.04 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	

100	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	0.50	100	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	1.00	11 6 11 0 X SQ= 3.07 P = 0.055 RV YES (NO)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.77	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.71	20 2 6 5 X SQ= 3.83 P = 0.027 RV YES (NO)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.80	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.71	16 2 4 5 X SQ= 4.07 P = 0.023 RV YES (YES)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.90	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.71	18 2 2 5 X SQ= 7.24 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
107	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.70	107	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.71	19 2 8 5 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.079 RV YES (NO)
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.92	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.71	24 2 2 5 X SQ= 9.86 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.96	110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH (15)	0.67	1 2 23 1 X SQ= 5.17 P = 0.025 RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.93	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.50	26 3 2 3 X SQ= 4.22 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)
118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.71	118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.71	8 5 20 2 X SQ= 2.76 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)

128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.71	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.86	17 7 X SQ= 4.98 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	1 6
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.88	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.71	21 3 X SQ= 6.99 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	2 5
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.83	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.71	20 4 X SQ= 5.45 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	2 5
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.89	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.71	3 24 X SQ= 8.14 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	5 2
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.54	142	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	1.00	14 12 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	0 6
144	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.57	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	3 4 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.081 RV YES (YES)	5 0
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.84	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.86	3 16 X SQ= 8.18 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	6 1
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.68	154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	1.00	6 13 X SQ= 7.04 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	7 0
157	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.65	157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	1.00	9 17 X SQ= 1.82 P = 0.149 RV NO (NO)	0 7

158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.65	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.86	17 9	1 6
						X SQ= 3.93 P = 0.030 RV YES (NO)	
160	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.74	160	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.71	6 17	5 2
						X SQ= 3.00 P = 0.068 RV YES (NO)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.85	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.71	22 4	2 5
						X SQ= 6.14 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.75	170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	1.00	18 6	0 7
						X SQ= 9.63 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.79	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.71	19 5	2 5
						X SQ= 4.24 P = 0.022 RV YES (YES)	
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.92	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.71	22 2	2 5
						X SQ= 9.00 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.77	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.83	10 3	1 5
						X SQ= 3.89 P = 0.041 RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.81	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.83	3 13	5 1
						X SQ= 5.32 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.64	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.86	18 10	1 6
						X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)	

194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE COMMUNIST (13)	0.71	0	5
						27	2

X SQ= 17.27
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

79	POLITIES THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	79	POLITIES THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

49 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	INDIA	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL
IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	LAOS	LEBANON	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO
NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA
TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UAR	US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	

18 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA
HONDURAS	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA		

48 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CHINA, PR	CONGO(LEO)	CZECHOS'KIA
DENMARK	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDONESIA
IRAN	ITALY	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MONGOLIA	NEPAL
NETHERLANDS	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SOMALIA	SPAIN
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR	UK	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA		

6	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.94	6	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (22)	1.00	3 18 46 0 X SQ= 49.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
8	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.82	8	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	1.00	9 0 40 18 X SQ= 2.40 P = 0.057 RV NO (NO)
10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.53	10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	26 0 23 18 X SQ= 13.45 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
11	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.55	11	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	1.00	22 0 27 18 X SQ= 10.08 P = 0. RV NO (NO)

13	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.80	13	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	1.00	10 0 39 18 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.052 RV NO (NO)	
17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	0.67	17	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	1.00	6 0 3 18 X SQ= 11.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
28	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.68	28	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.89	32 16 15 2 X SQ= 1.94 P = 0.119 RV NO (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.67	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.75	15 12 30 4 X SQ= 6.70 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.65	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.78	31 4 17 14 X SQ= 7.81 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.65	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.89	17 16 32 2 X SQ= 13.38 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
43	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.69	43	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.53	15 9 33 8 X SQ= 1.69 P = 0.147 RV YES (NO)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.74	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.61	12 11 35 7 X SQ= 5.73 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.62	46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	28 18 17 0 X SQ= 7.49 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	

47	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.58	47	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	1.00	5 0 7 11 X SQ= 3.66 P = 0.037 RV NO (YES)	
49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)	0.55	49	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)	1.00	14 7 17 0 X SQ= 4.91 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.52	55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	25 18 23 0 X SQ= 11.21 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
56	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.53	56	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.78	25 14 22 4 X SQ= 2.33 P = 0.093 RV NO (NO)	
57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.98	57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC (25)	0.78	1 14 48 4 X SQ= 39.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
58	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.80	58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	10 0 39 18 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.052 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.88	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.78	6 14 43 4 X SQ= 23.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	0.62	64	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	1.00	6 14 10 0 X SQ= 10.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETERDGENEOUS (49)	0.67	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.78	15 14 31 4 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	

67	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.73	67	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HETERDGENEOUS (27)	0.81	35 3 13 13 X SQ= 12.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETERDGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETERDGENEOUS (62)	0.78	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.72	11 13 38 5 X SQ= 12.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETERDGENEOUS (50)	0.67	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETERDGENEOUS (64)	0.78	16 14 33 4 X SQ= 9.09 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.88	72	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	1.00	6 18 43 0 X SQ= 40.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.80	73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	1.00	10 18 39 0 X SQ= 31.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.71	75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	1.00	14 18 34 0 X SQ= 23.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.81	77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	8 18 34 0 X SQ= 30.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED (11)	0.71	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	5 0 2 18 X SQ= 11.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.86	82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	1.00	7 18 42 0 X SQ= 37.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.59	86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	1.00	20 18 29 0 X SQ= 16.45 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
87	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.62	87	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.73	23 3 14 8 X SQ= 2.87 P = 0.082 RV YES (NO)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.80	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.58	8 7 33 5 X SQ= 5.11 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.54	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.87	15 2 13 13 X SQ= 5.04 P = 0.020 RV YES (YES)	
102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.52	102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.75	22 12 24 4 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.082 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.62	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.77	14 10 23 3 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.66	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.65	16 11 31 6 X SQ= 3.64 P = 0.044 RV YES (NO)	
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.68	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.79	32 3 15 11 X SQ= 7.79 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.59	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.89	20 16 29 2 X SQ= 10.38 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

118	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.61	118	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.83	15 3 23 15 X SQ= 1.96 P = 0.128 RV NO (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.76	121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	1.00	37 0 12 18 X SQ= 27.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.92	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.56	45 8 4 10 X SQ= 15.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
124	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.80	124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	9 0 36 14 X SQ= 1.94 P = 0.098 RV NO (NO)	
128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.56	128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.69	17 11 22 5 X SQ= 1.96 P = 0.138 RV YES (NO)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.51	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.94	19 15 20 1 X SQ= 7.93 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.70	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.73	19 4 8 11 X SQ= 5.78 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.52	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.81	22 3 20 13 X SQ= 4.06 P = 0.036 RV YES (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.76	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.63	31 6 10 10 X SQ= 5.76 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	

138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.63	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.81	15 13 25 3 X SQ= 7.09 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.61	139	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.94	18 1 28 16 X SQ= 5.03 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.79	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.63	8 10 31 6 X SQ= 7.28 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
146	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.81	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	8 0 34 17 X SQ= 2.30 P = 0.090 RV NO (NO)	
148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.75	148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	12 0 36 18 X SQ= 3.95 P = 0.027 RV NO (NO)	
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.70	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.71	19 4 8 10 X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.019 RV YES (YES)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.54	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.76	19 13 22 4 X SQ= 3.28 P = 0.046 RV YES (NO)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.69	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.65	11 11 25 6 X SQ= 4.23 P = 0.035 RV YES (YES)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.61	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.94	25 1 16 17 X SQ= 13.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.53	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.88	21 14 24 2 X SQ= 6.46 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.54	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.94	19 15 22 1 X SQ= 8.87 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.77	172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	11 0 37 18 X SQ= 3.44 P = 0.028 RV NO (NO)	
175	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.53	175	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.79	20 11 23 3 X SQ= 3.18 P = 0.062 RV YES (NO)	
178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.63	178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.65	27 6 16 11 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.084 RV YES (NO)	
181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.68	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	7 0 15 18 X SQ= 4.91 P = 0.011 RV NO (YES)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.58	182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	15 18 21 0 X SQ= 14.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.56	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.89	8 8 10 1 X SQ= 3.24 P = 0.042 RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.98	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.94	1 17 47 1 X SQ= 51.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

190 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.86
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS COMMON LAW, RATHER THAN
CIVIL LAW (7)

192 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.54
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN
MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)

193 TENO LESS TO BE THOSE 0.54
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INOIGENOUS (86)

190 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN
COMMON LAW (32)

1	17
6	0

X SQ= 15.13
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

192 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN
MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)

22	0
26	18

X SQ= 10.40
P = 0.
RV NO (NO)

193 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)

22	0
26	18

X SQ= 10.40
P = 0.
RV NO (NO)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

19 IN LEFT COLUMN

BURMA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	GHANA	INDIA	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	JAMAICA	JORDAN
MALAYA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	SIERRE LEO	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	UGANDA	UAR	

24 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	GABON	GUINEA	IVORY COAST
LAOS	LEBANON	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	SENEGAL	SYRIA	TOGO
TUNISIA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP						

72 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURUNDI
CANADA	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDONESIA	IRAN	ITALY	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LIBERIA
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA
SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA
YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA								

10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.63	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.75
11	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.68	11	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (28)	0.62
19	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.78	19	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	1.00

7	18	
12	6	
X SQ=	4.87	
P =	0.016	
RV YES	(YES)	
6	15	
13	9	
X SQ=	2.91	
P =	0.067	
RV YES	(YES)	
7	18	
2	0	
X SQ=	1.69	
P =	0.103	
RV NO	(YES)	

23	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.74	23	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	1.00	5 0 14 24 X SQ= 4.82 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.63	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.83	12 4 7 20 X SQ= 7.92 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.53	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.87	10 3 9 21 X SQ= 6.31 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.58	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.96	8 22 11 1 X SQ= 12.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.53	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.83	M 10 4 9 20 X SQ= 4.72 P = 0.021 RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.68	36	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.96	6 1 13 23 X SQ= 4.01 P = 0.033 RV NO (YES)	
37	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.58	37	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.83	8 4 11 20 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.091 RV NO (YES)	
39	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.84	39	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	1.00	3 0 16 24 X SQ= 2.00 P = 0.079 RV NO (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.71	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.73	12 6 5 16 X SQ= 5.60 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)	

43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.53	43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	1.00	10 0 9 23 X SQ= 13.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.79	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.65	M 15 7 4 13 X SQ= 5.97 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)
54	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.84	54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	3 0 16 23 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.084 RV NO (YES)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.68	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.74	M 13 6 6 17 X SQ= 5.92 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)
56	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.68	56	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.64	M 13 8 6 14 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.062 RV YES (YES)
75	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.58	75	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.92	8 2 11 22 X SQ= 5.02 P = 0.013 RV NO (YES)
77	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.65	77	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.92	6 2 11 22 X SQ= 3.05 P = 0.049 RV NO (YES)
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.72	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.63	M 13 9 5 15 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)
85	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.53	85	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.79	9 5 10 19 X SQ= 2.30 P = 0.102 RV NO (YES)

86	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.53	86	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.79	9 5 10 19 X SQ= 2.30 P = 0.102 RV NO (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.56	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.85	9 3 7 17 X SQ= 5.08 P = 0.014 RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.67	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.77	M 12 5 6 17 X SQ= 6.13 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.69	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.95	9 1 4 18 X SQ= 11.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.91	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.71	10 5 1 12 X SQ= 7.83 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.53	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.91	10 2 9 20 X SQ= 7.35 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
108	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.79	108	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.53	11 9 3 10 X SQ= 2.11 P = 0.087 RV YES (YES)
113	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.58	113	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.86	8 3 11 19 X SQ= 2.88 P = 0.075 RV NO (YES)
117	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.53	117	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.79	10 5 9 19 X SQ= 3.42 P = 0.052 RV YES (YES)

125	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.67	125	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.91	12 20 6 2 X SQ= 2.28 P = 0.110 RV NO (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.77	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.77	M 10 5 3 17 X SQ= 7.71 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.77	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.68	10 7 3 15 X SQ= 4.97 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.71	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.80	M 5 16 12 4 X SQ= 7.63 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.64	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.90	9 2 5 19 X SQ= 9.29 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.83	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.68	M 3 15 15 7 X SQ= 8.64 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
141	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.86	141	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	1.00	2 0 12 22 X SQ= 1.16 P = 0.144 RV NO (YES)	
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.54	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.90	6 2 7 19 X SQ= 4.12 P = 0.033 RV NO (YES)	
144	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.60	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	3 15 2 0 X SQ= 2.96 P = 0.053 RV NO (YES)	

147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.75	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	3 0 9 22 X SQ= 3.32 P = 0.037 RV NO (YES)	
148	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.95	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.54	1 11 18 13 X SQ= 6.78 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.77	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.70	3 16 10 7 X SQ= 5.46 P = 0.014 RV YES (YES)	
164	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.50	164	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.86	M 7 18 7 3 X SQ= 3.65 P = 0.053 RV YES (YES)	
168	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.56	168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	7 0 9 23 X SQ= 9.47 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.63	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.74	10 6 6 17 X SQ= 3.78 P = 0.046 RV YES (YES)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.79	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.67	3 14 11 7 X SQ= 5.19 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
171	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.80	171	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	1.00	3 0 12 22 X SQ= 2.48 P = 0.059 RV NO (YES)	
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.63	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.96	7 1 12 22 X SQ= 5.17 P = 0.015 RV NO (YES)	

174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.53	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	7 0 8 22 X SQ= 9.80 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.73	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.82	11 4 4 18 X SQ= 9.08 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.57	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.83	6 19 8 4 X SQ= 4.59 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.57	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.84	6 16 8 3 X SQ= 4.48 P = 0.024 RV YES (YES)
185	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.71	185	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.78	5 2 2 7 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.126 RV YES (YES)
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.56	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.90	8 18 10 2 X SQ= 7.11 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
189	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.84	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	3 0 16 24 X SQ= 2.00 P = 0.079 RV NO (YES)
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.72	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.67	5 16 13 8 X SQ= 4.76 P = 0.028 RV YES (YES)

MATRIX

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

34 POLITIES
WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM,
OR LOW (62)

BURMA	CEYLON	INDIA	IRAQ	IRELAND	ALGERIA	MOROCCO	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	
ISRAEL	MALAYA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	UAR					

10 . 4

9 . 20

34 POLITIES
WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IS VERY LOW (53)

CYPRUS	GHANA	JAMAICA	JORDAN	SIERRE LEO	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	UGANDA		DAHOMEY	GABON	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	LAOS
					LEBANON	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER
					SENEGAL	SYRIA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UPPER VOLTA

M

MATRIX

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

8C POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

46 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)

BURMA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	GHANA	INDIA	ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	LEBANON	MALAGASY R	SYRIA
IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	JAMAICA	JORDAN	TUNISIA	VIETNAM REP			
MALAYA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	TRINIDAD	UAR					

15 . 7

4 . 13

46 POLITIES
WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS
BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)

SIERRE LEO	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	UGANDA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY
				GABON	IVORY COAST	LADS	MALI	NIGER
				SENEGAL	TOGO	UPPER VOLTA		

M

MATRIX

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

55 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
TEN OR MORE
PER THOUSAND (78)

BURMA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	GHANA	INDIA	ALGERIA	LEBANON	MOROCCO	SYRIA	TUNISIA
IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	JAMAICA	JORDAN	VIETNAM REP				
MALAYA	TRINIDAD	UAR							

13 | 6

6 | 17

55 POLITIES
WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS
LESS THAN TEN
PER THOUSAND (35)

NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	SIERRE LEO	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
UGANDA					DAHOMEY	GABON	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	LAOS
					MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	SENEGAL
					TOGO	UPPER VOLTA			

M

MATRIX

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

56 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)

BURMA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	INDIA	IRAQ	ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	LEBANON	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO
IRELAND	ISRAEL	JAMAICA	JORDAN	MALAYA	SENEGAL	SYRIA	TUNISIA		
PAKISTAN	TRINIDAD	UAR							

13 8

6 14

56 POLITIES
WHERE THE RELIGION IS
PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY
NON-LITERATE (31)

GHANA	NIGERIA	SIERRE LEO	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY
UGANDA					GABON	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	LAOS	MALAGASY R
					MALI	NIGER	TOGO	UPPER VOLTA	

M

MATRIX

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

84 POLITIES
WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN
UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)

BURMA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	INDIA	IRAQ	ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	LAOS	LEBANON	MOROCCO
ISRAEL	JAMAICA	JORDAN	MALAYA	PAKISTAN	SYRIA	TUNISIA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	
SUDAN	TRINIDAD	UAR							

13 9

5 15

84 POLITIES
WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN
DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)

GHANA	NIGERIA	SIERRE LEO	TANGANYIKA	UGANDA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY
					GABON	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	MALAGASY R	MALI
					MAURITANIA	NIGER	SENEGAL	TOGO	UPPER VOLTA

80/102

M

MATRIX

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

102 POLITIES
WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)

CEYLON	CYPRUS	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	CAMEROUN	LEBANON	MALAGASY R	MOROCCO	TUNISIA
JAMAICA	MALAYA	NIGERIA	SIERRE LEO	TANGANYIKA					
TRINIDAD	UGANDA								

12 . 5

6 . 17

102 POLITIES
WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)

BURMA	GHANA	JORDAN	PAKISTAN	SUDAN	ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
UAR					DAHOMEY	GABON	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	LAOS
					MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	SENEGAL	UPPER VOLTA
					VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP			

M

MATRIX

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

128 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)

CEYLON	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	JAMAICA	CAMEROUN	LEBANON	MALAGASY R	MOROCCO	SYRIA
MALAYA	NIGERIA	SIERRE LEO	TRINIDAD	UGANDA					

10 . 5

3 . 17

128 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)

GHANA	TANGANYIKA	UAR	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY
			GABON	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	MALI	MAURITANIA
			NIGER	SENEGAL	TOGO	TUNISIA	UPPER VOLTA
			VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP			

M

MATRIX

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

133 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE EXECUTIVE
IS SIGNIFICANT (29)

GHANA	INDIA	MALAYA	TANGANYIKA	UAR	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)
					DAHOMEY	GABON	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	MALI
					MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	SENEGAL	TUNISIA
					UPPER VOLTA				

5 . 16

12 . 4

133 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE EXECUTIVE
IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR
NEGLIGIBLE (76)

BURMA	CEYLON	IRELAND	ISRAEL	JAMAICA	MALAGASY R	TOGO	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
JORDAN	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	SIERRE LEO	SUDAN				
TRINIDAD	UGANDA							

M

MATRIX

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

139 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
ONE-PARTY (34)

GHANA	TANGANYIKA	UAR			ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	DAHOMEY
					GABON	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	MALI	MAURITANIA
					NIGER	SENEGAL	TUNISIA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N

3 . 15

15 . 7

139 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)

BURMA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	INDIA	IRELAND	CAMERDUN	CONGO(BRA)	LAOS	LEBANON	MALAGASY R
ISRAEL	JAMAICA	JORDAN	MALAYA	NIGERIA	MOROCCO	VIETNAM REP			
PAKISTAN	SIERRE LEO	SUDAN	TRINIDAD	UGANDA					

M

MATRIX

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

164 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS PRONDUNCED OR MODERATE (34)

GHANA	INDIA	JAMAICA	JORDAN	PAKISTAN	ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	CAMERDUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
TANGANYIKA	UAR				CONGD(BRA)	DAHOMEY	GABON	GUINEA	IVORY COAST
					MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	SENEGAL
					TUNISIA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N		

7 18

7 3

164 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)

CEYLON	IRELAND	ISRAEL	MALAYA	SIERRE LEO	LEBANON	MALAGASY R	VIETNAM REP
SUDAN	TRINIDAD						

M

MATRIX

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 POLITIES
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

185 POLITIES
WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY
IN POLITICS IS
INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN
SUPPORTIVE (21)

BURMA IRAQ PAKISTAN SUDAN UAR SYRIA TOGO

5 2

2 7

185 POLITIES
WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY
IN POLITICS IS
SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN
INTERVENTIVE (31)

GHANA JORDAN ALGERIA CAMBODIA GUINEA LEBANON SENEGAL
VIETNAM, N VIETNAM REP

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 81  POLITIES                                                          81  POLITIES
     WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION                             WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
     IS EARLY EUROPEAN OR                                                  IS LATER EUROPEAN OR
     EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN                                   LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN
     LATER EUROPEAN OR                                                     EARLY EUROPEAN OR
     LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED  (11)                                          EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED  (40)

                                                                                                   BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
*****************************************************************************************************************************

      11 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA   BELGIUM     CANADA      FRANCE      LUXEMBOURG  NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND SO AFRICA   SWITZERLAND UK
US

      40 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA     ARGENTINA   AUSTRIA     BOLIVIA     BRAZIL      BULGARIA    CHILE       COLOMBIA    COSTA RICA  CUBA
CZECHOS'KIA DENMARK     DOMIN REP   ECUADOR     EL SALVADOR FINLAND     GERMANY, E  GERMAN FR   GREECE      GUATEMALA
HAITI       HONDURAS    HUNGARY     ICELAND     IRELAND     ITALY       MEXICO      NICARAGUA   NORWAY      PANAMA
PARAGUAY    PERU        POLAND      PORTUGAL    RUMANIA     SPAIN       SWEDEN      URUGUAY     VENEZUELA   YUGOSLAVIA

      64 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN ALGERIA     BURMA       BURUNDI     CAMBODIA    CAMEROUN    CEN AFR REP CEYLON      CHAD        CHINA, PR
CONGO(BRA)  CONGO(LEO)  CYPRUS      DAHOMEY     ETHIOPIA    GABON       GHANA       GUINEA      INDIA       INDONESIA
IRAN        IRAQ        ISRAEL      IVORY COAST JAMAICA     JAPAN       JORDAN      KOREA, N    KOREA REP   LAOS
LEBANON     LIBERIA     LIBYA       MALAGASY R  MALAYA      MALI        MAURITANIA  MONGOLIA    MOROCCO     NEPAL
NIGER       NIGERIA     PAKISTAN    PHILIPPINES RWANDA      SA'U ARABIA SENEGAL     SIERRE LEO  SOMALIA     SUDAN
SYRIA       TANGANYIKA  THAILAND    TOGO        TRINIDAD    TUNISIA     TURKEY      UGANDA      USSR        UAR
UPPER VOLTA VIETNAM, N  VIETNAM REP YEMEN

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  2  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.91          2  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.70        10   12
     LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                            1   28
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (22)                      WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                      X SQ=  10.68
                                                              NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)            P =    0.
                                                                                                             RV YES (ND )

  5  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00          5  TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE            0.60         6   12
     LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE,                   LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE,               0    8
     RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE  (18)                         RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE  (18)               X SQ=   1.84
                                                                                                             P =    0.132
                                                                                                             RV NO  (ND )

  6  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00          6  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.50         0   20
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE                            LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN,                           11   20
     CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,                              CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA  (22)        X SQ=   7.07
     OR SOUTH AMERICA  (93)                                                                                  P =    0.004
                                                                                                             RV YES (ND )
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31	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	1.00	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.72	0 29 11 11 X SQ= 15.65 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.82	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.65	9 14 2 26 X SQ= 5.86 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.91	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.70	10 12 1 28 X SQ= 10.68 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	1.00	36	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.57	11 23 0 17 X SQ= 5.23 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.91	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.51	10 19 1 20 X SQ= 4.66 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
40	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	1.00	40	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.75	11 30 0 10 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.094 RV NO (NO)	
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.91	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.79	10 8 1 31 X SQ= 15.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	1.00	42	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.56	11 22 0 17 X SQ= 5.45 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.91	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.67	10 13 1 27 X SQ= 9.65 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.82	50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.51	9 17 2 18 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.082 RV YES (NO)	
51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	1.00	51	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.60	11 21 0 14 X SQ= 4.58 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	
53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (14)	0.55	53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.82	6 7 5 33 X SQ= 4.44 P = 0.021 RV YES (NO)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.73	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.72	3 29 8 11 X SQ= 5.74 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.55	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.84	6 6 5 32 X SQ= 4.99 P = 0.016 RV YES (YES)	
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.90	5 2 0 18 X SQ= 11.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	1.00	89	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.55	11 17 0 14 X SQ= 5.56 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
93	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	1.00	93	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.72	0 11 11 28 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)	
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.59	10 22 0 15 X SQ= 4.23 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	

98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.91	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.80	10 8 1 32 X SQ= 16.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	99	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.57	11 20 0 15 X SQ= 5.18 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.91	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.54	10 17 1 20 X SQ= 5.26 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	102	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.61	11 23 0 15 X SQ= 4.54 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	
105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	1.00	105	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.60	10 21 0 14 X SQ= 4.09 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	
107	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.91	107	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.56	10 22 1 17 X SQ= 3.06 P = 0.041 RV NO (NO)	
108	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	1.00	108	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.69	10 27 0 12 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.051 RV NO (NO)	
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.82	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.69	9 11 2 25 X SQ= 7.08 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.91	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.78	10 8 1 29 X SQ= 14.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	1.00	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.57	11 16 0 21 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
118	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	1.00	118	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.65	0 14 11 26 X SQ= 3.69 P = 0.023 RV NO (NO)
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.91	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.70	1 28 10 12 X SQ= 10.68 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
125	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.89	125	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.50	1 16 8 16 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.056 RV YES (NO)
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.89	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.75	1 24 8 8 X SQ= 9.51 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
130	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (12)	0.56	130	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.92	5 3 4 33 X SQ= 7.99 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.90	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.58	9 16 1 22 X SQ= 5.48 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.90	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.67	9 12 1 24 X SQ= 7.97 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	1.00	138	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.67	10 24 0 12 X SQ= 2.95 P = 0.044 RV NO (NO)

139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	139	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.72	0 11 11 28 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)	
141	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY (11)	0.50	141	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.92	5 3 5 35 X SQ= 7.30 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
145	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (11)	0.56	145	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.86	4 18 5 3 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.032 RV YES (YES)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.78	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.66	7 12 2 23 X SQ= 3.89 P = 0.027 RV YES (NO)	
153	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.91	153	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.54	10 19 1 16 X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)	
154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	1.00	154	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.66	11 23 0 12 X SQ= 3.48 P = 0.024 RV NO (NO)	
158	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.91	158	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.61	1 15 10 23 X SQ= 2.33 P = 0.076 RV NO (NO)	
161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.73	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.58	3 22 8 16 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.095 RV YES (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.91	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.61	10 15 1 23 X SQ= 7.09 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	

169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	1.00	169	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.66	11 25 0 13 X SQ= 3.52 P = 0.024 RV NO (NO)
170	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.91	170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.55	1 17 10 21 X SQ= 3.26 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)
172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.64	172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.90	7 4 4 35 X SQ= 11.31 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.91	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.72	10 10 1 26 X SQ= 11.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	1.00	175	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.61	11 22 0 14 X SQ= 4.38 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)
178	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.91	178	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.54	1 18 10 21 X SQ= 3.55 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)
179	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.80	179	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.50	2 17 8 17 X SQ= 1.74 P = 0.148 RV YES (NO)
181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	1.00	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.77	11 9 0 31 X SQ= 18.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
186	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.90	186	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.61	1 11 9 17 X SQ= 1.73 P = 0.124 RV NO (NO)

187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.91	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.65	1	22
						10	12
						X SQ=	8.18
						P =	0.002
						RV YES	(NO)
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.64	189	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.97	4	1
						7	39
						X SQ=	7.69
						P =	0.006
						RV NO	(YES)
190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.56	190	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.96	5	25
						4	1
						X SQ=	5.99
						P =	0.010
						RV NO	(YES)

82 POLITIES WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY [51]	B2 POLITIES WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED [55]

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

51 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY
LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA
YUGOSLAVIA									

55 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAQ	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST
JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA
UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN					

9 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	CHINA, PR	ETHIOPIA	IRAN	JAPAN	NEPAL	THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA [93]	0.57	2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	22 0 29 55 X SQ= 27.37 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA [93]	0.61	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.96	20 2 31 53 X SQ= 18.26 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
8	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	1.00	8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.75	0 14 51 41 X SQ= 12.82 P = 0. RV NO (YES)

10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.98	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.56	1 31 50 24 X SQ= 34.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
11	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.98	11	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.53	1 26 50 29 X SQ= 26.28 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
13	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	1.00	13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.76	0 13 51 42 X SQ= 11.63 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.95	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.94	1 31 20 2 X SQ= 38.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.59	24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.60	30 22 21 33 X SQ= 3.04 P = 0.080 RV YES (YES)
26	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.51	26	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.67	26 18 25 37 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.076 RV YES (YES)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.55	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.65	23 34 28 18 X SQ= 3.51 P = 0.048 RV YES (YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.85	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.78	41 11 7 38 X SQ= 36.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.84	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.77	8 41 43 12 X SQ= 37.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.73	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.67	37 18 14 37 X SQ= 15.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.67	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.89	34 6 17 49 X SQ= 32.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.94	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.76	48 13 3 42 X SQ= 50.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.58	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.91	29 5 21 50 X SQ= 26.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.80	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.56	41 22 10 28 X SQ= 12.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDEROEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.64	41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	18 0 32 54 X SQ= 21.06 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.66	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.98	33 1 17 52 X SQ= 44.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.80	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.79	40 11 10 42 X SQ= 33.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.55	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	23 0 28 55 X SQ= 29.08 P = 0. RV NO (YES)

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.82	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.80	42 10 9 40 X SQ= 36.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.54	51 27 0 23 X SQ= 27.82 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.57	50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.64	26 16 20 28 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.061 RV YES (YES)	
53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.75	53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	13 0 38 55 X SQ= 13.70 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.63	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.94	32 3 19 50 X SQ= 35.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.58	51 22 0 31 X SQ= 39.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.88	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.53	45 27 6 24 X SQ= 13.65 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.53	57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.98	24 1 27 54 X SQ= 27.59 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.73	0 15 51 40 X SQ= 14.03 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.86	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.96	44 2 7 53 X SQ= 70.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.63	66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.56	32 21 19 27 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.071 RV YES (YES)	
67	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.65	67	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.81	32 42 17 10 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.115 RV NO (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.71	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.73	36 15 15 40 X SQ= 18.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.80	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.64	41 20 10 35 X SQ= 19.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.69	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.87	15 6 34 42 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.047 RV NO (YES)	
71	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.76	71	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	1.00	12 0 37 53 X SQ= 12.45 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.86	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.98	42 1 7 52 X SQ= 69.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	1.00	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.87	49 7 0 46 X SQ= 74.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.72	79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	7 42 18 0 X SQ= 37.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.76	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.69	39 17 12 37 X SQ= 19.56 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	1.00	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.69	51 17 0 37 X SQ= 51.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.93	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.72	3 28 40 11 X SQ= 33.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.67	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.93	28 3 14 41 X SQ= 30.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
93	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.78	93	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.63	11 19 39 33 X SQ= 1.94 P = 0.131 RV NO (YES)	
94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.68	94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.53	32 17 15 19 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.073 RV YES (YES)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.78	95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.94	38 50 11 3 X SQ= 4.73 P = 0.020 RV NO (YES)	
96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.93	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.57	43 20 3 15 X SQ= 13.15 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.79	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.83	3 15 11 3 X SQ= 9.88 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
99	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.67	99	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.52	31 15 15 16 X SQ= 2.05 P = 0.105 RV YES (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.56	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.71	27 12 21 29 X SQ= 5.49 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.69	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.54	34 23 15 27 X SQ= 4.63 P = 0.025 RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.69	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.74	31 10 14 29 X SQ= 13.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.64	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.77	32 12 18 40 X SQ= 15.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.70	110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	12 0 28 48 X SQ= 14.22 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.57	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.66	20 35 27 18 X SQ= 4.64 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.56	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.94	27 3 21 51 X SQ= 29.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.83	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.70	40 16 8 38 X SQ= 27.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.73	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.50	14 20 37 20 X SQ= 3.95 P = 0.031 RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.57	119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.90	29 36 22 4 X SQ= 10.49 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.80	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	41 40 10 0 X SQ= 6.92 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.96	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.84	2 46 49 9 X SQ= 64.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.63	122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	19 55 32 0 X SQ= 46.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.59	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.78	17 38 24 11 X SQ= 10.76 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.61	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	25 49 16 0 X SQ= 20.66 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.64	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.60	30 17 17 25 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.035 RV YES (YES)	

129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.72	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.52	34 20 13 22 X SQ= 4.69 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	
131	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.65	131	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.62	12 16 22 10 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.067 RV YES (YES)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.90	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.50	5 24 43 24 X SQ= 16.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.74	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.72	34 12 12 31 X SQ= 17.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.78	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.57	11 21 39 28 X SQ= 4.01 P = 0.033 RV NO (YES)	
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.54	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.81	22 8 26 35 X SQ= 6.43 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.83	0 8 47 38 X SQ= 6.87 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.57	147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.93	19 3 25 38 X SQ= 12.42 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.74	0 14 50 39 X SQ= 13.12 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.63	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.64	29 10 17 18 X SQ= 4.18 P = 0.031 RV YES (YES)	
158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.67	158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.52	16 22 33 20 X SQ= 2.85 P = 0.088 RV YES (YES)	
160	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.65	160	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.82	17 7 32 33 X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.093 RV NO (YES)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.94	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.67	3 29 48 14 X SQ= 36.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.51	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.85	25 7 24 41 X SQ= 12.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.73	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.58	36 20 13 28 X SQ= 8.79 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.70	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.64	33 16 14 29 X SQ= 9.74 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.62	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.70	19 32 31 14 X SQ= 8.36 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.57	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.69	19 27 25 12 X SQ= 4.67 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)	

181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.61	181	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.95	20 1 31 20 X SQ= 6.96 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.56	31 20 0 25 X SQ= 23.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.51	187	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.74	23 35 22 12 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.030 RV NO (YES)	
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.59	188	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	1.00	30 0 21 54 X SQ= 41.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
190	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.86	190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS COMMON LAW, RATHER THAN CIVIL LAW (7)	1.00	30 0 5 2 X SQ= 4.33 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)	
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.52	0 26 51 28 X SQ= 30.10 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.98	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.52	1 26 50 28 X SQ= 26.92 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
194	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.84	194	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.95	8 3 42 52 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.111 RV NO (YES)	

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 83  POLITIES                                                          83  POLITIES
     WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION                             WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
     IS NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS  (9)                                    IS OTHER THAN
                                                                           NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS  (106)

                                                                                                          BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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       9 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN CHINA, PR   ETHIOPIA    IRAN        JAPAN       NEPAL       THAILAND    TURKEY      USSR

     106 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA     ALGERIA     ARGENTINA   AUSTRALIA   AUSTRIA     BELGIUM     BOLIVIA     BRAZIL      BULGARIA    BURMA
BURUNDI     CAMBODIA    CAMEROUN    CANADA      CEN AFR REP CEYLON      CHAD        CHILE       COLOMBIA    CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LED)  COSTA RICA  CUBA        CYPRUS      CZECHOS'KIA DAHOMEY     DENMARK     DOMIN REP   ECUADOR     EL SALVADOR
FINLAND     FRANCE      GABON       GERMANY, E  GERMAN FR   GHANA       GREECE      GUATEMALA   GUINEA      HAITI
HONDURAS    HUNGARY     ICELAND     INDIA       INDONESIA   IRAQ        IRELAND     ISRAEL      ITALY       IVORY COAST
JAMAICA     JORDAN      KOREA, N    KOREA REP   LAOS        LEBANON     LIBERIA     LIBYA       LUXEMBOURG  MALAGASY R
MALAYA      MALI        MAURITANIA  MEXICO      MONGOLIA    MOROCCO     NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NICARAGUA   NIGER
NIGERIA     NORWAY      PAKISTAN    PANAMA      PARAGUAY    PERU        PHILIPPINES POLAND      PORTUGAL    RUMANIA
RWANDA      SA'U ARABIA SENEGAL     SIERRE LEO  SOMALIA     SO AFRICA   SPAIN       SUDAN       SWEDEN      SWITZERLAND
SYRIA       TANGANYIKA  TOGO        TRINIDAD    TUNISIA     UGANDA      UAR         UK          US          UPPER VOLTA
URUGUAY     VENEZUELA   VIETNAM, N  VIETNAM REP YEMEN       YUGOSLAVIA

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 15  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.75   15  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.80        3    8
     LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN            LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR                          1   32
     IN NORTH AFRICA OR                                 CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN         X SQ=   3.30
     CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (11)                     IN THE MIDDLE EAST  (33)                      P =    0.043
                                                                                                      RV YES (NO )

 17  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00   17  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.73        3    8
     LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN            LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN,                           0   22
     IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR              CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA,            X SQ=   3.71
     SOUTH AMERICA  (11)                                RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST  (22)          P =    0.030
                                                                                                      RV YES (NO )

 18  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.80   18  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.70        1   32
     LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR               LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR                          4   14
     SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN                     CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN         X SQ=   2.92
     NORTH AFRICA OR                                    IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR                  P =    0.047
     CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (18)                     SOUTHEAST ASIA  (33)                          RV YES (NO )

 20  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00   20  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.61        4   14
     LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR               LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN,                           0   22
     SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN                     CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA,            X SQ=   3.24
     THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,                    RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA,         P =    0.033
     OR SOUTH AMERICA  (18)                             OR SOUTHEAST ASIA  (22)                       RV YES (NO )
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21	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (32)	0.56	21	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.75	5 27 4 79 X SQ= 2.39 P = 0.113 RV YES (NO)	
23	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (27)	0.67	23	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.80	6 21 3 85 X SQ= 7.70 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
24	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	1.00	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.51	9 52 0 54 X SQ= 6.72 P = 0.003 RV YES (ND)	
30	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.78	30	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.53	7 49 2 55 X SQ= 2.01 P = 0.094 RV YES (ND)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.78	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.66	2 58 7 30 X SQ= 4.88 P = 0.025 RV YES (ND)	
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	63	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.57	0 46 8 60 X SQ= 4.16 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	
68	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.87	68	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.52	1 51 7 55 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)	
71	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	1.00	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.88	9 12 0 90 X SQ= 36.42 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	1.00	87	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.62	0 31 7 51 X SQ= 2.57 P = 0.050 RV NO (NO)	

94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.78	94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.59	2 49 7 34 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.073 RV YES (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.56	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.78	4 63 5 18 X SQ= 3.14 P = 0.044 RV YES (NO)	
102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.78	102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.58	2 57 7 42 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.076 RV YES (NO)	
108	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.67	108	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.68	3 62 6 29 X SQ= 2.96 P = 0.062 RV YES (NO)	
119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	119	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.71	9 65 0 26 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.107 RV NO (NO)	
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.70	9 74 0 32 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)	
125	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	1.00	125	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.61	9 55 0 35 X SQ= 3.85 P = 0.025 RV NO (NO)	
133	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	1.00	133	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.70	0 29 9 67 X SQ= 2.40 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)	
134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.78	134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.59	2 55 7 39 X SQ= 3.03 P = 0.074 RV YES (NO)	

135	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS NEGLIGIBLE (13)	0.57	135	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.89	3 74 4 9 X SQ= 7.76 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.75	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.73	6 24 2 65 X SQ= 5.84 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.78	169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.58	2 56 7 41 X SQ= 2.88 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	1.00	170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.58	0 39 9 54 X SQ= 4.46 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.75	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.76	2 70 6 22 X SQ= 7.16 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.86	0 25 5 4 X SQ= 12.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.83	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.68	5 26 1 55 X SQ= 4.35 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	

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84  POLITIES                                                    84  POLITIES
    WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION                       WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
    IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN                              IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN
    UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY  (31)                                      DEVELOPED TUTELARY  (24)

                                                                                                  BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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31 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CYPRUS	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAQ	ISRAEL	JAMAICA
JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAYA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	SA'U ARABIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UAR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YEMEN									

24 IN RIGHT COLUMN

BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA
IVORY COAST	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA						

60 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA
CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY
ICELAND	IRAN	IRELAND	ITALY	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA

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 8  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                  0.55        8  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00        14    0
    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA                    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA                 17   24
    SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA  (97)                    SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA  (97)          X SQ=  12.26
                                                                                                         P =    0.
                                                                                                         RV NO  (YES)

10  TEND TO BE THOSE                       0.77       10  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00         7   24
    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,                LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR                         24    0
    OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (82)                      CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (33)               X SQ=  29.89
                                                                                                         P =    0.
                                                                                                         RV YES (YES)

13  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                  0.58       13  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00        13    0
    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA DR              LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR           18   24
    THE MIDDLE EAST  (99)                                  THE MIDDLE EAST  (99)                        X SQ=  10.96
                                                                                                         P =    0.
                                                                                                         RV NO  (YES)
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15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.53	15	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	1.00	8 0 7 24 X SQ= 13.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.67	18	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	1.00	7 24 14 0 X SQ= 20.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
19	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.78	19	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	1.00	7 24 2 0 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.068 RV NO (YES)	
22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.52	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.79	15 19 16 5 X SQ= 4.20 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.55	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.79	17 5 14 19 X SQ= 5.18 P = 0.014 RV YES (YES)	
25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.81	25	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	1.00	6 0 25 24 X SQ= 3.41 P = 0.030 RV NO (NO)	
26	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.52	26	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.87	15 3 16 21 X SQ= 6.37 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)	
28	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.77	28	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.50	23 11 7 11 X SQ= 2.90 P = 0.076 RV YES (YES)	
29	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.56	29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	1.00	11 0 14 24 X SQ= 11.21 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

30	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.62	30	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.96	18 23 11 1 X SQ= 6.73 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.52	34	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.92	16 2 15 22 X SQ= 9.63 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.81	36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	1.00	6 0 25 24 X SQ= 3.41 P = 0.030 RV NO (NO)	
37	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.58	37	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	1.00	13 0 18 24 X SQ= 10.96 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
39	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.84	39	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	1.00	5 0 26 24 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.061 RV NO (NO)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.69	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.83	18 4 8 20 X SQ= 11.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPEO (57)	0.62	43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	1.00	11 0 18 24 X SQ= 9.30 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
45	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.62	45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	10 0 16 24 X SQ= 9.26 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.86	46	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.86	24 3 4 19 X SQ= 22.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.80	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.71	6 10 24 4 X SQ= 8.80 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.50	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.86	14 12 14 2 X SQ= 3.65 P = 0.042 RV YES (NO)	
52	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.79	52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	22 14 6 0 X SQ= 1.97 P = 0.083 RV NO (NO)	
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.72	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.96	21 1 8 23 X SQ= 22.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.89	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.87	24 3 3 21 X SQ= 26.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.61	58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.87	12 3 19 21 X SQ= 3.46 P = 0.037 RV NO (YES)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.67	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.86	18 3 9 18 X SQ= 11.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.52	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.83	16 4 15 20 X SQ= 5.71 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.76	73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	1.00	7 0 22 24 X SQ= 4.74 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)	

80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.59	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.75	13 5 9 15 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.57	85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	1.00	17 0 13 24 X SQ= 17.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.57	86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	1.00	17 0 13 24 X SQ= 17.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.61	87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	1.00	7 21 11 0 X SQ= 14.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
91	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.78	91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	7 21 2 0 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.083 RV NO (YES)
101	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.60	101	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.88	10 2 15 14 X SQ= 2.36 P = 0.084 RV NO (NO)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.53	117	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	1.00	16 0 14 24 X SQ= 15.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.60	118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.80	18 2 12 8 X SQ= 3.33 P = 0.065 RV YES (NO)
121	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.71	121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	1.00	22 24 9 0 X SQ= 6.34 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)

124	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.68	124	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.92	8 17 X SQ= P = RV NO	2 22 2.89 0.074 (YES)
128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.56	128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.71	10 8 X SQ= P = RV YES	7 17 1.98 0.117 (YES)
132	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.75	132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	12 4 X SQ= P = RV NO	23 0 3.98 0.022 (YES)
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.67	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.67	8 16 X SQ= P = RV YES	16 8 4.08 0.025 (YES)
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.52	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.83	11 12 X SQ= P = RV YES	19 4 4.70 0.029 (YES)
135	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.84	135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	16 3 X SQ= P = RV NO	22 0 1.78 0.091 (YES)
137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.68	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	6 13 X SQ= P = RV NO	0 24 6.37 0.004 (YES)
138	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.58	138	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.83	8 11 X SQ= P = RV NO	4 20 2.26 0.091 (YES)
139	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.69	139	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.57	8 18 X SQ= P = RV YES	13 10 2.34 0.088 (YES)

147	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.82	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	3 0 14 24 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.064 RV NO (YES)
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (14)	0.58	0 14 29 10 X SQ= 20.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
157	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.76	157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	1.00	5 0 16 23 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.019 RV NO (YES)
160	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.63	160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	7 0 12 21 X SQ= 7.00 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)
161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.58	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.76	11 5 8 16 X SQ= 3.51 P = 0.051 RV YES (YES)
164	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.56	164	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.83	14 15 11 3 X SQ= 2.42 P = 0.099 RV NO (YES)
168	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.73	168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	7 0 19 22 X SQ= 4.94 P = 0.011 RV NO (YES)
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.68	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.64	7 14 15 8 X SQ= 3.28 P = 0.042 RV YES (YES)
174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.70	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	7 0 16 22 X SQ= 5.78 P = 0.009 RV NO (YES)

175	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.52	175	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.77	11 5 12 17 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.120 RV NO (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.55	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.92	10 22 12 2 X SQ= 9.50 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.86	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.92	18 2 3 22 X SQ= 24.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.57	183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	1.00	3 22 4 0 X SQ= 10.17 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.50	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.86	11 3 11 18 X SQ= 4.72 P = 0.022 RV YES (YES)	
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.87	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.92	4 22 26 2 X SQ= 29.71 P = D. RV YES (YES)	

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 85  POLITIES                                                          85  POLITIES
     WHERE THE STAGE OF                                                    WHERE THE STAGE OF
     POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS                                            POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS
     ADVANCED, RATHER THAN                                                 MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL,
     MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL  (60)                                      RATHER THAN ADVANCED  (54)

                                                                                                   BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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      60 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA      ALGERIA      ARGENTINA    AUSTRALIA    AUSTRIA      BELGIUM      BRAZIL       BULGARIA     CANADA       CHILE
CHINA, PR    COSTA RICA   CUBA         CYPRUS       CZECHOS'KIA  DENMARK      FINLAND      FRANCE       GERMANY, E   GERMAN FR
GREECE       GUATEMALA    HUNGARY      ICELAND      INDIA        IRAQ         IRELAND      ISRAEL       ITALY        JAPAN
JORDAN       KOREA, N     KOREA REP    LEBANON      LUXEMBOURG   MEXICO       MONGOLIA     MOROCCO      NETHERLANDS  NEW ZEALAND
NORWAY       PAKISTAN     PHILIPPINES  POLAND       PORTUGAL     RUMANIA      SPAIN        SUDAN        SWEDEN       SWITZERLAND
SYRIA        TUNISIA      TURKEY       USSR         UAR          UK           US           URUGUAY      VENEZUELA    YUGOSLAVIA

      54 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN  BOLIVIA      BURMA        BURUNDI      CAMBODIA     CAMEROUN     CEN AFR REP  CEYLON       CHAD         COLOMBIA
CONGO(BRA)   CONGO(LEO)   DAHOMEY      DOMIN REP    ECUADOR      EL SALVADOR  ETHIOPIA     GABON        GHANA        GUINEA
HAITI        HONDURAS     INDONESIA    IRAN         IVORY COAST  JAMAICA      LAOS         LIBERIA      LIBYA        MALAGASY R
MALAYA       MALI         MAURITANIA   NEPAL        NICARAGUA    NIGER        NIGERIA      PANAMA       PARAGUAY     PERU
RWANDA       SENEGAL      SIERRE LEO   SOMALIA      SO AFRICA    TANGANYIKA   THAILAND     TOGO         TRINIDAD     UGANDA
UPPER VOLTA  VIETNAM, N   VIETNAM REP  YEMEN

       1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA'U ARABIA

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  2  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.63          2  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                         1.00        22    0
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                  LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          38   54
     WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                                  WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                   X SQ=  22.24
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)                        NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)         P =    0.
                                                                                                            RV NO  (YES)

  9  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                    0.98          9  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.85         1    8
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                  LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          59   46
     SOUTHEAST ASIA  (106)                                      SOUTHEAST ASIA  (106)                       X SQ=   5.07
                                                                                                            P =    0.013
                                                                                                            RV NO  (YES)

 10  TEND TO BE THOSE                         0.92         10  TEND TO BE THOSE                         0.52         5   28
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,                    LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR                        55   26
     OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (82)                          CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (33)              X SQ=  24.10
                                                                                                            P =    0.
                                                                                                            RV YES (YES)
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13	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.82	13	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.93	11 4 49 50 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.102 RV NO (YES)	
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.58	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.90	7 3 5 28 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.62	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.74	5 28 8 10 X SQ= 3.83 P = 0.041 RV YES (NO)	
19	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.64	19	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.68	5 28 9 13 X SQ= 3.36 P = 0.056 RV YES (NO)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.68	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.65	41 19 19 35 X SQ= 11.23 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.55	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.72	33 15 27 39 X SQ= 7.56 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
28	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.52	28	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.65	28 33 30 18 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.122 RV YES (YES)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.84	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.80	46 10 9 39 X SQ= 39.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.73	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.75	16 40 44 13 X SQ= 24.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

32	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.83	32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	10 0 50 54 X SQ= 7.89 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
33	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.53	33	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.96	28 2 32 52 X SQ= 24.88 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.78	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.74	47 14 13 40 X SQ= 29.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.60	35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	24 0 36 54 X SQ= 25.01 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.63	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.93	38 4 22 50 X SQ= 35.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.85	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.78	51 12 9 42 X SQ= 42.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.83	38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	10 0 48 54 X SQ= 8.21 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.59	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.94	35 3 24 51 X SQ= 34.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.90	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.65	52 18 6 33 X SQ= 32.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.67	41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	19 0 39 54 X SQ= 19.04 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.59	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.96	34 2 24 52 X SQ= 36.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.79	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.83	46 9 12 45 X SQ= 41.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.58	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	25 0 35 54 X SQ= 26.44 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.79	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.79	44 11 12 41 X SQ= 33.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.98	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.53	57 27 1 24 X SQ= 29.04 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
52	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.79	52	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.92	46 36 12 3 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.095 RV NO (NO)	
53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.77	53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	14 0 46 54 X SQ= 12.28 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.61	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.98	36 1 23 52 X SQ= 41.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.97	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.60	57 21 2 32 X SQ= 40.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.96	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.56	55 23 2 29 X SQ= 33.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.64	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.85	38 8 21 46 X SQ= 26.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.68	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.63	38 18 18 31 X SQ= 8.96 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.88	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.56	52 28 7 22 X SQ= 12.71 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.63	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.74	37 14 22 40 X SQ= 13.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.73	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.63	43 20 16 34 X SQ= 13.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.66	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.96	19 2 37 47 X SQ= 12.74 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.61	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.67	34 18 22 36 X SQ= 7.21 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)

73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.80	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.65	45 19 11 35 X SQ= 21.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.56	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	26 0 33 53 X SQ= 28.00 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.82	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.75	49 13 11 40 X SQ= 34.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.54	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	26 0 22 48 X SQ= 32.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.68	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.72	15 13 7 34 X SQ= 8.59 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
78	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.68	78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	15 13 7 0 X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.031 RV NO (NO)
80	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.64	80	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.66	9 10 5 19 X SQ= 2.30 P = 0.102 RV YES (NO)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.70	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.76	39 12 17 37 X SQ= 19.56 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.65	17 13 0 24 X SQ= 17.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.88	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.69	6 25 46 11 X SQ= 28.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.56	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.90	29 4 23 38 X SQ= 19.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.75	92	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.91	15 5 44 48 X SQ= 3.84 P = 0.046 RV NO (YES)	
94	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.63	94	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.54	35 16 21 19 X SQ= 1.83 P = 0.133 RV YES (NO)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.75	95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.98	45 49 15 1 X SQ= 9.83 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.89	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.52	50 17 6 16 X SQ= 13.95 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.71	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.94	6 16 15 1 X SQ= 13.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.73	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.72	41 8 15 21 X SQ= 14.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.59	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.79	32 9 22 34 X SQ= 12.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.64	102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.55	36 23 20 28 X SQ= 3.23 P = 0.054 RV YES (YES)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.63	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.71	31 12 18 29 X SQ= 9.02 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.55	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.74	33 13 27 37 X SQ= 8.27 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.69	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.55	31 22 14 27 X SQ= 4.56 P = 0.023 RV YES (YES)	
114	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.51	114	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.66	28 33 29 17 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.117 RV YES (YES)	
115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.64	115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	20 0 36 54 X SQ= 21.23 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.55	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.98	31 1 25 53 X SQ= 35.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.77	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.69	43 17 13 37 X SQ= 20.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.62	119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.92	37 36 23 3 X SQ= 9.93 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	

120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.83	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	50 39 10 0 X SQ= 5.51 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.78	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.74	13 40 47 14 X SQ= 29.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.53	122	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.93	32 50 28 4 X SQ= 19.79 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.87	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	52 54 8 0 X SQ= 5.83 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.57	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.84	20 43 27 8 X SQ= 16.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.66	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	31 51 16 0 X SQ= 18.33 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
127	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.71	127	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.86	15 6 36 36 X SQ= 2.21 P = 0.134 RV NO (YES)	
130	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.81	130	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.94	10 2 42 29 X SQ= 1.64 P = 0.125 RV NO (NO)	
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.83	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.60	9 20 45 30 X SQ= 5.92 P = 0.009 RV NO (YES)	

135	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.95	135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.78	41 36 2 10 X SQ= 4.19 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)	
136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.76	136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	12 0 39 46 X SQ= 10.28 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.53	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.96	27 2 24 44 X SQ= 24.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.69	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.71	34 14 15 34 X SQ= 14.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
140	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.93	140	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.80	4 9 50 36 X SQ= 2.40 P = 0.079 RV NO (YES)	
142	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.61	142	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.77	20 10 31 34 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.121 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.57	147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.93	20 3 27 40 X SQ= 13.13 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.72	0 14 60 36 X SQ= 16.81 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.70	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.81	37 5 16 22 X SQ= 16.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.78	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.67	12 28 42 14 X SQ= 17.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.79	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.50	12 21 44 21 X SQ= 7.54 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.52	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.90	29 5 27 44 X SQ= 18.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.63	169	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.53	35 23 21 26 X SQ= 1.97 P = 0.120 RV YES (YES)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.77	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.55	12 27 41 22 X SQ= 10.03 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
171	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.82	171	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.94	9 3 42 48 X SQ= 2.36 P = 0.122 RV NO (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.66	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.66	35 16 18 31 X SQ= 8.96 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.58	178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.61	22 31 31 20 X SQ= 3.13 P = 0.054 RV YES (YES)	
179	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.52	179	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.67	24 27 26 13 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.087 RV YES (YES)	

181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.64	181	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.95	20 1 35 20 X SQ= 6.09 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.95	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.53	35 20 2 23 X SQ= 19.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.54	187	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.80	30 35 26 9 X SQ= 6.21 P = 0.011 RV NO (YES)	
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.87	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.65	8 18 52 34 X SQ= 5.93 P = 0.013 RV NO (YES)	
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.53	0 28 60 25 X SQ= 39.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.80	194	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.98	12 1 47 53 X SQ= 7.74 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	

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B6 POLITIES
WHERE THE STAGE OF
POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS
ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL,
RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)

B6 POLITIES
WHERE THE STAGE OF
POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS
EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN
ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

76 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
CANADA	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN
JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR
UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA				

38 IN RIGHT COLUMN

BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY
GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN		

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA'U ARABIA

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.71	2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	22 0 54 38 X SQ= 11.84 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.74	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.95	20 2 56 36 X SQ= 5.92 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)	
9	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.97	9	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.82	2 7 74 31 X SQ= 6.65 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	

10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.91	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.68
13	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.83	13	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.95
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.56	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.96
16	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (11)	0.50	16	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	0.90
18	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.56	18	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.74
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.74	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.93
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.69	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.82
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.63	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.68
26	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.51	26	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.71

7	26	10	X SQ= 40.35
69	12		P = 0.
			RV YES (YES)
13	2	13	X SQ= 2.16
63	36		P = 0.088
			RV NO (NO)
9	1	15	X SQ= 12.74
7	26		P = 0.
			RV YES (YES)
9	1	16	X SQ= 2.91
9	9		P = 0.048
			RV YES (YES)
7	26	18	X SQ= 3.25
9	9		P = 0.057
			RV YES (YES)
7	26	19	X SQ= 22.94
20	2		P = 0.
			RV YES (YES)
9	9	20	X SQ= 6.38
20	2		P = 0.006
			RV YES (YES)
48	12	24	X SQ= 8.91
28	26		P = 0.003
			RV YES (NO)
37	11	26	X SQ= 3.28
39	27		P = 0.048
			RV NO (NO)

29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.77	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.94	54 2 16 32 X SQ= 43.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.68	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.86	24 32 52 5 X SQ= 27.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
32	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.87	32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	10 0 66 38 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
33	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.62	33	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.97	29 1 47 37 X SQ= 14.71 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.70	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.79	53 8 23 30 X SQ= 22.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.68	35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	24 0 52 38 X SQ= 13.36 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.51	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.92	39 3 37 35 X SQ= 18.70 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.79	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.92	60 3 16 35 X SQ= 48.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.86	38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	10 0 64 38 X SQ= 4.10 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)	

39	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.51	39	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.97	37 1 38 37 X SQ= 22.60 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.82	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.74	61 9 13 26 X SQ= 30.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.51	42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	1.00	36 0 38 38 X SQ= 25.06 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.68	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.87	50 5 24 33 X SQ= 27.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.67	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	25 0 51 38 X SQ= 14.15 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.68	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.83	49 6 23 30 X SQ= 23.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.96	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.63	71 13 3 22 X SQ= 43.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
52	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.80	52	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.96	57 25 14 1 X SQ= 2.55 P = 0.063 RV NO (NO)	
54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.51	54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	37 0 38 37 X SQ= 25.07 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.93	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.78	70 8 5 29 X SQ= 56.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.89	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.64	65 13 8 23 X SQ= 30.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.67	57	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	1.00	25 0 51 38 X SQ= 14.15 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.60	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.97	45 1 30 37 X SQ= 32.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.67	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.76	48 8 24 25 X SQ= 14.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.59	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.82	44 7 31 31 X SQ= 14.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.69	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.71	52 11 23 27 X SQ= 15.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.73	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.94	19 2 52 32 X SQ= 5.03 P = 0.017 RV NO (NO)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.69	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.95	50 2 22 36 X SQ= 38.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.85	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.92	61 3 11 35 X SQ= 57.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.65	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	26 0 48 38 X SQ= 15.47 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.79	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.92	59 3 16 35 X SQ= 48.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.57	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	26 0 35 35 X SQ= 18.36 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.74	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.91	25 3 9 32 X SQ= 27.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.53	79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	20 29 18 0 X SQ= 16.45 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
80	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.64	80	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.66	9 10 5 19 X SQ= 2.30 P = 0.102 RV YES (NO)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.75	82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	51 0 17 37 X SQ= 51.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.65	17 13 0 24 X SQ= 17.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL [58]	0.87	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.92	8 23 55 2 X SQ= 45.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL [33]	0.52	89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	33 0 31 30 X SQ= 21.63 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
91	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL [31]	0.67	91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	8 23 4 0 X SQ= 5.68 P = 0.009 RV NO (YES)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN [95]	0.80	95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.97	59 35 15 1 X SQ= 4.64 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN [16]	0.54	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.90	13 9 15 1 X SQ= 4.09 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	
99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD [50]	0.62	99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT [36]	0.63	43 6 26 10 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.094 RV YES (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC [41]	0.51	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC [57]	0.79	35 6 34 22 X SQ= 5.86 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE [43]	0.60	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE [47]	0.77	36 7 24 23 X SQ= 9.36 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS [46]	0.52	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL [65]	0.80	39 7 36 28 X SQ= 8.77 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	

110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.75	110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	15 0 45 34 X SQ= 8.34 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.50	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.71	36 25 36 10 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)
116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.56	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	32 0 40 38 X SQ= 21.71 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.75	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.84	54 6 18 32 X SQ= 32.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
119	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.70	119	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.87	53 20 23 3 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.114 RV NO (NO)
120	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.87	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	66 23 10 0 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.111 RV NO (NO)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.75	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.89	19 34 57 4 X SQ= 39.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.58	122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	44 38 32 0 X SQ= 20.21 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
125	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.55	125	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.81	34 29 28 7 X SQ= 5.49 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)

126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.74	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	46 36 16 0 X SQ= 9.29 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
128	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.59	128	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.63	36 12 25 20 X SQ= 3.08 P = 0.054 RV YES (NO)	
129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.67	129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.53	41 15 20 17 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
131	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.62	131	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.67	18 12 29 6 X SQ= 3.15 P = 0.054 RV YES (NO)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.85	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.53	10 19 58 17 X SQ= 15.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.51	134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.69	33 24 34 11 X SQ= 2.74 P = 0.092 RV YES (NO)	
136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.81	136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	12 0 50 35 X SQ= 6.05 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.56	137	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.94	27 2 35 33 X SQ= 13.53 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.66	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.80	41 7 21 28 X SQ= 17.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

140	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.91	140	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.79	6 7 60 26 X SQ= 1.87 P = 0.118 RV NO (YES)	
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.60	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.84	25 5 38 27 X SQ= 4.63 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)	
146	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.95	146	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.85	3 5 63 29 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.117 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.64	147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.94	21 2 37 30 X SQ= 8.22 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.62	0 14 73 23 X SQ= 28.33 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.60	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.76	38 4 25 13 X SQ= 5.87 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.68	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.61	21 19 44 12 X SQ= 6.11 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
160	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.61	160	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.88	25 4 39 28 X SQ= 5.94 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.81	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.71	13 20 57 8 X SQ= 22.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.62	169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.59	44 14 27 20 X SQ= 3.22 P = 0.059 RV YES (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.62	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.71	41 10 25 24 X SQ= 8.34 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.60	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.72	27 26 41 10 X SQ= 8.70 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
181	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.69	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	21 0 46 9 X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.056 RV NO (NO)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.96	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.72	46 9 2 23 X SQ= 37.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.71	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.88	2 23 5 3 X SQ= 7.76 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.57	188	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	1.00	32 0 43 37 X SQ= 20.06 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
190	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.86	190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS COMMON LAW, RATHER THAN CIVIL LAW (7)	1.00	32 0 5 2 X SQ= 4.66 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.88	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.54	9 17 66 20 X SQ= 14.17 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.97	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.70	2	26
						74	11
						X SQ=	57.51
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
194	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.84	194	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.97	12	1
						63	37
						X SQ=	3.21
						P =	0.057
						RV NO	(NO)

87 POLITIES WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	87 POLITIES WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

31 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP
GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	INDONESIA	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER
RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA
VENEZUELA									

58 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E
GERMAN FR	GREECE	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRAQ	IRELAND	ITALY	JAPAN
JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY
PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA
THAILAND	TURKEY	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA		

23 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CUBA	GUATEMALA	INDIA	IRAN	JAMAICA
LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MORDCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
TRINIDAD	UGANDA	VIETNAM REP							

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

KOREA REP	PERU	YEMEN

2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.62	0 / 31	22 / 36
						X SQ= 13.65	
						P = 0.	
						RV NO (NO)	
10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.81	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.97	25 / 6	2 / 56
						X SQ= 53.37	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.96	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.80	1 / 25	8 / 2
						X SQ= 18.46	
						P = 0.	
						RV YES (YES)	

18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.93	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.80	25 2 2 8 X SQ= 15.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.89	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.82	25 2 3 9 X SQ= 15.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.71	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.64	9 37 22 21 X SQ= 8.43 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
25	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	1.00	25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.79	0 12 31 46 X SQ= 5.75 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.81	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.55	6 32 25 26 X SQ= 9.18 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
28	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.66	28	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.56	19 24 10 31 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.069 RV YES (NO)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.83	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.77	5 40 25 12 X SQ= 25.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.84	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.73	26 15 5 41 X SQ= 23.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	32	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.84	0 9 31 49 X SQ= 3.78 P = 0.024 RV NO (NO)

33	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.97	33	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.57	1 25 30 33 X SQ= 13.67 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.77	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.72	7 42 24 16 X SQ= 18.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.90	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.60	3 35 28 23 X SQ= 19.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.77	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.83	7 48 24 10 X SQ= 28.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.84	0 9 31 47 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.024 RV NO (NO)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.90	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.54	3 31 28 26 X SQ= 15.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.63	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.82	11 46 19 10 X SQ= 16.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	1.00	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.60	0 34 29 23 X SQ= 26.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.90	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.76	3 42 28 13 X SQ= 32.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.57	0	25
						31	33
						X SQ=	16.51
						P =	0.
						RV NO	(NO)
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.87	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.75	4	40
						27	13
						X SQ=	28.24
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.66	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.93	10	52
						19	4
						X SQ=	30.09
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
52	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.95	52	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.76	20	42
						1	13
						X SQ=	2.46
						P =	0.095
						RV NO	(NO)
53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.76	0	14
						31	44
						X SQ=	7.15
						P =	0.002
						RV NO	(NO)
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.97	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.59	1	33
						30	23
						X SQ=	23.72
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.68	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.93	10	52
						21	4
						X SQ=	32.88
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.65	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.91	11	50
						20	5
						X SQ=	26.91
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.94	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.65	2	37
						29	20
						X SQ=	25.49
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)

66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.64	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.61	10 33 18 21 X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.037 RV YES (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.77	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.61	7 35 24 22 X SQ= 10.62 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.77	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.75	7 43 24 14 X SQ= 20.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
70	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.90	70	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.70	3 16 26 38 X SQ= 2.96 P = 0.057 RV NO (NO)	
71	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	1.00	71	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.65	0 19 31 36 X SQ= 11.81 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.90	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.69	3 38 28 17 X SQ= 25.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.90	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.91	3 50 28 5 X SQ= 51.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.54	0 26 30 31 X SQ= 17.40 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.81	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.77	6 44 25 13 X SQ= 25.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.59	D 26 30 18 X SQ= 24.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.83	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.65	5 11 25 6 X SQ= 9.12 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	78	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.61	5 11 0 7 X SQ= 1.26 P = 0.147 RV NO (NO)	
79	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.88	79	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.64	23 14 3 8 X SQ= 2.87 P = 0.082 RV NO (YES)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.90	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.78	3 40 28 11 X SQ= 33.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	83	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.88	0 7 31 51 X SQ= 2.57 P = 0.050 RV NO (NO)	
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.75	84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	7 11 21 0 X SQ= 14.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.81	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.81	6 46 25 11 X SQ= 28.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.74	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.96	8 55 23 2 X SQ= 45.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

93	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.55	93	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.77	14 13 17 44 X SQ= 3.73 P = 0.052 RV NO (YES)	
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.73	31 41 0 15 X SQ= 8.24 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.68	7 7 0 15 X SQ= 7.34 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.64	0 21 31 37 X SQ= 12.75 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.54	99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.73	6 40 7 15 X SQ= 2.29 P = 0.098 RV YES (NO)	
101	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.72	101	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.51	7 27 18 28 X SQ= 2.33 P = 0.092 RV NO (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.76	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.57	6 28 19 21 X SQ= 6.05 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.80	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.53	6 30 24 27 X SQ= 7.34 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.67	0 14 27 29 X SQ= 9.05 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.67	0	18	X SQ= 10.93 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
						31	37	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.94	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.51	2	28	X SQ= 15.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
						29	27	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.71	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.67	9	37	X SQ= 10.17 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
						22	18	
119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.62	17	36	X SQ= 7.39 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
						0	22	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.77	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.71	24	17	X SQ= 16.93 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
						7	41	
122	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.94	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.55	29	32	X SQ= 12.08 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
						2	26	
123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.86	31	50	X SQ= 3.16 P = 0.047 RV NO (NO)
						0	8	
125	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.82	125	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.51	23	24	X SQ= 5.98 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)
						5	23	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.66	28	31	X SQ= 10.17 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
						0	16	

128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.71	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.57	8 26 20 20 X SQ= 4.41 P = 0.030 RV YES (YES)
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.73	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.92	22 4 8 47 X SQ= 34.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.90	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.53	26 24 3 27 X SQ= 12.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.80	28 32 0 8 X SQ= 4.57 P = 0.017 RV NO (NO)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.78	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.59	6 30 21 21 X SQ= 8.10 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.55	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.71	16 16 13 39 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.032 RV YES (YES)
140	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.79	140	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.94	6 3 22 50 X SQ= 3.15 P = 0.058 RV NO (YES)
142	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.85	142	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.65	4 18 23 33 X SQ= 2.71 P = 0.068 RV NO (NO)
144	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.94	144	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.63	16 15 1 9 X SQ= 3.82 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)

146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.74	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	8 0 23 50 X SQ= 11.56 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.97	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.62	1 17 29 28 X SQ= 9.90 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.58	148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	13 0 18 54 X SQ= 23.59 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.69	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.71	4 36 9 15 X SQ= 5.41 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.62	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.73	16 14 10 37 X SQ= 7.04 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	160	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.53	0 25 27 28 X SQ= 16.39 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.81	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.58	5 31 22 22 X SQ= 9.99 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.70	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.85	19 8 8 44 X SQ= 21.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.60	169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.61	12 34 18 22 X SQ= 2.59 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)

170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.69	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.80	18 11 8 44 X SQ= 16.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
174	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.93	174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.58	2 23 25 32 X SQ= 8.56 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.78	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.60	6 33 21 22 X SQ= 8.90 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
176	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.89	176	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.62	24 34 3 21 X SQ= 5.17 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.86	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.60	25 21 4 32 X SQ= 14.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
179	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.70	179	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.50	16 25 7 25 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.136 RV YES (NO)	
181	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.89	181	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.61	1 20 8 31 X SQ= 1.56 P = 0.142 RV NO (NO)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.72	182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	8 31 21 0 X SQ= 31.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	1.00	183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	21 0 0 6 X SQ= 21.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

186	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.80	186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.55	5 22 20 27 X SQ= 3.42 P = 0.043 RV NO (NO)	
187	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.79	187	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.56	19 31 5 24 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.076 RV NO (NO)	
188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.90	188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.61	3 22 27 35 X SQ= 6.51 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)	
192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.57	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.95	17 3 13 54 X SQ= 26.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.65	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.95	20 3 11 55 X SQ= 34.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.78	0 13 31 45 X SQ= 6.44 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	

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 88  POLITIES                                                    88  POLITIES
     WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION                                   WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION
     IS SITUATIONAL  (5)                                             IS OTHER THAN SITUATIONAL  (95)


                                                                                                                SUBJECT ONLY
**********************************************************************************************************************

       5 IN LEFT COLUMN

EL SALVADOR HAITI        IRAQ         LAOS         SYRIA

      95 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN ALBANIA      ALGERIA      AUSTRALIA    AUSTRIA      BELGIUM      BOLIVIA      BULGARIA     BURUNDI      CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN    CANADA       CEN AFR REP  CHAD         CHILE        CHINA, PR    COLOMBIA     CONGO(BRA)   CONGO(LEO)   COSTA RICA
CUBA        CYPRUS       CZECHOS'KIA  DAHOMEY      DENMARK      DOMIN REP    ECUADOR      ETHIOPIA     FINLAND      FRANCE
GABON       GERMANY, E   GERMAN FR    GHANA        GREECE       GUINEA       HONDURAS     HUNGARY      ICELAND      INDIA
INDONESIA   IRAN         IRELAND      ISRAEL       ITALY        IVORY COAST  JAMAICA      JAPAN        JORDAN       KOREA, N
LEBANON     LIBERIA      LIBYA        LUXEMBOURG   MALAGASY R   MALAYA       MALI         MAURITANIA   MEXICO       MONGOLIA
MOROCCO     NEPAL        NETHERLANDS  NEW ZEALAND  NIGER        NIGERIA      NORWAY       PHILIPPINES  POLAND       RUMANIA
RWANDA      SA'U ARABIA  SENEGAL      SIERRE LEO   SOMALIA      SO AFRICA    SUDAN        SWEDEN       SWITZERLAND  TANGANYIKA
THAILAND    TOGO         TRINIDAD     TUNISIA      TURKEY       UGANDA       USSR         UAR          UK           US
UPPER VOLTA URUGUAY      VENEZUELA    VIETNAM, N   YUGOSLAVIA

      12 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA   BRAZIL       BURMA        CEYLON       GUATEMALA    NICARAGUA    PAKISTAN     PANAMA       PARAGUAY     PORTUGAL
SPAIN       VIETNAM REP

       3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

KOREA REP   PERU         YEMEN

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 15  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00     15  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.80        2    8
     LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN              LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR                          0   33
     IN NORTH AFRICA OR                                   CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN        X SQ=   3.15
     CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (11)                       IN THE MIDDLE EAST  (33)                     P =    0.050
                                                                                                      RV YES (NO )

 19  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00     19  LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE                 0.72        0   33
     LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN,                            LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR                          2   13
     CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA,                   CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN        X SQ=   1.86
     RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR                       IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR        P =    0.093
     CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (22)                       SOUTH AMERICA  (33)                          RV YES (NO )

 36  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00     36  LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THUSE            0.58        0   40
     WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT              WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT             5   55
     IS LOW OR VERY LOW  (73)                             IS LOW OR VERY LOW  (73)                     X SQ=   1.97
                                                                                                      P =    0.081
                                                                                                      RV NO  (NO )
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45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.51	0 45 5 44 X SQ= 3.04 P = 0.057 RV YES (NO)
50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	1.00	50	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.51	0 42 4 41 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.117 RV YES (NO)
96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	1.00	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.79	0 62 2 16 X SQ= 3.24 P = 0.048 RV YES (NO)
99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	1.00	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.70	0 48 4 21 X SQ= 5.33 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)
100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	0.80	100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.87	1 58 4 9 X SQ= 9.80 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	1.00	102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.59	0 55 3 39 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.078 RV YES (NO)
106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	1.00	106	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.65	0 46 2 25 X SQ= 1.27 P = 0.134 RV YES (NO)
107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	1.00	107	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.55	0 42 4 52 X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.133 RV NO (NO)
111	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	1.00	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.66	0 51 5 26 X SQ= 6.17 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)

124	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT (14)	0.60	124	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.90	3 8 2 73 X SQ= 6.59 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (9)	1.00	132	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.97	0 65 2 2 X SQ= 18.06 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS NEGLIGIBLE (13)	1.00	135	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.92	0 71 2 6 X SQ= 9.49 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	1.00	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.79	0 50 4 13 X SQ= 8.67 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED (14)	1.00	157	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.90	3 8 0 76 X SQ= 14.06 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	1.00	160	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.73	2 23 0 61 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.082 RV YES (NO)	
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	1.00	175	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.53	0 47 3 41 X SQ= 1.52 P = 0.109 RV YES (NO)	
185	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	1.00	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.82	4 6 0 28 X SQ= 8.63 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	

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B9  POLITIES                                          B9  POLITIES
    WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION                         WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION
    IS CONVENTIONAL  (33)                                 IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL  (62)


                                                                                          BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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33 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	ECUADOR
FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	JAPAN	LEBANON
LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TURKEY
UK	US	URUGUAY							

62 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	CZECHOS*KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL
IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NIGER
PAKISTAN	POLAND	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA
TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA								

18 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	GUATEMALA	INDIA	JAMAICA	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MOROCCO
NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	TRINIDAD	UGANDA		

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

KOREA REP PERU

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 2  TEND TO BE THOSE                    0.61        2  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                    1.00        20    0
    LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,               LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          13   62
    NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (22)                WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                 X SQ=  44.02
                                                       NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)       P =    0.
                                                                                                 RV YES (YES)

 3  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE               0.67        3  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                    1.00        11    0
    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          22   62
    WEST EUROPE  (102)                                 WEST EUROPE  (102)                        X SQ=  20.23
                                                                                                 P =    0.
                                                                                                 RV NO  (YES)

 5  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                    1.00        5  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                    1.00        16    0
    LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE,             LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN                 0    9
    RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE  (181                   IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE  (9)        X SQ=  20.85
                                                                                                 P =    0.
                                                                                                 RV YES (YES)
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8	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.94	8	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.79	2 13 31 49 X SQ= 2.57 P = 0.077 RV NO (NO)	
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.97	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.58	1 26 32 36 X SQ= 14.17 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
15	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.75	15	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.76	3 8 1 26 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.065 RV YES (NO)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.87	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.81	1 26 7 6 X SQ= 10.83 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.78	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.68	2 13 7 6 X SQ= 3.55 P = 0.042 RV YES (YES)	
25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.73	25	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.95	9 3 24 59 X SQ= 7.89 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
28	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.58	28	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.60	14 34 19 23 X SQ= 1.85 P = 0.130 RV YES (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.94	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.70	29 17 2 40 X SQ= 30.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.94	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.75	2 45 31 15 X SQ= 37.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.61	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.97	13 59 20 2 X SQ= 36.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.52	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.85	17 9 16 53 X SQ= 13.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.79	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.58	26 26 7 36 X SQ= 10.37 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.58	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.92	19 5 14 57 X SQ= 25.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.79	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.81	26 12 7 50 X SQ= 29.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	1.00	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.66	33 21 0 41 X SQ= 35.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.70	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.82	23 11 10 50 X SQ= 22.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.79	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.86	26 8 7 51 X SQ= 35.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.97	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.74	30 16 1 45 X SQ= 38.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.58	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.90	19 6 14 56 X SQ= 23.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.87	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.71	28 17 4 41 X SQ= 25.65 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.57	33 33 0 25 X SQ= 17.51 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.87	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.80	27 10 4 41 X SQ= 32.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	1.00	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.67	31 16 0 33 X SQ= 32.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.76	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.83	25 10 8 50 X SQ= 29.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.50	33 30 0 30 X SQ= 22.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.94	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.60	31 35 2 23 X SQ= 10.29 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.82	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.82	27 11 6 50 X SQ= 33.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.73	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.69	24 19 9 42 X SQ= 13.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.79	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.57	26 26 7 35 X SQ= 9.92 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.62	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.89	12 6 20 50 X SQ= 7.41 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.81	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.73	26 16 6 44 X SQ= 22.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.94	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.58	30 25 2 35 X SQ= 21.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.63	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.93	20 4 12 57 X SQ= 31.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.73	32 17 0 45 X SQ= 41.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.65	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.91	20 4 11 43 X SQ= 24.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.84	10 7 0 36 X SQ= 22.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.53	79	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.87	8 33 7 5 X SQ= 5.11 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.61	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	11 0 17 14 X SQ= 5.56 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.90	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.75	28 14 3 41 X SQ= 30.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.88	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.62	29 23 4 38 X SQ= 19.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	1.00	86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.51	33 31 0 30 X SQ= 21.63 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
93	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	1.00	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.53	0 31 33 28 X SQ= 23.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.81	32 8 0 35 X SQ= 45.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.75	99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.50	24 20 8 20 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.051 RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.84	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.87	27 7 5 46 X SQ= 39.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.78	33 13 0 45 X SQ= 47.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	1.00	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.87	28 6 0 41 X SQ= 50.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.91	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.88	30 7 3 52 X SQ= 51.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.97	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.61	31 20 1 31 X SQ= 25.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.80	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.53	24 22 6 25 X SQ= 7.06 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.55	115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	18 0 15 61 X SQ= 37.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.85	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.97	28 2 5 59 X SQ= 61.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.97	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.72	32 17 1 44 X SQ= 38.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.91	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.64	3 30 30 17 X SQ= 21.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.67	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.98	11 46 22 1 X SQ= 36.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.70	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	23 47 10 0 X SQ= 13.62 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.88	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.71	4 44 29 18 X SQ= 27.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.64	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.89	12 55 21 7 X SQ= 25.93 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.76	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	25 62 8 0 X SQ= 13.42 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.72	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.86	8 44 21 7 X SQ= 25.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.55	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	13 51 16 0 X SQ= 31.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.83	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.78	24 10 5 36 X SQ= 24.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.86	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.67	25 15 4 31 X SQ= 18.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

130	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.67	130	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.92	9	3	X SQ= 4.97 P = 0.021 RV NO (YES)
						18	34	
134	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.83	134	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.51	24	28	X SQ= 6.87 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)
						5	27	
135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.80	28	35	X SQ= 4.81 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)
						0	9	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.86	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.98	25	1	X SQ= 56.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
						4	50	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.97	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.86	30	7	X SQ= 50.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
						1	44	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.97	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.56	1	30	X SQ= 22.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
						32	24	
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.70	141	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.98	9	1	X SQ= 11.00 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
						21	49	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.53	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.88	16	6	X SQ= 13.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
						14	43	
144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	1.00	144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.97	0	31	X SQ= 30.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
						9	1	

146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.85	0 8 31 44 X SQ= 3.66 P = 0.023 RV NO (NO)
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.63	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.98	17 1 10 49 X SQ= 33.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.78	0 13 33 45 X SQ= 6.90 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.70	153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.53	21 17 9 19 X SQ= 2.61 P = 0.082 RV YES (YES)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.71	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.55	9 27 22 22 X SQ= 4.21 P = 0.037 RV YES (YES)
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.97	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.59	1 29 31 20 X SQ= 23.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.82	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.95	27 3 6 54 X SQ= 51.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	1.00	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.77	33 13 0 44 X SQ= 46.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.76	171	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.94	8 3 25 50 X SQ= 4.74 P = 0.019 RV NO (YES)

172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.64	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.93	12 4 21 53 X SQ= 10.39 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.70	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.96	23 2 10 48 X SQ= 37.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	1.00	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.88	33 6 0 44 X SQ= 58.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.78	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.77	7 41 25 12 X SQ= 22.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.86	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.85	4 41 25 7 X SQ= 35.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.61	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.96	20 1 13 25 X SQ= 18.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.53	13 25 0 22 X SQ= 7.70 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.90	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.56	3 25 27 20 X SQ= 14.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.80	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.91	6 50 24 5 X SQ= 40.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.52	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.90	17 6 16 54 X SQ= 17.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.85	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	5 0 28 62 X SQ= 7.11 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.62	0 23 33 37 X SQ= 14.81 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.97	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.62	1 23 32 38 X SQ= 11.78 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.79	0 13 33 48 X SQ= 6.47 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	

90 POLITIES WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL (5)	90 POLITIES WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN TRADITIONAL (102)

SUBJECT ONLY

5 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	JORDAN	SA'U ARABIA
THAILAND			

102 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST
JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LADS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NORWAY	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CAMBODIA	IRAN	LIBYA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGERIA	UGANDA

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

YEMEN

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13 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (16)	0.60	13 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.91	3 9 2 93 X SQ= 7.92 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
15 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.75	15 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.82	3 6 1 28 X SQ= 3.73 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)	
16 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (11)	0.75	16 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	0.71	3 6 1 15 X SQ= 1.45 P = 0.116 RV YES (NO)	

17	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	1.00	17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.79	3 6 0 22 X SQ= 4.75 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)
43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	1.00	43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.54	0 54 4 46 X SQ= 2.59 P = 0.050 RV YES (NO)
46	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.60	46	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.80	2 78 3 20 X SQ= 2.32 P = 0.072 RV YES (NO)
51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	1.00	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.66	0 56 5 29 X SQ= 6.14 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)
52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (16)	0.60	52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.85	2 73 3 13 X SQ= 3.84 P = 0.036 RV YES (NO)
55	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.60	55	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.75	2 75 3 25 X SQ= 1.46 P = 0.117 RV YES (NO)
58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)	0.60	58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.89	3 11 2 91 X SQ= 6.29 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	63	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.54	0 46 5 55 X SQ= 2.38 P = 0.067 RV NO (NO)
71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.60	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.84	3 16 2 82 X SQ= 3.48 P = 0.042 RV YES (NO)

75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.61	0 62 5 39 X SQ= 5.08 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
83	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (9)	0.60	83	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.96	3 4 2 98 X SQ= 16.20 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	1.00	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.81	0 63 5 15 X SQ= 12.63 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.57	0 55 5 41 X SQ= 4.19 P = 0.017 RV YES (NO)	
108	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	1.00	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.68	0 61 4 29 X SQ= 5.03 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
117	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	1.00	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.59	0 58 5 40 X SQ= 4.58 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	1.00	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.58	5 43 0 59 X SQ= 4.32 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	1.00	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.60	0 55 5 36 X SQ= 4.82 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
135	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS NEGLIGIBLE (13)	0.80	135	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.90	1 70 4 8 X SQ= 13.27 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	1.00	138	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.51	0 45 4 43 X SQ= 2.22 P = 0.117 RV YES (NO)	
154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	1.00	154	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.71	0 54 2 22 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.092 RV YES (NO)	
157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED (14)	1.00	157	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.87	1 12 0 81 X SQ= 1.11 P = 0.138 RV YES (NO)	
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	1.00	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.73	5 24 0 65 X SQ= 8.66 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
164	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.75	164	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.70	3 28 1 64 X SQ= 1.74 P = 0.097 RV YES (NO)	
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	1.00	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.58	0 55 5 40 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	1.00	170	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.57	0 39 4 52 X SQ= 1.41 P = 0.141 RV NO (NO)	
176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	1.00	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.76	0 68 4 22 X SQ= 7.48 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
178	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	1.00	178	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.54	0 51 3 43 X SQ= 1.60 P = 0.103 RV YES (NO)	

179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	179	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.54	4 0 X SQ= P = RV NO	44 37 1.64 0.129 (NO)
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	183	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.96	0 5 X SQ= P = RV YES	23 1 17.69 0. (YES)
186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	1.00	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.68	4 0 X SQ= P = RV YES	25 52 4.89 0.014 (NO)

91	POLITIES WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL [31]	91	POLITIES WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL [5]

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

31 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP
GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	INDONESIA	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER
RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA
VENEZUELA									

5 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	JORDAN	SA'U ARABIA THAILAND

20 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CUBA	GUATEMALA	INDIA	IRAN	JAMAICA
LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	TRINIDAD	UGANDA	VIETNAM REP

56 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA
CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE
HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRAQ	IRELAND	ITALY	JAPAN	KOREA, N	LAOS
LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TURKEY
USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA				

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

KOREA REP	PERU	YEMEN

10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA [33]	0.81	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA [82]	0.80	25 1 6 4 X SQ= 5.16 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
13	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST [99]	0.87	13	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST [16]	0.60	4 3 27 2 X SQ= 3.46 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)	

15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.96	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.75	1 3 25 1 X SQ= 9.66 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
17	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.75	17	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	1.00	1 3 3 0 X SQ= 1.47 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.71	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.80	9 4 22 1 X SQ= 2.89 P = 0.047 RV YES (NO)	
34	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.77	34	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.60	7 3 24 2 X SQ= 1.43 P = 0.119 RV YES (NO)	
40	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.63	40	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.80	11 4 19 1 X SQ= 1.75 P = 0.141 RV YES (NO)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.62	51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	1.00	13 0 8 5 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.039 RV YES (NO)	
52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.95	52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (16)	0.60	20 2 1 3 X SQ= 5.70 P = 0.014 RV YES (YES)	
56	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.65	56	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.80	11 4 20 1 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.138 RV YES (NO)	
58	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.77	58	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)	0.60	7 3 24 2 X SQ= 1.43 P = 0.119 RV YES (NO)	

66	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.64	66	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.80	10 4 18 1 X SQ= 1.83 P = 0.138 RV YES (NO)
69	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.77	69	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.60	7 3 24 2 X SQ= 1.43 P = 0.119 RV YES (NO)
71	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	1.00	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.60	0 3 31 2 X SQ= 13.20 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.90	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.60	3 3 28 2 X SQ= 4.65 P = 0.024 RV YES (YES)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.90	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.80	3 4 28 1 X SQ= 9.47 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	83	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (9)	0.60	0 3 31 2 X SQ= 13.20 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
84	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.75	84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	7 2 21 0 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.083 RV YES (NO)
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.74	86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	1.00	8 4 23 0 X SQ= 5.68 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)
93	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.55	93	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	1.00	14 0 17 5 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.134 RV NO (NO)

94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.53	94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	1.00	8 0 7 5 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.055 RV YES (NO)	
96	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.53	96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	1.00	8 0 7 5 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.055 RV YES (NO)	
98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.60	0 2 31 3 X SQ= 6.61 P = 0.016 RV NO (YES)	
102	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.57	102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	1.00	13 0 17 5 X SQ= 1.84 P = 0.134 RV NO (NO)	
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.63	108	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	1.00	17 0 10 4 X SQ= 3.32 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)	
118	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.65	118	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.80	6 4 11 1 X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.135 RV YES (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.90	134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	1.00	26 0 3 5 X SQ= 14.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	135	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS NEGLIGIBLE (13)	0.80	28 1 0 4 X SQ= 18.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.55	139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	16 0 13 4 X SQ= 2.36 P = 0.103 RV YES (NO)	

157	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.96	157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED (14)	1.00	1 27	1 0
						X SQ=	3.00
						P =	0.069
						RV YES	(YES)
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	1.00	0 27	5 0
						X SQ=	24.86
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.81	161	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	1.00	5 22	5 0
						X SQ=	9.52
						P =	0.001
						RV YES	(YES)
169	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.60	169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	1.00	12 18	0 5
						X SQ=	1.53
						P =	0.141
						RV NO	(NO)
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.69	170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	1.00	18 8	0 4
						X SQ=	4.34
						P =	0.018
						RV YES	(NO)
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.89	176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	1.00	24 3	0 4
						X SQ=	11.07
						P =	0.001
						RV YES	(YES)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.86	178	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	1.00	25 4	0 3
						X SQ=	7.32
						P =	0.007
						RV YES	(NO)
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	1.00	183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	21 0	0 5
						X SQ=	19.96
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.80	186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	1.00	5 20	4 0
						X SQ=	6.91
						P =	0.005
						RV YES	(NO)

193 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.65
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS PARTLY INOIGENOUS (28)

193 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.80
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INOIGENOUS (86)

	20	1
	11	4

X SQ= 1.92
P = 0.138
RV YES (NO)

92	POLITIES WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL (20)	92	POLITIES WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

20 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA
HUNGARY	KOREA, N	MONGOLIA	POLAND	RUMANIA	USSR	UAR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA

93 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS
DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR
GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND
ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES
PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US
UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA							

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

SPAIN

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

YEMEN

2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.77	0 21 20 72 X SQ= 4.15 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	1.00	5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	1.00	0 17 9 0 X SQ= 21.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
6	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.95	6	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.77	1 21 19 72 X SQ= 2.22 P = 0.116 RV NO (NO)	

11	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.90	11	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.72	2 26 18 67 X SQ= 1.97 P = 0.099 RV NO (NO)	
16	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	1.00	16	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	0.55	0 10 6 12 X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.062 RV NO (NO)	
18	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.60	18	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.71	4 29 6 12 X SQ= 2.12 P = 0.137 RV YES (ND)	
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.86	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.64	6 12 1 21 X SQ= 3.86 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.85	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.54	17 43 3 50 X SQ= 8.44 P = 0.002 RV YES (ND)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.65	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.63	13 34 7 59 X SQ= 4.37 P = 0.025 RV YES (ND)	
31	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.95	31	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.75	19 69 1 23 X SQ= 2.81 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.75	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.51	15 46 5 47 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.048 RV YES (ND)	
40	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.82	40	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.62	14 56 3 35 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.109 RV NO (NO)	

45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.75	45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.54	12 42 4 49 X SQ= 3.45 P = 0.055 RV YES (NO)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.73	17 66 0 25 X SQ= 4.63 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	
50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	1.00	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.56	0 43 20 34 X SQ= 17.86 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.95	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.78	1 59 19 17 X SQ= 32.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (16)	0.60	52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.95	8 73 12 4 X SQ= 30.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.94	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.65	17 60 1 33 X SQ= 5.03 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	
56	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.87	56	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.68	14 63 2 29 X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.145 RV NO (NO)	
67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.95	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.68	19 60 1 28 X SQ= 4.68 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.63	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.93	3 25 5 2 X SQ= 8.52 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	

81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	81	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.73	0 11 9 30 X SQ= 1.73 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.75	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.52	15 44 5 48 X SQ= 3.84 P = 0.046 RV YES (NO)	
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	89	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.55	0 33 20 41 X SQ= 11.86 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	1.00	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.72	0 51 20 20 X SQ= 29.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
95	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN (16)	0.74	95	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.99	5 90 14 1 X SQ= 64.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.74	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.95	5 18 14 1 X SQ= 15.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.88	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.50	15 34 2 34 X SQ= 6.65 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.68	0 59 20 28 X SQ= 27.56 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	1.00	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.60	0 43 17 29 X SQ= 17.32 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.94	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.81	1 51 17 12 X SQ= 31.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.95	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.50	1 45 19 45 X SQ= 11.83 P = 0. RV YES (ND)
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.94	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.79	1 64 17 17 X SQ= 32.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.65	0 32 19 59 X SQ= 7.79 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
117	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.63	117	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.58	7 53 12 38 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.128 RV YES (NO)
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.95	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.75	19 20 1 59 X SQ= 29.61 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.95	119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.68	19 54 1 25 X SQ= 4.56 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)
120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	120	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.87	20 69 0 10 X SQ= 1.59 P = 0.119 RV NO (NO)
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.81	12 70 0 16 X SQ= 1.48 P = 0.126 RV NO (NO)

128	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	1.00	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.65	0 48 18 26 X SQ= 21.88 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.94	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.74	1 55 17 19 X SQ= 25.93 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	1.00	130	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.82	0 12 15 55 X SQ= 1.88 P = 0.111 RV NO (NO)
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.79	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.64	4 53 15 30 X SQ= 9.82 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.63	0 29 17 50 X SQ= 7.29 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.94	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.59	1 47 16 33 X SQ= 13.63 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.85	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.81	17 16 3 68 X SQ= 29.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
141	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	1.00	141	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.86	0 11 19 67 X SQ= 1.78 P = 0.115 RV NO (NO)
142	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	1.00	142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.61	0 30 19 46 X SQ= 9.21 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)

147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.67	0 23 19 47 X SQ= 6.79 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.84	0 14 20 74 X SQ= 2.38 P = 0.068 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.88	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.57	14 27 2 36 X SQ= 8.48 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	1.00	154	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.60	16 38 0 25 X SQ= 7.54 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
158	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.84	158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.51	3 37 16 39 X SQ= 5.47 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.81	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.80	13 16 3 64 X SQ= 20.91 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
161	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	1.00	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.63	16 30 0 50 X SQ= 18.44 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
166	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	1.00	166	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.84	0 15 20 77 X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)	
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	1.00	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.67	0 58 19 28 X SQ= 25.96 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

170	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.81	170	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.58	3 36 13 49 X SQ= 2.25 P = 0.096 RV NO (NO)	
172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.76	0 21 20 68 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	1.00	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.63	0 51 18 30 X SQ= 20.92 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.94	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.88	1 71 17 10 X SQ= 45.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.88	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.57	15 37 2 49 X SQ= 9.87 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.55	19 32 0 39 X SQ= 16.25 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.64	0 21 17 37 X SQ= 6.85 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
182	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.89	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.62	17 37 2 23 X SQ= 3.95 P = 0.025 RV NO (NO)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.89	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.58	2 18 17 13 X SQ= 9.20 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	1.00	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.81	17 13 0 56 X SQ= 36.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	1.00	187	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.56	20 44 0 35 X SQ= 11.84 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
188	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	1.00	188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.66	0 31 19 61 X SQ= 7.29 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
194	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE COMMUNIST (13)	0.68	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	13 0 6 93 X SQ= 65.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

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 93  POLITIES                                                    93  POLITIES
     WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE                                          WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE
     IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR                                           IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL  (78)
     LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL  (32)

                                                                                                   BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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      32 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA      ALGERIA      BOLIVIA      BULGARIA     BURMA        CAMBODIA     CHINA, PR    CUBA         CZECHOS'KIA GERMANY, E
GHANA        GUINEA       HUNGARY      INDONESIA    ISRAEL       IVORY COAST  KOREA, N     MAURITANIA   MONGOLIA    MOROCCO
POLAND       RUMANIA      SENEGAL      SUDAN        TANGANYIKA   TUNISIA      USSR         UAR          VENEZUELA   VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP  YUGOSLAVIA

      78 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN  ARGENTINA    AUSTRALIA    AUSTRIA      BELGIUM      BRAZIL       BURUNDI      CAMEROUN     CANADA      CEN AFR REP
CEYLON       CHAD         CHILE        COLOMBIA     CONGO(BRA)   CONGO(LEO)   COSTA RICA   CYPRUS       DAHOMEY     DENMARK
DOMIN REP    ECUADOR      EL SALVADOR  ETHIOPIA     FINLAND      FRANCE       GABON        GERMAN FR    GREECE      GUATEMALA
HAITI        HONDURAS     ICELAND      INDIA        IRAN         IRAQ         IRELAND      ITALY        JAMAICA     JAPAN
JORDAN       LAOS         LEBANON      LIBERIA      LIBYA        LUXEMBOURG   MALAGASY R   MALAYA       MALI        MEXICO
NETHERLANDS  NEW ZEALAND  NICARAGUA    NIGER        NIGERIA      NORWAY       PANAMA       PARAGUAY     PERU        PHILIPPINES
PORTUGAL     RWANDA       SA'U ARABIA  SIERRE LEO   SOMALIA      SO AFRICA    SWEDEN       SWITZERLAND  SYRIA       THAILAND
TOGO         TRINIDAD     TURKEY       UGANDA       UK           US           UPPER VOLTA  URUGUAY

       1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

SPAIN

       4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

KOREA REP    NEPAL        PAKISTAN     YEMEN

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  2  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                          1.00          2  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                     0.73        0   21
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                  LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                           32   57
     WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                                  WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                 X SQ=   8.98
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)                        NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)       P =     0.
                                                                                                          RV NO  (NO )

  5  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                          1.00          5  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                         1.00        0   17
     LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN                        LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE,              9    0
     IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE  (9)                         RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE  (18)          X SQ=  21.77
                                                                                                          P =     0.
                                                                                                          RV YES (YES)

  6  TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE              0.91          6  TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE             0.76        3   19
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE                              LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE                       29   59
     CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,                                CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,               X SQ=   2.32
     OR SOUTH AMERICA  (93)                                     OR SOUTH AMERICA  (93)                    P =     0.114
                                                                                                          RV NO  (NO )
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8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.75	8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.91	8 7 24 71 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.035 RV NO (YES)	
9	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.84	9	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.95	5 4 27 74 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.118 RV NO (YES)	
16	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	0.89	16	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (11)	0.56	1 9 8 7 X SQ= 3.19 P = 0.040 RV YES (YES)	
19	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.79	19	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.54	11 22 3 19 X SQ= 1.76 P = 0.125 RV NO (NO)	
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.73	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.73	8 7 3 19 X SQ= 4.96 P = 0.025 RV YES (YES)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.69	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.55	22 35 10 43 X SQ= 4.27 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)	
25	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.97	25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.81	1 15 31 63 X SQ= 3.53 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.68	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.58	21 32 10 45 X SQ= 5.06 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.93	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.64	2 41 28 23 X SQ= 24.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.80	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.86	6 54 24 9 X SQ= 35.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
53	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.97	53	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.83	1 13 31 65 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.062 RV NO (NO)	
63	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.71	63	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSF WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.54	9 36 22 42 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.132 RV NO (NO)	
65	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (18)	0.70	65	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (25)	0.70	3 21 7 9 X SQ= 3.47 P = 0.059 RV YES (NO)	
68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETERDGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETERDGENEOUS (62)	0.68	68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMDGENEOUS (52)	0.51	10 40 21 38 X SQ= 2.51 P = 0.090 RV YES (NO)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.73	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.55	8 42 22 35 X SQ= 5.67 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
73	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.57	73	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.64	13 49 17 28 X SQ= 2.87 P = 0.081 RV YES (ND)	
74	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.87	74	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.73	4 21 27 56 X SQ= 1.82 P = 0.135 RV NO (NO)	
78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.50	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.92	5 23 5 2 X SQ= 5.47 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	

81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	81	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.72	0 11 11 28 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)	
82	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.63	82	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.54	11 39 19 33 X SQ= 1.94 P = 0.131 RV YES (NO)	
87	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.52	87	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.72	14 17 13 44 X SQ= 3.73 P = 0.052 RV YES (NO)	
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.54	0 33 31 28 X SQ= 23.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	91	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.77	14 17 0 5 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.134 RV NO (NO)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.79	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.76	6 45 23 14 X SQ= 22.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.55	95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.99	17 75 14 1 X SQ= 31.57 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.64	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.92	8 12 14 1 X SQ= 8.28 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
98	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.97	98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.74	1 20 31 58 X SQ= 6.06 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)	

100	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.88	100	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.71	23 40 3 16 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.101 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.84	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.57	5 36 27 27 X SQ= 13.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.81	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.73	6 53 26 20 X SQ= 24.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.88	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.65	3 40 23 22 X SQ= 18.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.78	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.85	6 46 21 8 X SQ= 28.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.88	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.56	4 42 28 33 X SQ= 15.59 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.69	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.81	9 56 20 13 X SQ= 20.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.80	111	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.53	16 37 4 33 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.039 RV NO (NO)	
115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.74	0 20 31 57 X SQ= 8.24 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	

116	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.94	116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.61	2 30 29 47 X SQ= 9.70 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
117	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.58	117	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.61	13 47 18 30 X SQ= 2.54 P = 0.088 RV YES (NO)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.66	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.75	21 16 11 48 X SQ= 13.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.97	119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.61	31 39 1 25 X SQ= 12.19 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.84	32 54 0 10 X SQ= 4.03 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)	
123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	123	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.90	32 70 0 8 X SQ= 2.18 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.78	23 56 0 16 X SQ= 4.66 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.86	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.69	4 44 24 20 X SQ= 21.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.79	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.78	6 50 22 14 X SQ= 23.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.73	131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.57	8	22	X SQ= 2.10
						3	29	P = 0.101
								RV YES (NO)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.85	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.63	4	44	X SQ= 15.24
						22	26	P = 0.
								RV YES (NO)
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.74	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.86	23	10	X SQ= 33.48
						8	62	P = 0.
								RV YES (YES)
141	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	1.00	141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.84	0	11	X SQ= 3.80
						29	57	P = 0.031
								RV NO (NO)
142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.93	142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.58	2	28	X SQ= 9.43
						26	39	P = 0.001
								RV NO (NO)
146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.71	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	8	0	X SQ= 17.62
						20	68	P = 0.
								RV NO (YES)
147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.97	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.63	1	22	X SQ= 9.85
						28	37	P = 0.001
								RV NO (NO)
148	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.97	148	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.82	1	13	X SQ= 2.98
						31	60	P = 0.059
								RV NO (NO)
153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.71	153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.54	17	24	X SQ= 3.09
						7	28	P = 0.052
								RV YES (NO)

158	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.73	158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.51	8	32
						22	33
						X SQ=	3.41
						P =	0.046
						RV NO	(NO)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.65	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.59	17	28
						9	41
						X SQ=	3.72
						P =	0.039
						RV YES	(NO)
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.57	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.76	17	16
						13	50
						X SQ=	8.23
						P =	0.003
						RV YES	(YES)
166	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.97	166	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.83	1	13
						31	64
						X SQ=	2.69
						P =	0.062
						RV NO	(NO)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.84	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.74	5	53
						26	19
						X SQ=	26.81
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.72	0	21
						31	54
						X SQ=	9.13
						P =	0.
						RV NO	(NO)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.86	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.68	4	47
						25	22
						X SQ=	22.01
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.62	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.88	11	61
						18	8
						X SQ=	24.16
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.79	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.62	22	28
						6	45
						X SQ=	11.53
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(NO)

179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.90	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.62	27	22
						3	36
						X SQ=	19.66
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
181	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.95	181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.62	1	20
						21	32
						X SQ=	7.16
						P =	0.004
						RV NO	(NO)
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.87	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.60	3	15
						20	10
						X SQ=	9.36
						P =	0.001
						RV YES	(YES)
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.74	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.83	20	10
						7	49
						X SQ=	24.16
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.91	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.50	29	32
						3	32
						X SQ=	13.50
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(NO)
188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.94	188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.62	2	29
						29	48
						X SQ=	9.05
						P =	0.001
						RV NO	(NO)
189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	189	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.91	0	7
						32	71
						X SQ=	1.75
						P =	0.104
						RV NO	(NO)
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.58	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	13	0
						18	78
						X SQ=	33.25
						P =	0.
						RV NO	(YES)

94 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)

94 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS AUTHORITARIAN OR
TOTALITARIAN (41)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

51 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA
CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	ICELAND
INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES
SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA									

41 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA
EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN	JORDAN
KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SPAIN	SUDAN	THAILAND	USSR	UAR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YUGOSLAVIA									

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA IVORY COAST SO AFRICA

11 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	GABON	MALI	NIGER	RWANDA	SOMALIA	TANGANYIKA
UPPER VOLTA									

9 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

CAMEROUN	CONGO(LEO)	GUATEMALA	IRAQ	PERU	SENEGAL	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.61	2	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.95	20 2 31 39 X SQ= 12.90 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	1.00	5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.82	16 2 0 9 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

6	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.73	6	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.88	14 5 37 36 X SQ= 2.36 P = 0.119 RV NO (NO)	
8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.90	8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.68	5 13 46 28 X SQ= 5.61 P = 0.016 RV NO (YES)	
9	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.96	9	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.83	2 7 49 34 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.073 RV NO (YES)	
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.74	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.72	5 13 14 5 X SQ= 6.07 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)	
24	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.51	24	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.71	26 29 25 12 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.086 RV NO (YES)	
25	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.75	25	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.90	13 4 38 37 X SQ= 2.76 P = 0.063 RV NO (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.79	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.60	37 14 10 21 X SQ= 11.20 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.78	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.64	11 25 40 14 X SQ= 14.93 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.59	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.76	30 10 21 31 X SQ= 9.61 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.80	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.59	41 17 10 24 X SQ= 13.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.82	38	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.97	9 1 42 38 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.039 RV NO (NO)	
39	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.51	39	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.72	25 11 26 29 X SQ= 3.49 P = 0.052 RV NO (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.53	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.80	26 8 23 32 X SQ= 8.84 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.76	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.65	37 14 12 26 X SQ= 13.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.72	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.50	36 18 14 18 X SQ= 3.45 P = 0.044 RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.96	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.82	47 31 2 7 X SQ= 3.32 P = 0.038 RV NO (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.77	50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	1.00	37 0 11 38 X SQ= 48.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.96	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.92	46 3 2 35 X SQ= 63.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.58	49 22 0 16 X SQ= 22.55 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.53	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.77	27 9 24 30 X SQ= 7.02 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.63	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.67	32 13 19 27 X SQ= 7.04 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
64	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.86	64	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.62	32 13 5 8 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.049 RV NO (YES)	
68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.61	68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.60	31 16 20 24 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.059 RV YES (YES)	
70	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.71	70	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.86	14 5 35 31 X SQ= 1.80 P = 0.123 RV NO (NO)	
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.60	74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.85	20 6 30 35 X SQ= 5.91 P = 0.010 RV NO (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.82	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.59	42 17 9 24 X SQ= 14.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.58	76	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.77	20 6 28 20 X SQ= 1.81 P = 0.132 RV NO (NO)	

77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.68	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.70	19 6 9 14 X SQ= 5.27 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)
78	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.90	78	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.55	19 6 2 5 X SQ= 3.55 P = 0.032 RV NO (YES)
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.69	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	10 0 22 15 X SQ= 4.23 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)
82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.65	82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.56	32 15 17 19 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.073 RV YES (YES)
83	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.96	83	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.83	2 7 49 34 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.073 RV NO (YES)
85	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.69	85	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.52	35 21 16 19 X SQ= 1.83 P = 0.133 RV NO (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.80	89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	32 0 8 35 X SQ= 45.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	91	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.58	8 7 0 5 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.055 RV NO (YES)
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL (20)	0.50	0 20 51 20 X SQ= 29.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.88	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.62	6 23 45 14 X SQ= 22.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
98	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.71	98	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.85	15 6 36 35 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.134 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.87	101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	1.00	41 0 6 40 X SQ= 62.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.98	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.97	50 1 1 39 X SQ= 79.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.93	105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	1.00	42 0 3 31 X SQ= 60.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.95	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.89	41 3 2 24 X SQ= 46.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.86	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.97	44 1 7 39 X SQ= 59.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.98	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.83	49 6 1 29 X SQ= 55.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.77	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.63	37 10 11 17 X SQ= 10.20 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.63	115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	19 0 32 37 X SQ= 15.45 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.59	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	30 0 21 37 X SQ= 30.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.86	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.70	44 11 7 26 X SQ= 26.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.92	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.82	4 33 46 7 X SQ= 47.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.50	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.97	25 39 25 1 X SQ= 22.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.80	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	40 40 10 0 X SQ= 7.09 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.78	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.56	11 23 40 18 X SQ= 10.20 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.53	122	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.83	27 34 24 7 X SQ= 7.85 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.84	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	43 41 8 0 X SQ= 5.21 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)

125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.60	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.82	18 27 27 6 X SQ= 11.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.64	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	29 33 16 0 X SQ= 12.66 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
127	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.64	127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	17 0 30 26 X SQ= 10.32 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.83	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.92	39 2 8 24 X SQ= 35.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.89	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.81	42 5 5 21 X SQ= 32.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
130	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.78	130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	1.00	10 0 35 30 X SQ= 5.89 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.56	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.86	25 2 20 12 X SQ= 5.76 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.77	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.82	37 7 11 31 X SQ= 26.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.63	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	29 0 17 33 X SQ= 30.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.88	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.93	43 2 6 28 X SQ= 46.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.94	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.63	3 22 48 13 X SQ= 29.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.77	141	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	1.00	11 0 37 32 X SQ= 6.68 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.51	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.94	24 2 23 29 X SQ= 14.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.50	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	21 0 21 30 X SQ= 18.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.96	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.84	2 26 45 5 X SQ= 48.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.70	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.94	14 29 33 2 X SQ= 28.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
163	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.96	163	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.75	2 9 46 27 X SQ= 6.12 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)
164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.85	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.54	7 16 41 19 X SQ= 8.30 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)

166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.76	166	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.98	12 1 39 40 X SQ= 6.68 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.66	168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	33 0 17 39 X SQ= 38.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.98	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.95	49 2 1 37 X SQ= 73.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.82	171	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	1.00	9 0 42 32 X SQ= 4.64 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.63	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.97	19 1 32 35 X SQ= 12.29 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.54	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	27 0 23 34 X SQ= 24.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.96	175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	1.00	48 0 2 34 X SQ= 72.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.82	50 6 0 28 X SQ= 58.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.74	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.68	13 23 37 11 X SQ= 12.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.84	179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	7 36 38 0 X SQ= 53.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.57	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	20 0 26 25 X SQ= 13.06 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	1.00	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.69	5 4 0 9 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	
185	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.67	185	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.73	4 10 2 27 X SQ= 2.11 P = 0.077 RV YES (NO)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.96	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.96	2 27 43 1 X SQ= 57.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.77	187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	1.00	10 41 34 0 X SQ= 49.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.57	188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.82	22 7 29 32 X SQ= 5.32 P = 0.013 RV NO (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.86	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	7 0 44 41 X SQ= 4.29 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
193	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.92	193	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.80	4 8 47 32 X SQ= 1.93 P = 0.121 RV NO (YES)	

194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.67	0	13
						51	27

X SQ= 16.77
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

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 95  POLITIES                                                    95  POLITIES
     WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME                                  WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
     IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR                                            IS TOTALITARIAN  (16)
     AUTHORITARIAN  (95)

                                                                                                   BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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      95 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN ALGERIA     ARGENTINA   AUSTRALIA   AUSTRIA     BELGIUM     BOLIVIA     BRAZIL      BURMA       BURUNDI
CAMBODIA    CAMEROUN    CANADA      CEN AFR REP CEYLON      CHAD        CHILE       COLOMBIA    CONGO(BRA)  CONGO(LEO)
COSTA RICA  CYPRUS      DAHOMEY     DENMARK     DOMIN REP   ECUADOR     EL SALVADOR ETHIOPIA    FINLAND     FRANCE
GABON       GERMAN FR   GHANA       GREECE      GUATEMALA   GUINEA      HONDURAS    ICELAND     INDIA       INDONESIA
IRAN        IRAQ        IRELAND     ISRAEL      ITALY       IVORY COAST JAMAICA     JAPAN       JORDAN      KOREA REP
LAOS        LEBANON     LIBERIA     LIBYA       LUXEMBOURG  MALAGASY R  MALAYA      MALI        MAURITANIA  MEXICO
MOROCCO     NEPAL       NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NICARAGUA   NIGER       NIGERIA     NORWAY      PAKISTAN    PANAMA
PARAGUAY    PERU        PHILIPPINES RWANDA      SA*U ARABIA SENEGAL     SIERRE LEO  SOMALIA     SUDAN       SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND SYRIA       TANGANYIKA  THAILAND    TOGO        TRINIDAD    TUNISIA     TURKEY      UGANDA      UAR
UK          US          UPPER VOLTA URUGUAY     VENEZUELA

      16 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA     BULGARIA    CHINA, PR   CUBA        CZECHOS*KIA GERMANY, E  HUNGARY     KOREA, N    MONGOLIA    POLAND
PORTUGAL    RUMANIA     SPAIN       USSR        VIETNAM, N  YUGOSLAVIA

       3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

HAITI       SO AFRICA   VIETNAM REP

       1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

YEMEN

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  5  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00      5  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.82        16    2
     LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE,              LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN                  0    9
     RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE  (18)                    IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE  (9)          X SQ=  16.13
                                                                                                     P =    0.
                                                                                                     RV YES (YES)

 10  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                   0.66     10  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00        32    0
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,             LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,              63   16
     OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (82)                   OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (82)           X SQ=   6.02
                                                                                                     P =    0.005
                                                                                                     RV NO  (NO )

 13  TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE            0.84     13  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00        15    0
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR           LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR            80   16
     THE MIDDLE EAST  (99)                               THE MIDDLE EAST  (99)                       X SQ=   1.73
                                                                                                     P =    0.122
                                                                                                     RV NO  (NO )
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18	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATEO IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL ANO SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.71	18	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATEO IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	1.00	32 0 13 4 X SQ= 5.36 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
24	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.53	24	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEOIUM (61)	0.87	45 14 50 2 X SQ= 7.32 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
26	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION OENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.66	26	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION OENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEOIUM (48)	0.87	32 14 63 2 X SQ= 14.20 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
28	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.61	28	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.71	56 4 36 10 X SQ= 3.93 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)	
29	TILT LESS TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE OEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.51	29	TILT MORE TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE OEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.75	46 9 44 3 X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.137 RV NO (NO)	
34	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PROOUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.51	34	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PROOUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEOIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.81	47 13 48 3 X SQ= 4.36 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
36	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PROOUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.67	36	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PROOUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEOIUM (42)	0.62	31 10 64 6 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.047 RV YES (NO)	
39	TILT TOWARO BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.69	39	TILT TOWARO BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEOIUM (38)	0.53	29 8 66 7 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.139 RV YES (NO)	
43	LEAN TOWARO BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC OEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDEROEVELOPED (57)	0.54	43	LEAN TOWARO BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC OEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS OEVELOPED, INTERMEOIATE, OR UNDEROEVELOPED (55)	0.75	42 12 50 4 X SQ= 3.60 P = 0.055 RV YES (NO)	

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.55	45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	42 12 51 0 X SQ= 10.69 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.73	46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	67 14 25 0 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.54	50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	1.00	43 0 36 16 X SQ= 13.79 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.76	51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	1.00	59 0 19 16 X SQ= 29.35 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.94	52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (16)	0.69	74 5 5 11 X SQ= 32.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.71	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.64	28 9 67 5 X SQ= 5.13 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)
55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.64	55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	61 14 34 0 X SQ= 5.71 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)
56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.69	56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	65 13 29 0 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)
58	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.82	58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	17 0 78 16 X SQ= 2.14 P = 0.073 RV NO (NO)

63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.62	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.67	36 10 59 5 X SQ= 3.30 P = 0.049 RV YES (NO)	
64	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.68	64	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	1.00	36 10 17 0 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.050 RV NO (NO)	
67	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.71	67	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.94	64 15 26 1 X SQ= 2.57 P = 0.065 RV NO (NO)	
69	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.52	69	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.80	49 12 46 3 X SQ= 3.16 P = 0.051 RV NO (NO)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.76	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.75	20 6 65 2 X SQ= 7.23 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.93	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.83	27 1 2 5 X SQ= 13.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
81	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.74	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	10 0 28 11 X SQ= 2.20 P = 0.090 RV NO (NO)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.57	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.79	38 11 50 3 X SQ= 4.73 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.52	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.94	45 15 49 1 X SQ= 9.83 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.57	87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	1.00	31 0 41 15 X SQ= 8.24 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
89	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.58	89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	32 0 45 14 X SQ= 7.24 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
92	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.95	92	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL (20)	0.93	5 14 90 1 X SQ= 64.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.82	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.93	17 14 75 1 X SQ= 31.57 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.50	99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	35 14 35 0 X SQ= 10.03 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.52	101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	1.00	41 0 38 16 X SQ= 12.57 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.65	102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	1.00	58 0 31 16 X SQ= 20.73 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.59	105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	1.00	43 0 30 15 X SQ= 15.00 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.80	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.94	51 1 13 15 X SQ= 27.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.78	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.94	64 18 X SQ= 27.77 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	1 15
115	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.79	115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	20 74 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.071 RV NO (NO)	0 13
116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.67	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	31 63 X SQ= 4.54 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	0 13
117	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.59	117	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.69	55 39 X SQ= 2.52 P = 0.077 RV YES (NO)	4 9
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.70	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.94	24 57 X SQ= 20.26 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	15 1
121	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.52	121	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.75	46 49 X SQ= 2.16 P = 0.106 RV NO (NO)	4 12
127	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.72	127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	21 55 X SQ= 4.27 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	0 16
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.63	128	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	1.00	48 28 X SQ= 18.67 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	0 16
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.72	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.94	55 21 X SQ= 21.56 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	1 15

130	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.82	130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	1.00	12 0 54 16 X SQ= 2.11 P = 0.111 RV NO (NO)	
133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.67	133	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	1.00	29 0 58 16 X SQ= 5.87 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.66	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.94	56 1 29 15 X SQ= 17.13 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.63	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	29 0 50 16 X SQ= 6.81 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.58	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.93	47 1 34 13 X SQ= 10.41 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.78	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.94	19 15 67 1 X SQ= 28.03 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
140	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.85	140	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	1.00	12 0 70 16 X SQ= 1.48 P = 0.126 RV NO (NO)	
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.62	142	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	1.00	30 0 48 16 X SQ= 7.36 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
144	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.62	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	18 16 11 0 X SQ= 6.11 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	

147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.68	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	23 0 50 16 X SQ= 5.25 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)
148	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.85	148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	14 0 77 16 X SQ= 1.64 P = 0.122 RV NO (NO)
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.59	153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	1.00	26 15 37 0 X SQ= 14.49 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.50	158	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	1.00	39 0 39 16 X SQ= 11.69 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.82	160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	1.00	14 15 66 0 X SQ= 36.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.63	161	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	1.00	30 15 50 0 X SQ= 17.36 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
166	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.84	166	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	1.00	15 0 79 16 X SQ= 1.76 P = 0.121 RV NO (NO)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.66	169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	1.00	57 0 30 16 X SQ= 20.90 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.56	170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	1.00	37 0 47 15 X SQ= 8.75 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)

172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.77	172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	21 0 70 15 X SQ= 2.99 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.61	175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	1.00	50 0 32 15 X SQ= 16.51 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.87	176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	1.00	71 0 11 15 X SQ= 44.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.55	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.80	39 12 47 3 X SQ= 4.83 P = 0.023 RV YES (NO)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.54	179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	33 16 39 0 X SQ= 13.45 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.66	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	20 0 38 16 X SQ= 5.91 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.60	182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	38 16 25 0 X SQ= 7.54 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.58	185	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	1.00	19 0 14 15 X SQ= 11.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.80	186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	1.00	14 15 56 0 X SQ= 31.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

187	TENO LESS TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.57	187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	1.00	46 16 35 0 X SQ= 9.02 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
188	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.69	188	TILT MORE TOWARD 8EING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.88	29 2 64 14 X SQ= 1.51 P = 0.148 RV NO (NO)	
192	TENO LESS TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.72	192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	26 0 67 16 X SQ= 4.44 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	
193	TENO LESS TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.72	193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	26 0 68 16 X SQ= 4.36 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND TO 8E THOSE THAT ARE COMMUNIST (13)	0.87	0 13 95 2 X SQ= 85.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

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96 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR
TOTALITARIAN (67)

96 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

67 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE
CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND
FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL
ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SIERRE LEO	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA
USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA			

23 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GHANA	GUINEA	INDONESIA
IRAN	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	SA'U ARABIA
SUDAN	THAILAND	UAR							

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA	HAITI	IVORY COAST	SO AFRICA	VIETNAM REP

11 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	GABON	MALI	NIGER	RWANDA	SOMALIA	TANGANYIKA
UPPER VOLTA									

9 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

CAMERDUN	CONGO(LEO)	GUATEMALA	IRAQ	PERU	SENEGAL	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.67	2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	22 0 45 23 X SQ= 8.30 P = 0.001 RV NO (ND)	
9	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.96	9	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.78	3 5 64 18 X SQ= 4.35 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	

10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.88	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.65	8 8 59 15 X SQ= 4.65 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	
17	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.79	17	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	0.57	4 4 15 3 X SQ= 1.66 P = 0.149 RV YES (YES)	
19	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.65	19	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.73	8 8 15 3 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.066 RV YES (YES)	
20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.62	20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.73	9 8 15 3 X SQ= 2.47 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.57	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.74	38 6 29 17 X SQ= 5.26 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
28	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.52	28	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.71	34 15 31 6 X SQ= 1.65 P = 0.138 RV NO (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.78	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.77	46 5 13 17 X SQ= 18.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.74	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.77	17 17 49 5 X SQ= 16.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.67	31	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	1.00	45 22 22 0 X SQ= 7.91 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	

32	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.85	32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, DR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	10 0 57 23 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.059 RV NO (NO)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.69	34	TEND TO BE THOSE, WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.57	46 10 21 13 X SQ= 3.61 P = 0.046 RV YES (NO)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.60	36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	1.00	40 0 27 23 X SQ= 22.36 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.79	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.78	53 5 14 18 X SQ= 22.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
38	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.85	38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	10 0 55 23 X SQ= 2.61 P = 0.057 RV ND (NO)
39	TEND TD BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.50	39	TEND TD BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.87	33 3 33 20 X SQ= 8.20 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.52	42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	1.00	34 0 31 22 X SQ= 16.76 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.75	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.91	49 2 16 20 X SQ= 27.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.63	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	25 0 42 23 X SQ= 10.10 P = 0. RV NO (NO)

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.77	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.77	48 5 14 17 X SQ= 18.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.97	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.68	61 15 2 7 X SQ= 11.27 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.58	50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	1.00	37 0 27 20 X SQ= 18.39 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.72	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.85	46 3 18 17 X SQ= 18.01 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.55	54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	36 0 29 23 X SQ= 19.33 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.91	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.52	59 11 6 12 X SQ= 16.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.91	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.68	58 15 6 7 X SQ= 4.80 P = 0.033 RV NO (YES)	
57	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.69	57	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.87	21 3 46 20 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.106 RV NO (NO)	
58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.93	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.65	5 8 62 15 X SQ= 8.25 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	

63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.64	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.87	42 24	3 20
						X SQ= 15.50 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.59	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.70	39 27	7 16
						X SQ= 4.52 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.71	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.61	47 19	9 14
						X SQ= 6.21 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
70	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.73	70	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.90	17 46	2 18
						X SQ= 1.61 P = 0.139 RV NO (NO)	
72	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.59	72	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.59	38 26	9 13
						X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.146 RV YES (NO)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.73	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.55	47 17	10 12
						X SQ= 4.55 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)	
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.61	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	26 40	0 23
						X SQ= 10.97 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.81	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.78	54 13	5 18
						X SQ= 23.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.54	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	26 30	0 16
						X SQ= 9.70 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.67	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.69	20 5 10 11 X SQ= 3.94 P = 0.031 RV YES (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.68	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.83	43 3 20 15 X SQ= 13.15 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
83	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.94	83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.78	4 5 63 18 X SQ= 3.14 P = 0.044 RV NO (YES)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.75	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.73	50 6 17 16 X SQ= 13.95 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.59	89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	32 0 22 19 X SQ= 17.71 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	91	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.58	8 7 0 5 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.055 RV NO (YES)
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.77	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.70	43 6 13 14 X SQ= 12.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.65	101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	1.00	41 0 22 22 X SQ= 25.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.75	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.95	50 1 17 21 X SQ= 30.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.70	105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	1.00	42 0 18 14 X SQ= 19.90 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.71	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.78	42 2 17 7 X SQ= 6.19 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.67	107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	1.00	45 0 22 22 X SQ= 27.26 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.76	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.71	50 5 16 12 X SQ= 11.00 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.75	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.62	39 8 13 13 X SQ= 7.35 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)
114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.51	114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.71	32 15 33 6 X SQ= 2.32 P = 0.085 RV YES (NO)
116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.53	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	30 0 34 22 X SQ= 13.84 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.75	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.68	48 7 16 15 X SQ= 11.44 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.71	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.77	19 17 47 5 X SQ= 14.10 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.61	119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	40 22 26 0 X SQ= 10.48 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.78	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.74	15 17 52 6 X SQ= 17.65 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
123	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.88	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	59 23 8 0 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.108 RV NO (NO)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.56	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.86	24 19 30 3 X SQ= 9.54 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.70	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	38 22 16 0 X SQ= 6.57 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
127	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.73	127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	17 0 46 9 X SQ= 1.86 P = 0.104 RV NO (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.62	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.78	39 2 24 7 X SQ= 3.57 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.54	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.83	25 2 21 10 X SQ= 4.02 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.59	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.70	38 6 26 14 X SQ= 4.16 P = 0.039 RV YES (NO)	

137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.53	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	29 0 33 15 X SQ= 9.35 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.70	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.93	44 1 19 13 X SQ= 16.05 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
141	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.83	141	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	1.00	11 0 53 14 X SQ= 1.56 P = 0.118 RV NO (NO)
144	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.62	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	18 7 11 0 X SQ= 2.24 P = 0.076 RV NO (NO)
146	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.98	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.79	1 4 60 15 X SQ= 6.30 P = 0.010 RV NO (YES)
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.64	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	21 0 37 13 X SQ= 5.06 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.69	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.85	38 2 17 11 X SQ= 10.40 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.80	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.54	44 6 11 7 X SQ= 4.57 P = 0.031 RV YES (NO)
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.77	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.77	15 10 49 3 X SQ= 11.76 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.73	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.73	17 45 X SQ= 9.11 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	11 4
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.53	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.87	29 33 X SQ= 6.23 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	13 2
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.81	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONDUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.61	12 51 X SQ= 10.20 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	11 7
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.50	168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	33 33 X SQ= 14.86 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	0 21
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.74	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.90	49 17 X SQ= 24.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	2 19
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.74	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.53	17 49 X SQ= 3.47 P = 0.042 RV YES (NO)	9 8
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.71	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.95	19 47 X SQ= 3.32 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)	1 18
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.74	175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	1.00	48 17 X SQ= 27.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	0 17
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.77	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.65	50 15 X SQ= 8.95 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	6 11

179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.62	179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	23 18 38 0 X SQ= 19.18 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
181	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.68	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	20 0 42 8 X SQ= 2.21 P = 0.095 RV NO (NO)	
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	1.00	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.69	5 4 0 9 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	
185	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.81	185	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.55	4 9 17 11 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.100 RV NO (YES)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.72	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.92	17 11 43 1 X SQ= 14.32 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.57	187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	1.00	26 23 34 0 X SQ= 19.80 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.88	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.57	8 9 59 12 X SQ= 7.92 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.94	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.68	4 7 63 15 X SQ= 7.97 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.80	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	13 0 53 23 X SQ= 3.84 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	

97 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN
TOTALITARIAN (23)

97 POLITIES
WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME
IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN
AUTHORITARIAN (16)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

23 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GHANA	GUINEA	INDONESIA
IRAN	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBERIA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	SA'U ARABIA
SUDAN	THAILAND	UAR							

16 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS*KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	KOREA, N	MONGOLIA	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	USSR	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA				

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA	HAITI	IVORY COAST	SO AFRICA	VIETNAM REP

51 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA
CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	ICELAND
INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES
SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA									

11 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	GABON	MALI	NIGER	RWANDA	SOMALIA	TANGANYIKA
UPPER VOLTA									

9 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

CAMEROUN	CONGO(LEO)	GUATEMALA	IRAQ	PERU	SENEGAL	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN

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10 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.65
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,
OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)

10 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,
OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)

8 0
15 16
X SQ= 5.03
P = 0.012
RV NO (YES)

13 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.74
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR
THE MIDDLE EAST (99)

13 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR
THE MIDDLE EAST (99)

6 0
17 16
X SQ= 3.13
P = 0.033
RV NO (NO)

14	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.83	14	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	1.00	4 19	0 16
						X SQ= 1.50 P = 0.130 RV NO (NO)	
18	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.50	18	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	1.00	8 8	0 4
						X SQ= 1.58 P = 0.117 RV YES (NO)	
24	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.61	24	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.87	14 9	14 2
						X SQ= 2.12 P = 0.086 RV NO (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.74	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.87	6 17	14 2
						X SQ= 11.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.71	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.71	15 6	4 10
						X SQ= 4.61 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.77	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.75	5 17	9 3
						X SQ= 6.73 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.77	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.60	17 5	6 9
						X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.038 RV YES (YES)	
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.91	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.50	2 21	8 8
						X SQ= 6.42 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.57	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.81	10 13	13 3
						X SQ= 4.11 P = 0.024 RV YES (YES)	

36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	1.00	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.62	0 10 23 6 X SQ= 16.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.78	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.75	5 12 18 4 X SQ= 8.83 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.87	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.53	3 8 20 7 X SQ= 5.34 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	1.00	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.50	0 8 22 8 X SQ= 11.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.91	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.75	2 12 20 4 X SQ= 14.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.62	0 6 23 10 X SQ= 7.52 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.77	45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	5 12 17 0 X SQ= 15.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.68	46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	15 14 7 0 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.029 RV NO (NO)	
52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.75	52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (16)	0.69	15 5 5 11 X SQ= 5.23 P = 0.017 RV YES (YES)	

54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.64	0	9
						23	5
						X SQ=	16.20
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.52	55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	11	14
						12	0
						X SQ=	8.56
						P =	0.001
						RV YES	(YES)
56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.68	56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	15	13
						7	0
						X SQ=	3.37
						P =	0.031
						RV NO	(NO)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.87	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.67	3	10
						20	5
						X SQ=	9.34
						P =	0.001
						RV YES	(YES)
64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	0.73	64	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	1.00	3	10
						8	0
						X SQ=	8.87
						P =	0.001
						RV YES	(YES)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.61	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.80	9	12
						14	3
						X SQ=	4.59
						P =	0.020
						RV YES	(YES)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.55	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.93	10	13
						12	1
						X SQ=	6.40
						P =	0.005
						RV YES	(YES)
74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.63	0	6
						23	10
						X SQ=	7.52
						P =	0.002
						RV NO	(YES)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.78	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.75	5	12
						18	4
						X SQ=	8.83
						P =	0.003
						RV YES	(YES)

76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.75	0 6 16 2 X SQ= 12.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.83	5 1 0 5 X SQ= 4.65 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.83	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.79	3 11 15 3 X SQ= 9.88 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.73	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.94	6 15 16 1 X SQ= 13.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.50	87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	1.00	7 0 7 15 X SQ= 7.34 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
92	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.78	92	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL (20)	0.93	5 14 18 1 X SQ= 15.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.60	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.93	8 14 12 1 X SQ= 8.28 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.70	99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	6 14 14 0 X SQ= 13.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
110	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.95	110	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH (15)	0.50	1 2 20 2 X SQ= 2.93 P = 0.057 RV YES (YES)	

114	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.71	114	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.56	15 6	7 9
						X SQ= 1.85 P = 0.107 RV YES (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.74	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.75	17 6	4 12
						X SQ= 7.22 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
128	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.78	128	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTFREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	1.00	2 7	0 16
						X SQ= 1.44 P = 0.120 RV NO (YES)	
129	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.56	129	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.94	4 5	1 15
						X SQ= 3.14 P = 0.040 RV NO (YES)	
133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.71	133	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	1.00	6 15	0 16
						X SQ= 3.56 P = 0.027 RV NO (YES)	
134	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.70	134	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.94	6 14	1 15
						X SQ= 1.86 P = 0.104 RV NO (YES)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.59	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.94	7 10	15 1
						X SQ= 8.02 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
146	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.79	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	4 15	0 15
						X SQ= 1.84 P = 0.113 RV NO (YES)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.85	153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	1.00	2 11	15 0
						X SQ= 17.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.54	154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	1.00	6 15 7 0 X SQ= 8.09 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.77	158	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	1.00	10 0 3 16 X SQ= 15.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
160	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.73	160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	1.00	11 15 4 0 X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.100 RV NO (YES)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.53	170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	1.00	9 0 8 15 X SQ= 8.58 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
176	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.65	176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	1.00	6 0 11 15 X SQ= 4.41 P = 0.019 RV NO (YES)	
178	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.53	178	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.80	9 12 8 3 X SQ= 1.53 P = 0.147 RV NO (YES)	
182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.67	182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	8 16 4 0 X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	
185	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.55	185	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	1.00	9 0 11 15 X SQ= 6.88 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.57	192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	9 0 12 16 X SQ= 6.88 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	

193 TENO LESS TO BE THOSE 0.68
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)

194 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)

193 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)

	7	0
	15	16

X SQ= 4.30
P = 0.014
RV NO (YES)

194 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.87
THAT ARE COMMUNIST (13)

	0	13
	23	2

X SQ= 26.57
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

****

98 POLITIES
WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY
IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND
DATES AT LEAST FROM
THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)

98 POLITIES
WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY
IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT
AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD,
OR IS ABSENT (93)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

22 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	AUSTRALIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	DENMARK	FINLAND	ICELAND	IRELAND	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PORTUGAL	SA'U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	USSR
UK	US								

93 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GABON
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEM-LA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDIA
INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N
KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA
MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES
POLAND	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND
TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA							

2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22)	0.77	2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.95	17 5 5 88 X SQ= 54.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
3	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.64	3	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.95	8 5 14 88 X SQ= 14.09 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	0.93	5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.62	13 5 1 8 X SQ= 6.69 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
6	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	1.00	6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.76	0 22 22 71 X SQ= 5.00 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)

8	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	1.00	8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.81	0 18 22 75 X SQ= 3.69 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.91	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.67	2 31 20 62 X SQ= 3.99 P = 0.034 RV NO (NO)
11	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.91	11	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.72	2 26 20 67 X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.095 RV NO (NO)
16	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (11)	1.00	16	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18)	0.67	2 9 0 18 X SQ= 1.25 P = 0.135 RV YES (NO)
17	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	1.00	17	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.71	2 9 0 22 X SQ= 1.66 P = 0.104 RV YES (NO)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.71	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.63	6 56 15 33 X SQ= 6.81 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.86	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.55	18 38 3 46 X SQ= 9.49 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.90	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.59	2 54 19 38 X SQ= 14.63 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.67	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.89	7 83 14 10 X SQ= 28.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.55	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.81	12 18 10 75 X SQ= 9.67 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.82	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.53	18 44 4 49 X SQ= 7.19 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.73	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.91	16 8 6 85 X SQ= 40.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.82	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.74	18 24 4 69 X SQ= 21.72 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.91	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.53	20 44 2 49 X SQ= 11.99 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.68	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.75	15 23 7 69 X SQ= 13.02 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.64	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.95	14 5 8 86 X SQ= 38.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.81	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.79	17 19 4 72 X SQ= 25.54 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.90	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.60	19 36 2 55 X SQ= 15.72 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.73	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.90	16 9 6 84 X SQ= 37.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.86	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.58	18 37 3 51 X SQ= 11.25 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
46	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.91	46	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.73	20 64 2 24 X SQ= 2.29 P = 0.094 RV NO (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.68	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.64	15 28 7 49 X SQ= 5.82 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (14)	0.50	53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.97	11 3 11 90 X SQ= 32.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.73	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.77	16 21 6 70 X SQ= 17.64 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.91	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.67	20 59 2 29 X SQ= 3.84 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
62	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PROTESTANT, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (5)	0.50	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 5 20 X SQ= 8.67 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.81	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.69	17 29 4 64 X SQ= 15.62 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

64	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.89	64	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.64	17 29 2 16 X SQ= 2.99 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)
71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.55	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.90	12 9 10 80 X SQ= 19.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.82	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.62	18 34 4 55 X SQ= 11.78 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	1.00	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.52	22 43 0 46 X SQ= 17.35 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.81	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.90	17 9 4 83 X SQ= 44.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.86	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.53	18 44 3 49 X SQ= 8.70 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.94	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.88	17 9 1 69 X SQ= 46.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED (11)	0.56	81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.97	10 1 8 32 X SQ= 16.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.90	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.62	18 33 2 53 X SQ= 15.32 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.86	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.55	18 42 3 51 X SQ= 9.73 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	1.00	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.54	0 31 21 37 X SQ= 12.75 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.84	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.78	16 17 3 59 X SQ= 22.99 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (5)	1.00	91	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.91	0 31 2 3 X SQ= 6.61 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)
92	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.95	92	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.79	1 19 20 73 X SQ= 1.97 P = 0.116 RV NO (NO)
93	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.95	93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.65	1 31 20 58 X SQ= 6.06 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)
94	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.71	94	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.51	15 36 6 35 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.134 RV NO (NO)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.68	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.66	15 26 7 50 X SQ= 6.76 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.77	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.51	17 42 5 44 X SQ= 4.63 P = 0.018 RV YES (NO)

105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.75	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.60	15 28 5 42 X SQ= 6.30 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.68	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.65	15 31 7 58 X SQ= 6.77 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)
110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.53	110	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.92	9 6 10 70 X SQ= 14.97 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
111	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.74	111	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.51	14 39 5 37 X SQ= 2.24 P = 0.120 RV NO (NO)
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.65	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.92	13 7 7 84 X SQ= 32.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.80	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.82	16 16 4 75 X SQ= 28.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.85	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.53	17 43 3 48 X SQ= 7.95 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.68	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.86	7 67 15 11 X SQ= 23.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.55	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	12 78 10 0 X SQ= 34.51 P = 0. RV NO (YES)

121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.86	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.55	3 51 19 42 X SQ= 10.53 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.59	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.80	9 74 13 19 X SQ= 11.39 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.76	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.76	5 59 16 19 X SQ= 17.25 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.67	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.97	7 76 14 2 X SQ= 45.56 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.74	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.54	14 34 5 40 X SQ= 3.61 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)	
132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	132	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.85	17 50 0 9 X SQ= 1.66 P = 0.111 RV NO (NO)	
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.95	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.67	1 28 20 56 X SQ= 5.51 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
136	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT (12)	0.50	136	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.97	10 2 10 75 X SQ= 28.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.75	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.82	15 14 5 63 X SQ= 21.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.83	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.58	15 33 3 46 X SQ= 8.54 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
139	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.82	139	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.64	4 30 18 53 X SQ= 1.81 P = 0.130 RV NO (NO)	
140	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	1.00	140	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.84	0 13 21 66 X SQ= 2.65 P = 0.064 RV NO (NO)	
144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.56	144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.83	4 30 5 6 X SQ= 3.98 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.71	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.85	12 11 5 62 X SQ= 19.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.84	0 14 20 76 X SQ= 2.30 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)	
153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	1.00	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.63	20 22 0 38 X SQ= 21.65 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	1.00	154	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.58	20 35 0 25 X SQ= 10.26 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	1.00	157	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.82	0 14 20 64 X SQ= 2.85 P = 0.039 RV NO (NO)	

158	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.95	158	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCEO OR MOOERATE (40)	0.51	1 39 19 37 X SQ= 12.13 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
163	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEAOERSHIP CHARISMA IS MOOERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	1.00	163	LEAN LESS TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEAOERSHIP CHARISMA IS MOOERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.84	0 13 20 67 X SQ= 2.44 P = 0.065 RV NO (NO)	
164	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEAOERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.95	164	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEAOERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.58	1 33 19 46 X SQ= 8.01 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
168	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.73	168	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITEO OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.79	16 18 6 66 X SQ= 18.77 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
169	LEAN TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITEO (58)	0.73	169	LEAN TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.50	16 42 6 42 X SQ= 2.78 P = 0.091 RV YES (NO)	
170	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIOENTIAL (63)	0.90	170	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.54	2 37 19 44 X SQ= 7.76 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
174	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.76	174	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.85	16 12 5 67 X SQ= 27.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.76	175	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.56	16 35 5 44 X SQ= 5.53 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
178	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.81	178	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.59	4 49 17 34 X SQ= 9.18 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.67	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.64	7 45 14 25 X SQ= 5.12 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.80	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.91	16 5 4 51 X SQ= 33.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	183	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.78	0 25 2 7 X SQ= 2.57 P = 0.064 RV YES (NO)	
185	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	1.00	185	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.53	0 21 7 24 X SQ= 3.71 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.68	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.75	7 59 15 20 X SQ= 12.13 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.77	189	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.98	5 2 17 91 X SQ= 9.82 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.55	190	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.93	6 26 5 2 X SQ= 5.48 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)	
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.95	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.71	1 26 21 65 X SQ= 4.38 P = 0.023 RV NO (NO)	
193	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.91	193	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.72	2 26 20 66 X SQ= 2.56 P = 0.095 RV NO (NO)	

99 POLITIES WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)									99 POLITIES WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

50 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK
FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GUINEA	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL
ITALY	JAPAN	KOREA, N	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TUNISIA	USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA

36 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN
KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PERU	SENEGAL	SUDAN
SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	TURKEY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP				

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

HAITI	HUNGARY	PARAGUAY

26 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP
GABON	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN				

2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.58	2	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.97	21 / 29	1 / 35
						X SQ= 14.92	
						P = 0.	
						RV NO (YES)	
6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.96	6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.61	2 / 48	14 / 22
						X SQ= 14.60	
						P = 0.	
						RV NO (YES)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.80	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.74	8 / 2	5 / 14
						X SQ= 5.62	
						P = 0.016	
						RV YES (YES)	

20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.80	20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.58	8 10 2 14 X SQ= 2.77 P = 0.063 RV YES (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.56	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.72	28 10 22 26 X SQ= 5.66 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.60	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.82	19 28 28 6 X SQ= 12.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.80	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.50	35 17 9 17 X SQ= 6.26 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.71	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.58	14 21 34 15 X SQ= 6.05 P = 0.013 RV YES (YES)
32	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.80	32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	10 0 40 36 X SQ= 6.32 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.50	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.86	25 5 25 31 X SQ= 10.48 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.64	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.86	32 5 18 31 X SQ= 19.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.78	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.50	39 18 11 18 X SQ= 6.14 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)

38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.79	38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	10 0 38 36 X SQ= 6.64 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.59	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.78	29 8 20 28 X SQ= 10.08 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.61	41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	19 0 30 35 X SQ= 15.39 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.62	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.89	30 4 18 31 X SQ= 19.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.78	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.65	38 12 11 22 X SQ= 13.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.52	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	24 0 26 36 X SQ= 21.64 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.76	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.60	34 14 11 21 X SQ= 8.94 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.96	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.81	44 29 2 7 X SQ= 3.29 P = 0.038 RV NO (YES)	
52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.76	52	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.96	38 27 12 1 X SQ= 4.02 P = 0.026 RV NO (NO)	

53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.72	53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	14 0 36 36 X SQ= 10.07 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.60	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.86	29 5 19 31 X SQ= 16.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.91	56	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.74	43 25 4 9 X SQ= 3.48 P = 0.063 RV NO (YES)	
62	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.71	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 12 10 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.124 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.61	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.69	30 11 19 25 X SQ= 6.64 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	
64	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.83	64	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.58	30 11 6 8 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.054 RV NO (YES)	
67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.90	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.62	44 21 5 13 X SQ= 7.71 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.57	68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.64	28 13 21 23 X SQ= 2.88 P = 0.079 RV YES (YES)	
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.66	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.88	16 4 31 30 X SQ= 4.14 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)	

71	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.66	71	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.86	16 5 31 30 X SQ= 3.14 P = 0.072 RV ND (ND)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.50	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.97	24 1 24 35 X SQ= 19.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.73	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.50	36 18 13 18 X SQ= 3.97 P = 0.040 RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.65	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.97	24 1 13 30 X SQ= 24.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.55	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.94	5 16 6 1 X SQ= 6.04 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.88	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.50	15 13 2 13 X SQ= 5.04 P = 0.020 RV YES (YES)	
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.65	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	11 0 20 15 X SQ= 5.18 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
82	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.67	82	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.52	31 15 15 16 X SQ= 2.05 P = 0.105 RV YES (YES)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.84	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.58	41 15 8 21 X SQ= 14.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

87	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.87	87	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.68	6 7 40 15 X SQ= 2.29 P = 0.098 RV NO (YES)	
89	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.55	89	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.71	24 8 20 20 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.051 RV YES (YES)	
92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.69	92	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.94	15 2 34 34 X SQ= 6.65 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.71	95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	35 35 14 0 X SQ= 10.03 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.88	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.52	43 13 6 14 X SQ= 12.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.70	97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	6 14 14 0 X SQ= 13.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.57	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.74	28 7 21 20 X SQ= 5.63 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
106	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.58	106	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.81	25 13 18 3 X SQ= 1.80 P = 0.132 RV NO (NO)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.81	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.66	29 12 7 23 X SQ= 13.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

113	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.79	113	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.64	10 38 X SQ= P = RV NO	12 21 1.66 0.136 (YES)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.53	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.80	25 22 X SQ= P = RV YES	7 28 7.95 0.003 (YES)
119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.60	119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.94	30 20 X SQ= P = RV NO	33 2 10.89 0. (YES)
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.80	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	40 10 X SQ= P = RV NO	35 0 6.12 0.004 (NO)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.76	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.56	12 38 X SQ= P = RV YES	20 16 7.62 0.004 (YES)
122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.58	122	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.81	29 21 X SQ= P = RV NO	29 7 3.88 0.036 (YES)
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.84	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	42 8 X SQ= P = RV NO	36 0 4.60 0.019 (NO)
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.62	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.91	16 26 X SQ= P = RV YES	30 3 19.57 0. (YES)
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.62	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	26 16 X SQ= P = RV NO	33 0 13.79 0. (YES)

128	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.51	128	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.74
129	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.51	129	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.87
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.61	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.79
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.60	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.72
136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.74	136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.50	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.85
139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.62	139	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.89
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.74	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.64
145	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.63	145	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.88

23	17	X SQ=	2.39
22	6	P =	0.117
		RV NO	(NO)
23	20	X SQ=	6.94
22	3	P =	0.004
		RV NO	(NO)
17	5	X SQ=	6.87
11	19	P =	0.005
		RV YES	(YES)
29	8	X SQ=	6.55
19	21	P =	0.009
		RV YES	(YES)
12	0	X SQ=	6.37
34	26	P =	0.003
		RV NO	(NO)
23	4	X SQ=	7.08
23	22	P =	0.005
		RV YES	(NO)
19	3	X SQ=	4.96
31	24	P =	0.017
		RV NO	(NO)
12	14	X SQ=	7.37
34	8	P =	0.007
		RV YES	(YES)
12	14	X SQ=	1.57
7	2	P =	0.135
		RV NO	(YES)

147	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.57	147	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.83	17 4 23 19 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.054 RV NO (NO)
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.91	153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	1.00	40 0 4 29 X SQ= 54.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	1.00	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.79	44 6 0 23 X SQ= 47.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.87	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.88	6 23 41 3 X SQ= 36.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.50	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.83	25 5 25 24 X SQ= 7.03 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.85	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.59	7 17 41 12 X SQ= 14.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
172	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.75	172	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.91	12 3 36 30 X SQ= 2.31 P = 0.086 RV NO (NO)
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.51	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	25 0 24 25 X SQ= 17.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.56	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	21 0 27 20 X SQ= 10.69 P = 0. RV NO (NO)

182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.80	27 20 0 5 X SQ= 3.89 P = 0.020 RV NO (YES)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.95	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.65	1 17 20 9 X SQ= 15.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.53	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.94	23 29 26 2 X SQ= 16.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.76	188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.51	12 17 37 18 X SQ= 4.23 P = 0.035 RV NO (YES)	
189	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.90	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	5 0 45 36 X SQ= 2.21 P = 0.072 RV NO (NO)	
190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.71	190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	12 17 5 0 X SQ= 3.75 P = 0.044 RV NO (YES)	
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.76	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	12 0 38 36 X SQ= 8.14 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	

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100  POLITIES                                                    100  POLITIES
     WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY                                     WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY
     IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM                              IS ABSENT  (22)
     AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS
     GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND
     DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD  (64)

                                                                                                   BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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      64 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN ALBANIA     AUSTRALIA   AUSTRIA     BELGIUM     BOLIVIA     BULGARIA    CAMBODIA    CANADA      CHILE
CHINA, PR   COLOMBIA    COSTA RICA  CZECHOS'KIA DENMARK     ETHIOPIA    FINLAND     FRANCE      GERMANY, E  GERMAN FR
GHANA       GREECE      GUINEA      HAITI       HUNGARY     ICELAND     INDIA       INDONESIA   IRELAND     ISRAEL
ITALY       JAPAN       KOREA, N    LIBERIA     LIBYA       LUXEMBOURG  MALAYA      MEXICO      MONGOLIA    MOROCCO
NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NICARAGUA   NORWAY      PARAGUAY    PHILIPPINES POLAND      PORTUGAL    RUMANIA     SA'U ARABIA
SO AFRICA   SPAIN       SWEDEN      SWITZERLAND THAILAND    TUNISIA     USSR        UAR         UK          US
URUGUAY     VIETNAM, N  VIETNAM REP YUGOSLAVIA

      22 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA   BRAZIL      BURMA       CEYLON      CONGO(LEO)  ECUADOR     EL SALVADOR GUATEMALA   HONDURAS    IRAN
IRAQ        JORDAN      KOREA REP   LAOS        LEBANON     NEPAL       PAKISTAN    PANAMA      PERU        SUDAN
SYRIA       VENEZUELA

      29 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA     BURUNDI     CAMEROUN    CEN AFR REP CHAD        CONGO(BRA)  CUBA        CYPRUS      DAHOMEY     DOMIN REP
GABON       IVORY COAST JAMAICA     MALAGASY R  MALI        MAURITANIA  NIGER       NIGERIA     RWANDA      SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO  SOMALIA     TANGANYIKA  TOGO        TRINIDAD    TURKEY      UGANDA      UPPER VOLTA YEMEN

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  2  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.66          2  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                         1.00        22    0
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                  LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          42   22
     WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                                  WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                X SQ=    8.44
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)                        NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)      P =     0.001
                                                                                                         RV NO  (NO )

  6  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                    0.86          6  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.59         9    9
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE                              LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE                      55   13
     CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,                                CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,              X SQ=    5.60
     OR SOUTH AMERICA  (93)                                     OR SOUTH AMERICA  (93)                   P =     0.014
                                                                                                         RV NO  (YES)

 15  LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE                  0.75         15  LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE                  0.71         3    5
     LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR                                 LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN            9    2
     CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN                      IN NORTH AFRICA OR                       X SQ=    2.24
     IN THE MIDDLE EAST  (33)                                   CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (11)           P =     0.074
                                                                                                         RV YES (YES)
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19	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.50	19	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.82	9 2 9 9 X SQ= 1.74 P = 0.125 RV YES (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.53	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.73	34 6 30 16 X SQ= 3.42 P = 0.048 RV YES (NO)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.53	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.82	28 18 32 4 X SQ= 6.71 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.65	31	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.95	41 21 22 1 X SQ= 6.16 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
32	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.84	32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	10 0 54 22 X SQ= 2.52 P = 0.058 RV NO (NO)	
33	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.59	33	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.86	26 3 38 19 X SQ= 4.20 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	
34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.73	34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.50	47 11 17 11 X SQ= 3.10 P = 0.064 RV YES (NO)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.55	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.86	35 3 29 19 X SQ= 9.58 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
38	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.84	38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	10 0 52 22 X SQ= 2.64 P = 0.057 RV NO (NO)	

39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.52	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.82	33 4 30 18 X SQ= 6.43 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.70	41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	19 0 44 21 X SQ= 6.55 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.53	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.90	33 2 29 19 X SQ= 10.56 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.68	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.62	42 8 20 13 X SQ= 4.59 P = 0.021 RV YES (NO)	
44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.61	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	25 0 39 22 X SQ= 10.30 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.73	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.67	43 7 16 14 X SQ= 8.72 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
46	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.95	46	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.82	57 18 3 4 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.079 RV NO (YES)	
50	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.56	50	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.89	27 2 35 16 X SQ= 5.03 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.78	53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	14 0 50 22 X SQ= 4.26 P = 0.017 RV NO (NO)	

54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.53	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.91	33 2 29 20 X SQ= 11.26 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.59	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.73	37 6 26 16 X SQ= 5.26 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)
68	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.57	68	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.64	36 8 27 14 X SQ= 2.05 P = 0.137 RV YES (NO)
69	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.70	69	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.55	44 10 19 12 X SQ= 3.20 P = 0.070 RV YES (NO)
70	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.69	70	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.90	18 2 41 19 X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.079 RV NO (NO)
71	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.70	71	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.90	18 2 43 19 X SQ= 2.39 P = 0.081 RV NO (NO)
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.58	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	26 0 36 22 X SQ= 11.47 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
75	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.70	75	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.50	44 11 19 11 X SQ= 2.01 P = 0.122 RV YES (NO)
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.53	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	26 0 23 20 X SQ= 14.84 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

78	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.65	78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	11 11 6 0 X SQ= 3.07 P = 0.055 RV NO (YES)	
81	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.72	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	11 0 29 9 X SQ= 1.81 P = 0.098 RV NO (NO)	
82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.69	82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.55	40 9 18 11 X SQ= 2.70 P = 0.066 RV YES (NO)	
85	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.71	85	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.50	45 11 18 11 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.115 RV YES (NO)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.50	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.80	28 3 28 12 X SQ= 3.20 P = 0.045 RV YES (NO)	
92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.73	92	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.95	17 1 46 21 X SQ= 3.67 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
93	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.63	93	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.84	23 3 40 16 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.101 RV NO (NO)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.75	95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	46 22 15 0 X SQ= 5.05 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.80	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.56	49 7 12 9 X SQ= 6.81 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	

97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.56	97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	12 9 15 0 X SQ= 6.44 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)
101	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.51	101	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.79	31 3 32 11 X SQ= 2.55 P = 0.077 RV NO (NO)
106	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.58	106	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.88	30 7 22 1 X SQ= 1.50 P = 0.138 RV NO (NO)
108	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.57	108	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.85	36 11 27 2 X SQ= 2.38 P = 0.071 RV NO (NO)
110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.72	110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	13 0 34 22 X SQ= 5.80 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.70	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.77	33 5 14 17 X SQ= 11.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
115	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.70	115	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.90	18 2 43 19 X SQ= 2.39 P = 0.081 RV NO (NO)
116	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.56	116	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.81	27 4 34 17 X SQ= 3.22 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)
119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.66	119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	42 22 22 0 X SQ= 8.44 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)

121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.72	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.59	18 13 46 9 X SQ= 5.53 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)	
122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.58	122	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.86	37 19 27 3 X SQ= 4.69 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	
123	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.88	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	56 22 8 0 X SQ= 1.73 P = 0.107 RV NO (NO)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.54	125	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	1.00	25 20 29 0 X SQ= 15.48 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.78	127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	0.54	12 7 42 6 X SQ= 3.72 P = 0.038 RV YES (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.50	128	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	1.00	27 13 27 0 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
130	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.80	130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	1.00	10 0 40 19 X SQ= 2.98 P = 0.052 RV NO (NO)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.54	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.94	19 1 16 15 X SQ= 8.71 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.55	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.93	34 1 28 14 X SQ= 9.44 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

136	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.79	136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	12 0 45 15 X SQ= 2.43 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)	
137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.56	137	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.93	25 1 32 14 X SQ= 5.60 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.64	139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	22 0 39 17 X SQ= 6.85 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.75	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.92	14 12 43 1 X SQ= 18.01 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
145	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.64	145	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.92	14 12 8 1 X SQ= 2.18 P = 0.109 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.76	153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	1.00	41 0 13 19 X SQ= 29.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.93	154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	1.00	50 0 4 19 X SQ= 51.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
157	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.90	157	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED (14)	0.57	6 8 53 6 X SQ= 13.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.73	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.93	16 13 43 1 X SQ= 17.77 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

161	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.54	161	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.79	33 11 28 3 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.134 RV NO (NO)	
163	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.84	163	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	1.00	10 0 52 16 X SQ= 1.69 P = 0.112 RV NO (NO)	
168	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.56	168	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.93	28 1 36 14 X SQ= 5.69 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.74	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.56	16 9 46 7 X SQ= 4.10 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.60	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	25 0 38 12 X SQ= 5.47 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)	
181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.63	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	21 0 36 13 X SQ= 5.20 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.81	36 13 0 3 X SQ= 4.13 P = 0.025 RV NO (YES)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.83	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.76	5 13 25 4 X SQ= 13.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.56	187	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.95	34 18 27 1 X SQ= 8.05 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	

194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.80	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	13	0	
						51	22	
						X SQ=	3.80	
						P =	0.018	
						RV NO	(NO)	

101 POLITIES
WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER
OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC [41]

101 POLITIES
WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER
OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC,
PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR
NON-POLYARCHIC [57]

PREDICATE ONLY

41 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	CANADA	CEYLON	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA
JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PANAMA
PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UK	US	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA									

57 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHILE
CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON
GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN	IVORY COAST	JORDAN
KOREA, N	LAOS	LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	PAKISTAN
PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA
THAILAND	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA	CAMEROUN	LEBANON	LIBYA	NIGERIA	SOMALIA	UGANDA

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	RWANDA

8 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

CONGO(LEO)	GUATEMALA	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PERU	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN

102 POLITIES
WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER
OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC
OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)

102 POLITIES
WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER
OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC
OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)

PREDICATE ONLY

59 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEYLON
CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN
LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	

49 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)
CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI
HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA
NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL
SPAIN	SUDAN	THAILAND	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA	

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

GUATEMALA	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PERU	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN

103	POLITIES WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, RATHER THAN NON-POLYARCHIC (43)					103	POLITIES WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS NON-POLYARCHIC, RATHER THAN PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC (6)					SUBJECT ONLY

43 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA
CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY
INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NICARAGUA	NIGER
PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SENEGAL	SPAIN	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA
VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA							

6 IN RIGHT COLUMN

BURMA	IRAN	NEPAL	SA'U ARABIA	SUDAN	THAILAND

59 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEYLON
CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LED)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN
LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

GUATEMALA	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PERU	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN

14	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.95	14	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.67	2 2 41 4 X SQ= 2.59 P = 0.068 RV NO (YES)
15	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.89	15	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.67	2 2 16 1 X SQ= 2.17 P = 0.080 RV YES (YES)
24	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.51	24	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	1.00	22 6 21 0 X SQ= 3.33 P = 0.031 RV NO (NO)

75	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.60	75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	1.00	17 0 26 6 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.080 RV NO (NO)	
80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.81	80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	1.00	4 2 17 0 X SQ= 2.72 P = 0.059 RV YES (NO)	
91	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.84	91	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (5)	0.67	16 1 3 2 X SQ= 1.47 P = 0.117 RV YES (NO)	
95	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.61	95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	25 6 16 0 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.082 RV NO (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.53	96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	1.00	17 0 15 6 X SQ= 3.82 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.52	97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	15 6 16 0 X SQ= 3.56 P = 0.027 RV YES (NO)	
99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.64	99	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.83	18 1 10 5 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.066 RV YES (NO)	
100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.87	100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	0.67	26 2 4 4 X SQ= 5.43 P = 0.014 RV YES (YES)	
113	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.82	113	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME (27)	0.60	7 3 33 2 X SQ= 2.51 P = 0.065 RV YES (NO)	

121	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.60	121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	1.00	26 17 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.080 RV NO (NO)	6 0
134	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.57	134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	1.00	17 23 X SQ= 2.43 P = 0.071 RV NO (NO)	0 6
135	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.72	135	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS NEGLIGIBLE (13)	0.75	23 9 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.098 RV YES (NO)	1 3
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.73	139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	30 11 X SQ= 3.94 P = 0.027 RV YES (NO)	0 3
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.85	154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	1.00	23 4 X SQ= 3.86 P = 0.037 RV YES (NO)	0 2
182	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.66	182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	1.00	23 12 X SQ= 1.24 P = 0.137 RV YES (NO)	0 2
185	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.81	185	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.60	6 25 X SQ= 1.94 P = 0.088 RV YES (NO)	3 2

104 POLITIES
WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS
COMPETITIVE, RATHER THAN
NON-COMPETITIVE (43)

104 POLITIES
WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS
NON-COMPETITIVE, RATHER THAN
COMPETITIVE (30)

SUBJECT ONLY

43 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	COSTA RICA
DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA							

30 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	GABON
GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA
MONGOLIA	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	TUNISIA	USSR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA

11 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

AFGHANISTAN	COLOMBIA	CYPRUS	ETHIOPIA	JORDAN	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBYA	MEXICO	PAKISTAN
SO AFRICA									

10 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

BURUNDI	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	TANGANYIKA	UPPER VOLTA

21 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	CAMEROUN	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	GUATEMALA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	MOROCCO
NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PERU	RWANDA	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	UAR
YEMEN									

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2 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.53

2 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.93

	20	2
	23	28

X SQ= 11.50
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

3 LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102) — 0.74

3 LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102) — 0.93

	11	2
	32	28

X SQ= 3.12
P = 0.060
RV NO (NO)

5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	1.00	5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.82	16 2 0 9 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.70	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.93	13 2 30 28 X SQ= 4.65 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.93	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.63	3 11 40 19 X SQ= 8.23 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)
15	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.60	15	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	1.00	2 0 3 11 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.083 RV NO (YES)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.81	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.85	3 11 13 2 X SQ= 9.96 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.72	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.75	5 6 13 2 X SQ= 3.31 P = 0.038 RV YES (YES)
25	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.72	25	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.90	12 3 31 27 X SQ= 2.46 P = 0.081 RV NO (NO)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.82	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.64	32 9 7 16 X SQ= 12.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.84	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.69	7 20 36 9 X SQ= 18.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.51	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.97	21 29 22 1 X SQ= 16.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.70	34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.53	30 14 13 16 X SQ= 3.03 P = 0.056 RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.67	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.70	29 9 14 21 X SQ= 8.48 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.86	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.53	37 14 6 16 X SQ= 11.21 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.56	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.72	24 8 19 21 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.59	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.73	24 8 17 22 X SQ= 5.88 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.81	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.63	34 11 8 19 X SQ= 12.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.79	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.52	34 12 9 13 X SQ= 5.63 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.82	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.92	33 2 7 23 X SQ= 31.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.97	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.88	39 3 1 22 X SQ= 45.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.60	41 15 0 10 X SQ= 16.34 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.63	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.71	27 8 16 20 X SQ= 6.63 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.88	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.65	38 17 5 9 X SQ= 3.97 P = 0.031 RV NO (YES)	
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.63	57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.87	16 4 27 26 X SQ= 3.94 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.72	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.66	31 10 12 19 X SQ= 8.52 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.63	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.66	27 10 16 19 X SQ= 4.48 P = 0.030 RV YES (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.69	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.64	29 10 13 18 X SQ= 6.27 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.91	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.57	39 13 4 17 X SQ= 17.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.80	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.87	16 2 4 13 X SQ= 12.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.89	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.71	16 2 2 5 X SQ= 6.35 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.58	79	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.93	14 14 10 1 X SQ= 3.99 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)	
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.90	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.92	9 1 1 12 X SQ= 12.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.68	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	10 0 21 12 X SQ= 3.40 P = 0.040 RV NO (NO)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.76	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.57	31 12 10 16 X SQ= 6.27 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)	
85	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.72	85	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.53	31 16 12 14 X SQ= 1.96 P = 0.137 RV NO (YES)	
86	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.84	86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.60	36 18 7 12 X SQ= 4.01 P = 0.031 RV NO (YES)	
87	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.82	87	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.63	6 10 28 17 X SQ= 2.01 P = 0.142 RV NO (YES)	

89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.82	89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	28 6	0 27
						X SQ= 37.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL (20)	0.59	0 43	17 12
						X SQ= 29.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.93	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.72	3 40	21 8
						X SQ= 30.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.92	42 0	2 24
						X SQ= 55.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
98	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.65	98	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.87	15 28	4 26
						X SQ= 3.22 P = 0.057 RV NO (NO)	
100	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.81	100	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.96	29 7	22 1
						X SQ= 1.59 P = 0.133 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.90	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.97	37 4	1 29
						X SQ= 49.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.93	43 0	2 28
						X SQ= 61.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.98	107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	1.00	42 1	0 30
						X SQ= 65.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.98	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.86	42 1	4 25
						X SQ= 49.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.77	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.53	31 9	8 9
						X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.032 RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.67	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	29 14	0 27
						X SQ= 28.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.91	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.78	39 4	6 21
						X SQ= 30.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.93	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.77	3 39	20 6
						X SQ= 31.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.60	119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	17 25	26 0
						X SQ= 21.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.84	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.50	7 36	15 15
						X SQ= 8.01 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.56	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.83	19 24	25 5
						X SQ= 9.73 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.81	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	35 8	30 0
						X SQ= 4.51 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	

125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.68	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.82	12 18 25 4 X SQ= 11.56 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.57	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	21 22 16 0 X SQ= 10.96 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
127	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.63	127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	15 0 26 28 X SQ= 11.03 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.88	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.93	36 2 5 26 X SQ= 40.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.93	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.89	38 3 3 25 X SQ= 43.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
130	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.80	130	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.95	8 1 32 20 X SQ= 1.48 P = 0.146 RV NO (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.76	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.66	32 10 10 19 X SQ= 10.68 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.68	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	28 0 13 29 X SQ= 30.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.93	138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	1.00	39 0 3 27 X SQ= 53.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

139	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.98	139	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.90	1 27 42 3 X SQ= 53.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.75	141	ALWAYS ARE THOSL WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	1.00	10 0 30 30 X SQ= 6.83 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.55	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.97	22 1 18 29 X SQ= 18.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	1.00	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	0 27 10 0 X SQ= 32.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASEO TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASEO TERRITORIAL (92)	0.81	0 5 40 22 X SQ= 5.55 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)
147	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTEO OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.61	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	22 0 14 28 X SQ= 23.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
148	TILT MORE TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.95	148	TILT LESS TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.83	2 5 41 24 X SQ= 1.86 P 0.110 RV NO (YES)
153	LEAN LESS TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.55	153	LEAN MORE TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.78	21 18 17 5 X SQ= 2.36 P = 0.100 RV NO (NO)
154	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MOOERATELY STABLE (55)	0.71	154	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MOOERATELY STABLE (55)	0.96	27 22 11 1 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)

160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.95	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.63	2 17 40 10 X SQ= 25.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.76	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.78	10 21 32 6 X SQ= 17.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.93	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.52	3 15 39 14 X SQ= 15.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.74	166	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	1.00	11 0 32 30 X SQ= 7.15 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.78	168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	32 0 9 30 X SQ= 39.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	1.00	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.90	41 3 0 27 X SQ= 55.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.79	171	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	1.00	9 0 34 27 X SQ= 4.75 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.58	172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	18 0 25 28 X SQ= 13.57 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	1.00	175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	1.00	42 0 0 30 X SQ= 67.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.77	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.83	10 25 33 5 X SQ= 23.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.92	179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	3 30 33 0 X SQ= 51.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.50	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	20 0 20 21 X SQ= 13.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.83	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.91	5 2 1 21 X SQ= 10.69 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.97	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.75	1 21 35 7 X SQ= 33.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.84	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.97	6 28 32 1 X SQ= 39.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.51	188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.86	21 4 22 25 X SQ= 7.90 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.84	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	7 0 36 30 X SQ= 3.69 P = 0.037 RV NO (ND)	
192	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.93	192	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.76	3 7 40 22 X SQ= 2.95 P = 0.078 RV NO (YES)	

193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.93	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.70	3 9 40 21 X SQ= 5.25 P = 0.021 RV NO (YES)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.57	0 13 43 17 X SQ= 19.81 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

105 POLITIES
WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS
COMPETITIVE (43)

105 POLITIES
WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS
PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR
NON-COMPETITIVE (47)

PREDICATE ONLY

43 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	COSTA RICA
DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA							

47 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)
CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY
IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NICARAGUA
NIGER	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SPAIN
TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	USSR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

COLOMBIA	CYPRUS	LEBANON	MEXICO	SO AFRICA

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA'U ARABIA

19 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	CAMEROUN	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	GUATEMALA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	MOROCCO
NEPAL	NIGERIA	PERU	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	UAR	YEMEN	

106 POLITIES
WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS
COMPETITIVE OR
PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)

106 POLITIES
WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS
NON-COMPETITIVE (30)

PREDICATE ONLY

52 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CANADA	CEYLON	CHAD
CHILE	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE
HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

30 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS*KIA	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	GABON
GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA
MONGOLIA	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	TUNISIA	USSR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA

11 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

AFGHANISTAN	COLOMBIA	CYPRUS	ETHIOPIA	JORDAN	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBYA	MEXICO	PAKISTAN
SO AFRICA									

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA*U ARABIA

21 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	CAMEROUN	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	GUATEMALA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	MOROCCO
NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PERU	RWANDA	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	UAR
YEMEN									

107 POLITIES
WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS
ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)

107 POLITIES
WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS
ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS,
ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS,
OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)

PREDICATE ONLY

46 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS
ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD
TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA				

65 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E
GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN
KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL
NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SD AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TUNISIA	USSR
UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA					

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

LAOS

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

PERU TOGO YEMEN

****

108 POLITIES
WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS
ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED
IN POLITICS (65)

108 POLITIES
WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS
ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS
OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)

PREDICATE ONLY

****

65 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEYLON
CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU
PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA					

35 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA
GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	LIBERIA	MALI	MONGOLIA
NEPAL	NIGER	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SPAIN	SUDAN	THAILAND	USSR
UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA					

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

JORDAN	LAOS	SO AFRICA

12 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CONGO(LEO)	GUATEMALA	IRAQ	KOREA REP	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	SENEGAL	SYRIA
TOGO	YEMEN								

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109  POLITIES                                                    109  POLITIES
     WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION                                    WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION
     IS HIGH, RATHER THAN                                             IS LOW, RATHER THAN
     LOW  (15)                                                        HIGH  (42)

                                                                                                                SUBJECT ONLY
*****************************************************************************************************************************

      15 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA   AUSTRIA     COSTA RICA  DENMARK     ICELAND     IRELAND     JAPAN       LUXEMBOURG  NEW ZEALAND NORWAY
POLAND      SWEDEN      THAILAND    TURKEY      UK

      42 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA   BELGIUM     BOLIVIA     BRAZIL      CEN AFR REP CHAD        CHILE       CONGO(BRA)  CONGO(LEO)  CYPRUS
DAHOMEY     ECUADOR     EL SALVADOR ETHIOPIA    GABON       GUATEMALA   HAITI       INDONESIA   IRAN        IRAQ
JORDAN      KOREA REP   LAOS        LEBANON     LIBERIA     MALAYA      NEPAL       NICARAGUA   NIGER       NIGERIA
PAKISTAN    PANAMA      PERU        SA'U ARABIA SO AFRICA   SPAIN       SYRIA       UGANDA      UPPER VOLTA VIETNAM REP
YEMEN       YUGOSLAVIA

       2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

SWITZERLAND URUGUAY

      38 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN ALGERIA     BURMA       CAMBODIA    CAMEROUN    CANADA      CEYLON      COLOMBIA    DOMIN REP   FINLAND
FRANCE      GERMAN FR   GHANA       GREECE      GUINEA      HONDURAS    INDIA       ISRAEL      ITALY       IVORY COAST
JAMAICA     LIBYA       MALAGASY R  MAURITANIA  MEXICO      MOROCCO     NETHERLANDS PHILIPPINES SENEGAL     SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA     SUDAN       TANGANYIKA  TOGO        TRINIDAD    TUNISIA     US          VENEZUELA

      18 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

ALBANIA     BULGARIA    BURUNDI     CHINA, PR   CUBA        CZECHOS'KIA GERMANY, E  HUNGARY     KOREA, N    MALI
MONGOLIA    PARAGUAY    PORTUGAL    RUMANIA     RWANDA      USSR        UAR         VIETNAM, N

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  2  TEND TO BE THOSE                    0.67        2  TEND TO BE THOSE                    0.95        10    2
     LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                        5   40
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (22)                 WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                 X SQ=  21.90
                                                         NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)       P =    0.
                                                                                                   RV YES (YES)

  3  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE               0.73        3  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE               0.95         4    2
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                           LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                       11   40
     WEST EUROPE  (102)                                  WEST EUROPE  (102)                        X SQ=   3.55
                                                                                                   P =    0.036
                                                                                                   RV NO  (YES)
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10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.69	0 13 15 29 X SQ= 4.38 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
26	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.60	26	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.67	9 14 6 28 X SQ= 2.25 P = 0.124 RV YES (NO)	
28	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.60	28	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.66	6 27 9 14 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.125 RV YES (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.93	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.60	14 16 1 24 X SQ= 10.46 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.87	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.61	2 25 13 16 X SQ= 8.17 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.60	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.90	6 37 9 4 X SQ= 12.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
32	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.87	32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	2 0 13 42 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.066 RV NO (YES)	
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.53	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.81	8 8 7 34 X SQ= 4.85 P = 0.019 RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.87	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.55	13 19 2 23 X SQ= 6.11 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	

35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.67	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.98	10 1 5 41 X SQ= 25.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.87	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.79	13 9 2 33 X SQ= 17.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.93	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.55	14 19 1 23 X SQ= 8.61 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.80	38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	3 0 12 42 X SQ= 5.31 P = 0.016 RV NO (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.67	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.79	10 9 5 33 X SQ= 8.24 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.80	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.85	12 6 3 35 X SQ= 18.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.93	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.67	14 13 1 27 X SQ= 13.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.80	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.98	12 1 3 41 X SQ= 33.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.93	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.72	14 11 1 29 X SQ= 16.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.67	15 28 0 14 X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.73	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.74	11 9 4 25 X SQ= 7.62 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (14)	0.60	53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	9 0 6 42 X SQ= 25.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.87	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.88	13 5 2 37 X SQ= 25.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.57	15 24 0 18 X SQ= 7.52 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.52	15 21 0 19 X SQ= 8.89 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
62	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.56	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	4 0 5 8 X SQ= 2.51 P = 0.082 RV NO (YES)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.80	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.79	12 9 3 33 X SQ= 13.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
64	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.92	64	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.53	12 9 1 8 X SQ= 3.72 P = 0.042 RV NO (YES)	

66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.73	66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.59	11 16 4 23 X SQ= 3.32 P = 0.066 RV YES (NO)
67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.93	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.61	14 23 1 15 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.87	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.74	13 11 2 31 X SQ= 14.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
69	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	1.00	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.64	15 15 0 27 X SQ= 15.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
70	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, AND LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (21)	0.53	70	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.95	8 2 7 36 X SQ= 13.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.60	71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.90	9 4 6 37 X SQ= 12.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.80	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.56	12 18 3 23 X SQ= 4.39 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)
73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	1.00	73	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.59	15 24 0 17 X SQ= 7.08 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.73	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.95	11 2 4 39 X SQ= 25.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.93	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.63	14 15 1 26 X SQ= 11.98 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.92	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.94	11 2 1 33 X SQ= 28.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
78	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.67	78	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.92	1 12 2 1 X SQ= 2.37 P = 0.071 RV YES (YES)
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.62	12 15 0 24 X SQ= 11.59 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.93	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.66	14 14 1 27 X SQ= 13.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	1.00	86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.59	15 24 0 17 X SQ= 7.08 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	1.00	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.59	0 11 14 16 X SQ= 5.86 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.80	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.81	12 6 3 25 X SQ= 13.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.80	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.61	12 11 3 17 X SQ= 4.97 P = 0.023 RV YES (YES)

96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.93	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.50	14 13 1 13 X SQ= 6.13 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
97	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.67	97	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.87	1 13 2 2 X SQ= 1.61 P = 0.108 RV YES (YES)	
98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.60	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.88	9 5 6 37 X SQ= 11.32 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.86	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.77	12 7 2 23 X SQ= 12.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
100	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	1.00	100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	0.55	13 14 0 17 X SQ= 9.42 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.80	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.84	12 5 3 26 X SQ= 15.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.80	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.58	12 15 3 21 X SQ= 4.80 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.92	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.67	12 9 1 18 X SQ= 9.99 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.87	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.72	13 11 2 28 X SQ= 12.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.80	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.68	3 26 12 12 X SQ= 8.32 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.53	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.92	8 3 7 36 X SQ= 11.24 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.80	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.85	12 6 3 33 X SQ= 17.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.93	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.54	14 18 1 21 X SQ= 8.13 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.87	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.50	2 17 13 17 X SQ= 4.45 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.73	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.94	4 32 11 2 X SQ= 20.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
120	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARITUCLATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED (10)	0.53	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	7 34 8 0 X SQ= 17.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.93	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.67	1 28 14 14 X SQ= 13.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.73	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.93	4 39 11 3 X SQ= 22.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

123	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (8)	0.53	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	7 42 8 0 X SQ= 21.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	124	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.77	0 9 15 30 X SQ= 2.66 P = 0.049 RV NO (NO)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.73	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.90	4 35 11 4 X SQ= 18.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.67	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.97	5 38 10 1 X SQ= 23.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
129	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.93	129	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.64	13 18 1 10 X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.067 RV NO (NO)	
130	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.73	130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	1.00	4 0 11 26 X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.013 RV NO (YES)	
131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.50	131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.77	7 5 7 17 X SQ= 1.77 P = 0.148 RV YES (YES)	
132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	132	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.72	13 18 0 7 X SQ= 2.79 P = 0.072 RV NO (NO)	
133	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	1.00	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.71	0 10 15 24 X SQ= 3.88 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	

134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.87	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.66	13 11 2 21 X SQ= 9.18 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.80	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.91	12 3 3 29 X SQ= 20.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.87	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.58	13 13 2 18 X SQ= 6.51 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.69	141	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	1.00	4 0 9 31 X SQ= 7.10 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.67	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	2 9 4 0 X SQ= 5.13 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)	
145	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.60	145	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	1.00	6 15 4 0 X SQ= 4.48 P = 0.017 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.77	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.82	10 5 3 23 X SQ= 10.93 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.86	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.81	12 5 2 21 X SQ= 13.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.93	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.69	13 8 1 18 X SQ= 11.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.87	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.77	2 24 13 7 X SQ= 14.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.79	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.58	3 18 11 13 X SQ= 3.83 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.93	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.59	1 13 14 19 X SQ= 4.12 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.80	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.82	12 6 3 28 X SQ= 14.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.80	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.59	12 14 3 20 X SQ= 4.84 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	1.00	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.58	0 21 14 15 X SQ= 11.79 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.71	171	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.94	4 2 10 33 X SQ= 2.97 P = 0.048 RV NO (YES)	
172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.57	172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.87	8 5 6 33 X SQ= 8.34 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.79	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.87	11 4 3 28 X SQ= 16.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.86	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.59	12 13 2 19 X SQ= 6.27 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
178	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.77	178	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.53	3 19 10 17 X SQ= 2.31 P = 0.104 RV YES (NO)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.86	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.69	2 20 12 9 X SQ= 9.22 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.71	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.90	10 2 4 19 X SQ= 11.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.92	186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.54	1 12 11 14 X SQ= 3.67 P = 0.030 RV NO (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.73	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.91	4 31 11 3 X SQ= 18.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.73	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	4 0 11 42 X SQ= 8.31 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
190	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS COMMON LAW, RATHER THAN CIVIL LAW (7)	0.50	190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	4 13 4 0 X SQ= 5.11 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.66	0 14 15 27 X SQ= 5.13 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	

193 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)

193 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.62 0 16
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM 15 26
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86) X SQ= 6.17
P = 0.006
RV NO (NO)

110 POLITIES
WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION
IS HIGH (15)

110 POLITIES
WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION
IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)

PREDICATE ONLY

15 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	COSTA RICA	DENMARK	ICELAND	IRELAND	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY
POLAND	SWEDEN	THAILAND	TURKEY	UK					

80 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA
CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA
GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST
JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PERU
PHILIPPINES	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA
TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA	US	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

SWITZERLAND URUGUAY

18 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	KOREA, N	MALI
MONGOLIA	PARAGUAY	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	USSR	UAR	VIETNAM, N		

111 POLITIES
WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION
IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)

111 POLITIES
WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION
IS LOW (42)

PREDICATE ONLY

53 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEYLON	COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	HONDURAS
ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG
MALAGASY R	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SWEDEN	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
UK	US	VENEZUELA							

42 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHILE	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS
DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GUATEMALA	HAITI	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ
JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	MALAYA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PERU	SA*U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SYRIA	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP
YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA								

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

SWITZERLAND URUGUAY

18 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS*KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	KOREA, N	MALI
MONGOLIA	PARAGUAY	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	USSR	UAR	VIETNAM, N		

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112  POLITIES                                                    112  POLITIES
     WHERE SECTIONALISM IS                                            WHERE SECTIONALISM IS
     EXTREME, RATHER THAN                                             NEGLIGIBLE, RATHER THAN
     NEGLIGIBLE  (27)                                                 EXTREME  (47)

                                                                                                                SUBJECT ONLY
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      27 IN LEFT COLUMN

BELGIUM      BRAZIL       BURMA        CANADA       COLOMBIA     CONGO(LEO)   CZECHOS'KIA  ECUADOR      INDIA        INDONESIA
IRAN         IRAQ         JORDAN       LAOS         LIBYA        MALAGASY R   MOROCCO      NIGERIA      PAKISTAN     SOMALIA
SUDAN        SWITZERLAND  UGANDA       USSR         UK           YEMEN        YUGOSLAVIA

      47 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRIA      BOLIVIA      BURUNDI      CEN AFR REP  CHILE        CUBA         COSTA RICA   CYPRUS       DENMARK      DOMIN REP
EL SALVADOR  FINLAND      GERMANY, E   GREECE       GUATEMALA    HAITI        HONDURAS     HUNGARY      ICELAND      IRELAND
ISRAEL       IVORY COAST  JAMAICA      JAPAN        KOREA, N     KOREA REP    LUXEMBOURG   MONGOLIA     NEW ZEALAND  NORWAY
PANAMA       PARAGUAY     POLAND       PORTUGAL     RUMANIA      RWANDA       SA'U ARABIA  SWEDEN       TANGANYIKA   TRINIDAD
TUNISIA      TURKEY       UAR          UPPER VOLTA  VENEZUELA    VIETNAM, N   VIETNAM REP

       3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA    MEXICO       URUGUAY

      34 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN  ALBANIA      ALGERIA      AUSTRALIA    BULGARIA     CAMBODIA     CAMEROUN     CEYLON       CHAD         CHINA, PR
CONGO(BRA)   DAHOMEY      ETHIOPIA     FRANCE       GABON        GERMAN FR    GHANA        GUINEA       ITALY        LEBANON
LIBERIA      MALAYA       MAURITANIA   NETHERLANDS  PERU         PHILIPPINES  SENEGAL      SIERRE LEO   SO AFRICA    SPAIN
SYRIA        THAILAND     TOGO         US

       4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

MALI         NEPAL        NICARAGUA    NIGER

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  6  LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE          0.89          6  LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE          0.70          3   14
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE                           LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE                      24   33
     CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,                             CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,                  X SQ=   2.41
     OR SOUTH AMERICA  (93)                                  OR SOUTH AMERICA  (93)                       P =    0.087
                                                                                                          RV NO  (NO )

 19  LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE               0.73         19  LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE               0.64          8    8
     LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR                              LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN,                          3   14
     CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN                   CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA,           X SQ=   2.56
     IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR                   RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR               P =    0.071
     SOUTH AMERICA  (33)                                     CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (22)               RV YES (YES)
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22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.85	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.60	23 19 4 28 X SQ= 12.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.70	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.57	19 20 8 27 X SQ= 4.27 P = 0.030 RV YES (NO)
26	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.67	26	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.53	9 25 18 22 X SQ= 1.98 P = 0.146 RV YES (NO)
32	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.85	32	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.98	4 1 23 46 X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.056 RV NO (YES)
33	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.59	33	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.83	11 8 16 39 X SQ= 3.89 P = 0.031 RV NO (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.59	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.70	11 33 16 14 X SQ= 5.02 P = 0.016 RV YES (YES)
38	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.85	38	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.98	4 1 23 45 X SQ= 2.51 P = 0.059 RV NO (YES)
45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.59	45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.66	11 29 16 15 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.050 RV YES (YES)
52	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.92	52	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.74	23 29 2 10 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.106 RV NO (NO)

54	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.78	54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.51	6 22 21 23 X SQ= 3.99 P = 0.028 RV NO (ND)	
55	TEND LESS TD BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATIDN IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.59	55	TEND MORE TD BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.84	16 38 11 7 X SQ= 4.44 P = D.025 RV NO (YES)	
63	LEAN TOWARD BEING THDSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY DR PARTLY DTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.69	63	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGIDN IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.53	8 25 18 22 X SQ= 2.55 P = 0.087 RV YES (NO)	
65	TEND TO BE THDSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (18)	0.75	65	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (25)	0.78	3 14 9 4 X SQ= 6.16 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TD BE THDSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEDUS (62)	0.70	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMDGENEDUS (52)	0.68	8 32 19 15 X SQ= 8.72 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TD BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (5D)	0.70	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMDGENEDUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.83	8 39 19 8 X SQ= 18.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
70	TEND MDRE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, DR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.88	70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, DR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.65	3 14 22 26 X SQ= 3.11 P = 0.047 RV NO (NO)	
72	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.67	72	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.52	9 23 18 21 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.145 RV YES (NO)	
73	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.52	73	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.68	13 30 14 14 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.134 RV YES (YES)	

75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.59	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.70	11	33	X SQ= 5.02
						16	14	P = 0.016
								RV YES (YES)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.79	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.60	4	15	X SQ= 5.18
						15	10	P = 0.014
								RV YES (YES)
79	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.86	79	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.58	12	15	X SQ= 2.11
						2	11	P = 0.090
								RV NO (NO)
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.56	81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.93	4	2	X SQ= 4.27
						5	25	P = 0.024
								RV NO (YES)
82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED [55]	0.64	82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY [51]	0.60	9	27	X SQ= 2.81
						16	18	P = 0.080
								RV YES (NO)
100	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.55	100	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.83	12	29	X SQ= 4.05
						10	6	P = 0.033
								RV NO (YES)
111	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.58	111	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.66	10	23	X SQ= 2.44
						14	12	P = 0.109
								RV YES (YES)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.56	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.70	15	14	X SQ= 3.76
						12	33	P = 0.047
								RV YES (YES)
122	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.89	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.57	24	27	X SQ= 6.51
						3	20	P = 0.005
								RV NO (NO)

123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.85	27 0	40 7	X SQ= 2.87 P = 0.043 RV NO (NO)
125	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.73	125	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.53	19 7	18 20	X SQ= 3.20 P = 0.070 RV YES (YES)
128	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.76	128	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.50	13 4	21 21	X SQ= 2.47 P = 0.084 RV YES (NO)
134	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.64	134	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.59	8 14	27 19	X SQ= 2.14 P = 0.120 RV YES (NO)
135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	135	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.82	19 0	32 7	X SQ= 2.37 P = 0.083 RV NO (NO)
139	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.87	139	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.67	3 20	15 31	X SQ= 2.11 P = 0.092 RV NO (NO)
166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.73	166	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.96	7 19	2 45	X SQ= 6.00 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.74	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.64	6 17	27 15	X SQ= 7.22 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
182	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.56	182	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.83	9 7	29 6	X SQ= 2.81 P = 0.080 RV NO (YES)

192 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.63
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN
MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)

192 TENO MORE TO BE THOSE 0.87 10 6
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM 17 41
IS OTHER THAN X SQ= 4.61
MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86) P = 0.020
RV NO (YES)

113 POLITIES
WHERE SECTIONALISM IS
EXTREME (27)

113 POLITIES
WHERE SECTIONALISM IS
MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)

PREDICATE ONLY

27 IN LEFT COLUMN

BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BURMA	CANADA	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	CZECHOS'KIA	ECUADOR	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	LAOS	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MOROCCO	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	SOMALIA
SUDAN	SWITZERLAND	UGANDA	USSR	UK	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA			

81 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY
DENMARK	DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA
GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MAURITANIA
MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA
THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR	US	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP									

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA	MEXICO	URUGUAY

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

MALI	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER

114 POLITIES
WHERE SECTIONALISM IS
EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)

114 POLITIES
WHERE SECTIONALISM IS
NEGLIGIBLE (47)

PREDICATE ONLY

61 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CANADA	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR
ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ
ITALY	JORDAN	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO
NETHERLANDS	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	PHILIPPINES	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN
SUDAN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	UGANDA	USSR	UK	US	YEMEN
YUGOSLAVIA									

47 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRIA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CEN AFR REP	CHILE	CUBA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND
ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LUXEMBOURG	MONGOLIA	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SWEDEN	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP			

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA	MEXICO	URUGUAY

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

MALI	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER

115 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT [20]

115 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR
NEGLIGIBLE (91)

PREDICATE ONLY

20 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CANADA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	ITALY
JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK	US

91 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	COSTA RICA
CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA
GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN
IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA
LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA
NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	POLAND	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YEMEN									

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

PORTUGAL	SPAIN	YUGOSLAVIA

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

KOREA REP

****

116 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)

116 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

32 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHILE	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TURKEY	UK	US
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

79 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA
DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN
KOREA, N	LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	POLAND	RUMANIA
RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO
TRINIOAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

PORTUGAL SPAIN YUGOSLAVIA

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

KOREA REP

2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22)	0.62	2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	20 0 12 79 X SQ= 56.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
3	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.66	3	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	1.00	11 0 21 79 X SQ= 26.42 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	1.00	5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	1.00	16 0 0 8 X SQ= 19.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

8	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (971	0.94	8	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.81	2 15 30 64 X SQ= 1.95 P = 0.144 RV NO (NO)
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.97	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.59	1 32 31 47 X SQ= 13.50 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.75	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (331	0.80	3 8 1 32 X SQ= 3.30 P = 0.043 RV YES (NO)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.86	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.67	1 32 6 16 X SQ= 4.97 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)
24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.66	24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.54	21 36 11 43 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.063 RV YES (NO)
25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.72	25	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.91	9 7 23 72 X SQ= 5.38 P = 0.015 RV NO (YES)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (481	0.59	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.65	13 48 19 26 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)
29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.68	31 23 0 48 X SQ= 36.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.97	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.69	1 53 31 24 X SQ= 36.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.69	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.97	10 76 22 2 X SQ= 54.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.59	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.89	19 9 13 70 X SQ= 25.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.91	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.63	29 29 3 50 X SQ= 24.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.66	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.96	21 3 11 76 X SQ= 47.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.87	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.85	28 12 4 67 X SQ= 48.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	1.00	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.63	32 29 0 50 X SQ= 34.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.78	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.86	25 11 7 67 X SQ= 39.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.97	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.51	31 36 1 38 X SQ= 20.32 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.53	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.96	16 3 14 76 X SQ= 33.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.87	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.88	26 9 4 69 X SQ= 52.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.73	31 21 0 56 X SQ= 43.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.59	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.92	19 6 13 73 X SQ= 32.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.94	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.70	29 22 2 52 X SQ= 33.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.65	32 48 0 26 X SQ= 13.06 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.74	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.69	23 20 8 44 X SQ= 13.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.97	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.52	30 30 1 32 X SQ= 19.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.74	32 46 0 16 X SQ= 8.21 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.78	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.84	25 12 7 65 X SQ= 36.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.55	32 42 0 35 X SQ= 19.39 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.97	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.60	31 45 1 30 X SQ= 13.08 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.59	57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.87	13 10 19 69 X SQ= 9.21 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.97	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.78	1 17 31 62 X SQ= 4.40 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	
62	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.72	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 13 10 X SQ= 1.75 P = 0.128 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.84	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.79	27 16 5 62 X SQ= 36.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
66	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.66	66	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.52	21 34 11 37 X SQ= 2.12 P = 0.135 RV YES (NO)	
67	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.84	67	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.68	26 50 5 24 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.100 RV NO (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.75	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.67	24 26 8 52 X SQ= 14.25 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.81	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.55	26 35 6 43 X SQ= 10.73 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.61	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.89	12 8 19 63 X SQ= 8.64 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.81	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.68	25 25 6 52 X SQ= 18.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.94	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.57	29 33 2 44 X SQ= 21.20 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.67	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.95	20 4 10 75 X SQ= 44.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.65	31 28 0 51 X SQ= 34.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.69	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.94	20 4 9 61 X SQ= 38.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.67	8 20 0 41 X SQ= 10.61 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.59	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	11 0 16 21 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)

82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.90	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.71	27 21 3 51 X SQ= 29.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.97	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.68	31 25 1 53 X SQ= 35.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	1.00	86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.51	32 40 0 38 X SQ= 21.71 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.93	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.52	2 29 28 27 X SQ= 15.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.93	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.92	28 5 2 59 X SQ= 61.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.76	0 19 32 59 X SQ= 7.79 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
93	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.94	93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.62	2 29 30 47 X SQ= 9.70 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.64	30 21 0 37 X SQ= 30.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.50	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.95	16 4 16 75 X SQ= 28.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.78	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.56	25 22 7 28 X SQ= 7.95 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.90	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.78	27 14 3 51 X SQ= 36.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.63	32 27 0 46 X SQ= 33.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	1.00	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.76	29 14 0 44 X SQ= 41.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	1.00	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.54	29 23 0 27 X SQ= 21.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.94	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.79	30 16 2 59 X SQ= 45.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
108	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	1.00	108	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.52	31 34 0 32 X SQ= 20.29 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.80	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.53	24 29 6 33 X SQ= 7.83 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.91	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.52	3 33 29 31 X SQ= 14.45 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.69	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.94	10 60 22 4 X SQ= 39.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.69	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	22 64 10 0 X SQ= 19.10 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.91	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.63	3 50 29 29 X SQ= 24.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.66	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.87	11 69 21 10 X SQ= 29.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.75	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	24 79 8 0 X SQ= 17.71 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.79	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.82	6 55 22 12 X SQ= 29.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.57	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	12 67 16 0 X SQ= 42.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.83	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.62	25 23 5 37 X SQ= 14.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.87	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.50	26 30 4 30 X SQ= 9.93 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.86	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.54	25 32 4 38 X SQ= 12.16 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.79	29 46 0 12 X SQ= 5.33 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.61	136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	12 0 19 63 X SQ= 24.59 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.84	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.95	26 3 5 60 X SQ= 57.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.97	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.72	30 18 1 47 X SQ= 37.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.56	0 31 32 39 X SQ= 18.32 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.76	141	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.94	7 4 22 62 X SQ= 4.79 P = 0.031 RV NO (YES)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.59	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.80	17 13 12 51 X SQ= 11.71 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	1.00	144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.89	0 31 7 4 X SQ= 19.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.88	0 30 X SQ= 2.54 P = 0.054 RV NO (NO)	8 58	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.77	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.95	20 6 X SQ= 44.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	3 58	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.81	0 32 X SQ= 5.42 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	14 60	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.71	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.62	22 9 X SQ= 6.82 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	17 28	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.75	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.52	8 24 X SQ= 5.38 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	32 29	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.77	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.59	7 24 X SQ= 9.50 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	37 26	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.97	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.51	1 31 X SQ= 19.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	32 31	
166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.72	166	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.92	9 23 X SQ= 6.40 P = 0.011 RV NO (YES)	6 72	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.87	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.90	27 4 X SQ= 55.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	7 65	

169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	1.00	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.62	31 27 0 45 X SQ= 31.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
170	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.78	170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.52	7 32 25 35 X SQ= 5.04 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.72	171	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.96	9 3 23 66 X SQ= 9.64 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.62	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.88	12 9 20 65 X SQ= 7.50 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.72	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.92	23 5 9 60 X SQ= 39.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	1.00	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.71	32 19 0 46 X SQ= 40.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.81	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.67	6 46 26 23 X SQ= 18.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.89	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.75	3 46 24 15 X SQ= 28.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.66	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	21 0 11 40 X SQ= 33.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.62	11 40 0 25 X SQ= 4.68 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
186	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.93	186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.54	2 26 25 31 X SQ= 10.38 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.83	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.85	5 57 25 10 X SQ= 39.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.50	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.82	16 14 16 63 X SQ= 9.93 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.84	189	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.97	5 2 27 77 X SQ= 4.58 P = 0.020 RV NO (YES)	
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.65	0 27 32 50 X SQ= 13.09 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.97	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.65	1 27 31 51 X SQ= 10.26 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE, THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.85	0 12 32 66 X SQ= 4.06 P = 0.017 RV NO (NO)	

117 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED (60)

117 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)

PREDICATE ONLY

60 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	CANADA	CEYLON
CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRELAND
ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
SYRIA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA

51 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI
IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA
MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YEMEN									

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

PORTUGAL SPAIN YUGOSLAVIA

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

KOREA REP

118 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
IS VERY SIGNIFICANT [40]

118 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED [60]

PREDICATE ONLY

40 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CYPRUS
CZECHOS'KIA	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN
KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	USSR	UAR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA

60 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)
COSTA RICA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA
HAITI	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PERU	PHILIPPINES	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA

15 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	GABON	MALI	NIGER	RWANDA
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	TOGO	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN					

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119  POLITIES                                                    119  POLITIES
     WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION                                      WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
     BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS                                          BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
     IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT  (74)                         IS MODERATE OR LIMITED  (26)

                                                                                                   BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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      74 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN ALBANIA     ALGERIA     ARGENTINA   BOLIVIA     BRAZIL      BULGARIA    BURMA       CAMBODIA    CEYLON
CHINA, PR   COLOMBIA    CONGO(LEO)  CUBA        CYPRUS      CZECHOS*KIA DOMIN REP   ECUADOR     EL SALVADOR ETHIOPIA
GERMANY, E  GHANA       GUATEMALA   GUINEA      HAITI       HONDURAS    HUNGARY     INDIA       INDONESIA   IRAN
IRAQ        ISRAEL      ITALY       IVORY COAST JAPAN       JORDAN      KOREA, N    KOREA REP   LAOS        LEBANON
LIBERIA     LIBYA       MALAYA      MAURITANIA  MEXICO      MONGOLIA    MOROCCO     NEPAL       NICARAGUA   NIGERIA
PAKISTAN    PANAMA      PARAGUAY    PERU        POLAND      PORTUGAL    RUMANIA     SA*U ARABIA SENEGAL     SO AFRICA
SPAIN       SUDAN       SYRIA       TANGANYIKA  THAILAND    TUNISIA     TURKEY      UGANDA      USSR        UAR
VENEZUELA   VIETNAM, N  VIETNAM REP YUGOSLAVIA

      26 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA   AUSTRIA     BELGIUM     CANADA      CHILE       COSTA RICA  DENMARK     FINLAND     FRANCE      GERMAN FR
GREECE      ICELAND     IRELAND     JAMAICA     LUXEMBOURG  MALAGASY R  NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NORWAY      PHILIPPINES
SWEDEN      SWITZERLAND TRINIDAD    UK          US          URUGUAY

      15 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURUNDI     CAMEROUN    CEN AFR REP CHAD        CONGO(BRA)  DAHOMEY     GABON       MALI        NIGER       RWANDA
SIERRE LEO  SOMALIA     TOGO        UPPER VOLTA YEMEN
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  2  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.96          2  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.73        3   19
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                   LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                 71    7
     WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                                   NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (22)        X SQ=  49.47
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)                                                                    P =    0.
                                                                                                            RV YES (YES)

  3  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                     0.96          3  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.62        3   10
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                   LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                           71   16
     WEST EUROPE  (102)                                          WEST EUROPE  (102)                         X SQ=  17.21
                                                                                                            P =    0.
                                                                                                            RV NO  (YES)

  5  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.75          5  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                          1.00        3   15
     LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN                         LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE,               9    0
     IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE  (9)                          RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE  (18)           X SQ=  13.67
                                                                                                            P =    0.
                                                                                                            RV YES (YES)
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8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.77	8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.96	17 1 57 25 X SQ= 3.56 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)	
10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.76	10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.96	18 1 56 25 X SQ= 4.00 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	
11	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.82	11	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.96	13 1 61 25 X SQ= 1.98 P = 0.107 RV NO (NO)	
13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.80	13	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	1.00	15 0 59 26 X SQ= 4.71 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	
14	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.86	14	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	1.00	10 0 64 26 X SQ= 2.55 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)	
21	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.65	21	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.88	26 3 48 23 X SQ= 4.12 P = 0.025 RV NO (NO)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.66	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.62	46 10 24 16 X SQ= 4.73 P = 0.021 RV YES (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.50	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.96	33 23 33 1 X SQ= 13.84 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.56	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.96	40 1 32 25 X SQ= 18.92 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.93	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.73	68 7 5 19 X SQ= 42.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
32	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.93	32	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.81	5 5 69 21 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.121 RV NO (YES)	
34	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.55	34	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.81	41 21 33 5 X SQ= 4.23 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.92	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.69	6 18 68 8 X SQ= 36.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.76	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.92	18 24 56 2 X SQ= 33.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.71	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.65	21 17 52 9 X SQ= 9.38 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.94	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.58	4 15 68 11 X SQ= 29.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.77	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.77	16 20 55 6 X SQ= 21.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.58	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.96	30 25 41 1 X SQ= 20.38 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.91	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.69	7 18 67 8 X SQ= 33.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.56	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.96	30 25 38 1 X SQ= 18.89 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.84	46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	58 26 11 0 X SQ= 3.26 P = 0.032 RV NO (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.79	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.92	14 23 53 2 X SQ= 35.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.55	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.96	30 24 36 1 X SQ= 17.16 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.79	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.85	15 22 57 4 X SQ= 30.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.75	56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.96	52 25 17 1 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)	
58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.78	58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	16 0 58 26 X SQ= 5.18 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)	
62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	62	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.64	0 5 16 9 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.014 RV NO (YES)	

63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.70	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.92	22 24 51 2 X SQ= 27.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.62	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.77	28 20 45 6 X SQ= 9.93 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.86	70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.58	10 10 59 14 X SQ= 6.26 P = 0.009 RV NO (YES)	
72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.52	72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.72	34 18 37 7 X SQ= 3.41 P = 0.061 RV YES (NO)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.90	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.73	7 19 65 7 X SQ= 36.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.51	75	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.96	37 25 36 1 X SQ= 15.05 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.88	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.73	7 19 49 7 X SQ= 27.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
77	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.54	77	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.86	22 6 26 1 X SQ= 2.46 P = 0.101 RV YES (NO)	
81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.97	81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.55	1 10 28 12 X SQ= 10.68 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

82	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.55	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.85	29 22 36 4 X SQ= 10.49 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
83	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.88	83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	9 0 65 26 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.107 RV NO (NO)
85	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.51	85	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.88	37 23 36 3 X SQ= 9.93 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
86	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.73	86	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.88	53 23 20 3 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.114 RV NO (NO)
87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.68	87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	1.00	17 0 36 22 X SQ= 7.39 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.81	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.96	11 22 46 1 X SQ= 36.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.74	92	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.96	19 1 54 25 X SQ= 4.56 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)
93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.56	93	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.96	31 1 39 25 X SQ= 12.19 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.61	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.96	25 25 39 1 X SQ= 22.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

95	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN [95]	0.79	95	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.96	56 25 15 1 X SQ= 2.97 P = 0.061 RV NO (NO)	
96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.65	96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	1.00	40 26 22 0 X SQ= 10.48 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.91	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.58	7 15 67 11 X SQ= 23.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.52	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.91	30 20 33 2 X SQ= 10.89 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
100	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.66	100	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	1.00	42 22 22 0 X SQ= 8.44 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC [57]	0.75	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.92	16 24 47 2 X SQ= 30.65 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.58	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.96	29 25 40 1 X SQ= 20.40 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.68	105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	1.00	17 25 36 0 X SQ= 28.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.57	106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	1.00	20 26 26 0 X SQ= 20.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.74	107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	1.00	19 26 53 0 X SQ= 38.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.54	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.92	27 22 32 2 X SQ= 13.03 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.94	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.62	4 16 66 10 X SQ= 32.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.86	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.85	10 22 60 4 X SQ= 39.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.50	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.96	35 25 35 1 X SQ= 15.32 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.50	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.92	37 2 37 24 X SQ= 12.75 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.82	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.73	61 7 13 19 X SQ= 24.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.69	74 18 0 8 X SQ= 20.75 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.84	125	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	1.00	51 0 10 24 X SQ= 46.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.67	61 8 0 16 X SQ= 45.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.56	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.84	24 21 30 4 X SQ= 9.35 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
130	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.93	130	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.67	4 8 52 16 X SQ= 7.10 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
132	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.77	132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	30 24 9 0 X SQ= 4.71 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.66	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.92	22 23 42 2 X SQ= 21.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.75	135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	39 25 13 0 X SQ= 5.84 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.89	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.88	6 23 51 3 X SQ= 44.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.63	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.96	21 25 36 1 X SQ= 23.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.59	139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	27 0 39 26 X SQ= 13.15 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

141	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.97	141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.68	2 8 58 17 X SQ= 11.35 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
145	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.90	145	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.58	19 11 2 8 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)
146	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.87	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	8 0 55 23 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.89	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.77	6 17 48 5 X SQ= 29.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.57	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.82	24 18 32 4 X SQ= 8.14 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.54	158	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.85	27 4 32 22 X SQ= 5.94 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.51	160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	30 0 29 25 X SQ= 17.62 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.69	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.84	41 4 18 21 X SQ= 18.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.65	164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.88	22 3 40 23 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)

168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.83	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.88	11 23 55 3 X SQ= 38.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.59	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.96	27 25 39 1 X SQ= 20.97 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.58	170	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.84	27 4 37 21 X SQ= 4.34 P = 0.026 RV NO (NO)	
172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.91	172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.50	6 13 63 13 X SQ= 17.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.89	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.84	7 21 55 4 X SQ= 39.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.61	175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	1.00	24 25 38 0 X SQ= 24.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.54	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.84	35 4 30 21 X SQ= 9.05 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.72	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.91	44 2 17 20 X SQ= 23.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.94	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.72	3 18 48 7 X SQ= 33.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.61	186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	1.00	31 0 20 24 X SQ= 22.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.85	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.96	57 1 10 24 X SQ= 47.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.73	0 7 74 19 X SQ= 17.49 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.59	22 10 0 7 X SQ= 8.42 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.72	192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	20 0 52 26 X SQ= 7.44 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
193	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.81	193	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.96	14 1 59 25 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)	
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.82	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	13 0 61 25 X SQ= 3.63 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)	

120 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR
MODERATE (9D)

120 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARITUCLATION
BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS
IS LIMITED (1D)

PREDICATE ONLY

9D IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS
CZECHOS'KIA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE
GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND
ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON
LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS
NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA

1D IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	DENMARK	FINLAND	ICELAND	LUXEMBOURG	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN	UK	US

15 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	GABON	MALI	NIGER	RWANDA
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	TOGO	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN					

121 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT (54)

121 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR
NEGLIGIBLE (61)

PREDICATE ONLY

54 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAN	IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	UGANDA
UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN						

61 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA
CHILE	COLOMBIA	CUBA	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND
FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL
ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA
YUGOSLAVIA									

122 POLITIES WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	122 POLITIES WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

83 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS
LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	RUMANIA	RWANDA
SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA
THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA							

32 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BULGARIA	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CUBA	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK
DOMIN REP	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY
LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PORTUGAL	SWEDEN	UK	US
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.95	2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22)	0.56	4 18 79 14 X SQ= 36.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
3	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.96	3	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.69	3 10 80 22 X SQ= 14.94 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
5	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.62	5	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	0.79	3 15 5 4 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.072 RV YES (YES)	
8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.78	8	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	1.00	18 0 65 32 X SQ= 6.67 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	

9	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	0.89	9	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (106)	1.00	9 0 74 32 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)
10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.60	10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	33 0 50 32 X SQ= 15.95 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.81	13	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	1.00	16 0 67 32 X SQ= 5.65 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)
17	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.52	17	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	1.00	11 0 12 10 X SQ= 5.18 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.73	19	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	1.00	33 0 12 10 X SQ= 15.41 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.60	20	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	1.00	18 0 12 10 X SQ= 8.62 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.64	22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.53	53 15 30 17 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.138 RV YES (NO)
26	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.63	26	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.53	31 17 52 15 X SQ= 1.76 P = 0.143 RV YES (NO)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.65	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.66	51 11 27 21 X SQ= 7.66 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)

29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.64	29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	27 29 49 0 X SQ= 32.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.69	30	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	1.00	56 0 25 32 X SQ= 41.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.93	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.56	76 14 6 18 X SQ= 30.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.57	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.81	36 26 47 6 X SQ= 11.85 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.94	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.59	5 19 78 13 X SQ= 36.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.81	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.81	16 26 67 6 X SQ= 35.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.60	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.97	33 31 50 1 X SQ= 28.26 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.77	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.61	19 19 64 12 X SQ= 13.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.85	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.77	12 24 69 7 X SQ= 37.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.67	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.90	27 28 54 3 X SQ= 26.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.92	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.56	7 18 76 14 X SQ= 28.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.70	45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	23 32 54 0 X SQ= 41.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.68	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.68	22 21 46 10 X SQ= 9.46 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.88	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.84	10 27 71 5 X SQ= 50.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.57	55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	46 32 35 0 X SQ= 18.06 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.60	56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	47 32 31 0 X SQ= 15.80 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.89	57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC (25)	0.50	9 16 74 16 X SQ= 18.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.78	58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	18 0 65 32 X SQ= 6.67 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	

63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.83	63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	1.00	14 32 68 0 X SQ= 62.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.54	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.72	34 23 40 9 X SQ= 5.04 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.71	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.87	24 28 58 4 X SQ= 29.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.60	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.97	33 31 49 1 X SQ= 27.72 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.91	70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.53	7 14 68 16 X SQ= 16.41 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.67	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.83	27 25 54 5 X SQ= 20.02 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.57	73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	1.00	35 30 46 0 X SQ= 26.80 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.94	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.66	5 21 76 11 X SQ= 42.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.63	75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	1.00	30 32 52 0 X SQ= 34.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.92	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.68	5 21 60 10 X SQ= 35.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.69	77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	18 10 41 0 X SQ= 14.36 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.85	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.71	45 4 8 10 X SQ= 15.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.74	82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	1.00	19 32 55 0 X SQ= 46.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
83	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.89	83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	9 0 74 32 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.61	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.88	32 28 50 4 X SQ= 19.79 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.54	86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	1.00	44 32 38 0 X SQ= 20.21 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.52	87	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.93	29 2 32 26 X SQ= 12.08 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.82	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.75	12 21 55 7 X SQ= 25.93 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.56	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.77	27 24 34 7 X SQ= 7.85 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.63	96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.97	37 30 22 1 X SQ= 10.67 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.69	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.86	22 1 10 6 X SQ= 4.97 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.50	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.75	29 21 29 7 X SQ= 3.88 P = 0.036 RV YES (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.72	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.71	19 22 48 9 X SQ= 14.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.55	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.78	34 25 42 7 X SQ= 8.83 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.68	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.80	19 24 41 6 X SQ= 16.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.73	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.78	21 25 58 7 X SQ= 22.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.55	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.87	32 21 39 3 X SQ= 11.43 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.65	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.67	51 10 27 20 X SQ= 7.80 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.86	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.68	11 21 69 10 X SQ= 29.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.57	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.84	34 26 46 5 X SQ= 13.78 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.90	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.59	61 13 7 19 X SQ= 24.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.69	68 22 0 10 X SQ= 20.27 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.80	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.83	60 4 15 20 X SQ= 29.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.96	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.54	72 11 3 13 X SQ= 30.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.57	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.70	27 21 36 9 X SQ= 4.96 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)
134	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.50	134	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.68	36 21 36 10 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.131 RV YES (NO)

137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.84	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.62	11 18 57 11 X SQ= 18.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.66	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.83	23 25 44 5 X SQ= 18.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.62	139	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.81	28 6 45 26 X SQ= 3.06 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)	
142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.77	142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.52	15 15 50 16 X SQ= 5.14 P = 0.018 RV NO (YES)	
144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.85	144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.50	28 6 5 6 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.044 RV YES (YES)	
146	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.89	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	8 0 63 29 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.101 RV NO (NO)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.87	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.54	8 15 54 13 X SQ= 14.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.82	148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	14 0 64 32 X SQ= 5.06 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.56	153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.68	23 19 29 9 X SQ= 3.18 P = 0.061 RV YES (NO)	

158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.51	158	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.74	32 33 X SQ= 3.82 P = 0.045 RV NO (NO)	8 23
161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.55	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.65	36 30 X SQ= 2.35 P = 0.087 RV YES (NO)	11 20
164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.52	164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.94	32 35 X SQ= 14.76 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	2 30
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.81	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.65	14 61 X SQ= 19.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	20 11
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.55	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.77	34 41 X SQ= 7.86 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	24 7
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.83	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.53	12 58 X SQ= 11.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	16 14
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.61	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.80	27 43 X SQ= 12.81 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	24 6
178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.58	178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.65	42 31 X SQ= 3.40 P = 0.054 RV YES (NO)	11 20
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.70	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.71	44 19 X SQ= 11.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	8 20

181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.89	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.50	5 16 39 16 X SQ= 11.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.61	182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	39 16 25 0 X SQ= 7.36 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
186	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.57	186	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.81	26 5 35 21 X SQ= 3.39 P = 0.050 RV NO (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.77	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.64	56 10 17 18 X SQ= 13.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.81	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.53	15 17 66 15 X SQ= 11.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
189	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.98	189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.84	2 5 81 27 X SQ= 4.93 P = 0.017 RV NO (YES)	
192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.67	192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	27 0 54 32 X SQ= 12.24 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.66	193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	28 0 54 32 X SQ= 12.70 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

123 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED [107)

123 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS
IS NEGLIGIBLE (8)

PREDICATE ONLY

107 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI
CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST
JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NICARAGUA	NIGER
NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA
SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA
THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US
UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA			

8 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	DENMARK	ICELAND	LUXEMBOURG	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN

124 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS FREQUENT (14)

124 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR
VERY INFREQUENT (85)

PREDICATE ONLY

14 IN LEFT COLUMN

CEYLON	CHINA, PR	CONGO(LED)	GERMANY, E	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	LAOS	PAKISTAN	RWANDA
SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SYRIA	VIETNAM REP						

85 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GABON	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA
HAITI	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA
JAPAN	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR
UAR	UK	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	YUGOSLAVIA					

6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA	CYPRUS	FRANCE	HUNGARY	US	VENEZUELA

6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	KOREA, N	MONGOLIA	RUMANIA	VIETNAM, N

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	YEMEN

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125  POLITIES                                                    125  POLITIES
     WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION                                      WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
     BY ANOMIC GROUPS                                                 BY ANOMIC GROUPS
     IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL  (64)                                  IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT  (35)


                                                                                                   BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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      64 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN BOLIVIA     BRAZIL      BURMA       CAMBODIA    CAMEROUN    CEN AFR REP CEYLON      CHAD        CHINA, PR
COLOMBIA    CONGO(BRA)  CONGO(LEO)  DAHOMEY      ECUADOR     EL SALVADOR ETHIOPIA    GABON       GERMANY, E  GHANA
GUATEMALA   GUINEA      HAITI       HONDURAS    INDIA       INDONESIA   IRAN        IRAQ        IVORY COAST JAPAN
JORDAN      KOREA REP   LAOS        LEBANON     MALAYA      MALI        MAURITANIA  MEXICO      MOROCCO     NEPAL
NIGER       NIGERIA     PAKISTAN    PANAMA      PARAGUAY    PERU        POLAND      RWANDA      SA'U ARABIA SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO  SOMALIA     SO AFRICA   SPAIN       SUDAN       SYRIA       THAILAND    TOGO        TURKEY      UGANDA
USSR        UPPER VOLTA VIETNAM REP YUGOSLAVIA

      35 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA   AUSTRIA     BELGIUM     BURUNDI     CANADA      CHILE       COSTA RICA  CZECHOS*KIA DENMARK     FINLAND
GERMAN FR   GREECE      ICELAND     IRELAND     ISRAEL      ITALY       JAMAICA     LIBERIA     LIBYA       LUXEMBOURG
MALAGASY R  NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NICARAGUA   NORWAY      PHILIPPINES PORTUGAL    SWEDEN      SWITZERLAND TANGANYIKA
TRINIDAD    TUNISIA     UAR         UK          URUGUAY

       6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA   CYPRUS      FRANCE      HUNGARY     US          VENEZUELA

       6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

ALBANIA     BULGARIA    KOREA, N    MONGOLIA    RUMANIA     VIETNAM, N

       4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA     CUBA        DOMIN REP   YEMEN

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  2  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.98     2  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.54        1   19
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                             LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                 63   16
     WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                             NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (22)          X SQ=  35.81
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)                                                              P =    0.
                                                                                                      RV YES (YES)

  3  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                     0.98     3  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                     0.69        1   11
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                             LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                            63   24
     WEST EUROPE  (102)                                    WEST EUROPE  (102)                           X SQ=  16.25
                                                                                                      P =    0.
                                                                                                      RV NO  (YES)
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5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.80	5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	0.94	1 16 4 1 X SQ= 8.23 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.78	8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.97	14 1 50 34 X SQ= 4.97 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
10	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.61	10	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.80	25 7 39 28 X SQ= 2.94 P = 0.072 RV NO (NO)	
11	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.62	11	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.89	24 4 40 31 X SQ= 6.35 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)	
20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.54	20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.86	14 1 12 6 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.095 RV YES (NO)	
22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.70	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.57	45 15 19 20 X SQ= 6.04 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.69	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.54	20 19 44 16 X SQ= 4.11 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.68	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.57	41 15 19 20 X SQ= 4.92 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.67	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.87	20 28 40 4 X SQ= 22.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.68	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.80	43 7 20 28 X SQ= 19.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.97	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.54	61 16 2 19 X SQ= 31.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.55	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.69	29 .24 35 11 X SQ= 4.03 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.97	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.54	2 19 62 16 X SQ= 32.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.86	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.71	9 25 55 10 X SQ= 30.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.66	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.86	22 30 42 5 X SQ= 21.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.78	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.51	14 18 49 17 X SQ= 7.45 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.86	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.59	9 20 54 14 X SQ= 18.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.69	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.80	19 28 43 7 X SQ= 19.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.73	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.79	17 27 45 7 X SQ= 21.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.76	47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.63	4 17 13 10 X SQ= 5.02 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.71	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.75	15 24 36 8 X SQ= 14.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.92	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.66	5 23 59 12 X SQ= 34.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.56	56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.89	34 31 27 4 X SQ= 9.52 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
57	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.86	57	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.69	9 11 55 24 X SQ= 3.22 P = 0.065 RV NO (YES)	
62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	62	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.69	0 5 9 11 X SQ= 1.83 P = 0.123 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.83	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.74	11 26 52 9 X SQ= 28.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	0.54	64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.90	11 26 13 3 X SQ= 9.98 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

66	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.55	66	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.62	26 21 32 13 X SQ= 1.83 P = 0.135 RV YES (NO)	
67	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.66	67	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.85	40 28 21 5 X SQ= 3.07 P = 0.055 RV NO (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.75	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.71	16 25 47 10 X SQ= 17.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.63	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.77	23 27 40 8 X SQ= 13.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.95	70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.56	3 14 56 18 X SQ= 17.95 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.63	72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.59	23 20 39 14 X SQ= 3.36 P = 0.054 RV YES (NO)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.53	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.71	29 24 33 10 X SQ= 4.12 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.95	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.59	3 20 60 14 X SQ= 32.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.65	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.83	22 29 41 6 X SQ= 18.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.94	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.61	3 20 50 13 X SQ= 28.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.71	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.62	14 8 35 5 X SQ= 3.54 P = 0.048 RV YES (NO)	
80	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.63	80	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.75	12 6 20 2 X SQ= 2.28 P = 0.110 RV YES (NO)	
81	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.94	81	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.67	1 8 16 16 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.056 RV NO (YES)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.69	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.69	17 24 38 11 X SQ= 10.76 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.86	83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	9 0 55 35 X SQ= 3.85 P = 0.025 RV NO (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.68	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.77	20 27 43 8 X SQ= 16.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.51	87	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.82	23 5 24 23 X SQ= 5.98 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.85	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.75	8 21 44 7 X SQ= 25.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.60	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.82	18 27 27 6 X SQ= 11.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.56	96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.91	24 30 19 3 X SQ= 9.54 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.65	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.90	16 26 30 3 X SQ= 19.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
100	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.56	100	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	1.00	25 29 20 0 X SQ= 15.48 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.80	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.76	10 25 41 8 X SQ= 23.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.62	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.86	22 30 36 5 X SQ= 18.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.72	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.76	12 25 31 8 X SQ= 15.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.50	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.88	18 29 18 4 X SQ= 9.70 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.77	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.74	14 26 47 9 X SQ= 22.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.60	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.86	23 25 35 4 X SQ= 15.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.70	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.61	42 13 18 20 X SQ= 7.04 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.90	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.65	6 22 55 12 X SQ= 29.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.61	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.82	24 28 37 6 X SQ= 14.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.71	51 10 0 24 X SQ= 46.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.70	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.89	45 4 19 31 X SQ= 29.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.94	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.57	60 15 4 20 X SQ= 29.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.77	64 27 0 8 X SQ= 12.99 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.54	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.70	22 23 26 10 X SQ= 3.60 P = 0.042 RV YES (YES)	

130	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.95	130	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.71	2 9 39 22 X SQ= 6.20 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	
133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.64	133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.85	21 5 37 29 X SQ= 3.88 P = 0.032 RV NO (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.54	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.79	26 27 30 7 X SQ= 8.19 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.68	0 11 52 23 X SQ= 16.50 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.92	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.71	4 24 48 10 X SQ= 34.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.71	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.82	15 27 36 6 X SQ= 19.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.66	139	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.82	19 6 37 28 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.145 RV NO (NO)	
141	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.94	141	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.79	3 7 47 26 X SQ= 3.02 P = 0.080 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.93	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.63	3 19 43 11 X SQ= 25.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

148	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.80	148	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.94	12 2 48 32 X SQ= 2.39 P = 0.077 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.72	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.82	11 23 29 5 X SQ= 17.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.52	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.93	19 26 21 2 X SQ= 13.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.62	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.82	31 6 19 27 X SQ= 13.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.61	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.76	31 8 20 25 X SQ= 9.34 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.53	164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.82	24 6 27 28 X SQ= 6.49 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.89	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.69	6 24 51 11 X SQ= 30.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.58	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.80	24 28 33 7 X SQ= 11.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.52	170	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.81	27 6 29 26 X SQ= 6.34 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	

171	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.91	171	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.78	5 7 51 25 X SQ= 1.90 P = 0.112 RV NO (YES)	
172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.88	172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.60	7 14 52 21 X SQ= 8.47 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.92	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.65	4 22 48 12 X SQ= 29.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.63	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.76	19 26 33 8 X SQ= 11.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.61	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.73	35 9 22 24 X SQ= 8.43 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.74	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.73	35 8 12 22 X SQ= 15.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.97	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.56	1 18 29 14 X SQ= 17.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
182	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.58	182	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.82	29 14 21 3 X SQ= 2.30 P = 0.086 RV NO (NO)	
186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.53	186	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.91	20 3 23 29 X SQ= 10.22 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	

187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.86	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.78	48 / 8	7 / 25
						X SQ=	32.74
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.83	0 / 64	6 / 29
						X SQ=	8.86
						P =	0.001
						RV NO	(YES)
190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.67	15 / 0	12 / 6
						X SQ=	4.08
						P =	0.021
						RV NO	(YES)
192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.66	192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.89	21 / 41	4 / 31
						X SQ=	4.78
						P =	0.017
						RV NO	(NO)
193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.62	193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.89	24 / 39	4 / 31
						X SQ=	6.59
						P =	0.005
						RV NO	(NO)

126 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR
INFREQUENT (83)

126 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY ANOMIC GROUPS
IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)

PREDICATE ONLY

83 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD
CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	INDIA
INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA REP
LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO
NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEG	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA
TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA
URUGUAY	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA							

16 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMAN FR	ICELAND	IRELAND	LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK				

6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA	CYPRUS	FRANCE	HUNGARY	US	VENEZUELA

6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	KOREA, N	MONGOLIA	RUMANIA	VIETNAM, N

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	YEMEN

127 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS SIGNIFICANT (21)

127 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR
NEGLIGIBLE (72)

PREDICATE ONLY

21 IN LEFT COLUMN

BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	CEYLON	CHILE	CONGO(LEO)	DENMARK	FINLAND	GUATEMALA	ICELAND	ISRAEL
LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PERU	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	UGANDA
VENEZUELA									

72 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA
CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	HONDURAS	HUNGARY
INDIA	IRELAND	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN	TANGANYIKA
TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CYPRUS	INDONESIA	LAOS	SO AFRICA	URUGUAY

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	LIBYA	SA'U ARABIA

12 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CUBA	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SUDAN
THAILAND	YEMEN								

128 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)

128 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

48 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMEROUN	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA
CONGO(LEO)	DENMARK	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS
ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG
MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PERU	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TRINIDAD	UGANDA	UK	VENEZUELA		

45 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA
CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HUNGARY	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N
MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NICARAGUA	NIGER	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SPAIN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR
US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA					

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CYPRUS	INDONESIA	LAOS	SO AFRICA	URUGUAY

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	LIBYA	SA'U ARABIA

12 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CUBA	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SUDAN
THAILAND	YEMEN								

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2 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.62

2 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.91

	18 4
	30 41
X SQ=	9.00
P =	0.001
RV NO	(YES)

5 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18) — 1.00

5 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9) — 0.82

	16 2
	0 9
X SQ=	16.13
P =	0.
RV YES	(YES)

6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA [93]	0.71	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.89	14 5 34 40 X SQ= 3.61 P = 0.040 RV NO (YES)
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.81	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA [82]	0.58	9 19 39 26 X SQ= 5.02 P = 0.023 RV NO (YES)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA [22]	0.61	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.79	9 19 14 5 X SQ= 6.24 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)
20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.78	20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.58	4 7 14 5 X SQ= 2.64 P = 0.063 RV YES (YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH [56]	0.70	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW [49]	0.55	32 17 14 21 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.73	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.64	13 28 35 16 X SQ= 10.98 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW [62]	0.62	34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.56	30 20 18 25 X SQ= 2.36 P = 0.098 RV YES (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.56	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.73	27 12 21 33 X SQ= 7.18 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.75	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.53	36 21 12 24 X SQ= 6.71 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)

40	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.76	40	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.53	35 23 11 20 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.029 RV NO (YES)
41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.70	41	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.89	14 5 32 40 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.038 RV NO (YES)
42	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.52	42	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.76	22 11 24 34 X SQ= 4.42 P = 0.029 RV NO (YES)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.66	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.62	31 17 16 28 X SQ= 6.23 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)
45	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.63	45	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.54	29 19 17 22 X SQ= 1.82 P = 0.135 RV YES (YES)
46	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.89	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.66	42 27 5 14 X SQ= 5.83 P = 0.010 RV NO (YES)
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.70	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.71	30 10 13 24 X SQ= 10.82 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.98	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.68	42 11 1 23 X SQ= 34.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.62	44 21 0 13 X SQ= 17.53 P = 0. RV NO (YES)

53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.75	53	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.96	12 2 36 43 X SQ= 6.15 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)	
54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.52	54	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.74	23 11 25 32 X SQ= 3.93 P = 0.032 RV NO (YES)	
55	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.83	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.60	40 26 8 17 X SQ= 4.86 P = 0.019 RV NO (YES)	
62	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.74	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 14 9 X SQ= 1.37 P = 0.144 RV NO (NO)	
63	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.56	63	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.61	27 17 21 27 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.100 RV YES (YES)	
68	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.56	68	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.61	27 17 21 27 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.100 RV YES (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.60	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.65	28 15 19 28 X SQ= 4.54 P = 0.022 RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.70	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.53	33 20 14 23 X SQ= 4.28 P = 0.032 RV YES (YES)	
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.62	74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.82	18 8 29 37 X SQ= 3.82 P = 0.038 RV NO (YES)	

75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.77	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.53	37 21 11 24 X SQ= 7.91 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
76	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.60	76	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.78	18 8 27 28 X SQ= 2.14 P = 0.100 RV NO (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.63	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.75	17 7 10 21 X SQ= 6.58 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
78	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.94	78	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.54	17 7 1 6 X SQ= 4.98 P = 0.025 RV NO (YES)	
79	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.61	79	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.81	17 22 11 5 X SQ= 1.96 P = 0.138 RV NO (YES)	
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.67	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.85	10 3 5 17 X SQ= 7.71 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.64	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.60	30 17 17 25 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.035 RV YES (YES)	
84	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.59	84	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.68	10 8 7 17 X SQ= 1.98 P = 0.117 RV YES (YES)	
86	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.75	86	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.56	36 25 12 20 X SQ= 3.08 P = 0.054 RV NO (YES)	

87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.76	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.50	8 20 26 20 X SQ= 4.41 P = 0.030 RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.71	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.88	24 5 10 36 X SQ= 24.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.59	0 18 48 26 X SQ= 21.88 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.92	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.55	4 24 44 20 X SQ= 21.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.95	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.75	39 8 2 24 X SQ= 35.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.64	48 28 0 16 X SQ= 18.67 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.95	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.77	39 24 2 7 X SQ= 3.57 P = 0.033 RV NO (YES)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.70	2 7 0 16 X SQ= 1.44 P = 0.120 RV YES (NO)	
98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.71	98	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.89	14 5 34 40 X SQ= 3.61 P = 0.040 RV NO (YES)	

99	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.57	99	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.79	23 22 17 6 X SQ= 2.39 P = 0.117 RV NO (NO)
100	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.67	100	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	1.00	27 27 13 0 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.82	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.83	31 7 7 35 X SQ= 31.16 P = D. RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.98	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.77	44 10 1 34 X SQ= 49.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.92	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.88	36 5 3 36 X SQ= 48.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.95	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.65	37 14 2 26 X SQ= 28.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.81	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.86	38 6 9 38 X SQ= 38.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.98	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.60	43 17 1 26 X SQ= 31.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
113	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.72	113	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.90	13 4 34 37 X SQ= 3.43 P = 0.056 RV NO (YES)

116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.52	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.88	25 23	5 37
						X SQ= 14.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.83	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.69	40 8	13 29
						X SQ= 23.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.89	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.59	5 40	20 14
						X SQ= 18.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.75	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.53	12 36	24 21
						X SQ= 6.71 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.56	122	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.80	27 21	36 9
						X SQ= 4.96 P = 0.016 RV NO (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.83	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	40 8	45 0
						X SQ= 6.22 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.51	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.72	22 23	26 10
						X SQ= 3.60 P = 0.042 RV YES (YES)	
130	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.91	130	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.77	4 40	7 23
						X SQ= 1.84 P = 0.108 RV NO (YES)	
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.84	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.53	7 38	21 24
						X SQ= 8.76 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	

137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.55	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.91	24 4 20 39 X SQ= 18.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.84	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.83	38 7 7 35 X SQ= 37.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.98	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.72	1 31 46 12 X SQ= 44.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.58	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.98	26 1 19 41 X SQ= 28.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.89	144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.91	1 32 8 3 X SQ= 20.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
145	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.76	145	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (11)	0.75	26 1 8 3 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.065 RV YES (NO)	
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.83	0 7 43 35 X SQ= 5.76 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.59	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	23 0 16 44 X SQ= 33.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
148	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.96	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.73	2 12 46 33 X SQ= 7.52 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	

153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.54	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.73	19 22 22 8 X SQ= 4.13 P = 0.030 RV YES (YES)	
154	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.56	154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	1.00	23 30 18 0 X SQ= 15.40 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.68	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.59	14 24 30 17 X SQ= 5.10 P = 0.017 RV YES (YES)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.89	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.54	5 22 39 19 X SQ= 15.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.77	166	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.96	11 2 36 43 X SQ= 5.34 P = 0.014 RV NO (YES)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.58	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.89	25 5 18 40 X SQ= 19.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.98	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.76	42 11 1 34 X SQ= 46.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
170	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.70	170	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.51	14 20 32 21 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.123 RV NO (YES)	
171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.78	171	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.98	10 1 36 40 X SQ= 5.67 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)	

172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.62	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.95	18 2 30 41 X SQ= 12.42 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.50	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.93	22 3 22 39 X SQ= 17.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.93	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.88	41 5 3 37 X SQ= 53.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.50	44 21 0 21 X SQ= 26.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.68	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.74	15 32 32 11 X SQ= 14.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.84	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.87	6 35 31 5 X SQ= 36.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.56	181	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.93	18 2 23 26 X SQ= 9.21 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.73	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.80	8 5 3 20 X SQ= 7.06 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.92	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.51	3 20 33 19 X SQ= 14.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.64	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.84	16 32 28 6 X SQ= 17.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.56	188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.84	21 7 27 37 X SQ= 7.14 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)
189	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.87	189	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.98	6 1 42 44 X SQ= 2.20 P = 0.112 RV NO (YES)
192	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.87	192	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.73	6 12 42 32 X SQ= 2.31 P = 0.113 RV NO (YES)
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.85	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.62	7 17 41 28 X'SQ= 5.37 P = 0.017 RV NO (YES)
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.70	0 13 48 31 X SQ= 14.17 P = 0. RV NO (YES)

129 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED (56)

129 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)

PREDICATE ONLY

56 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMEROUN	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE
GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON
LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA
NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA
TOGO	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	VENEZUELA				

37 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CZECHOS'KIA
DAHOMEY	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HUNGARY	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	MALI	MEXICO
MONGOLIA	NIGER	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SENEGAL	SPAIN	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA
USSR	UAR	US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CYPRUS	INDONESIA	LAOS	SO AFRICA	URUGUAY

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	LIBYA	SA'U ARABIA

12 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CUBA	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SUDAN
THAILAND	YEMEN								

130 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS SIGNIFICANT (12)

130 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR
NEGLIGIBLE (71)

PREDICATE ONLY

12 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	CANADA	MEXICO	NEW ZEALAND	PHILIPPINES	SENEGAL	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	UK
US	URUGUAY								

71 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEYLON	CHILE
CHINA, PR	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GERMANY, E
GERMAN FR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRAN	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SUDAN
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YUGOSLAVIA									

6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

COLOMBIA	CYPRUS	FRANCE	GREECE	INDONESIA	SO AFRICA

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	LIBYA	SA'U ARABIA

14 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	MALI
NIGER	RWANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA						

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CUBA	IRAQ	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN

131 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)

131 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

30 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BOLIVIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	GERMAN FR	INDIA	IRELAND	JAMAICA
JAPAN	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	PHILIPPINES
SENEGAL	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA

35 IN RIGHT COLUMN

BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	COSTA RICA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND
GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	ICELAND	IRAN	ISRAEL	ITALY	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON
LUXEMBOURG	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	VIETNAM REP					

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA	COLOMBIA	CYPRUS	FRANCE	GREECE	INDONESIA	SO AFRICA

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	LIBYA	SA'U ARABIA

29 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	GABON
GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HUNGARY	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	MALI	MONGOLIA	NIGER	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SPAIN	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA	

9 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	IRAQ	SUDAN	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN

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10 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82) — 0.67

10 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82) — 0.94

10	2
20	33

X SQ= 6.45
P = 0.008
RV NO (YES)

15 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33) — 0.91

15 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11) — 0.67

1	4
10	2

X SQ= 3.74
P = 0.028
RV YES (YES)

18	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.67	18	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.78	10 2 5 7 X SQ= 2.84 P = 0.089 RV YES (YES)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.62	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.86	10 2 6 12 X SQ= 5.36 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)
22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.70	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.60	21 14 9 21 X SQ= 4.71 P = 0.024 RV YES (YES)
32	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.80	32	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.97	6 1 24 34 X SQ= 3.32 P = 0.042 RV NO (YES)
38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.77	38	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.97	7 1 23 34 X SQ= 4.52 P = 0.020 RV NO (YES)
51	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.90	51	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.70	26 21 3 9 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.104 RV NO (YES)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.57	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.70	13 23 17 10 X SQ= 3.45 P = 0.044 RV YES (YES)
72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.55	72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.68	13 23 16 11 X SQ= 2.46 P = 0.080 RV YES (YES)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.52	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.76	14 26 15 8 X SQ= 4.22 P = 0.035 RV YES (YES)

79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.83	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.58	19 8 4 11 X SQ= 5.78 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)	
82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.57	82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.69	12 22 16 10 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.067 RV YES (YES)	
86	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.60	86	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.83	18 29 12 6 X SQ= 3.15 P = 0.054 RV NO (YES)	
93	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.73	93	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.91	8 3 22 29 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.101 RV NO (YES)	
94	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.93	94	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.63	25 20 2 12 X SQ= 5.76 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)	
96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.93	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.68	25 21 2 10 X SQ= 4.02 P = 0.025 RV NO (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.77	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.63	17 11 5 19 X SQ= 6.87 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.81	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.50	22 15 5 15 X SQ= 4.88 P = 0.025 RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.90	102	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.66	27 21 3 11 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.033 RV NO (YES)	

111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.83	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.52	24 16 5 17 X SQ= 6.49 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.97	118	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.70	1 10 28 23 X SQ= 5.90 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	
124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	124	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.82	0 6 28 28 X SQ= 3.64 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)	
127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.86	127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	0.54	4 15 25 13 X SQ= 8.43 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.52	133	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	1.00	14 0 15 32 X SQ= 17.41 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.90	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.58	26 13 3 18 X SQ= 12.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.77	29 24 0 7 X SQ= 5.38 P = 0.011 RV NO (YES)	
136	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.90	136	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.71	3 9 26 22 X SQ= 2.21 P = 0.107 RV NO (YES)	
139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.80	139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	6 0 24 30 X SQ= 4.63 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	

141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.70	141	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.93	8 2 19 27 X SQ= 3.50 P = 0.038 RV NO (YES)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.85	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.79	4 22 22 6 X SQ= 19.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
145	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (11)	0.67	145	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.92	4 22 8 2 X SQ= 10.82 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
146	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.89	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	3 0 24 33 X SQ= 1.87 P = 0.085 RV NO (YES)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.68	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.69	15 10 7 22 X SQ= 5.74 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.91	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.56	20 14 2 18 X SQ= 10.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
157	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.93	157	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.69	2 9 28 20 X SQ= 4.28 P = 0.021 RV NO (YES)	
158	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.77	158	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.52	7 14 23 15 X SQ= 2.99 P = 0.060 RV NO (YES)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.78	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.60	6 18 21 12 X SQ= 6.84 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	

164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.68	164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.91	9 19	3 29
						X SQ= 3.52 P = 0.050 RV NO (YES)	
166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.67	166	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.91	10 20	3 32
						X SQ= 4.74 P = 0.027 RV NO (YES)	
176	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.97	176	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.79	29 1	22 6
						X SQ= 2.93 P = 0.048 RV NO (YES)	
178	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.77	178	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.56	7 23	14 18
						X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.112 RV NO (YES)	
182	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.67	182	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.88	14 7	15 2
						X SQ= 1.37 P = 0.148 RV NO (YES)	
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.87	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.71	7 1	2 5
						X SQ= 3.23 P = 0.041 RV YES (YES)	
187	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.67	187	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.57	10 20	17 13
						X SQ= 2.42 P = 0.119 RV YES (YES)	
190	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS COMMON LAW, RATHER THAN CIVIL LAW (7)	0.50	190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	7 7	17 0
						X SQ= 8.31 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

132 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED (67)

132 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY POLITICAL PARTIES
IS NEGLIGIBLE (9)

PREDICATE ONLY

67 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA
CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK
DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	GABON	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GUINEA	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA
IRELAND	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI
MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
UGANDA	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA			

9 IN RIGHT COLUMN

EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	ISRAEL	LAOS	LEBANON	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	VIETNAM REP

6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ARGENTINA	COLOMBIA	CYPRUS	FRANCE	GREECE	INDONESIA

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	LIBYA	SA'U ARABIA

15 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	KOREA, N	MONGOLIA	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	SPAIN	USSR	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA					

13 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	PERU	SUDAN	SYRIA
THAILAND	TOGO	YEMEN							

133 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE EXECUTIVE
IS SIGNIFICANT (29)

133 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE EXECUTIVE
IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR
NEGLIGIBLE (76)

PREDICATE ONLY

29 IN LEFT COLUMN

BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	FRANCE	GABON
GHANA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO
NIGER	PHILIPPINES	SENEGAL	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	UAR	US	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	

76 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CANADA
CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS
HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRAN	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N
KOREA REP	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA
NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TURKEY
UGANDA	USSR	UK	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA				

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CYPRUS	LAOS	LEBANON	SO AFRICA	URUGUAY

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	IRAQ	PERU	SYRIA	YEMEN

134 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE EXECUTIVE
IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)

134 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE EXECUTIVE
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

57 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR
GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST
JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	TURKEY	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA			

46 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	CUBA
CZECHOS'KIA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	IRAN
JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND
TOGO	UGANDA	USSR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA				

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CYPRUS	LAOS	LEBANON	SO AFRICA	URUGUAY

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	CONGO(LEO)	IRAQ	PAKISTAN	PERU	SYRIA	YEMEN

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2 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.67

2 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.93

19	3
38	43

X SQ= 9.36
P = 0.001
RV NO (YES)

3 TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102) — 0.82

3 TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102) — 0.93

10	3
47	43

X SQ= 1.89
P = 0.136
RV NO (NO)

5 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18) — 1.00

5 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9) — 0.75

15	3
0	9

X SQ= 13.67
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

6	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.86	6	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.74	8 12 49 34 X SQ= 1.66 P = 0.140 RV NO (YES)	
10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.61	10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.83	22 8 35 38 X SQ= 4.57 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)	
15	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.92	15	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.67	2 4 22 8 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.149 RV NO (YES)	
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.79	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.56	22 8 6 10 X SQ= 4.22 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.73	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.60	22 8 8 12 X SQ= 4.25 P = 0.038 RV YES (YES)	
24	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.54	24	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.63	26 29 31 17 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.112 RV YES (YES)	
31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.68	31	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.91	39 41 18 4 X SQ= 6.37 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	
35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.65	35	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.91	20 4 37 42 X SQ= 8.50 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
36	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.54	36	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.74	26 12 31 34 X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.064 RV NO (YES)	

38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.84	38	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.98	9 1 48 43 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.040 RV NO (NO)	
39	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.58	39	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.73	24 12 33 33 X SQ= 1.99 P = 0.144 RV NO (YES)	
41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.73	41	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.91	15 4 40 42 X SQ= 4.51 P = 0.022 RV NO (YES)	
42	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.60	42	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.76	22 11 33 34 X SQ= 2.05 P = 0.135 RV NO (YES)	
44	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.68	44	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.85	18 7 39 39 X SQ= 2.87 P = 0.066 RV NO (YES)	
47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.60	47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.70	18 7 12 16 X SQ= 3.46 P = 0.052 RV YES (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.72	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.82	34 7 13 33 X SQ= 23.93 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.83	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.67	39 13 8 27 X SQ= 20.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
52	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.96	52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.65	46 26 2 14 X SQ= 11.95 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.79	53	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.96	12 2 45 44 X SQ= 4.71 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	
62	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.71	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 12 12 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.059 RV NO (YES)	
72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.59	72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.60	23 26 33 17 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.069 RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.54	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.74	26 32 30 11 X SQ= 6.74 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.66	74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.85	19 7 37 39 X SQ= 3.72 P = 0.040 RV NO (YES)	
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.84	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.50	31 10 6 10 X SQ= 5.76 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.64	81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.96	9 1 16 22 X SQ= 5.48 P = 0.011 RV NO (YES)	
83	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.96	83	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.85	2 7 55 39 X SQ= 3.03 P = 0.074 RV NO (YES)	
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.63	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.75	11 12 19 4 X SQ= 4.70 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	

86	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.58	86	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.76	33 34 24 11 X SQ= 2.74 P = 0.092 RV NO (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.52	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.90	26 3 24 27 X SQ= 12.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.54	89	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.84	24 5 28 27 X SQ= 6.87 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	91	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (5)	0.63	26 3 0 5 X SQ= 14.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
92	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.93	92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.67	4 15 53 30 X SQ= 9.82 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.84	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.74	37 11 7 31 X SQ= 26.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.98	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.66	56 29 1 15 X SQ= 17.13 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.86	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.65	38 26 6 14 X SQ= 4.16 P = 0.039 RV NO (YES)	
97	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.86	97	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.52	6 14 1 15 X SQ= 1.86 P = 0.104 RV YES (NO)	

99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.78	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.52	29 19 8 21 X SQ= 6.55 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.65	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.89	35 4 19 34 X SQ= 24.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.70	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.67	40 14 17 29 X SQ= 12.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.64	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.72	32 10 18 26 X SQ= 9.59 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.80	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.61	39 12 10 19 X SQ= 12.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.60	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.80	34 9 23 36 X SQ= 14.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.82	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.62	46 15 10 25 X SQ= 18.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.79	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.68	42 10 11 21 X SQ= 16.37 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
113	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.85	113	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.67	8 14 46 29 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.051 RV NO (YES)

117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.65	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.62	37 16 20 26 X SQ= 5.95 P = 0.014 RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.91	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.66	4 29 41 15 X SQ= 28.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.51	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.95	22 42 23 2 X SQ= 21.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.78	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	35 44 10 0 X SQ= 8.90 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
122	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.63	122	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.78	36 36 21 10 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.131 RV NO (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.86	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	49 46 8 0 X SQ= 5.18 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.51	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.81	26 30 27 7 X SQ= 8.19 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
130	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.72	130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	1.00	11 0 28 38 X SQ= 10.31 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.67	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.86	26 3 13 18 X SQ= 12.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.61	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.68	33 12 21 26 X SQ= 6.65 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
140	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.81	140	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.92	10 3 43 37 X SQ= 1.60 P = 0.141 RV NO (NO)	
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.81	141	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.97	10 1 44 37 X SQ= 3.95 P = 0.024 RV NO (NO)	
144	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.63	144	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.94	17 16 10 1 X SQ= 3.87 P = 0.031 RV NO (NO)	
145	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.57	145	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.92	13 12 10 1 X SQ= 3.47 P = 0.031 RV NO (NO)	
146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.86	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	7 0 44 40 X SQ= 4.17 P = 0.017 RV NO (NO)	
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.64	147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.88	18 4 32 30 X SQ= 4.96 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)	
148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.77	148	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.98	13 1 44 40 X SQ= 6.50 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
154	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.89	154	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.60	33 21 4 14 X SQ= 6.69 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	

157	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.95	157	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.79	3 7 53 27 X SQ= 3.55 P = 0.038 RV NO (YES)	
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.72	0 28 53 11 X SQ= 51.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.83	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.90	9 35 44 4 X SQ= 44.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.56	164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.79	24 8 31 30 X SQ= 4.13 P = 0.028 RV NO (NO)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.70	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.67	40 14 17 28 X SQ= 11.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.84	171	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.97	9 1 46 39 X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.041 RV NO (NO)	
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.70	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.93	17 3 39 39 X SQ= 6.60 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.64	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.69	35 12 20 27 X SQ= 8.59 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.93	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.59	51 16 4 23 X SQ= 27.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.60	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.82	21 28 31 6 X SQ= 13.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.50	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.97	19 1 19 31 X SQ= 16.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.53	182	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.84	19 31 17 6 X SQ= 6.76 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.94	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.54	17 6 1 7 X SQ= 6.84 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.90	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.77	5 23 47 7 X SQ= 35.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.62	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.93	19 38 31 3 X SQ= 26.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.67	190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	14 16 7 0 X SQ= 4.58 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)	
193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.67	193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.87	19 6 38 39 X SQ= 4.41 P = 0.022 RV NO (YES)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.72	0 13 56 33 X SQ= 15.69 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

135 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE EXECUTIVE
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED (77)

135 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE EXECUTIVE
IS NEGLIGIBLE (13)

PREDICATE ONLY

77 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HONDURAS
ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN
JORDAN	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	RWANDA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
UGANDA	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	YUGOSLAVIA			

13 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	CEYLON	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E	HAITI	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY	PORTUGAL
SA'U ARABIA	THAILAND	VIETNAM REP							

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CYPRUS	LAOS	LEBANON	SO AFRICA	URUGUAY

11 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	HUNGARY	KOREA, N	MONGOLIA	RUMANIA	USSR
VIETNAM, N									

9 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	CONGO(LEO)	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PERU	SUDAN	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN

136 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE LEGISLATURE
IS SIGNIFICANT (12)

136 POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE LEGISLATURE
IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR
NEGLIGIBLE (85)

PREDICATE ONLY

12 IN LEFT COLUMN

BELGIUM	DENMARK	FINLAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NORWAY	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND
US	URUGUAY								

85 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA
CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA
GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	ITALY	IVORY COAST
JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SPAIN	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UK
UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA					

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

COLOMBIA	CYPRUS	INDONESIA	SO AFRICA

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA'U ARABIA

13 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CUBA	DOMIN REP	IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	MOROCCO	PERU	SUDAN
SYRIA	UAR	YEMEN							

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137  POLITIES                                                    137  POLITIES
     WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION                                       WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
     BY THE LEGISLATURE                                               BY THE LEGISLATURE
     IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE  (29)                                 IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE  (68)

                                                                                                   BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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      29 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA   AUSTRIA     BELGIUM     CANADA      CHILE       DENMARK     FINLAND     GERMAN FR   GREECE      ICELAND
INDIA       IRELAND     ISRAEL      ITALY       JAMAICA     JAPAN       LEBANON     LUXEMBOURG  NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND
NORWAY      PHILIPPINES SWEDEN      SWITZERLAND TRINIDAD    TURKEY      UK          US          URUGUAY

      68 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN ALBANIA     ARGENTINA   BOLIVIA     BRAZIL      BULGARIA    BURUNDI     CAMBODIA    CAMEROUN    CEN AFR REP
CEYLON      CHAD        CHINA, PR   CONGO(BRA)  CONGO(LEO)  COSTA RICA  CZECHOS'KIA DAHOMEY     ECUADOR     EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA    FRANCE      GABON       GERMANY, E  GHANA       GUATEMALA   GUINEA      HAITI       HONDURAS    HUNGARY
IVORY COAST JORDAN      KOREA, N    LAOS        LIBERIA     LIBYA       MALAGASY R  MALAYA       MALI        MAURITANIA
MEXICO      MONGOLIA    NEPAL       NICARAGUA   NIGER       NIGERIA     PAKISTAN    PANAMA      PARAGUAY    POLAND
PORTUGAL    RUMANIA     RWANDA      SENEGAL     SIERRE LEO  SOMALIA     SPAIN       TANGANYIKA  THAILAND    TOGO
TUNISIA     UGANDA      USSR        UPPER VOLTA VENEZUELA   VIETNAM, N  VIETNAM REP YUGOSLAVIA

       4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

COLOMBIA    CYPRUS      INDONESIA   SO AFRICA

       1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA'U ARABIA

      13 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA     BURMA       CUBA        DOMIN REP   IRAN        IRAQ        KOREA REP   MOROCCO     PERU        SUDAN
SYRIA       UAR         YEMEN

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  2  TEND TO BE THOSE                    0.66        2  TEND TO BE THOSE                    0.96        19    3
     LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,               LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                       10   65
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (22)                WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                 X SQ=  39.87
                                                        NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)       P =    0.
                                                                                                  RV YES (YES)

  3  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE               0.66        3  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE               0.96        10    3
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                       19   65
     WEST EUROPE  (102)                                 WEST EUROPE  (102)                        X SQ=  13.35
                                                                                                  P =    0.
                                                                                                  RV NO  (YES)
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5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	1.00	5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.75	15 3 0 9 X SQ= 13.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.59	0 28 29 40 X SQ= 14.84 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
15	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	1.00	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.93	3 2 0 28 X SQ= 11.93 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
18	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	1.00	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.70	0 28 3 12 X SQ= 3.33 P = 0.037 RV YES (NO)	
19	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	1.00	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.67	0 28 4 14 X SQ= 4.30 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.62	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.62	18 26 11 42 X SQ= 3.75 P = 0.045 RV YES (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.96	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.67	26 20 1 41 X SQ= 27.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.93	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.66	2 44 27 23 X SQ= 25.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.69	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.96	9 65 20 3 X SQ= 43.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.52	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.81	15 13 14 55 X SQ= 9.00 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.83	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.62	24 26 5 42 X SQ= 14.40 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.66	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.93	19 5 10 63 X SQ= 33.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.90	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.79	26 14 3 54 X SQ= 37.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.97	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.63	28 25 1 43 X SQ= 26.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.69	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.79	20 14 9 53 X SQ= 18.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.96	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.53	26 31 1 35 X SQ= 17.63 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.54	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.94	15 4 13 63 X SQ= 25.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.75	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.82	21 12 7 55 X SQ= 25.93 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.69	28 21 0 47 X SQ= 35.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.62	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.90	18 7 11 61 X SQ= 25.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.93	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.65	26 22 2 41 X SQ= 23.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.64	29 41 0 23 X SQ= 11.98 P = 0. RV NO (ND)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.89	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.74	25 14 3 39 X SQ= 26.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	1.00	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.57	28 23 0 30 X SQ= 22.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.74	29 39 0 14 X SQ= 7.47 P = 0.001 RV NO (ND)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.79	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.82	23 12 6 54 X SQ= 29.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.53	29 35 0 31 X SQ= 18.14 P = 0. RV NO (ND)	

56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.56	29 36 0 28 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
62	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.62	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 8 14 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.016 RV NO (YES)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.79	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.70	23 20 6 47 X SQ= 18.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
64	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.96	64	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.71	23 20 1 8 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)	
67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.89	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.68	25 44 3 21 X SQ= 3.70 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.69	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.63	20 25 9 42 X SQ= 6.92 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.79	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.51	23 33 6 34 X SQ= 6.34 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.64	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.85	10 9 18 53 X SQ= 4.01 P = 0.048 RV NO (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.68	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.59	19 27 9 39 X SQ= 4.69 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	

73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.82	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.52	23 32 5 34 X SQ= 7.84 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.68	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.90	19 7 9 61 X SQ= 30.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.62	29 26 0 42 X SQ= 29.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.73	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.87	19 7 7 48 X SQ= 26.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.71	7 14 0 34 X SQ= 10.16 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.83	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.69	5 9 1 20 X SQ= 3.70 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.57	81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.96	9 1 12 24 X SQ= 7.97 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.78	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.60	21 25 6 37 X SQ= 9.12 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.65	6 13 0 24 X SQ= 6.37 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	

85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.93	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL. RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.65	27 24 2 44 X SQ= 24.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
87	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.96	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.51	1 25 25 26 X SQ= 13.76 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.96	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.93	25 4 1 50 X SQ= 56.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.75	0 17 29 50 X SQ= 7.29 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
93	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.97	93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.62	1 25 28 40 X SQ= 10.60 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.66	29 17 0 33 X SQ= 30.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.52	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.93	15 5 14 63 X SQ= 21.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.96	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.82	27 10 1 47 X SQ= 44.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.64	29 24 0 42 X SQ= 30.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	1.00	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.78	28 13 0 46 X SQ= 43.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	1.00	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.56	28 23 0 29 X SQ= 22.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	1.00	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.79	29 14 0 52 X SQ= 47.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.89	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.56	24 23 3 29 X SQ= 12.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.59	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.95	17 3 12 62 X SQ= 31.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.90	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.92	26 5 3 60 X SQ= 57.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	1.00	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.71	29 19 0 46 X SQ= 37.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.97	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.52	1 28 28 26 X SQ= 17.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.79	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.94	6 51 23 3 X SQ= 44.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.66	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	19 54 10 0 X SQ= 18.04 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.90	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.59	3 40 26 28 X SQ= 17.45 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.62	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.84	11 57 18 11 X SQ= 18.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.72	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	21 68 8 0 X SQ= 16.96 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	124	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.84	0 9 28 49 X SQ= 3.34 P = 0.028 RV NO (NO)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.86	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.83	4 48 24 10 X SQ= 34.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.57	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	12 58 16 0 X SQ= 37.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.86	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.66	24 20 4 39 X SQ= 18.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.89	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.56	25 26 3 33 X SQ= 14.20 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

130	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.71	130	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.92	8 4 20 45 X SQ= 4.20 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.93	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.58	25 27 2 38 X SQ= 18.21 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.78	27 43 0 12 X SQ= 5.26 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.52	0 31 29 33 X SQ= 18.95 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.70	141	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.97	8 2 19 60 X SQ= 10.63 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.52	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.80	14 12 13 49 X SQ= 7.83 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.83	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.97	20 2 4 56 X SQ= 51.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.78	0 14 29 50 X SQ= 5.86 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.81	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.58	21 20 5 28 X SQ= 8.91 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.83	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.50	5 29 24 29 X SQ= 7.39 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	160	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.54	0 28 28 33 X SQ= 16.68 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.86	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.64	4 39 24 22 X SQ= 17.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
163	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.97	163	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.83	1 10 28 48 X SQ= 2.20 P = 0.091 RV NO (NO)	
164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.93	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.53	2 27 27 31 X SQ= 11.95 P = 0. RV ND (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.97	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.97	28 2 1 63 X SQ= 76.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	1.00	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.65	29 23 0 42 X SQ= 31.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
170	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.90	170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.52	3 31 26 34 X SQ= 10.55 P = 0. RV ND (ND)	
171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.69	171	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.97	9 2 20 63 X SQ= 12.58 P = 0. RV ND (YES)	

172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.52	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.89	14 7 15 58 X SQ= 14.17 P = 0. RV ND (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.86	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.98	25 1 4 62 X SQ= 66.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	1.00	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.73	29 17 0 46 X SQ= 39.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.79	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.67	6 44 23 22 X SQ= 15.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.96	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.80	1 44 24 11 X SQ= 37.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.66	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.97	19 1 10 36 X SQ= 27.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.62	10 36 0 22 X SQ= 4.01 P = 0.024 RV ND (ND)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.96	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.51	1 25 27 24 X SQ= 15.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.93	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.85	2 50 26 9 X SQ= 44.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.76	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	7 0 22 68 X SQ= 14.27 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.61	190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	11 17 7 0 X SQ= 6.01 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)	
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.73	0 18 29 48 X SQ= 8.06 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.62	0 26 29 42 X SQ= 13.26 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.81	0 13 29 54 X SQ= 4.96 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)	

13B POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE LEGISLATURE
IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR
LIMITED (48)

13B POLITIES
WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION
BY THE LEGISLATURE
IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)

PREDICATE ONLY

48 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CHILE	COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA
HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LIBYA
LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA		

49 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	CZECHOS*KIA	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI
HUNGARY	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NIGER	PARAGUAY	POLAND	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA
TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	USSR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA	

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

INDONESIA	PORTUGAL	SO AFRICA	SPAIN

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA*U ARABIA

13 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CUBA	IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	MOROCCO	PAKISTAN	PERU	SUDAN
SYRIA	UAR	YEMEN							

139 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
ONE-PARTY (34)

139 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

34 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY
GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HUNGARY	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA
MONGOLIA	NIGER	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SENEGAL	SPAIN	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	USSR
UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA						

71 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN
CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS
ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	LAOS	LEBANON
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA
SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA
VIETNAM REP									

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

INDONESIA NICARAGUA

8 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

IRAN IRAQ KOREA REP NEPAL SYRIA THAILAND TOGO YEMEN

2	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.94	2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.72	2 20 32 51 X SQ= 5.61 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	
5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.82	5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	1.00	2 16 9 0 X SQ= 16.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.97	6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.72	1 20 33 51 X SQ= 7.64 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	

10	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.50	10	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL ANO SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.79	17 15 17 56 X SQ= 7.73 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
11	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.59	11	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.82	14 13 20 58 X SQ= 5.15 P = 0.017 RV NO (YES)	
14	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	1.00	14	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.90	0 7 34 64 X SQ= 2.18 P = 0.093 RV NO (NO)	
15	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATEO IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIODLE EAST (33)	1.00	15	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.68	0 7 17 15 X SQ= 4.61 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)	
16	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIODLE EAST (18)	1.00	16	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDOLE EAST (18)	0.56	0 7 5 9 X SQ= 1.61 P = 0.123 RV NO (NO)	
19	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.94	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL ANO SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.57	17 15 1 20 X SQ= 11.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
20	TENO TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.83	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.69	5 9 1 20 X SQ= 3.70 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
25	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.97	25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.79	1 15 33 56 X SQ= 4.56 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.66	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.62	10 41 19 25 X SQ= 5.13 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	

30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.70	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.67	23 23 10 47 X SQ= 10.87 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.59	34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.61	14 43 20 28 X SQ= 2.74 P = 0.093 RV YES (NO)	
37	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.56	37	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.65	15 46 19 25 X SQ= 3.23 P = 0.058 RV YES (NO)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.52	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.72	15 50 16 19 X SQ= 4.44 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.67	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.62	11 43 22 26 X SQ= 6.41 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.79	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.59	6 37 22 26 X SQ= 9.38 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.75	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.83	7 52 21 11 X SQ= 25.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
53	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.97	53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.82	1 13 33 58 X SQ= 3.46 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
57	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.88	57	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.72	4 20 30 51 X SQ= 2.64 P = 0.082 RV NO (NO)	

63	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.70	63	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.51	10 35 23 36 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.090 RV NO (NO)	
67	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.85	67	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.66	29 44 5 23 X SQ= 3.41 P = 0.059 RV NO (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.70	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.55	10 39 23 32 X SQ= 4.54 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)	
69	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.55	69	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.62	15 44 18 27 X SQ= 1.88 P = 0.139 RV YES (NO)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.72	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.56	9 39 23 31 X SQ= 5.65 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
73	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.56	73	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.63	14 44 18 26 X SQ= 2.54 P = 0.087 RV YES (NO)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.59	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.67	14 47 20 23 X SQ= 5.34 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.84	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.55	3 24 16 20 X SQ= 6.63 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.63	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED T ROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.92	3 24 5 2 X SQ= 8.14 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	

79	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.95	79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.64	18 28 1 16 X SQ= 5.03 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.83	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.68	3 15 15 7 X SQ= 8.64 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	81	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.72	0 11 11 28 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.66	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.58	11 39 21 28 X SQ= 4.01 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)
84	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.62	84	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.64	8 18 13 10 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.088 RV YES (YES)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.50	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.75	16 13 16 39 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.032 RV YES (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.97	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.57	1 32 30 24 X SQ= 22.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	91	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.76	16 13 0 4 X SQ= 2.36 P = 0.103 RV NO (YES)
92	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL (20)	0.52	92	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.96	17 3 16 68 X SQ= 29.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.70	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.89	23 8 10 62 X SQ= 33.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.88	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.79	3 48 22 13 X SQ= 29.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.56	95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.99	19 67 15 1 X SQ= 28.03 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.68	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.91	7 10 15 1 X SQ= 8.02 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
98	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.88	98	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.75	4 18 30 53 X SQ= 1.81 P = 0.130 RV NO (NO)	
99	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.86	99	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.56	19 31 3 24 X SQ= 4.96 P = 0.017 RV NO (NO)	
100	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	1.00	100	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.70	22 39 0 17 X SQ= 6.85 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.94	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.66	2 39 32 20 X SQ= 29.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.88	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.80	4 55 30 14 X SQ= 40.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.97	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.75	1 42 32 14 X SQ= 40.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.87	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.94	4 47 27 3 X SQ= 50.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	1.00	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.67	0 46 34 23 X SQ= 38.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.84	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.90	5 57 27 6 X SQ= 49.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
113	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.91	113	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.71	3 20 29 48 X SQ= 3.87 P = 0.040 RV NO (NO)	
116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.55	0 32 31 39 X SQ= 18.32 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.81	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.70	6 50 25 21 X SQ= 20.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.78	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.80	21 13 6 52 X SQ= 24.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.60	27 39 0 26 X SQ= 13.15 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

122	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.82	122	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.63	28 45 6 26 X SQ= 3.06 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)	
123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	123	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.89	34 63 0 8 X SQ= 2.70 P = 0.052 RV NO (NO)	
125	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.76	125	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.57	19 37 6 28 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.145 RV NO (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.75	25 49 0 16 X SQ= 5.90 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	127	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.66	0 20 32 38 X SQ= 12.26 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.97	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.79	1 46 31 12 X SQ= 44.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.94	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.88	2 51 30 7 X SQ= 53.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
131	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	1.00	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.56	6 24 0 30 X SQ= 4.63 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	
133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.52	133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.82	16 12 17 53 X SQ= 8.25 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	

138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	1.00	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.73	0 47 29 17 X SQ= 40.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.76	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	8 0 25 60 X SQ= 12.98 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.57	0 23 33 30 X SQ= 17.40 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
148	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.76	148	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.92	8 5 26 61 X SQ= 3.74 P = 0.055 RV NO (YES)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.79	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.54	19 23 5 27 X SQ= 5.98 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	1.00	154	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.60	24 30 0 20 X SQ= 11.21 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.52	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.82	16 11 15 50 X SQ= 9.62 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.61	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.59	19 25 12 36 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.080 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.64	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.81	21 12 12 50 X SQ= 16.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

166	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	1.00	166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.79	0 15 34 55 X SQ= 6.87 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.97	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.50	1 33 33 33 X SQ= 20.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.91	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.82	3 54 31 12 X SQ= 45.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
171	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	1.00	171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.82	0 12 30 54 X SQ= 4.68 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.70	0 21 32 49 X SQ= 10.32 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.55	0 28 34 34 X SQ= 19.55 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.97	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.81	1 50 33 12 X SQ= 50.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.56	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.89	15 55 19 7 X SQ= 19.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.85	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.67	28 22 5 44 X SQ= 21.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.97	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.69	31 17 1 38 X SQ= 32.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.60	0 21 21 31 X SQ= 10.02 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.95	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.62	1 13 21 8 X SQ= 13.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.64	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.85	21 8 12 44 X SQ= 18.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.93	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.53	27 29 2 33 X SQ= 16.01 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.91	188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.61	3 27 30 43 X SQ= 8.07 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	189	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.90	0 7 34 64 X SQ= 2.18 P = 0.093 RV NO (NO)	
192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.61	192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.86	13 10 20 60 X SQ= 6.77 P = 0.010 RV NO (YES)	
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.62	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	13 0 21 70 X SQ= 27.19 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

140 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
ONE PARTY DOMINANT (13)

140 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

13 IN LEFT COLUMN

BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CONGO(BRA)	FRANCE	GREECE	INDIA	MALAGASY R	MEXICO	PARAGUAY
RWANDA	SOMALIA	VIETNAM REP							

87 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA
COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND
GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LEBANON
LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA
NORWAY	PANAMA	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA	USSR	UAR
UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA			

6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

INDONESIA	MALAYA	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA	SO AFRICA	TURKEY

9 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	YEMEN

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29 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49) — 0.73

29 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56) — 0.56

3	45
8	35

X SQ= 2.20
P = 0.107
RV YES (NO)

30 LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56) — 0.69

30 LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57) — 0.59

9	35
4	50

X SQ= 2.54
P = 0.075
RV YES (NO)

37 TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51) — 0.77

37 TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64) — 0.63

3	55
10	32

X SQ= 5.92
P = 0.013
RV YES (NO)

40	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.62	40	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.67	5 55 8 27 X SQ= 2.81 P = 0.064 RV YES (NO)	
43	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.69	43	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.55	4 46 9 38 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.140 RV YES (NO)	
54	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.85	54	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.59	2 35 11 50 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.123 RV NO (NO)	
84	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.75	84	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.55	2 21 6 17 X SQ= 1.36 P = 0.145 RV YES (NO)	
85	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.69	85	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.58	4 50 9 36 X SQ= 2.40 P = 0.079 RV YES (NO)	
86	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.54	86	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.70	6 60 7 26 X SQ= 1.87 P = 0.118 RV YES (NO)	
87	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.67	87	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.69	6 22 3 50 X SQ= 3.15 P = 0.058 RV YES (NO)	
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.81	12 70 0 16 X SQ= 1.48 P = 0.126 RV NO (NO)	
98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	98	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.76	0 21 13 66 X SQ= 2.65 P = 0.064 RV NO (NO)	

102	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE RFGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.77	102	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.53	10 45 3 40 X SQ= 1.75 P = 0.138 RV NO (NO)	
106	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.90	106	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.58	9 40 1 29 X SQ= 2.57 P = 0.080 RV NO (NO)	
108	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.92	108	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.59	12 47 1 32 X SQ= 3.90 P = 0.028 RV NO (NO)	
121	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.62	121	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.61	8 34 5 53 X SQ= 1.51 P = 0.143 RV YES (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.78	12 57 0 16 X SQ= 1.96 P = 0.111 RV NO (NO)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.54	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.77	7 19 6 62 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.041 RV YES (NO)	
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.69	0 23 10 52 X SQ= 2.79 P = 0.056 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.78	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.64	2 39 7 22 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
160	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.92	160	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.67	1 25 11 51 X SQ= 1.94 P = 0.100 RV NO (NO)	

169	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.77	169	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.52	10 43 3 39 X SQ= 1.82 P = 0.136 RV NO (NO)	
170	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.62	170	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.65	8 28 5 51 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.123 RV YES (NO)	
174	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.92	174	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.68	1 25 12 54 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.101 RV NO (NO)	
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.76	0 20 13 65 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.064 RV NO (NO)	

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141  POLITIES                                                  141  POLITIES
     WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY                        WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
     TWO-PARTY  (11)                                                 OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY  (87)


                                                                                                   BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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11 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	CANADA	COLOMBIA	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	NEW ZEALAND	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	UK
US									

87 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA
CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE
GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	ICELAND
INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LEBANON
LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS
NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA
SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA
USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

INDONESIA	MALAYA	NICARAGUA	SO AFRICA	TURKEY	URUGUAY

11 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO
YEMEN									

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 2  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.55      2  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.82        6   16
    LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                             5   71
    NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (22)                     WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                   X SQ=   5.40
                                                            NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)         P =    0.014
                                                                                                        RV YES (NO )

29  TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE              0.80     29  TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE              0.51        8   40
    WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION                        WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION                      2   39
    IS HIGH  (56)                                           IS HIGH  (56)                               X SQ=   2.01
                                                                                                        P =    0.100
                                                                                                        RV NO  (NO )

31  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.55     31  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.81        5   70
    WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION                           WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION                         6   16
    IS LOW OR VERY LOW  (24)                                IS HIGH OR MEDIUM  (90)                     X SQ=   5.28
                                                                                                        P =    0.015
                                                                                                        RV YES (NO )
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35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.55	35	TEND TU BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.79	6 18 5 69 X SQ= 4.36 P = 0.023 RV YES (NO)	
36	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.64	36	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.63	7 32 4 55 X SQ= 1.93 P = 0.108 RV YES (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.73	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.70	8 26 3 60 X SQ= 5.98 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
42	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.64	42	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.68	7 27 4 57 X SQ= 2.94 P = 0.090 RV YES (NO)	
43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.82	43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.54	9 39 2 45 X SQ= 3.56 P = 0.051 RV YES (NO)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.55	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.78	6 19 5 68 X SQ= 3.91 P = 0.029 RV YES (NO)	
45	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.82	45	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.51	9 41 2 40 X SQ= 2.65 P = 0.060 RV NO (NO)	
50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	1.00	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.58	10 31 0 43 X SQ= 9.69 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.91	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.60	10 34 1 52 X SQ= 8.42 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	

64	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	1.00	64	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.76	10 34 0 11 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.104 RV NO (NO)	
68	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.73	68	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETERDGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETERDGENEOUS (62)	0.53	8 40 3 46 X SQ= 1.74 P = 0.121 RV YES (NO)	
72	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.73	72	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.56	8 37 3 47 X SQ= 2.16 P = 0.108 RV YES (NO)	
74	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.55	74	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.77	6 20 5 66 X SQ= 3.40 P = 0.063 RV YES (NO)	
75	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.91	75	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.56	10 49 1 38 X SQ= 3.54 P = 0.046 RV NO (NO)	
76	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.55	76	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZFD THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.73	6 20 5 53 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.087 RV YES (NO)	
80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	1.00	80	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.65	2 12 0 22 X SQ= 1.16 P = 0.144 RV YES (NO)	
81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED (11)	0.63	81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.88	5 5 3 35 X SQ= 7.30 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.90	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.70	9 21 1 49 X SQ= 11.00 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

93	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	1.00	93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.66	0 29 11 57 X SQ= 3.80 P = 0.031 RV NO (ND)	
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.54	11 37 0 32 X SQ= 6.68 P = 0.002 RV NO (ND)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.82	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.61	9 29 2 46 X SQ= 5.60 P = 0.009 RV YES (ND)	
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	102	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.52	11 44 0 41 X SQ= 7.39 P = 0.002 RV NO (ND)	
105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	1.00	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.60	10 30 0 45 X SQ= 10.46 P = 0. RV YES (ND)	
107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	1.00	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.62	11 32 0 53 X SQ= 12.90 P = 0. RV YES (ND)	
111	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	1.00	111	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.54	11 37 0 31 X SQ= 6.45 P = 0.003 RV NO (ND)	
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.55	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.83	6 14 5 70 X SQ= 6.27 P = 0.010 RV YES (ND)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.64	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.74	7 22 4 62 X SQ= 4.79 P = 0.031 RV YES (ND)	

117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.91	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.51	10 41 1 43 X SQ= 5.34 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
118	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	1.00	118	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.59	0 31 10 44 X SQ= 4.84 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.80	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.77	2 58 8 17 X SQ= 11.35 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
121	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.82	121	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.56	2 38 9 49 X SQ= 1.68 P = 0.120 RV NO (NO)	
125	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.70	125	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.64	3 47 7 26 X SQ= 3.02 P = 0.080 RV YES (NO)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.50	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.85	5 62 5 11 X SQ= 4.83 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	
127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	127	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.74	0 20 11 57 X SQ= 2.37 P = 0.063 RV NO (NO)	
130	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (12)	0.70	130	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED. OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.94	7 4 3 59 X SQ= 22.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.80	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.59	8 19 2 27 X SQ= 3.50 P = 0.038 RV YES (NO)	

134	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.91	134	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.54	10 44 1 37 X SQ= 3.95 P = 0.024 RV NO (NO)
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.80	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.76	8 19 2 60 X SQ= 10.63 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	1.00	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.57	11 34 0 45 X SQ= 10.36 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
164	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.91	164	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.60	1 31 10 47 X SQ= 2.72 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.73	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.73	8 22 3 61 X SQ= 7.54 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	1.00	169	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.51	11 42 0 41 X SQ= 7.73 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.55	172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.83	6 14 5 70 X SQ= 6.27 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.73	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.79	8 17 3 64 X SQ= 10.62 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	1.00	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.56	11 36 0 45 X SQ= 9.84 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)

178	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.73	178	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.55	3 46 8 37 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.110 RV YES (NO)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.91	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.62	1 45 10 27 X SQ= 8.96 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
181	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.60	181	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.76	6 14 4 45 X SQ= 3.85 P = 0.053 RV YES (NO)	
186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	1.00	186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.61	0 28 10 44 X SQ= 4.30 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.82	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.67	2 49 9 24 X SQ= 7.66 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.55	189	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.98	5 2 6 85 X SQ= 21.30 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
190	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS COMMON LAW, RATHER THAN CIVIL LAW (7)	0.62	190	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.93	3 25 5 2 X SQ= 8.52 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	

142 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
MULTI-PARTY (30)

142 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

30 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GUATEMALA	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	LAOS	LEBANON
LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PERU	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UGANDA	VENEZUELA

66 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMERDUN
CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA
FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY
INDIA	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA
SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	USSR	UAR
UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA				

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

INDONESIA	MALAYA	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA	SO AFRICA	TURKEY	URUGUAY

12 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND
TOGO	YEMEN								

5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	1.00	5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.56	11 7 0 9 X SQ= 6.92 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.63	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.86	11 9 19 57 X SQ= 5.31 P = 0.015 RV NO (YES)
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.90	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.61	3 26 27 40 X SQ= 7.12 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)

15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.50	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENIRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.93	3 2 3 26 X SQ= 4.22 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.79	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.74	3 26 11 9 X SQ= 9.48 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.85	20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.50	2 9 11 9 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.066 RV YES (YES)	
22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.53	22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.65	14 43 16 23 X SQ= 2.21 P = 0.117 RV YES (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.72	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.57	21 25 8 33 X SQ= 5.54 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.87	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.59	4 38 26 26 X SQ= 15.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.57	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.67	17 22 13 44 X SQ= 3.74 P = 0.043 RV YES (NO)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.83	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.52	25 32 5 34 X SQ= 8.99 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
40	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.77	40	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.56	23 34 7 27 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)	

43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.68	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.55	19 29 9 36 X SQ= 3.35 P = 0.045 RV YES (NO)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.72	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.52	21 29 8 32 X SQ= 3.97 P = 0.040 RV YES (NO)	
46	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.90	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.69	27 43 3 19 X SQ= 3.67 P = 0.037 RV NO (NO)	
50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.67	50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.58	18 23 9 32 X SQ= 3.53 P = 0.059 RV YES (NO)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.96	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.51	26 27 1 28 X SQ= 15.65 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.73	27 41 0 15 X SQ= 7.11 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.57	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.70	17 19 13 45 X SQ= 5.20 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)	
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.60	57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.83	12 11 18 55 X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.020 RV NO (YES)	
58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	58	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.86	0 9 30 57 X SQ= 3.05 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)	

62	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.71	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 12 11 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.125 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.63	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.62	19 25 11 40 X SQ= 4.16 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.63	72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.59	19 26 11 37 X SQ= 3.13 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.87	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.50	26 33 4 33 X SQ= 10.21 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.78	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.68	14 12 4 26 X SQ= 8.71 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	78	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.67	14 12 0 6 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.56	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.84	8 31 10 6 X SQ= 7.28 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.75	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.73	6 7 2 19 X SQ= 4.12 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.73	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.57	22 26 8 35 X SQ= 6.43 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	

85	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.67	85	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.52	20 31 10 34 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.121 RV YES (NO)	
87	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.82	87	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.59	4 23 18 33 X SQ= 2.71 P = 0.068 RV NO (NO)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.73	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.75	16 14 6 43 X SQ= 13.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.71	0 19 30 46 X SQ= 9.21 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.92	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.56	24 23 2 29 X SQ= 14.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.75	30 48 0 16 X SQ= 7.36 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.54	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.81	12 34 14 8 X SQ= 7.37 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.78	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.69	18 19 5 42 X SQ= 13.19 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.93	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.58	26 28 2 38 X SQ= 18.44 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.92	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.70	22 18 2 42 X SQ= 23.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.95	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.52	21 27 1 29 X SQ= 12.96 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.82	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.70	23 20 5 46 X SQ= 19.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.54	111	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.69	13 34 15 15 X SQ= 3.04 P = 0.056 RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.57	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.81	17 12 13 51 X SQ= 11.71 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.83	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.60	25 25 5 38 X SQ= 13.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.80	118	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.55	6 24 24 29 X SQ= 4.27 P = 0.032 RV NO (NO)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.50	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.76	15 50 15 16 X SQ= 5.14 P = 0.018 RV YES (NO)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.60	126	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.89	15 50 10 6 X SQ= 7.60 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	

127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	0.70	127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.98	19 8	1 59
						X SQ= 45.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.96	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.68	26 1	19 41
						X SQ= 28.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	1.00	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.62	27 0	23 37
						X SQ= 26.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	1.00	130	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.74	0 28	11 32
						X SQ= 6.63 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.85	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.79	4 22	22 6
						X SQ= 19.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.96	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.62	1 25	25 40
						X SQ= 9.27 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.54	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.79	14 12	13 49
						X SQ= 7.83 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.86	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.66	24 4	21 40
						X SQ= 18.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.85	0 30	8 47
						X SQ= 3.26 P = 0.046 RV NO (NO)	

147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.56	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.86	15 8 12 49 X SQ= 13.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.79	0 13 30 48 X SQ= 5.82 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.58	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.70	11 30 15 13 X SQ= 3.99 P = 0.042 RV YES (YES)	
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.50	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.88	13 38 13 5 X SQ= 10.46 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
157	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.79	157	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.93	6 4 22 57 X SQ= 2.89 P = 0.066 RV NO (YES)	
161	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.65	161	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.55	9 33 17 27 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.103 RV YES (NO)	
164	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	1.00	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.52	0 30 25 32 X SQ= 16.38 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.65	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.80	17 13 9 53 X SQ= 15.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.96	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.59	25 27 1 39 X SQ= 20.97 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

171	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.79	171	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.93	6 4 23 56 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.072 RV NO (YES)
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.50	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.81	13 12 13 52 X SQ= 7.51 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.92	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.66	24 22 2 42 X SQ= 22.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.66	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.62	10 39 19 24 X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.95	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.72	1 43 20 17 X SQ= 25.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.54	181	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.81	12 8 14 34 X SQ= 4.45 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.75	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.86	6 4 2 25 X SQ= 9.01 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
186	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.90	186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.58	2 25 19 34 X SQ= 6.08 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.61	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.68	9 40 14 19 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)

188	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.53	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.81	16 12 14 52 X SQ= 10.09 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
190	LEAN MORE TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.94	190	LEAN LESS TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.67	16 12 1 6 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.088 RV NO (YES)	
192	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.93	192	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.75	2 16 28 48 X SQ= 3.33 P = 0.048 RV NO (NO)	
193	LEAN MORE TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.87	193	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.68	4 21 26 45 X SQ= 2.76 P = 0.079 RV NO (NO)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.80	0 13 30 52 X SQ= 5.36 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)	

143 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
NO-PARTY (5)

143 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
OTHER THAN NO-PARTY (100)

SUBJECT ONLY

5 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	LIBYA	SA'U ARABIA

100 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURUNDI
CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HONDURAS
HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN
KOREA, N	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO
MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA
SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA
USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

INDONESIA

9 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	IRAN	JORDAN	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SUDAN	THAILAND	YEMEN

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13 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (16) — 0.60

13 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99) — 0.90

	3 10
	2 90
X SQ=	6.85
P =	0.013
RV YES (NO)	

16 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (11) — 1.00

16 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (18) — 0.67

	2 6
	0 12
X SQ=	1.13
P =	0.147
RV YES (NO)	

21 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (32) — 0.60

21 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83) — 0.75

	3 25
	2 75
X SQ=	1.46
P =	0.117
RV YES (NO)	

30	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.56	4 44 0 55 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.044 RV YES (NO)
36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	1.00	36	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.58	0 42 5 58 X SQ= 1.97 P = 0.082 RV NO (NO)
37	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.80	37	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.63	1 63 4 37 X SQ= 2.11 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	45	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.54	0 51 5 43 X SQ= 3.63 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)
46	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.60	46	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.79	2 75 3 20 X SQ= 2.17 P = 0.078 RV YES (NO)
50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	1.00	50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.51	0 43 5 41 X SQ= 3.11 P = 0.056 RV YES (NO)
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.80	51	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.70	1 58 4 25 X SQ= 3.29 P = 0.039 RV YES (NO)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.80	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.73	I 72 4 26 X SQ= 4.25 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)
58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)	0.60	58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.90	3 10 2 90 X SQ= 6.85 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)

63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	63	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.54	0 46 5 53 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.065 RV NO (NO)	
67	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS (27)	0.75	67	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.74	1 72 3 25 X SQ= 2.51 P = 0.064 RV YES (NO)	
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.63	0 62 5 37 X SQ= 5.37 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	1.00	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.56	0 56 4 44 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.042 RV YES (NO)	
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (5)	1.00	91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	0 29 3 0 X SQ= 21.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.80	94	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.64	1 50 4 28 X SQ= 2.22 P = 0.070 RV YES (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.75	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.86	1 66 3 11 X SQ= 6.02 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.59	3 11 0 16 X SQ= 1.80 P = 0.090 RV YES (NO)	
101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	1.00	101	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.52	0 41 4 45 X SQ= 1.84 P = 0.123 RV NO (NO)	

105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	1.00	105	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.51	0 43 4 41 X SQ= 2.22 P = 0.117 RV YES (NO)
107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	1.00	107	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.53	0 46 5 51 X SQ= 2.62 P = 0.062 RV NO (NO)
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.80	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.69	1 62 4 28 X SQ= 3.12 P = 0.043 RV YES (NO)
117	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	1.00	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.59	0 57 5 40 X SQ= 4.49 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)
134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	1.00	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.62	0 56 5 34 X SQ= 5.23 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)
135	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS NEGLIGIBLE (13)	0.80	135	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.91	1 72 4 7 X SQ= 15.13 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
160	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.75	160	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.73	3 24 1 65 X SQ= 2.27 P = 0.072 RV YES (NO)
161	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	1.00	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.55	4 40 0 49 X SQ= 2.71 P = 0.046 RV YES (NO)
164	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.75	164	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.69	3 28 1 61 X SQ= 1.60 P = 0.106 RV YES (NO)

176	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.75	176	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.76	1 3 X SQ= P = RV YES	70 22 2.88 0.053 (NO)
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.92	0 3 X SQ= P = RV YES	23 2 9.82 0.003 (YES)
186	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.75	186	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.69	3 1 X SQ= P = RV YES	25 55 1.61 0.106 (NO)

144 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN
TWO-PARTY (34)

144 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN
ONE-PARTY (11)

PREDICATE ONLY

34 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY
GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HUNGARY	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA
MONGOLIA	NIGER	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SENEGAL	SPAIN	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	USSR
UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA						

11 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	CANADA	COLOMBIA	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	NEW ZEALAND	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	UK
US									

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

INDONESIA	MALAYA	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA	SO AFRICA	TURKEY	URUGUAY			

53 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ARGENTINA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEYLON	CHILE	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAPAN
JORDAN	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NIGERIA	NORWAY
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SOMALIA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD
UGANDA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP							

10 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	NEPAL	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	YEMEN

145 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN
TWO-PARTY (30)

145 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY
TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN
MULTI-PARTY (11)

PREDICATE ONLY

30 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GUATEMALA	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	LAOS	LEBANON
LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PERU	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UGANDA	VENEZUELA

11 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	CANADA	COLOMBIA	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	NEW ZEALAND	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	UK
US									

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

INDONESIA	MALAYA	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA	SO AFRICA	TURKEY	URUGUAY

55 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	INDIA	IVORY COAST	JAPAN	KOREA, N	LIBERIA
LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NIGER	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SPAIN	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	USSR
UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA					

12 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND
TOGO	YEMEN								

146 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (8)

146 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
OTHER THAN
MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

8 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST	SENEGAL	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	UAR

92 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI
CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GABON
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRELAND	ISRAEL
ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG
MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA
NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND
TOGO	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA
VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA								

6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CAMBODIA	FRANCE	GREECE	INDIA	MOROCCO	VIETNAM REP

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	LIBYA	SA'U ARABIA

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

CUBA	IRAQ	SYRIA	YEMEN

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10 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33) — 1.00

10 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82) — D.76

8	22
0	70

X SQ= 16.83
P = 0.
RV YES (NO)

11 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (28) — 0.62

11 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87) — D.76

5	22
3	70

X SQ= 3.77
P = 0.032
RV YES (NO)

18	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	1.00	18	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.59	8 22 0 15 X SQ= 3.21 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)	
19	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	1.00	19	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.52	8 22 0 20 X SQ= 4.52 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)	
22	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.87	22	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.57	7 52 1 40 X SQ= 1.78 P = 0.136 RV NO (NO)	
26	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	1.00	26	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.54	0 42 8 50 X SQ= 4.56 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	
28	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.86	28	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.54	6 48 1 41 X SQ= 1.53 P = 0.132 RV NO (NO)	
29	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.75	29	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.57	2 47 6 36 X SQ= 1.80 P = 0.137 RV YES (NO)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.87	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.58	7 38 1 53 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)	
33	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	1.00	33	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.70	0 28 8 64 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.101 RV NO (NO)	
34	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.75	34	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.55	2 51 6 41 X SQ= 1.65 P = 0.143 RV YES (NO)	

36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	1.00	36	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.58	0 39 8 53 X SQ= 3.92 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)
43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.54	0 49 8 41 X SQ= 6.67 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.59	0 51 8 35 X SQ= 8.12 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.83	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.68	1 54 5 25 X SQ= 4.46 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)
54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.62	0 34 8 56 X SQ= 3.11 P = 0.048 RV NO (NO)
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	63	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.53	0 43 8 48 X SQ= 4.90 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)
64	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	1.00	64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.86	0 43 4 7 X SQ= 12.00 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
69	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.75	69	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.57	2 52 6 39 X SQ= 1.90 P = 0.136 RV YES (NO)
73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	1.00	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.63	0 55 8 33 X SQ= 9.29 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)

74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	74	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.73	0 24 8 66 X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.116 RV NO (NO)	
75	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.75	75	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.62	2 56 6 35 X SQ= 2.68 P = 0.063 RV YES (NO)	
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.69	0 24 8 53 X SQ= 2.11 P = 0.099 RV NO (NO)	
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.67	8 34 0 17 X SQ= 2.30 P = 0.090 RV NO (NO)	
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.55	0 47 8 38 X SQ= 6.87 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
86	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.63	86	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.68	3 63 5 29 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.117 RV YES (NO)	
87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	1.00	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.68	8 23 0 50 X SQ= 11.56 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
93	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	1.00	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.77	8 20 0 68 X SQ= 17.62 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.80	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.80	1 60 4 15 X SQ= 6.30 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	

97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.50	4 15 0 15 X SQ= 1.84 P = 0.113 RV YES (NO)	
101	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.88	101	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.54	1 36 7 43 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.131 RV NO (NO)	
102	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.75	102	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.59	2 52 6 36 X SQ= 2.22 P = 0.132 RV YES (NO)	
105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	1.00	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.54	0 40 7 34 X SQ= 5.47 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
106	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.71	106	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.68	2 46 5 22 X SQ= 2.68 P = 0.091 RV YES (NO)	
107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	1.00	107	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.53	0 42 8 47 X SQ= 4.87 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
111	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	1.00	111	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.52	7 38 0 35 X SQ= 4.18 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	116	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.66	0 30 8 58 X SQ= 2.54 P = 0.054 RV NO (NO)	
119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	119	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.71	8 55 0 23 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)	

122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.68	8 63 0 29 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.101 RV NO (NO)	
129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	1.00	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.64	0 50 7 28 X SQ= 8.41 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (12)	1.00	130	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.88	3 9 0 66 X SQ= 11.07 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
133	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	1.00	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.79	7 18 0 68 X SQ= 16.76 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	1.00	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.53	0 43 6 38 X SQ= 4.35 P = 0.026 RV YES (NO)	
139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	1.00	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.71	8 25 0 60 X SQ= 12.98 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
163	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERF THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED (13)	0.62	163	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.96	5 3 3 78 X SQ= 24.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
164	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	1.00	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.77	8 18 0 62 X SQ= 17.43 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	1.00	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.62	0 53 8 33 X SQ= 8.94 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	1.00	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.63	5 32 0 55 X SQ= 5.45 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	1.00	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.56	0 46 8 36 X SQ= 7.07 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
178	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	1.00	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.51	7 43 0 44 X SQ= 4.78 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)
179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.53	8 34 0 38 X SQ= 6.07 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)
188	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	1.00	188	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.68	0 29 7 63 X SQ= 1.78 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	1.00	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.84	7 15 0 77 X SQ= 21.74 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.62	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.77	5 21 3 70 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)

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147  POLITIES                                                    147  POLITIES
     WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY                          WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
     CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL  (23)                        OTHER THAN
                                                                      CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL  (67)


                                                                                                   BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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      23 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA    AUSTRALIA    AUSTRIA      BELGIUM      BRAZIL       CHILE        DENMARK      FINLAND      GERMAN FR    ICELAND
ISRAEL       ITALY        JAMAICA      JAPAN        LUXEMBOURG   NETHERLANDS  NEW ZEALAND  NORWAY       PERU         SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND  TRINIDAD     UK

      67 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA      ALGERIA      BOLIVIA      BULGARIA     BURUNDI      CAMBODIA     CAMEROUN     CANADA       CEN AFR REP  CHAD
CHINA, PR    COLOMBIA     CONGO(BRA)   CONGO(LEO)   COSTA RICA   CUBA         CYPRUS       CZECHOS'KIA  DAHOMEY      DOMIN REP
ECUADOR      EL SALVADOR  GABON        GERMANY, E   GHANA        GUINEA       HONDURAS     HUNGARY      IVORY COAST  KOREA, N
LAOS         LEBANON      MALAGASY R   MALAYA       MALI         MAURITANIA   MEXICO       MONGOLIA     NEPAL        NICARAGUA
NIGER        NIGERIA      PANAMA       PARAGUAY     PHILIPPINES  POLAND       PORTUGAL     RUMANIA      RWANDA       SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO   SOMALIA      SPAIN        SUDAN        TANGANYIKA   THAILAND     TOGO         TUNISIA      UGANDA       USSR
UAR          US           UPPER VOLTA  VENEZUELA    VIETNAM, N   VIETNAM REP  YUGOSLAVIA

      12 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CEYLON       FRANCE       GREECE       GUATEMALA    INDIA        INDONESIA    IRELAND      LIBERIA      MOROCCO      SO AFRICA
TURKEY       URUGUAY

       5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN  ETHIOPIA     HAITI        LIBYA        SA'U ARABIA

       8 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA        IRAN         IRAQ         JORDAN       KOREA REP    PAKISTAN     SYRIA        YEMEN

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  2  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.65          2  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.94        15    4
     LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                        LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          8   63
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (22)                         WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                    X SQ=  32.62
                                                                 NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)          P =    0.
                                                                                                              RV YES (YES)

  3  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                     0.65          3  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                   0.97         8    2
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                   LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                         15   65
     WEST EUROPE  (102)                                          WEST EUROPE  (102)                           X SQ=  14.46
                                                                                                              P =    0.
                                                                                                              RV NO  (YES)
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5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	1.00	5	TENO TO 8E THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.82	13 2 0 9 X SQ= 13.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
7	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN CENTRAL AMERICA (10)	1.00	7	TILT TOWARD 8EING THOSE LOCATED IN CENTRAL AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN SOUTH AMERICA (7)	0.55	0 6 4 5 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.103 RV YES (NO)	
10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATEO ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL ANO SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	10	TEND LESS TO 8E THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL ANO SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.58	0 28 23 39 X SQ= 12.07 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
15	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIOOLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	1.00	15	LEAN TOWARD 8EING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL ANO SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIOOLE EAST (33)	0.93	1 2 0 28 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.097 RV YES (NO)	
19	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATEO IN THE CARI8BEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	1.00	19	TENO TO 8E THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARI8BEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.68	0 28 6 13 X SQ= 7.50 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
25	TENO LESS TO 8E THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.57	25	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.96	10 3 13 64 X SQ= 18.04 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
28	LEAN TOWARO BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.61	28	LEAN TOWARD 8EING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.60	9 38 14 25 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.093 RV YES (NO)	
29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	29	TENO TO 8E THOSE WHERE THE OEGREE OF UR8ANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.64	22 21 0 37 X SQ= 23.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	1.00	30	TEND TO 8E THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.61	0 40 23 26 X SQ= 22.93 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.78	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.96	5 64 18 3 X SQ= 48.06 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.57	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.84	13 11 10 56 X SQ= 12.11 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.83	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.61	19 26 4 41 X SQ= 11.45 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.70	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.91	16 6 7 61 X SQ= 30.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.91	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.76	21 16 2 51 X SQ= 29.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	1.00	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.54	23 31 0 36 X SQ= 18.42 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.74	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.77	17 15 6 51 X SQ= 17.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.95	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.52	20 31 1 33 X SQ= 12.55 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.59	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.92	13 5 9 61 X SQ= 23.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.82	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.80	18 13 4 53 X SQ= 25.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.68	23 21 0 44 X SQ= 28.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.65	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.88	15 8 8 59 X SQ= 22.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.96	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.60	22 25 1 37 X SQ= 18.60 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.65	23 41 0 22 X SQ= 9.04 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.83	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.61	19 21 4 33 X SQ= 10.66 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	1.00	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.52	23 26 0 28 X SQ= 16.57 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (14)	0.52	53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.97	12 2 11 65 X SQ= 27.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.83	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.78	19 14 4 51 X SQ= 24.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.58	23 38 0 27 X SQ= 11.90 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.96	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.60	22 38 1 25 X SQ= 8.37 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
62	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.58	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 7 15 X SQ= 5.16 P = 0.010 RV NO (YES)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.83	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.65	19 23 4 43 X SQ= 13.75 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
64	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	1.00	64	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.79	19 23 0 6 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.068 RV NO (NO)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.74	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.62	17 25 6 41 X SQ= 7.50 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.83	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.50	19 33 4 33 X SQ= 6.18 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.64	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.89	8 7 14 54 X SQ= 5.19 P = 0.020 RV NO (YES)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.77	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.63	17 24 5 41 X SQ= 9.18 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)

73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.86	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.54	19 3 3 35 X SQ= 9.23 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.68	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.88	15 8 7 59 X SQ= 24.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.54	23 31 0 36 X SQ= 18.42 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.71	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.86	15 8 6 49 X SQ= 21.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.63	6 18 0 31 X SQ= 6.32 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	1.00	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.71	3 9 0 22 X SQ= 3.32 P = 0.037 RV YES (NO)	
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.63	81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.92	7 2 12 23 X SQ= 3.89 P = 0.027 RV NO (YES)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.86	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.60	19 25 3 38 X SQ= 12.42 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.63	3 14 0 24 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.064 RV YES (NO)	

85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.87	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.60	20 27 3 40 X SQ= 13.13 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.94	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.51	1 29 17 28 X SQ= 9.90 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.94	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.83	17 10 1 49 X SQ= 33.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.71	0 19 23 47 X SQ= 6.79 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
93	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.96	93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.57	1 28 22 37 X SQ= 9.85 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.59	21 21 0 30 X SQ= 18.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.52	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.93	12 5 11 62 X SQ= 19.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.90	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.76	19 14 2 44 X SQ= 25.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.61	22 26 0 40 X SQ= 22.06 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	1.00	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.74	22 14 0 40 X SQ= 31.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	1.00	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.74	22 17 0 48 X SQ= 33.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.55	110	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.94	10 3 12 46 X SQ= 13.18 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
111	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.77	111	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.53	17 26 5 23 X SQ= 2.78 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)	
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.70	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.95	16 3 7 61 X SQ= 38.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.87	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.91	20 6 3 58 X SQ= 44.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	1.00	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.64	23 23 0 41 X SQ= 25.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.91	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.51	2 27 21 26 X SQ= 10.41 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.74	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.91	6 48 17 5 X SQ= 29.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	1.00	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.57	0 38 23 29 X SQ= 20.31 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.65	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.81	8 54 15 13 X SQ= 14.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	124	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.87	0 7 22 47 X SQ= 1.78 P = 0.100 RV NO (NO)
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.86	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.80	3 43 19 11 X SQ= 25.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.64	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.98	8 53 14 1 X SQ= 33.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	0.52	127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.90	12 6 11 54 X SQ= 15.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
128	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	1.00	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.73	23 16 0 44 X SQ= 33.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
133	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	1.00	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.60	0 25 22 38 X SQ= 10.53 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
134	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.82	134	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.52	18 32 4 30 X SQ= 4.96 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)

135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	135	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.84	22 42 0 8 X SQ= 2.51 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.91	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.93	20 4 2 56 X SQ= 51.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	1.00	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.70	22 18 0 43 X SQ= 29.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
140	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	1.00	140	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.84	0 10 23 52 X SQ= 2.79 P = 0.056 RV NO (NO)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.65	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.80	15 12 8 49 X SQ= 13.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	1.00	144	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.85	0 33 5 6 X SQ= 12.71 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.76	153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.51	16 22 5 23 X SQ= 3.32 P = 0.060 RV YES (NO)	
157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	1.00	157	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.84	0 10 23 52 X SQ= 2.79 P = 0.056 RV NO (NO)	
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	160	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.60	0 23 23 34 X SQ= 11.13 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.83	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.60	4 34 19 23 X SQ= 10.10 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
163	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	1.00	163	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.84	0 9 23 48 X SQ= 2.66 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)	
168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	1.00	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.89	21 7 0 58 X SQ= 53.56 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.86	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.51	3 31 19 30 X SQ= 7.77 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.73	171	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.97	6 2 16 59 X SQ= 8.11 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.52	172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.89	12 7 11 57 X SQ= 14.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVC (28)	0.86	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.92	19 5 3 57 X SQ= 45.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	1.00	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.69	22 19 0 43 X SQ= 28.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.83	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.71	4 44 19 18 X SQ= 17.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	1.00	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.70	0 39 19 17 X SQ= 24.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.70	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.95	16 2 7 36 X SQ= 25.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.60	7 36 0 24 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.044 RV NO (NO)	
185	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	1.00	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.72	3 9 0 23 X SQ= 3.50 P = 0.034 RV YES (NO)	
186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	1.00	186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.56	0 23 20 29 X SQ= 11.04 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.95	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.82	1 47 19 10 X SQ= 34.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.78	189	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.99	5 1 18 66 X SQ= 8.26 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.73	0 18 23 48 X SQ= 6.26 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	
193	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	1.00	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.64	0 24 23 43 X SQ= 9.48 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

194 ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101) 1.00

194 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101) 0.80

	0	13
	23	53

X SQ= 3.84
P = 0.018
RV NO (NO)

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148  POLITIES                                                          148  POLITIES
     WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY                                WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
     AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL  (14)                                             OTHER THAN
                                                                            AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL  (96)

                                                                                                                BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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      14 IN LEFT COLUMN

BURUNDI      CEN AFR REP CHAD         CONGO(BRA)  DAHOMEY     GABON       MALAGASY R  MALI        MAURITANIA  NIGER
RWANDA       SIERRE LEO  TOGO         UPPER VOLTA

      96 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA      ALGERIA     ARGENTINA    AUSTRALIA   AUSTRIA     BELGIUM     BOLIVIA     BRAZIL      BULGARIA    BURMA
CAMBODIA     CAMEROUN    CANADA       CEYLON      CHILE       CHINA, PR   COLOMBIA    CONGO(LEO)  COSTA RICA  CUBA
CYPRUS       CZECHOS'KIA DENMARK      DOMIN REP   ECUADOR     EL SALVADOR FINLAND     FRANCE      GERMANY, E  GERMAN FR
GHANA        GREECE      GUATEMALA    GUINEA      HONDURAS    HUNGARY     ICELAND     INDIA       INDONESIA   IRAN
IRAQ         IRELAND     ISRAEL       ITALY       IVORY COAST JAMAICA     JAPAN       JORDAN      KOREA, N    KOREA REP
LAOS         LEBANON     LIBERIA      LUXEMBOURG  MALAYA      MEXICO      MONGOLIA    MOROCCO     NEPAL       NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND  NICARAGUA   NIGERIA      NORWAY      PAKISTAN    PANAMA      PARAGUAY    PERU        PHILIPPINES POLAND
PORTUGAL     RUMANIA     SENEGAL      SOMALIA     SO AFRICA   SPAIN       SUDAN       SWEDEN      SWITZERLAND SYRIA
TANGANYIKA   THAILAND    TRINIDAD     TUNISIA     TURKEY      UGANDA      USSR        UAR         UK          US
URUGUAY      VENEZUELA   VIETNAM, N   VIETNAM REP YEMEN       YUGOSLAVIA

       5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN ETHIOPIA     HAITI        LIBYA       SA'U ARABIA
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 10  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00      10  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.82        14   17
     LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR                           LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,                0   79
     CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (33)                        OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (82)          X SQ=  36.92
                                                                                                      P =    0.
                                                                                                      RV YES (NO )

 24  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00      24  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.60         0   58
     WHOSE POPULATION IS                                   WHOSE POPULATION IS                                 14   38
     SMALL  (54)                                           VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM  (61)         X SQ=  15.55
                                                                                                      P =    0.
                                                                                                      RV YES (NO )

 25  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                        1.00      25  TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE            0.83         0   16
     WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS                           WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS                         14   80
     MEDIUM OR LOW  (98)                                   MEDIUM OR LOW  (98)                        X SQ=   1.55
                                                                                                      P =    0.126
                                                                                                      RV NO  (ND )
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26	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.86	26	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.53	2 45 12 51 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.023 RV NO (NO)
29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	1.00	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.64	0 55 14 31 X SQ= 17.40 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
30	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.60	14 38 0 57 X SQ= 15.28 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
34	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	1.00	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.62	0 60 14 36 X SQ= 16.81 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
37	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	1.00	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.66	0 63 14 33 X SQ= 18.90 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
40	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	1.00	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.75	0 68 14 23 X SQ= 26.50 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.57	0 54 14 40 X SQ= 13.87 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.61	0 55 14 35 X SQ= 15.79 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.92	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.88	1 81 12 11 X SQ= 38.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	1.00	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.58	6 37 0 51 X SQ= 5.45 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	1.00	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.82	0 77 14 17 X SQ= 36.05 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.93	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.82	1 75 13 16 X SQ= 30.73 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	63	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.52	0 46 14 49 X SQ= 9.83 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.91	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.59	1 53 10 37 X SQ= 7.87 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.79	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.61	3 58 11 37 X SQ= 6.25 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)
70	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	1.00	70	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.78	0 20 11 70 X SQ= 1.81 P = 0.115 RV NO (NO)
73	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	1.00	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.66	0 61 14 31 X SQ= 19.24 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.65	0 62 14 33 X SQ= 18.61 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.67	0 26 14 54 X SQ= 4.77 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)
77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	1.00	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.53	0 28 14 25 X SQ= 10.63 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.67	12 36 0 18 X SQ= 3.95 P = 0.027 RV NO (NO)
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.92	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.58	1 18 11 13 X SQ= 6.78 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.56	0 50 14 39 X SQ= 13.12 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.74	0 29 14 10 X SQ= 20.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	1.00	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.76	0 73 14 23 X SQ= 28.33 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	1.00	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.75	13 18 0 54 X SQ= 23.59 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.79	0 20 14 74 X SQ= 2.38 P = 0.068 RV NO (NO)

93	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.93	93	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.66	1 31 13 60 X SQ= 2.98 P = 0.059 RV NO (NO)	
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.83	14 77 0 16 X SQ= 1.64 P = 0.122 RV NO (NO)	
98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	98	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.79	0 20 14 76 X SQ= 2.30 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)	
102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.69	102	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.60	4 54 9 36 X SQ= 2.85 P = 0.071 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.85	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.56	2 41 11 32 X SQ= 5.80 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.85	107	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.53	2 44 11 49 X SQ= 3.52 P = 0.037 RV NO (NO)	
117	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	1.00	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.65	0 60 14 32 X SQ= 18.47 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	1.00	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.62	14 36 0 60 X SQ= 16.81 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
125	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.86	125	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.60	12 48 2 32 X SQ= 2.39 P = 0.077 RV NO (NO)	

126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.80	14 64 0 16 X SQ= 2.11 P = 0.117 RV NO (NO)	
127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	127	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.73	0 21 14 58 X SQ= 3.41 P = 0.034 RV NO (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITEO OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.86	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.58	2 46 12 33 X SQ= 7.52 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.64	129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.65	5 51 9 28 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.073 RV YES (NO)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.71	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.78	10 19 4 67 X SQ= 11.94 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.63	0 29 14 50 X SQ= 5.86 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.93	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.58	1 46 13 33 X SQ= 10.46 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
139	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.62	139	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.70	8 26 5 61 X SQ= 3.74 P = 0.055 RV YES (NO)	
142	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	1.00	142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.62	0 30 13 48 X SQ= 5.82 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	

158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.82	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.64	9 31 2 54 X SQ= 6.48 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	160	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.66	0 27 13 53 X SQ= 4.65 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.85	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.51	2 41 11 39 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.018 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.82	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.74	9 22 2 62 X SQ= 11.28 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	168	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.61	0 34 14 53 X SQ= 6.59 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.69	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.66	9 29 4 56 X SQ= 4.47 P = 0.029 RV YES (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.85	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.58	2 48 11 35 X SQ= 6.50 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	176	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.70	13 58 0 25 X SQ= 3.85 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.93	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.55	13 39 1 47 X SQ= 9.07 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	1.00	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.83	0 53 14 11 X SQ= 32.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	1.00	183	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.65	14 11 0 6 X SQ= 4.07 P = 0.021 RV NO (YES)	
186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	1.00	186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.60	0 28 13 42 X SQ= 6.16 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	
188	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	1.00	188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.67	0 31 14 64 X SQ= 4.88 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)	0.93	193	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.85	13 14 1 81 X SQ= 35.88 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

149 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
BROADLY AGGREGATIVE, RATHER THAN
PERSONALISTIC, SITUATIONAL, OR AD HOC (4)

149 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
PERSONALISTIC, SITUATIONAL, OR AD HOC,
RATHER THAN BROADLY AGGREGATIVE (4)

SUBJECT ONLY

4 IN LEFT COLUMN

CANADA	MEXICO	PHILIPPINES	US

4 IN RIGHT COLUMN

EL SALVADOR	LAOS	LEBANON	PANAMA

13 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CAMBODIA	CEYLON	FRANCE	GREECE	GUATEMALA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRELAND	MOROCCO	SO AFRICA
TURKEY	URUGUAY	VIETNAM REP							

83 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GABON
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI
MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PARAGUAY	PERU
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	UPPER VOLTA
VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA							

11 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND
YEMEN									

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21 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (32) — 0.75

21 ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83) — 1.00

3	0
1	4

X SQ= 2.13
P = 0.143
RV YES (YES)

22 ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68) — 1.00

22 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47) — 0.75

4	1
0	3

X SQ= 2.13
P = 0.143
RV YES (YES)

23	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (27)	1.00	23	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	1.00	4 0 0 4 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)
24	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	1.00	24	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	1.00	4 0 0 4 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)
33	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.75	33	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	1.00	3 0 1 4 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
34	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	1.00	34	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	1.00	4 0 0 4 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)
39	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	1.00	39	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	1.00	4 0 0 4 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)
40	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	1.00	40	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.75	4 1 0 3 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
42	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.75	42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	1.00	3 0 1 4 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	1.00	43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	1.00	4 0 0 3 X SQ= 3.51 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	45	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.67	4 1 0 2 X SQ= 1.18 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)

50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	1.00	50	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.67	4 1 0 2 X SQ= 1.18 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	1.00	85	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.75	4 1 0 3 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	1.00	89	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.67	4 1 0 2 X SQ= 1.18 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	1.00	4 0 0 4 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)
100	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	1.00	100	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	1.00	4 0 0 4 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)
101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	1.00	101	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.67	4 1 0 2 X SQ= 1.18 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
111	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	1.00	111	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	1.00	4 0 0 4 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)
115	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.75	115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	3 0 1 4 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	1.00	116	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.75	4 1 0 3 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)

119	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.75	119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	1 4 3 0 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)	
125	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.67	125	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	1.00	1 4 2 0 X SQ= 1.18 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)	
128	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	1.00	128	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	1.00	0 3 4 0 X SQ= 3.51 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	
129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	1.00	129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	1.00	0 3 4 0 X SQ= 3.51 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	
130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (12)	1.00	130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	1.00	4 0 0 4 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	
132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (9)	1.00	4 0 0 4 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	
134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	1.00	134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	1.00	4 0 0 2 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.067 RV YES (YES)	
145	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (11)	1.00	145	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	1.00	0 4 3 0 X SQ= 3.51 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	
153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	1.00	153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	1.00	4 0 0 4 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)	

154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	1.00	154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	1.00	4 0 0 4 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)
157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	1.00	157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED (14)	1.00	0 4 4 0 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)
158	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	1.00	158	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	1.00	0 4 4 0 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	160	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.67	0 2 4 1 X SQ= 1.18 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
168	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.75	168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	3 0 1 4 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
174	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.75	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	3 0 1 4 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
178	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	1.00	178	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.75	0 3 4 1 X SQ= 2.13 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	1.00	187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	1.00	0 3 4 0 X SQ= 3.51 P = 0.029 RV YES (YES)

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150  POLITIES                                          150  POLITIES
     WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY                WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
     LATIN LIBERAL CONSERVATIVE, RATHER THAN                LATIN SOCIAL REVOLUTIONARY, RATHER THAN
     LATIN SOCIAL REVOLUTIONARY  (5)                        LATIN LIBERAL CONSERVATIVE  (4)
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SUBJECT ONLY

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       5 IN LEFT COLUMN

COLOMBIA     ECUADOR      HONDURAS     NICARAGUA    PARAGUAY

       4 IN RIGHT COLUMN

BOLIVIA      COSTA RICA   DOMIN REP    VENEZUELA

       1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

URUGUAY

     104 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN  ALBANIA      ALGERIA      ARGENTINA    AUSTRALIA    AUSTRIA      BELGIUM      BRAZIL       BULGARIA     BURMA
BURUNDI      CAMBODIA     CAMEROUN     CANADA       CEN AFR REP  CEYLON       CHAD         CHILE        CHINA, PR    CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)   CYPRUS       CZECHOS*KIA  DAHOMEY      DENMARK      EL SALVADOR  ETHIOPIA     FINLAND      FRANCE       GABON
GERMANY, E   GERMAN FR    GHANA        GREECE       GUATEMALA    GUINEA       HAITI        HUNGARY      ICELAND      INDIA
INDONESIA    IRAN         IRAQ         IRELAND      ISRAEL       ITALY        IVORY COAST  JAMAICA      JAPAN        JORDAN
KOREA, N     KOREA REP    LAOS         LEBANON      LIBERIA      LIBYA        LUXEMBOURG   MALAGASY R   MALAYA       MALI
MAURITANIA   MEXICO       MONGOLIA     MOROCCO      NEPAL        NETHERLANDS  NEW ZEALAND  NIGER        NIGERIA      NORWAY
PAKISTAN     PANAMA       PERU         PHILIPPINES  POLAND       PORTUGAL     RUMANIA      RWANDA       SA'U ARABIA  SENEGAL
SIERRE LEO   SOMALIA      SO AFRICA    SPAIN        SUDAN        SWEDEN       SWITZERLAND  SYRIA        TANGANYIKA   THAILAND
TOGO         TRINIDAD     TUNISIA      TURKEY       UGANDA       USSR         UAR          UK           US           UPPER VOLTA
VIETNAM, N   VIETNAM REP  YEMEN        YUGOSLAVIA

       1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

CUBA
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 87  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                    1.00        87  TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE              0.75        0    3
     WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION                       WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION                    3    1
     IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL  (58)                   IS DEVELOPMENTAL  (31)                     X SQ=   1.47
                                                                                                    P =    0.143
                                                                                                    RV YES (YES)

 89  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                    1.00        89  TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE              0.75        3    1
     WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION                       WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION                    0    3
     IS CONVENTIONAL  (33)                               IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL  (62)           X SQ=   1.47
                                                                                                    P =    0.143
                                                                                                    RV YES (YES)
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101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	1.00	101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	1.00	0 4 5 0 X SQ= 5.41 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)
127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	127	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	0.67	0 2 5 1 X SQ= 1.60 P = 0.107 RV YES (YES)
131	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	1.00	131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.67	0 2 4 1 X SQ= 1.18 P = 0.143 RV YES (YES)
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.80	160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	4 0 1 4 X SQ= 2.98 P = 0.048 RV YES (YES)
161	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	1.00	161	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	1.00	5 0 0 4 X SQ= 5.41 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)

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151 POLITIES
LOCATED IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA AND
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
REGIONAL OR REGIONAL-ETHNIC (5)

151 POLITIES
LOCATED IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA AND
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
OTHER THAN
REGIONAL OR REGIONAL ETHNIC (22)

SUBJECT ONLY

****

5 IN LEFT COLUMN

CAMEROUN	CONGO(LEO)	NIGERIA	SOMALIA	UGANDA

22 IN RIGHT COLUMN

BURUNDI	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	IVORY COAST
LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	TANGANYIKA
TOGO	UPPER VOLTA								

87 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
BURMA	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS
CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE
GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND
ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBYA
LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SPAIN
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA			

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

SUDAN

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24 LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.60
WHOSE POPULATION IS
VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)

24 LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.82
WHOSE POPULATION IS
SMALL (54)

3 4
2 18
X SQ= 1.85
P = 0.091
RV YES (NO)

28 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS LOW (48)

28 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.63
WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
IS HIGH (62)

0 12
5 7
X SQ= 4.04
P = 0.037
RV YES (NO)

80 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.67
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)

80 TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.82
WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914,
AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF
FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)

2 3
1 14
X SQ= 1.18
P = 0.140
RV YES (NO)

102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.67	5 7 0 14 X SQ= 4.79 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
113	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME (27)	0.80	113	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.95	4 1 1 19 X SQ= 9.77 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
127	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (21)	0.60	127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	3 0 2 20 X SQ= 8.55 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
128	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	1.00	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.85	5 3 0 17 X SQ= 9.66 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
133	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.80	133	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.71	1 15 4 6 X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.055 RV YES (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.75	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.86	1 18 3 3 X SQ= 3.87 P = 0.031 RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.60	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.95	3 1 2 20 X SQ= 5.70 P = 0.014 RV YES (YES)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.60	142	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	1.00	3 0 2 20 X SQ= 8.55 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	1.00	154	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.89	0 8 2 1 X SQ= 2.81 P = 0.055 RV YES (YES)	

166	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF EFFECTIVE FEDERALISM OR LIMITED FEDERALISM (15)	0.75	166	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	1.00	3 0 1 22 X SQ= 12.03 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	1.00	169	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.68	3 7 0 15 X SQ= 2.67 P = 0.052 RV YES (NO)	
170	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.80	170	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.70	1 14 4 6 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.121 RV YES (NO)	
171	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.60	171	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.95	2 1 3 21 X SQ= 2.22 P = 0.079 RV NO (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.75	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.86	3 3 1 18 X SQ= 3.87 P = 0.031 RV YES (YES)	
179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	1.00	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.88	0 15 2 2 X SQ= 3.91 P = 0.035 RV YES (YES)	

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152  POLITIES                                                          152  POLITIES
     WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS                                              WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
     STABLE, RATHER THAN                                                    UNSTABLE, RATHER THAN
     UNSTABLE  (42)                                                         STABLE  (25)


                                                                                                                  SUBJECT ONLY
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      42 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA      AUSTRALIA    AUSTRIA      BELGIUM      BULGARIA     CANADA       CHINA, PR    CZECHOS'KIA  DENMARK      FINLAND
GERMANY, E   GERMAN FR    GUINEA       HUNGARY      ICELAND      INDIA        IRELAND      ISRAEL       JAPAN        KOREA, N
LIBERIA      LUXEMBOURG   MEXICO       MONGOLIA     NETHERLANDS  NEW ZEALAND  NORWAY       PHILIPPINES  POLAND       PORTUGAL
RUMANIA      SO AFRICA    SPAIN        SWEDEN       SWITZERLAND  TANGANYIKA   TUNISIA      USSR         UK           US
VIETNAM, N   YUGOSLAVIA

      25 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA    BOLIVIA      BRAZIL       CEYLON       CHILE        CONGO(LEO)   ECUADOR      EL SALVADOR  GREECE       GUATEMALA
HONDURAS     IRAQ         JORDAN       KOREA REP    LAOS         LEBANON      NEPAL        PAKISTAN     PANAMA       PERU
SIERRE LEO   SOMALIA      SYRIA        THAILAND     VENEZUELA

       3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

COLOMBIA     INDONESIA    URUGUAY

      18 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN  CAMBODIA     COSTA RICA   ETHIOPIA     FRANCE       GHANA        HAITI        ITALY        IVORY COAST  LIBYA
MALAGASY R   MALAYA       NICARAGUA    PARAGUAY     SA'U ARABIA  SENEGAL      TURKEY       VIETNAM REP

      27 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA      BURMA        BURUNOI      CAMEROUN     CEN AFR REP  CHAD         CONGO(BRA)   CUBA         CYPRUS       DAHOMEY
DOMIN REP    GABON        IRAN         JAMAICA      MALI         MAURITANIA   MOROCCO      NIGER        NIGERIA      RWANDA
SUDAN        TOGO         TRINIDAD     UGANDA       UAR          UPPER VOLTA  YEMEN

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  2  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.55          2  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                    0.96        19    1
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                  LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                           23   24
     WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                                  WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                     X SQ=  10.83
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)                        NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)           P =    0.
                                                                                                              RV NO  (YES)

  6  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                    0.98          6  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.56         1   11
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE                              LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE                       41   14
     CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,                                CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,                   X SQ=  15.74
     OR SOUTH AMERICA  (93)                                     OR SOUTH AMERICA  (93)                        P =    0.
                                                                                                              RV NO  (YES)
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14	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.98	14	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.84	1 4 41 21 X SQ= 2.47 P = 0.061 RV NO (YES)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.83	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.79	5 3 1 11 X SQ= 4.37 P = 0.018 RV YES (YES)	
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.87	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.65	7 6 1 11 X SQ= 4.03 P = 0.030 RV YES (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.62	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.68	26 8 16 17 X SQ= 4.47 P = 0.024 RV YES (YES)	
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.65	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.84	14 21 26 4 X SQ= 12.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
29	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.81	29	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.52	30 13 7 12 X SQ= 4.65 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	
30	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.73	30	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.52	11 12 30 13 X SQ= 2.20 P = 0.111 RV NO (YES)	
31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.57	31	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.92	24 23 18 2 X SQ= 7.50 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
32	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.81	32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	8 0 34 25 X SQ= 3.75 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	

33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.55	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.88	23 3 19 22 X SQ= 10.33 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.79	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.52	33 12 9 13 X SQ= 5.33 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.50	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.96	21 1 21 24 X SQ= 13.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.69	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.80	29 5 13 20 X SQ= 13.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.80	38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	8 0 32 25 X SQ= 4.00 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.66	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.80	27 5 14 20 X SQ= 11.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.59	41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	17 0 24 24 X SQ= 11.41 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.68	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.87	28 3 13 21 X SQ= 16.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.81	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.62	34 9 8 15 X SQ= 10.86 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.57	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	24 0 18 25 X SQ= 19.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.86	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.62	32 9 5 15 X SQ= 13.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.97	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.80	38 20 1 5 X SQ= 3.59 P = 0.030 RV NO (YES)	
50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.52	50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.75	22 5 20 15 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.057 RV YES (NO)	
53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.67	53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	14 0 28 25 X SQ= 8.61 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.67	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.84	27 4 13 21 X SQ= 14.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
56	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.90	56	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.71	35 17 4 7 X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.086 RV NO (YES)	
58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.98	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.80	1 5 41 20 X SQ= 4.00 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	
62	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.64	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 9 7 X SQ= 1.61 P = 0.123 RV NO (NO)	

63	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREOOMINANTLY SOME KINO OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.68	63	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREOOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.68	28 8 13 17 X SQ= 6.85 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
67	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.90	67	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.61	38 14 4 9 X SQ= 6.40 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)	
71	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INOEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.64	71	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.92	14 2 25 22 X SQ= 4.59 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	
74	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.57	74	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.96	23 1 17 24 X SQ= 16.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
75	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZEO (62)	0.80	75	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZEO (62)	0.56	33 14 8 11 X SQ= 3.43 P = 0.050 RV NO (YES)	
76	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.74	76	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.95	23 1 8 21 X SQ= 22.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
78	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZEO WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.67	78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	3 13 6 0 X SQ= 8.79 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
79	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENOENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.92	79	TENO TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENOENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.56	12 8 1 10 X SQ= 5.61 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	
81	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVEO, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVEO (40)	0.66	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	10 0 19 12 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	

82	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.74	82	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.52	29 10 X SQ= P = RV NO	12 11 2.27 0.098 (YES)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.88	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.52	37 5 X SQ= P = RV YES	12 13 10.86 0.001 (YES)
87	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.90	87	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.69	4 36 X SQ= P = RV NO	5 11 2.41 0.100 (YES)
89	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.55	89	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.72	21 17 X SQ= P = RV YES	5 13 2.69 0.085 (NO)
92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.66	92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	14 27 X SQ= P = RV NO	0 25 8.89 0.001 (NO)
93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.59	93	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.91	17 24 X SQ= P = RV NO	2 20 5.67 0.009 (NO)
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.63	95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	26 15 X SQ= P = RV NO	25 0 9.84 0. (NO)
96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.95	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.61	38 2 X SQ= P = RV NO	11 7 8.44 0.002 (YES)
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.88	97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	2 15 X SQ= P = RV YES	7 0 12.92 0. (YES)

99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	1.00	40 0 0 23 X SQ= 58.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
100	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	1.00	100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	0.83	41 4 0 19 X SQ= 44.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.55	106	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.92	22 12 18 1 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)
108	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.59	108	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.88	24 15 17 2 X SQ= 3.56 P = 0.034 RV NO (NO)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.83	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.72	24 7 5 18 X SQ= 14.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.56	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.75	22 6 17 18 X SQ= 4.73 P = 0.020 RV YES (YES)
119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.57	119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.91	24 21 18 2 X SQ= 6.62 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.76	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	32 23 10 0 X SQ= 4.77 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.79	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.52	9 13 33 12 X SQ= 5.33 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)

122	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.55	122	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.80	23 20 19 5 X SQ= 3.31 P = 0.064 RV NO (NO)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.81	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	34 25 8 0 X SQ= 3.75 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.68	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.91	11 21 23 2 X SQ= 17.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.53	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	18 23 16 0 X SQ= 12.81 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.54	128	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	1.00	19 18 22 0 X SQ= 13.19 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
130	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.75	130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	1.00	10 0 30 22 X SQ= 4.84 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.60	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.90	15 2 10 18 X SQ= 9.79 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.59	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.78	24 4 17 14 X SQ= 5.24 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.73	136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	11 0 30 21 X SQ= 5.13 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	

137	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.51	137	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITEO OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.86	21 3 20 18 X SQ= 6.50 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
144	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.73	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	1.00	19 0 7 2 X SQ= 1.81 P = 0.095 RV YES (NO)	
145	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.61	145	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.87	11 13 7 2 X SQ= 1.56 P = 0.134 RV NO (YES)	
157	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	1.00	157	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCEO (14)	0.50	0 10 42 10 X SQ= 21.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
158	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.95	158	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCEO OR MODERATE (40)	0.85	2 17 40 3 X SQ= 37.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
161	TILT LESS TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.52	161	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.75	22 15 20 5 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.105 RV NO (NO)	
168	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.52	168	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITEO OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.84	22 3 20 16 X SQ= 5.81 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
170	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.85	170	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.52	6 11 35 10 X SQ= 8.14 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
174	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.52	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	22 0 20 18 X SQ= 12.72 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.54	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	19 0 22 16 X SQ= 9.13 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
185	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	1.00	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.80	0 12 18 3 X SQ= 19.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.55	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.86	19 18 23 3 X SQ= 7.87 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.78	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.52	9 13 32 12 X SQ= 5.03 P = 0.016 RV YES (YES)
189	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.88	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	5 0 37 25 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.149 RV NO (NO)
190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.64	190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	9 13 5 0 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.041 RV NO (YES)
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.69	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	13 0 29 25 X SQ= 7.72 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)

153 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
STABLE (42)

153 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)

PREDICATE ONLY

42 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	FINLAND
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GUINEA	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	JAPAN	KOREA, N
LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	USSR	UK	US
VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA								

38 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHILE	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
FRANCE	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	IRAQ	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA REP
LAOS	LEBANON	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SYRIA	THAILAND	TURKEY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP		

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

COLOMBIA	INDONESIA	URUGUAY

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	LIBYA	SA'U ARABIA

27 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY
DOMIN REP	GABON	IRAN	JAMAICA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA
SUDAN	TOGO	TRINIDAD	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN			

154 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)

154 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
UNSTABLE (25)

PREDICATE ONLY

55 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CHINA, PR	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA
DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GUINEA	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAPAN	KOREA, N	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR
UK	US	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA					

25 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	CONGO(LEO)	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GREECE	GUATEMALA
HONDURAS	IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PERU
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SYRIA	THAILAND	VENEZUELA					

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

COLOMBIA	INDONESIA	URUGUAY

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	LIBYA	SA'U ARABIA

27 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY
DOMIN REP	GABON	IRAN	JAMAICA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA
SUDAN	TOGO	TRINIDAD	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN			

155 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
STABLE MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN
UNSTABLE MULTI-PARTY (11)

155 POLITIES
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS
UNSTABLE MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN
STABLE MULTI-PARTY (13)

SUBJECT ONLY

11 IN LEFT COLUMN

BELGIUM	DENMARK	FINLAND	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NORWAY	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND									

13 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	CONGO(LEO)	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	LAOS	LEBANON
PANAMA	PERU	VENEZUELA							

91 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS
CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE
GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ITALY	IVORY COAST
JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI
MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN
PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN
YUGOSLAVIA									

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2 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22) — 0.91

2 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 1.00

	10 0
	1 13
X SQ=	16.69
P =	0.
RV YES	(YES)

3 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102) — 0.55

3 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102) — 1.00

	5 0
	6 13
X SQ=	4.96
P =	0.011
RV NO	(YES)

6 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93) — 1.00

6 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (22) — 0.69

	0 9
	11 4
X SQ=	9.41
P =	0.001
RV YES	(YES)

21	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	1.00	21	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.62	0 5 11 8 X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.041 RV NO (YES)
22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.73	22	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.62	3 8 8 5 X SQ= 1.61 P = 0.123 RV YES (YES)
26	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.64	26	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.77	7 3 4 10 X SQ= 2.54 P = 0.095 RV YES (YES)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.82	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.85	2 11 9 2 X SQ= 8.09 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	29	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.62	11 8 0 5 X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.041 RV NO (YES)
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.82	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.85	2 11 9 2 X SQ= 8.09 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	1.00	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.92	11 1 0 12 X SQ= 16.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.80	41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	8 0 2 12 X SQ= 11.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	1.00	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.83	10 2 0 10 X SQ= 12.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.50	11 6 0 6 X SQ= 5.07 P = 0.014 RV YES (YES)
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.91	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	10 0 1 13 X SQ= 16.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.50	11 6 0 6 X SQ= 5.07 P = 0.014 RV YES (YES)
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.91	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.70	10 3 1 7 X SQ= 5.86 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)
53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (14)	0.64	53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	7 0 4 13 X SQ= 8.80 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	1.00	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.77	11 3 0 10 X SQ= 11.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.62	11 8 0 5 X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.041 RV NO (YES)
62	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PROTESTANT, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (5)	0.62	62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	5 0 3 6 X SQ= 3.43 P = 0.031 RV YES (YES)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.91	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.54	10 6 1 7 X SQ= 3.55 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)

66	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.82	66	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.54	9 6 2 7 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.105 RV YES (YES)
67	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	1.00	67	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS (27)	0.58	11 5 0 7 X SQ= 6.67 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
70	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, AND LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (21)	0.55	70	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.92	6 1 5 11 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)
71	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1800 (21)	0.55	71	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	1.00	6 0 5 13 X SQ= 6.77 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	1.00	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	10 0 0 13 X SQ= 19.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	1.00	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	10 0 0 13 X SQ= 19.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.73	2 3 0 8 X SQ= 1.33 P = 0.128 RV YES (NO)
81	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.60	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	4 0 6 9 X SQ= 2.47 P = 0.087 RV NO (YES)
85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	1.00	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.54	11 6 0 7 X SQ= 5.96 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)

89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.91	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.57	10 3 1 4 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.047 RV YES (YES)	
98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.91	98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	10 0 1 13 X SQ= 16.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	1.00	11 0 0 13 X SQ= 20.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	1.00	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.63	11 3 0 5 X SQ= 6.39 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH (15)	0.60	110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	6 0 4 13 X SQ= 7.67 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.90	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.85	9 2 1 11 X SQ= 9.80 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.73	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.85	8 2 3 11 X SQ= 5.87 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)	
116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	1.00	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.62	11 5 0 8 X SQ= 7.57 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
118	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	1.00	118	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.69	0 4 11 9 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.098 RV NO (YES)	

119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.91	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.92	1 12 10 1 X SQ= 13.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
120	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARITUCLATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED (10)	0.55	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	5 13 6 0 X SQ= 6.77 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	1.00	121	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.69	0 4 11 9 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.098 RV NO (YES)	
122	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.73	122	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.69	3 9 8 4 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.100 RV YES (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.55	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	6 13 5 0 X SQ= 4.96 P = 0.011 RV NO (YES)	
125	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	1.00	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.91	0 10 11 1 X SQ= 14.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.91	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	1 11 10 0 X SQ= 14.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
132	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.91	132	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.55	10 6 1 5 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.149 RV NO (YES)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.91	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.89	10 1 1 8 X SQ= 9.72 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

136	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT (12)	0.91	136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	10 0 1 12 X SQ= 15.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	1.00	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.83	11 2 0 10 X SQ= 13.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	1.00	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.64	10 4 0 7 X SQ= 6.90 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
158	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	1.00	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.92	0 12 11 1 X SQ= 16.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
161	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	1.00	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.75	0 9 11 3 X SQ= 10.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	1.00	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.80	11 2 0 8 X SQ= 11.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	1.00	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.67	0 8 11 4 X SQ= 8.50 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
172	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.55	172	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.85	6 2 5 11 X SQ= 2.54 P = 0.082 RV YES (YES)
174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	1.00	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	11 0 0 10 X SQ= 17.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	1.00	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	11 0 0 11 X SQ= 18.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	1.00	186	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.50	0 2 11 2 X SQ= 2.76 P = 0.057 RV YES (YES)	
187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	1.00	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.89	0 8 11 1 X SQ= 12.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

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156  POLITIES                                          156  POLITIES
     WHERE PERSONALISMO IS                                  WHERE PERSONALISMO IS
     PRONOUNCED, RATHER THAN                                NEGLIGIBLE, RATHER THAN
     NEGLIGIBLE  I141                                       PRONOUNCED  (56)

                                                                                                                                SUBJECT ONLY
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14 IN LEFT COLUMN

CAMBODIA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	LAOS	LEBANON	NICARAGUA	PANAMA
SYRIA	THAILAND	UAR	URUGUAY						

56 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA
DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GUINEA	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL
ITALY	JAMAICA	KOREA, N	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA
USSR	UK	US	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA				

31 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GABON	GHANA	HAITI	INDONESIA
IVORY COAST	JAPAN	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	PERU	SA'U ARABIA	UPPER VOLTA
VIETNAM REP									

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	CYPRUS	RWANDA

11 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	DOMIN REP	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SUDAN	TOGO
YEMEN									

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 2  LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE          0.93        2  LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE          0.64        1   20
    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                            LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                        13   36
    WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                            WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                  X SQ=   3.10
    NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)                  NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)        P =    0.050
                                                                                                    RV NO  (NO )

 6  TEND TO BE THOSE                      0.50        6  TEND TO BE THOSE                      0.89        7    6
    LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN,                            LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE                     7   50
    CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA  (22)              CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,                X SQ=   8.98
                                                         OR SOUTH AMERICA  (93)                     P =    0.003
                                                                                                    RV YES (YES)
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15	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.67	15	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.86	2 2 1 12 X SQ= 1.42 P = 0.121 RV YES (YES)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.87	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.67	1 12 7 6 X SQ= 4.51 P = 0.030 RV YES (YES)
22	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.71	22	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.59	4 33 10 23 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.071 RV YES (NO)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.79	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.64	3 36 11 20 X SQ= 6.69 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)
26	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.71	26	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.55	4 31 10 25 X SQ= 2.23 P = 0.084 RV YES (NO)
28	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.79	28	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.52	11 26 3 28 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.069 RV YES (NO)
31	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.93	31	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.64	13 36 1 20 X SQ= 3.10 P = 0.050 RV NO (NO)
33	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	1.00	33	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.57	0 24 14 32 X SQ= 7.33 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.71	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.71	4 40 10 16 X SQ= 7.07 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)

35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.59	0 23 14 33 X SQ= 6.80 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.79	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.61	3 34 11 22 X SQ= 5.45 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.93	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.53	1 29 13 26 X SQ= 7.67 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.67	0 18 14 36 X SQ= 4.75 P = 0.014 RV NO (NO)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.86	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.52	2 28 12 26 X SQ= 4.93 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.77	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.71	3 40 10 16 X SQ= 8.55 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.59	0 23 14 33 X SQ= 6.80 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.69	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.71	4 37 9 15 X SQ= 5.65 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)
53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	53	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.77	0 13 14 43 X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.057 RV NO (NO)

54	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.79	54	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.52	3 28 11 26 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.069 RV YES (NO)	
74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.93	74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.56	1 24 13 30 X SQ= 5.15 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.92	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.52	1 24 12 22 X SQ= 6.49 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
77	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.75	77	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.57	9 9 3 12 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.145 RV YES (YES)	
78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	78	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.60	9 9 0 6 X SQ= 2.90 P = 0.052 RV NO (YES)	
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.58	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.85	5 22 7 4 X SQ= 5.42 P = 0.017 RV YES (YES)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.60	5 12 0 8 X SQ= 1.39 P = 0.140 RV NO (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.57	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.75	6 42 8 14 X SQ= 3.98 P = 0.050 RV YES (NO)	
93	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.86	93	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.60	2 22 12 33 X SQ= 2.22 P = 0.115 RV NO (NO)	

95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.71	14 39 0 16 X SQ= 3.79 P = 0.029 RV NO (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.50	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.94	6 49 6 3 X SQ= 12.34 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.84	6 3 0 16 X SQ= 10.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.66	0 19 14 37 X SQ= 4.92 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.86	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.93	2 41 12 3 X SQ= 30.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	0.57	100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.98	6 43 8 1 X SQ= 20.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
101	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.73	101	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.58	3 31 8 22 X SQ= 2.42 P = 0.096 RV YES (NO)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.67	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.83	4 35 8 7 X SQ= 9.27 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.70	0 16 14 37 X SQ= 4.02 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	

116	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.79	116	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.55	3 24 11 29 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.134 RV NO (NO)	
120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	120	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.81	14 44 0 10 X SQ= 1.74 P = 0.108 RV NO (NO)	
125	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.71	125	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.59	10 19 4 27 X SQ= 2.79 P = 0.068 RV YES (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.65	14 30 0 16 X SQ= 4.98 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.82	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.61	2 23 9 15 X SQ= 4.54 P = 0.018 RV YES (NO)	
132	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (9)	0.55	132	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.95	5 39 6 2 X SQ= 12.84 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.70	134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.63	3 34 7 20 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.081 RV YES (NO)	
142	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.60	142	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.71	6 15 4 37 X SQ= 2.38 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.65	0 18 10 33 X SQ= 3.45 P = 0.026 RV NO (NO)	

153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	1.00	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.82	0 40 12 9 X SQ= 24.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.83	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.94	2 46 10 3 X SQ= 29.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.70	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.67	7 17 3 35 X SQ= 3.47 P = 0.037 RV YES (NO)	
161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.80	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.54	8 24 2 28 X SQ= 2.61 P = 0.083 RV YES (NO)	
166	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	1.00	166	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.82	0 10 14 46 X SQ= 1.64 P = 0.112 RV NO (NO)	
168	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.85	168	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.53	2 26 11 29 X SQ= 3.20 P = 0.058 RV NO (NO)	
171	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	1.00	171	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.79	0 11 12 41 X SQ= 1.76 P = 0.106 RV NO (NO)	
174	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.92	174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.55	1 25 11 30 X SQ= 4.26 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	
181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.58	0 20 11 28 X SQ= 5.20 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	

183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	1.00	0 8 3 0 X SQ= 6.54 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.73	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.90	8 2 3 19 X SQ= 10.64 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.85	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.52	11 27 2 29 X SQ= 4.27 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.64	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.76	9 13 5 42 X SQ= 6.72 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	190	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.65	9 13 0 7 X SQ= 2.46 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.76	0 13 14 42 X SQ= 2.68 P = 0.056 RV NO (NO)	

157 POLITIES
WHERE PERSONALISMO IS
PRONOUNCED (14)

157 POLITIES
WHERE PERSONALISMO IS
MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)

PREDICATE ONLY

14 IN LEFT COLUMN

CAMBODIA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	LAOS	LEBANON	NICARAGUA	PANAMA
SYRIA	THAILAND	UAR	URUGUAY						

84 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURUNDI
CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
COSTA RICA	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
GHANA	GUINEA	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST
JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO
MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA
VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA						

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	LIBYA	SA'U ARABIA

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

CYPRUS

11 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	DOMIN REP	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SUDAN	TOGO
YEMEN									

158 POLITIES
WHERE PERSONALISMO IS
PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)

158 POLITIES
WHERE PERSONALISMO IS
NEGLIGIBLE (56)

PREDICATE ONLY

40 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FRANCE	GABON	GHANA	GREECE
GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	JAPAN	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA
NICARAGUA	NIGER	PANAMA	PERU	SYRIA	THAILAND	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VIETNAM REP

56 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHINA, PR	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA
DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GUINEA	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL
ITALY	JAMAICA	KOREA, N	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA
USSR	UK	US	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA				

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ETHIOPIA	HAITI	LIBYA	SA'U ARABIA

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	CYPRUS	RWANDA

11 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	DOMIN REP	IRAN	IRAQ	JORDAN	KOREA REP	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	SUDAN	TOGO
YEMEN									

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159  POLITIES                                          159  POLITIES
     WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS                      WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS
     ELITIST, RATHER THAN                                   NON-ELITIST, RATHER THAN
     NON-ELITIST  (30)                                      ELITIST  (50)

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              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SUBJECT ONLY

30 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E	GUATEMALA
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	THAILAND	USSR	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA

50 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR
GREECE	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN
LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NORWAY	SENEGAL
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA

10 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CAMBODIA	CYPRUS	HAITI	IRAN	LEBANON	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	RWANDA	UGANDA	UAR

17 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

BRAZIL	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	GHANA	GUINEA	LIBYA	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	PANAMA
PERU	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	UK	US	VIETNAM REP			

8 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CUBA	IRAQ	KOREA REP	SUDAN	SYRIA	YEMEN

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 2  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                    0.93     2  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.64        2   18
    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS                     28   32
    WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                          NON-ELITIST, RATHER THAN                   X SQ=   7.11
    NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)                ELITIST  (50)                              P =    0.003
                                                                                                  RV NO  (NO )

 3  TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE             0.93     3  TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE             0.80        2   10
    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                             28   40
    WEST EUROPE  (102)                                 WEST EUROPE  (102)                         X SQ=   1.67
                                                                                                  P =    0.122
                                                                                                  RV NO  (NO )

 5  TEND TO BE THOSE                         0.82     5  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                         1.00        2   15
    LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN                LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE,                 9    0
    IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE  (9)                 RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE  (18)           X SQ=  15.33
                                                                                                  P =    0.
                                                                                                  RV YES (YES)
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8	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.77	8	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.92	7 4 23 46 X SQ= 2.54 P = 0.090 RV NO (YES)
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.90	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.64	3 18 27 32 X SQ= 5.27 P = 0.017 RV NO (NO)
15	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.50	15	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.90	3 2 3 18 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.062 RV YES (YES)
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.70	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.82	3 18 7 4 X SQ= 6.05 P = 0.013 RV YES (YES)
19	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.67	19	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.69	3 18 6 8 X SQ= 2.25 P = 0.112 RV YES (NO)
24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.63	24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.60	19 20 11 30 X SQ= 3.21 P = 0.064 RV YES (NO)
25	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.93	25	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.80	2 10 28 40 X SQ= 1.67 P = 0.122 RV NO (NO)
31	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.93	31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.62	27 31 2 19 X SQ= 7.57 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)
36	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.67	36	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.52	10 26 20 24 X SQ= 1.94 P = 0.113 RV YES (NO)

41	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDEROEVELOPED (94)	0.90	41	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.71	3 14 27 34 X SQ= 2.93 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)
49	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)	0.58	49	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)	0.71	7 6 5 15 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.142 RV YES (YES)
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.96	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.75	1 30 25 10 X SQ= 29.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.85	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.92	4 37 22 3 X SQ= 36.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (16)	0.54	52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	12 41 14 0 X SQ= 24.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
53	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.97	53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.78	1 11 29 39 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.026 RV NO (NO)
62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	62	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.69	0 5 7 11 X SQ= 1.26 P = 0.147 RV NO (NO)
72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.68	72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.55	19 22 9 27 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.061 RV YES (NO)
77	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.67	77	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.69	6 9 3 20 X SQ= 2.31 P = 0.115 RV YES (NO)

79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.60	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.81	4 25 6 6 X SQ= 4.23 P = 0.040 RV YES (YES)	
81	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.94	81	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.67	1 8 16 16 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.056 RV NO (YES)	
82	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.71	82	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.50	17 24 7 24 X SQ= 2.05 P = 0.130 RV YES (NO)	
83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.80	83	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.96	6 2 24 48 X SQ= 3.70 P = 0.047 RV NO (YES)	
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.67	7 8 0 16 X SQ= 7.16 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
86	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.86	86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.60	25 30 4 20 X SQ= 4.79 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	
87	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	1.00	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.50	0 22 25 22 X SQ= 16.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.88	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.50	3 22 21 22 X SQ= 7.85 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (5)	1.00	91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	0 22 5 0 X SQ= 20.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.55	92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	13 0 16 50 X SQ= 23.67 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.93	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.94	2 33 26 2 X SQ= 44.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
95	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN (16)	0.52	95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	14 50 15 0 X SQ= 28.65 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.61	96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.94	17 33 11 2 X SQ= 8.75 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	1.00	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.73	0 33 29 12 X SQ= 35.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.86	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.78	4 38 25 11 X SQ= 27.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.92	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.71	2 32 23 13 X SQ= 23.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.81	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.86	4 37 17 6 X SQ= 24.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.93	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.63	2 31 27 18 X SQ= 21.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.81	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.85	5 40 21 7 X SQ= 28.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.76	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.71	4 32 13 13 X SQ= 9.60 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.68	0 16 27 34 X SQ= 9.05 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
116	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.96	116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.52	1 24 26 26 X SQ= 13.73 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.67	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.66	9 33 18 17 X SQ= 6.29 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.73	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.92	22 3 8 36 X SQ= 28.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.54	30 18 0 21 X SQ= 20.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.80	122	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.60	24 30 6 20 X SQ= 2.57 P = 0.086 RV NO (NO)	
123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.84	30 42 0 8 X SQ= 3.70 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)	

125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.83	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.56	19 20 4 25 X SQ= 7.57 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.67	23 30 0 15 X SQ= 7.99 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.77	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.64	5 30 17 17 X SQ= 8.55 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.68	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.70	7 33 15 14 X SQ= 7.56 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	1.00	130	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.77	0 8 26 27 X SQ= 4.98 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.91	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.64	1 21 10 12 X SQ= 7.76 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
132	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (9)	0.56	132	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.98	4 44 5 1 X SQ= 16.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	1.00	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.92	0 44 28 4 X SQ= 57.26 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
135	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS NEGLIGIBLE (13)	0.56	135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	8 46 10 0 X SQ= 26.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.52	0 24 28 22 X SQ= 19.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.85	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.64	4 30 22 17 X SQ= 13.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.59	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.75	16 12 11 36 X SQ= 7.27 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
140	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.96	140	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.82	1 8 25 37 X SQ= 1.77 P = 0.141 RV NO (NO)	
142	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.84	142	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.61	4 17 21 27 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.061 RV NO (NO)	
144	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.94	144	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.69	16 11 1 5 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.085 RV NO (YES)	
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.55	0 19 23 23 X SQ= 12.60 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.78	0 11 27 39 X SQ= 5.25 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
157	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.72	157	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.96	7 2 18 46 X SQ= 6.57 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	

166	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM [99]	1.00	166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM [99]	0.82	0 9 30 40 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE [72]	0.97	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT [34]	0.56	1 27 29 21 X SQ= 20.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE [48]	0.80	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED [58]	0.73	6 35 24 13 X SQ= 18.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
171	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN [90]	0.96	171	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN [90]	0.80	1 10 26 40 X SQ= 2.59 P = 0.085 RV NO (NO)
172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST [88]	0.96	172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST [88]	0.70	1 15 26 35 X SQ= 5.85 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE [49]	0.89	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE [51]	0.70	3 33 25 14 X SQ= 22.56 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE [28]	0.79	176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE [72]	1.00	6 47 22 0 X SQ= 48.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT [52]	0.96	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG [39]	0.66	26 14 1 27 X SQ= 23.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN [55]	0.96	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN [21]	0.55	1 18 22 15 X SQ= 13.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.52	22 15 0 16 X SQ= 13.91 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	1.00	183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	1.00	0 16 7 0 X SQ= 18.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
185	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.79	185	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.60	6 3 22 2 X SQ= 1.53 P = 0.111 RV YES (NO)	
186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	1.00	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.95	22 2 0 42 X SQ= 53.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	1.00	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.63	30 16 0 27 X SQ= 27.26 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
192	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.93	192	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.76	2 12 27 38 X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.070 RV NO (NO)	
193	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.87	193	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.66	4 17 26 33 X SQ= 3.14 P = 0.065 RV NO (NO)	
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.57	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	13 0 17 50 X SQ= 22.78 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

160 POLITIES
WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS
ELITIST (30)

160 POLITIES
WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS
MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)

PREDICATE ONLY

30 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E	GUATEMALA
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PARAGUAY
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	THAILAND	USSR	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA

67 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP
CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NORWAY	PANAMA	PERU
PHILIPPINES	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA
TURKEY	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP			

10 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CAMBODIA	CYPRUS	HAITI	IRAN	LEBANON	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	RWANDA	UGANDA	UAR

8 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CUBA	IRAQ	KOREA REP	SUDAN	SYRIA	YEMEN

161 POLITIES
WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS
ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)

161 POLITIES
WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS
NON-ELITIST (50)

PREDICATE ONLY

47 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CZECHOS'KIA	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	JORDAN	KOREA, N
LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY
PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN
THAILAND	USSR	UK	US	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

50 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR
GREECE	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN
LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NORWAY	SENEGAL
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA

10 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CAMBODIA	CYPRUS	HAITI	IRAN	LEBANON	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	RWANDA	UGANDA	UAR

8 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CUBA	IRAQ	KOREA REP	SUDAN	SYRIA	YEMEN

162 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS PRONOUNCED, RATHER THAN
NEGLIGIBLE (13)

162 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS NEGLIGIBLE, RATHER THAN
PRONOUNCED (65)

SUBJECT ONLY

13 IN LEFT COLUMN

CAMBODIA	CHINA, PR	CUBA	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GHANA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST
TANGANYIKA	UAR	VIETNAM, N							

65 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CEYLON
CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GERMANY, E
GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
JAPAN	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY
UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP					

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

AFGHANISTAN	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	IRAN	NIGERIA	UGANDA	USSR

21 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

ALGERIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	GABON	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA, N
LIBYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	PAKISTAN	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	TUNISIA	UPPER VOLTA
YUGOSLAVIA									

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	LAOS	NEPAL	RWANDA

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	IRAQ	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN

2	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.92	2	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.68	1 21 12 44 X SQ= 2.14 P = 0.096 RV NO (NO)
6	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.92	6	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.69	1 20 12 45 X SQ= 1.88 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)

19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.86	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.77	6 6 1 20 X SQ= 6.84 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.83	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.71	5 8 1 20 X SQ= 4.17 P = 0.021 RV YES (NO)	
22	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.77	22	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.51	10 32 3 33 X SQ= 2.32 P = 0.078 RV YES (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.73	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.76	3 44 8 14 X SQ= 7.94 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.75	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.74	9 17 3 48 X SQ= 8.73 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.85	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.55	2 36 11 29 X SQ= 5.43 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.77	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.80	3 52 10 13 X SQ= 14.26 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.92	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.51	1 32 12 31 X SQ= 6.49 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.69	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.68	4 43 9 20 X SQ= 4.93 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.73	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.76	3 47 8 15 X SQ= 8.07 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.83	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.56	2 33 10 26 X SQ= 4.68 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.75	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.71	3 42 9 17 X SQ= 7.28 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	53	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.78	0 14 13 51 X SQ= 2.11 P = 0.110 RV NO (NO)	
54	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.83	54	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.51	2 33 10 32 X SQ= 3.48 P = 0.055 RV YES (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.85	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.65	2 42 11 23 X SQ= 8.77 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	0.50	64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.95	2 42 2 2 X SQ= 4.86 P = 0.030 RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.75	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.62	3 40 9 25 X SQ= 4.10 P = 0.027 RV YES (NO)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.58	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.75	5 49 7 16 X SQ= 4.01 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)	

72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.69	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.71	4 44 9 18 X SQ= 5.89 P = 0.010 RV YES (ND)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.69	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.84	4 52 9 10 X SQ= 13.34 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.92	74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.60	1 25 12 38 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.028 RV NO (NO)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.62	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.81	5 52 8 12 X SQ= 8.18 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
76	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.91	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.55	1 25 10 30 X SQ= 3.67 P = 0.040 RV NO (NO)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.70	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.76	3 22 7 7 X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.019 RV YES (YES)	
79	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.89	79	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.52	8 16 1 17 X SQ= 3.21 P = 0.055 RV YES (NO)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.82	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.77	2 48 9 14 X SQ= 12.57 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
85	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.62	85	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.68	5 44 8 21 X SQ= 2.81 P = 0.062 RV YES (NO)	

86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.54	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.88	6 57 7 8 X SQ= 9.51 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.60	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.85	6 8 4 44 X SQ= 7.17 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.92	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.61	1 31 11 20 X SQ= 8.70 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.77	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.79	10 13 3 50 X SQ= 13.62 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.82	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.68	2 41 9 19 X SQ= 7.80 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.55	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.88	5 51 6 7 X SQ= 8.31 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.71	0 19 13 46 X SQ= 3.56 P = 0.031 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.85	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.59	2 35 11 24 X SQ= 6.57 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.77	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.73	3 45 10 17 X SQ= 9.38 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.80	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.70	2 39 8 17 X SQ= 6.90 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
106	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.60	106	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.75	4 41 6 14 X SQ= 3.26 P = 0.057 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.77	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.62	3 40 10 24 X SQ= 5.31 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.62	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.74	5 46 8 16 X SQ= 4.77 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.92	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.50	1 31 12 31 X SQ= 6.23 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.62	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.74	5 46 8 16 X SQ= 4.77 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.77	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.78	10 14 3 51 X SQ= 13.11 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.71	11 39 0 16 X SQ= 2.79 P = 0.053 RV NO (NO)	
127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	127	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.71	0 17 11 41 X SQ= 2.85 P = 0.054 RV NO (NO)	

128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.82	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.67	2 39 9 19 X SQ= 7.31 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.73	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.74	3 43 8 15 X SQ= 7.15 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.69	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.90	9 6 4 55 X SQ= 19.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.73	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.67	3 39 8 19 X SQ= 4.64 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.67	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.81	8 12 4 50 X SQ= 9.14 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
142	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	1.00	142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.56	0 25 12 32 X SQ= 6.46 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	
144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	144	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.52	9 11 0 10 X SQ= 4.46 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
146	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (8)	0.62	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	5 0 3 62 X SQ= 32.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.60	0 22 9 33 X SQ= 3.86 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)	

154	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	1.00	154	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.69	9 41 0 18 X SQ= 2.33 P = 0.099 RV NO (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.92	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.50	1 31 12 31 X SQ= 6.23 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.85	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.74	2 46 11 16 X SQ= 13.68 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	172	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.75	0 16 12 47 X SQ= 2.51 P = 0.059 RV NO (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.83	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.70	2 42 10 18 X SQ= 9.83 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.58	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.77	5 46 7 14 X SQ= 4.36 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)	
179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.64	13 19 0 34 X SQ= 14.73 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
185	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.87	185	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.52	1 14 7 15 X SQ= 2.01 P = 0.108 RV NO (NO)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.70	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.69	7 15 3 34 X SQ= 3.95 P = 0.030 RV YES (NO)	

187	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.77	187	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.51	10 30 3 29 X SQ= 1.97 P = 0.125 RV NO (NO)	
188	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.91	188	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.52	1 31 10 34 X SQ= 4.28 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)	
192	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.55	192	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.95	5 3 6 62 X SQ= 12.61 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
193	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.54	193	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.92	6 5 7 60 X SQ= 10.24 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	

163 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS PRONOUNCED (13)

163 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)

PREDICATE ONLY

13 IN LEFT COLUMN

CAMBODIA	CHINA, PR	CUBA	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GHANA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST
TANGANYIKA	UAR	VIETNAM, N							

87 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA
DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE
GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN
JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI
MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NORWAY	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

AFGHANISTAN	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	IRAN	NIGERIA	UGANDA	USSR

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	LAOS	NEPAL	RWANDA

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

IRAQ	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN

164 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE [34]

164 POLITIES
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS NEGLIGIBLE [65]

PREDICATE ONLY

34 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA
FRANCE	GABON	GHANA	GUINEA	INDIA	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	KOREA, N
LIBYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	PAKISTAN	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA
UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA						

65 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CEYLON
CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GERMANY, E
GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
JAPAN	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY
UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP					

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

AFGHANISTAN	CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	IRAN	NIGERIA	UGANDA	USSR

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	LAOS	NEPAL	RWANDA

5 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	IRAQ	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN

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165  POLITIES                                                  165  POLITIES
     WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION                          WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
     IS THAT OF EFFECTIVE FEDERALISM  (8)                           IS THAT OF LIMITED FEDERALISM,
                                                                    FORMAL FEDERALISM, OR
                                                                    FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM  (106)

                                                                                                          SUBJECT ONLY
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8 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	BRAZIL	CAMEROUN	CANADA	GERMAN FR	SWITZERLAND	UGANDA	US

106 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI
CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CUBA
CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE
GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND
INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN
JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER
NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SYRIA
TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK	UPPER VOLTA
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA				

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

CONGO(LEO)

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  2  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.62          2  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.84        5   17
     LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                        LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                           3   89
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (22)                         WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                     X SQ=   7.54
                                                                 NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)           P =    0.007
                                                                                                               RV YES (NO )

 22  TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE              0.87         22  TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE              0.57        7   60
     WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS                                   WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS                           1   46
     VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM  (68)                          VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM  (68)            X SQ=   1.79
                                                                                                               P =    0.137
                                                                                                               RV NO  (NO )

 31  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.62         31  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.82        3   86
     WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION                               WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION                       5   19
     IS LOW OR VERY LOW  (24)                                    IS HIGH OR MEDIUM  (90)                       X SQ=   6.31
                                                                                                               P =    0.011
                                                                                                               RV YES (NO )
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33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.75	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.77	6 24 2 82 X SQ= 7.99 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.62	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.82	5 19 3 87 X SQ= 6.41 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
36	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.62	36	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.65	5 37 3 69 X SQ= 1.39 P = 0.142 RV YES (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.75	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.70	6 32 2 73 X SQ= 4.76 P = 0.017 RV YES (NO)	
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.62	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.87	5 14 3 90 X SQ= 9.44 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.75	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDEROEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.71	6 30 2 73 X SQ= 5.19 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.62	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.81	5 20 3 86 X SQ= 5.92 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.87	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.60	7 36 1 54 X SQ= 4.94 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	
51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	1.00	51	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.58	8 51 0 37 X SQ= 3.84 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)	

54	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.62	54	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.69	5 32 3 72 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.113 RV YES (NO)	
63	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.75	63	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.62	6 40 2 65 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.061 RV YES (NO)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.87	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.58	1 56 7 41 X SQ= 4.41 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.63	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.80	5 21 3 83 X SQ= 5.27 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.63	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.76	5 21 3 66 X SQ= 3.67 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED (11)	0.67	81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.84	4 7 2 38 X SQ= 5.43 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.83	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.68	5 28 1 60 X SQ= 4.48 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)	
93	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	1.00	93	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.68	0 32 8 69 X SQ= 2.22 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)	
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.52	7 44 0 41 X SQ= 4.29 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	

101	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.83	101	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.61	5 36 1 56 X SQ= 2.89 P = 0.079 RV YES (NO)	
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	102	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.51	8 50 0 49 X SQ= 5.45 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	1.00	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.57	7 36 0 47 X SQ= 6.18 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.87	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.62	7 39 1 63 X SQ= 5.51 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
108	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	1.00	108	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.62	8 57 0 35 X SQ= 3.16 P = 0.048 RV NO (NO)	
114	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	1.00	114	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.53	8 52 0 47 X SQ= 4.98 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.75	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.86	6 14 2 88 X SQ= 14.83 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.75	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.75	6 26 2 76 X SQ= 6.58 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.71	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.77	2 71 5 21 X SQ= 5.62 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	

126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.57	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.87	3 79 4 12 X SQ= 6.26 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.75	131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.58	6 24 2 33 X SQ= 1.87 P = 0.130 RV YES (NO)	
137	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.62	137	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.73	5 24 3 64 X SQ= 2.81 P = 0.101 RV YES (NO)	
138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	1.00	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.55	8 40 0 48 X SQ= 6.68 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	139	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.65	0 34 8 62 X SQ= 2.75 P = 0.051 RV NO (NO)	
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	160	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.66	0 30 7 59 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.094 RV NO (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.86	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.72	6 28 1 71 X SQ= 7.44 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	1.00	169	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.52	7 51 0 48 X SQ= 4.40 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.62	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.75	5 23 3 69 X SQ= 3.44 P = 0.037 RV YES (NO)	

175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	1.00	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.53	8 43 0 49 X SQ= 6.36 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)
179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	1.00	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.61	0 52 6 33 X SQ= 6.25 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.83	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.77	5 16 1 54 X SQ= 7.31 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)
186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	1.00	186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.61	0 31 7 49 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.047 RV NO (NO)
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.86	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.69	1 64 6 29 X SQ= 6.28 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)

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166  POLITIES                                                    166  POLITIES
     WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION                            WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
     IS THAT OF EFFECTIVE FEDERALISM OR                               IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR
     LIMITED FEDERALISM  (15)                                         FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM  (99)

                                                                                                   BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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15 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BRAZIL	CAMEROUN	CANADA	GERMAN FR	LIBYA	MALAYA	NIGERIA
PAKISTAN	SWITZERLAND	UGANDA	US	VENEZUELA					

99 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP
CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA
DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E
GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N
KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA
MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU
PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA
SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
USSR	UAR	UK	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA	

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

CONGO(LED)

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21  TEND TO BE THOSE                      0.60     21  TEND TO BE THOSE                      0.78        9   22
    WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS                          WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS                         6   77
    VERY LARGE OR LARGE  (32)                          MEDIUM OR SMALL  (B3)                     X SQ=   7.58
                                                                                                 P =    0.004
                                                                                                 RV YES (NO )

24  TEND TO BE THOSE                      0.80     24  TEND TO BE THOSE                      0.52       12   48
    WHOSE POPULATION IS                                WHOSE POPULATION IS                               3   51
    VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM  (61)                 SMALL  (54)                               X SQ=   4.00
                                                                                                 P =    0.027
                                                                                                 RV YES (NO )

30  TEND TO BE THOSE                      0.80     30  TEND TO BE THOSE                      0.54        3   52
    WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION                      WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION                    12   45
    IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW  (57)                  IS HIGH  (56)                             X SQ=   4.60
                                                                                                 P =    0.024
                                                                                                 RV YES (NO )
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33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.60	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.79	9 21 6 78 X SQ= 8.21 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.80	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.51	12 49 3 50 X SQ= 3.72 P = 0.049 RV YES (NO)	
36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.60	36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.67	9 33 6 66 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.082 RV YES (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.67	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.71	10 28 5 70 X SQ= 6.84 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
42	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.57	42	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.71	8 28 6 69 X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.063 RV YES (NO)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.80	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.55	12 43 3 53 X SQ= 5.10 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
51	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.87	51	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.57	13 46 2 35 X SQ= 3.59 P = 0.041 RV NO (NO)	
52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.80	15 66 0 16 X SQ= 2.23 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)	
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.79	0 20 15 77 X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)	

93	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.93	93	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.67	1 31 13 64 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.062 RV NO (NO)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.92	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.51	12 39 1 40 X SQ= 6.68 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.83	15 79 0 16 X SQ= 1.76 P = 0.121 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.80	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.63	8 33 2 55 X SQ= 5.03 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.93	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.52	14 44 1 48 X SQ= 9.00 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.85	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.58	11 32 2 45 X SQ= 6.63 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	1.00	106	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.58	11 41 0 30 X SQ= 5.62 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.73	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.63	11 35 4 60 X SQ= 5.67 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
108	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	1.00	108	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.60	13 52 0 35 X SQ= 6.37 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	

114	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.86	114	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.52	12 48 2 45 X SQ= 4.44 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.60	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.76	9 23 6 72 X SQ= 6.40 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
118	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.79	118	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.56	3 37 11 48 X SQ= 1.61 P = 0.149 RV NO (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.85	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.54	11 36 2 43 X SQ= 5.34 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.77	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.62	10 20 3 32 X SQ= 4.74 P = 0.027 RV YES (NO)	
135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	135	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.83	15 62 0 13 X SQ= 1.80 P = 0.115 RV NO (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.93	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.57	13 35 1 47 X SQ= 10.12 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.62	0 34 15 55 X SQ= 6.87 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	160	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.64	0 30 12 54 X SQ= 4.68 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	

161	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.75	161	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.52	3 44 9 40 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.121 RV YES (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.62	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.72	8 26 5 67 X SQ= 4.46 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.92	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.51	12 46 1 47 X SQ= 6.81 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	1.00	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.57	14 37 0 49 X SQ= 13.44 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.80	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.56	3 49 12 39 X SQ= 5.18 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.92	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.65	1 51 11 28 X SQ= 11.25 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
181	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.55	181	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.77	6 15 5 50 X SQ= 3.22 P = 0.062 RV YES (NO)	
185	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	1.00	185	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.63	3 18 0 31 X SQ= 2.44 P = 0.060 RV YES (NO)	
186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	1.00	186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.59	0 31 11 45 X SQ= 5.31 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	

187	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.62	187	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.69	5 8	60 27

X SQ= 3.38
P = 0.057
RV YES (NO)

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*****************************************************************************************************************************
167  POLITIES                                                    167  POLITIES
     WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION                          WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
     IS SIGNIFICANT, RATHER THAN                                      IS NEGLIGIBLE, RATHER THAN
     NEGLIGIBLE  (34)                                                 SIGNIFICANT  (48)

                                                                                                                   SUBJECT ONLY
*****************************************************************************************************************************

      34 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA   AUSTRIA     BELGIUM     BRAZIL      CANADA      CHILE       COSTA RICA  CYPRUS      DENMARK     DOMIN REP
FINLAND     GERMAN FR   GREECE      ICELAND     INDIA       IRELAND     ISRAEL      ITALY       JAMAICA     JAPAN
LUXEMBOURG  MALAYA      NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NORWAY      PHILIPPINES SO AFRICA   SWEDEN      SWITZERLAND TRINIDAD
TURKEY      UK          US          URUGUAY

      48 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN ALBANIA     ALGERIA     BULGARIA    CAMBODIA    CEN AFR REP CHAD        CHINA, PR   CONGO(BRA)  CUBA
CZECHOS'KIA DAHOMEY     ETHIOPIA    GABON       GERMANY, E  GHANA       GUINEA      HAITI       HUNGARY     INDONESIA
IRAN        IVORY COAST JORDAN      KOREA, N    LAOS        LIBERIA     MONGOLIA    NEPAL       NIGER       PAKISTAN
PARAGUAY    POLAND      PORTUGAL    RUMANIA     SA'U ARABIA SENEGAL     SPAIN       SUDAN       TANGANYIKA  THAILAND
TOGO        TUNISIA     USSR        UAR         UPPER VOLTA VIETNAM, N  VIETNAM REP YUGOSLAVIA

      24 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

BOLIVIA     BURUNDI     CAMEROUN    CEYLON      COLOMBIA    ECUADOR     EL SALVADOR FRANCE      GUATEMALA   HONDURAS
LEBANON     LIBYA       MALAGASY R  MALI        MAURITANIA  MEXICO      MOROCCO     NICARAGUA   NIGERIA     PANAMA
RWANDA      SIERRE LEO  SOMALIA     VENEZUELA

       1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

UGANDA

       8 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ARGENTINA   BURMA       CONGO(LEO)  IRAQ        KOREA REP   PERU        SYRIA       YEMEN
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  2  TEND TO BE THOSE                    0.56        2  TEND TO BE THOSE                    0.96        19    2
     LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                       15   46
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (22)                 WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                 X SQ=  25.29
                                                         NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)       P =    0.
                                                                                                   RV YES (YES)

  3  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE               0.71        3  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE               0.96        10    2
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                           LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                       24   46
     WEST EUROPE  (102)                                  WEST EUROPE  (102)                        X SQ=   8.23
                                                                                                   P =    0.003
                                                                                                   RV NO  (YES)
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5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	1.00	5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.82	15 2 0 9 X SQ= 15.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
6	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.79	6	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.94	7 3 27 45 X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.084 RV NO (YES)
10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.97	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.60	1 19 33 29 X SQ= 12.57 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.75	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.83	3 4 1 19 X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.042 RV YES (NO)
18	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.80	18	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.63	1 19 4 11 X SQ= 1.75 P = 0.141 RV YES (NO)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.87	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.86	1 19 7 3 X SQ= 11.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.64	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.79	4 11 7 3 X SQ= 2.98 P = 0.049 RV YES (YES)
25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.68	25	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.96	11 2 23 46 X SQ= 9.83 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.93	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.69	28 13 2 29 X SQ= 25.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.94	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.72	2 33 32 13 X SQ= 31.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.62	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.98	13 46 21 1 X SQ= 32.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.50	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.79	17 10 17 38 X SQ= 6.40 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.79	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.54	27 22 7 26 X SQ= 7.99 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.56	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.94	19 3 15 45 X SQ= 22.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.82	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.79	28 10 6 38 X SQ= 27.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.97	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.67	33 16 1 32 X SQ= 31.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.65	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.77	22 11 12 36 X SQ= 12.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.73	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.83	24 8 9 39 X SQ= 22.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.97	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.72	32 13 1 34 X SQ= 35.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.53	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.87	18 6 16 42 X SQ= 13.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.88	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.63	30 16 4 27 X SQ= 18.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.62	34 28 0 17 X SQ= 14.21 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.88	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.92	29 3 4 37 X SQ= 44.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	1.00	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.87	33 5 0 35 X SQ= 52.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.74	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.80	25 9 9 37 X SQ= 21.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.52	34 24 0 22 X SQ= 20.09 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.97	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.61	33 27 1 17 X SQ= 11.83 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.68	57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.90	11 5 23 43 X SQ= 4.78 P = 0.022 RV NO (YES)	
58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.97	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.79	1 10 33 38 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.76	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.77	26 11 8 36 X SQ= 20.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.65	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.70	22 14 12 33 X SQ= 8.38 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.74	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.55	25 21 9 26 X SQ= 5.57 P = 0.013 RV YES (YES)	
70	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.67	70	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.86	11 6 22 38 X SQ= 3.18 P = 0.053 RV NO (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.70	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.65	23 16 10 30 X SQ= 8.03 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.79	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.52	26 22 7 24 X SQ= 6.48 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.59	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.88	19 6 13 42 X SQ= 17.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.97	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.69	32 15 1 33 X SQ= 32.03 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.61	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.82	19 6 12 28 X SQ= 11.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.91	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.86	10 4 1 24 X SQ= 16.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	1.00	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.74	7 6 0 17 X SQ= 9.12 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.60	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	10 0 15 13 X SQ= 5.15 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.78	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.68	25 13 7 28 X SQ= 13.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
84	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	1.00	84	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.54	7 15 0 13 X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.031 RV NO (NO)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.85	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.55	29 21 5 26 X SQ= 12.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
87	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.90	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.55	3 18 27 22 X SQ= 8.40 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)

89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.90	89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	27 0 3 44 X SQ= 58.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.60	0 19 34 28 X SQ= 15.78 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.97	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.58	1 26 33 19 X SQ= 23.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.97	33 1 0 37 X SQ= 63.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.53	98	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.88	16 6 18 42 X SQ= 10.41 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
99	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.83	99	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.62	25 21 5 13 X SQ= 2.68 P = 0.093 RV NO (YES)	
100	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.97	100	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.83	28 29 1 6 X SQ= 1.81 P = 0.116 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.91	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.98	31 1 3 46 X SQ= 61.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.94	34 3 0 44 X SQ= 65.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	1.00	105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	1.00	32 0 0 39 X SQ= 67.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	1.00	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.79	31 7 0 27 X SQ= 38.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.94	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.98	32 1 2 45 X SQ= 64.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.97	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.79	32 9 1 33 X SQ= 39.56 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.81	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.59	25 14 6 20 X SQ= 8.94 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.53	115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	18 0 16 45 X SQ= 27.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.79	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	27 0 7 45 X SQ= 50.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.97	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.80	33 9 1 36 X SQ= 43.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.91	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.77	3 31 31 9 X SQ= 32.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.68	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.97	11 39 23 1 X SQ= 32.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.71	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	24 40 10 0 X SQ= 11.20 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.85	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.65	5 31 29 17 X SQ= 18.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.59	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.85	14 41 20 7 X SQ= 15.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.76	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	26 48 8 0 X SQ= 9.99 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.80	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.82	6 33 24 7 X SQ= 24.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.53	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	14 40 16 0 X SQ= 24.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
127	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.63	127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	11 0 19 35 X SQ= 12.95 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.83	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.97	25 1 5 34 X SQ= 40.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.90	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.89	27 4 3 31 X SQ= 36.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.87	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.62	27 17 4 28 X SQ= 16.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.71	30 25 0 10 X SQ= 8.05 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.93	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	28 0 2 42 X SQ= 60.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.97	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.97	31 1 1 38 X SQ= 59.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.97	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.72	1 31 33 12 X SQ= 34.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.73	141	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	1.00	8 0 22 41 X SQ= 9.80 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.57	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.97	17 1 13 39 X SQ= 23.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	1.00	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	0 32 8 0 X SQ= 33.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.80	0 8 32 33 X SQ= 5.16 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.75	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	21 0 7 39 X SQ= 39.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.82	0 8 34 36 X SQ= 5.05 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)	
158	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.81	158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.58	6 16 26 22 X SQ= 3.38 P = 0.042 RV NO (YES)	
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.97	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.60	1 24 32 16 X SQ= 23.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.82	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.67	6 27 27 13 X SQ= 15.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.94	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.62	2 26 31 16 X SQ= 22.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.76	166	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.98	8 1 26 47 X SQ= 7.30 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
170	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.79	170	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.59	7 17 27 24 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.081 RV NO (YES)	

171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.71	171	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	1.00	10 0 24 41 X SQ= 11.49 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.56	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.98	15 1 19 42 X SQ= 17.69 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	1.00	175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	1.00	33 0 0 42 X SQ= 71.00 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.82	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.77	6 33 27 10 X SQ= 23.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.93	179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	2 42 28 0 X SQ= 60.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.59	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	20 0 14 23 X SQ= 18.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.64	14 23 0 13 X SQ= 5.08 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)	
185	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.67	185	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.80	2 7 1 28 X SQ= 1.25 P = 0.134 RV YES (NO)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.97	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.74	1 28 31 10 X SQ= 32.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.93	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.98	2	44	X SQ= 58.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
						27	1	
188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.59	188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.89	14	5	X SQ= 8.31 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)
						20	41	
189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.79	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	7	0	X SQ= 8.33 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
						27	48	
192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.97	192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.63	1	17	X SQ= 11.09 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
						33	29	
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.97	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.62	1	18	X SQ= 11.48 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
						33	30	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.72	0	13	X SQ= 9.24 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
						34	34	

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168 POLITIES
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS SIGNIFICANT (34)

168 POLITIES
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)

PREDICATE ONLY

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34 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHILE	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP
FINLAND	GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN
LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD
TURKEY	UK	US	URUGUAY						

72 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON
CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDONESIA
IRAN	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI
MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN
SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

UGANDA

8 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ARGENTINA	BURMA	CONGO(LEO)	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PERU	SYRIA	YEMEN

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169 POLITIES
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)

169 POLITIES
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)

PREDICATE ONLY

58 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR
GREECE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN
LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA		

48 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA
CZECHOS*KIA	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	INDONESIA
IRAN	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NIGER	PAKISTAN
PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SPAIN	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND
TOGO	TUNISIA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA		

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

UGANDA

8 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ARGENTINA	BURMA	CONGO(LEO)	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PERU	SYRIA	YEMEN

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170  POLITIES                                                    170  POLITIES
     WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE                        WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
     IS PRESIDENTIAL  (39)                                            IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL  (63)


                                                                                                          BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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39 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS
DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GABON	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS
INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	NIGER	PAKISTAN	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SENEGAL	TUNISIA	US	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	

63 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEYLON
CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(LEO)	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
GREECE	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRAN	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN
JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MALI	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UK
URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA							

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

TANGANYIKA

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA'U ARABIA

11 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CUBA	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PERU	SUDAN	SYRIA	TOGO	UAR
YEMEN									

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  2  TEND MORE TO BE THOSE                    0.97          2  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.67          1   21
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                             38   42
     WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                                WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                       X SQ=  11.72
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)                      NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)             P =    0.
                                                                                                              RV NO  (NO )

  3  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                         1.00          3  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.79          0   13
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                             39   50
     WEST EUROPE  (102)                                       WEST EUROPE  (102)                              X SQ=   7.46
                                                                                                              P =    0.001
                                                                                                              RV NO  (NO )
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6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.56	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.95	17 3 22 60 X SQ= 20.64 P = 0. RV ND (YES)	
10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.59	10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.81	16 12 23 51 X SQ= 4.79 P = 0.022 RV NO (YES)	
15	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.94	15	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.67	1 6 16 12 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.088 RV ND (YES)	
17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.94	17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	0.67	1 6 17 3 X SQ= 8.70 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
18	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.80	18	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.50	16 12 4 12 X SQ= 3.05 P = 0.060 RV YES (YES)	
19	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.52	19	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.80	16 12 17 3 X SQ= 3.02 P = 0.059 RV YES (NO)	
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.81	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.80	4 12 17 3 X SQ= 10.81 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.69	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.62	12 39 27 24 X SQ= 8.14 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.77	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.59	9 37 30 26 X SQ= 10.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.74	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.57	28 26 10 34 X SQ= 7.48 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.66	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.67	12 38 23 19 X SQ= 7.91 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
30	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.59	30	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.61	23 24 16 38 X SQ= 3.18 P = 0.065 RV YES (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.72	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.68	11 43 28 20 X SQ= 13.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.87	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.57	5 36 34 27 X SQ= 17.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.56	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.76	17 45 22 14 X SQ= 9.43 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.71	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.65	11 40 27 22 X SQ= 10.55 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.61	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.64	15 37 23 21 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.023 RV YES (YES)	
47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.93	47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.65	1 24 14 13 X SQ= 12.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

52	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.96	52	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.80	26 49 1 12 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.058 RV NO (NO)	
53	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.97	53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.79	1 13 38 50 X SQ= 5.20 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
54	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.85	54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.51	6 30 33 31 X SQ= 10.37 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.55	56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.83	21 50 17 10 X SQ= 7.83 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.64	57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.84	14 10 25 53 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.030 RV NO (YES)	
62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	62	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.67	0 5 14 10 X SQ= 3.54 P = 0.042 RV NO (YES)	
67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.56	67	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.85	20 53 16 9 X SQ= 9.22 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.91	70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.72	3 17 32 43 X SQ= 4.07 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)	
73	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.51	73	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.67	19 40 20 20 X SQ= 2.46 P = 0.095 RV YES (YES)	

74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.97	74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.59	1 25 38 36 X SQ= 16.31 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.97	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.52	1 25 37 23 X SQ= 22.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	1.00	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.54	18 6 0 7 X SQ= 9.63 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.56	79	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.96	19 22 15 1 X SQ= 8.87 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.82	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.61	3 11 14 7 X SQ= 5.19 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.94	81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.68	1 10 17 21 X SQ= 3.26 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)	
83	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	1.00	83	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.86	0 9 39 54 X SQ= 4.46 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
84	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.67	84	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.65	7 15 14 8 X SQ= 3.28 P = 0.069 RV YES (YES)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.69	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.65	12 41 27 22 X SQ= 10.03 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.62	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.85	18 8 11 44 X SQ= 16.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	91	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.67	18 8 0 4 X SQ= 4.34 P = 0.018 RV NO (YES)	
92	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.92	92	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.79	3 13 36 49 X SQ= 2.25 P = 0.096 RV NO (NO)	
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.76	37 47 0 15 X SQ= 8.75 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.65	96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.86	17 49 9 8 X SQ= 3.47 P = 0.042 RV NO (YES)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.65	9 8 0 15 X SQ= 8.58 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.71	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.77	7 41 17 12 X SQ= 14.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
101	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.69	101	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.54	11 30 24 26 X SQ= 3.42 P = 0.052 RV YES (NO)	
110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.70	0 14 36 33 X SQ= 10.86 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.58	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.68	15 32 21 15 X SQ= 4.77 P = 0.025 RV YES (YES)	
115	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.90	115	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.73	4 16 35 44 X SQ= 3.00 P = 0.072 RV NO (NO)	
116	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.82	116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.58	7 25 32 35 X SQ= 5.04 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
119	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.87	119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.64	27 37 4 21 X SQ= 4.34 P = 0.026 RV NO (NO)	
120	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.97	120	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.84	30 49 1 9 X SQ= 1.95 P = 0.094 RV NO (NO)	
123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.87	39 55 0 8 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)	
125	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.82	125	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.53	27 29 6 26 X SQ= 6.34 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.71	33 39 0 16 X SQ= 9.86 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.59	128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.60	14 32 20 21 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.123 RV YES (NO)	

133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.50	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.86	19 8 19 51 X SQ= 13.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
136	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.97	136	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.82	1 11 33 49 X SQ= 3.34 P = 0.050 RV NO (NO)	
137	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.91	137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.57	3 26 31 34 X SQ= 10.55 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
140	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.78	140	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.91	8 5 28 51 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.123 RV NO (YES)	
146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.86	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	5 0 32 55 X SQ= 5.45 P = 0.009 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.91	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.61	3 19 31 30 X SQ= 7.77 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.76	148	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.93	9 4 29 56 X SQ= 4.47 P = 0.029 RV NO (YES)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.76	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.70	6 35 19 15 X SQ= 12.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.74	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.79	25 12 9 44 X SQ= 21.62 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

160	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.80	160	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.62	7 28	22 36	X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.105 RV NO (NO)
168	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.82	168	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.56	7 31	27 34	X SQ= 5.84 P = 0.010 RV NO (NO)
174	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.92	174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.59	3 33	25 36	X SQ= 10.22 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
176	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.86	176	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.64	31 5	39 22	X SQ= 4.49 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)
178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.63	178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.58	24 14	26 36	X SQ= 3.44 P = 0.063 RV YES (NO)
181	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.96	181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.57	1 23	20 27	X SQ= 9.47 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	1.00	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.50	12 0	8 8	X SQ= 6.13 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.59	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.92	10 7	2 22	X SQ= 9.94 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
187	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.83	187	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.51	25 5	30 29	X SQ= 7.57 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)

188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.55	188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.77	17 21	14 48
						X SQ=	4.42
						P =	0.026
						RV NO	(YES)
190	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.94	190	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.70	17 1	14 6
						X SQ=	2.32
						P =	0.093
						RV NO	(YES)
193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.59	193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.84	16 23	10 53
						X SQ=	6.75
						P =	0.009
						RV NO	(YES)
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.79	0 39	13 50
						X SQ=	7.46
						P =	0.001
						RV NO	(NO)

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171  POLITIES                                                    171  POLITIES
     WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE                        WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
     IS PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN  (12)                                IS OTHER THAN
                                                                      PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN  (90)


                                                                                                   BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE
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      12 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRIA      CONGO(LEO)  FINLAND     GERMAN FR   ICELAND     INDIA       IRELAND     ISRAEL      ITALY       SOMALIA
SO AFRICA    TURKEY

      90 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN  ALBANIA     ARGENTINA   AUSTRALIA   BELGIUM     BOLIVIA     BRAZIL      BULGARIA    BURUNDI     CAMBODIA
CAMEROUN     CANADA      CEN AFR REP CEYLON      CHAD        CHILE       CHINA, PR   COLOMBIA    CONGO(BRA)  COSTA RICA
CYPRUS       CZECHOS'KIA DAHOMEY     DENMARK     DOMIN REP   ECUADOR     EL SALVADOR ETHIOPIA    FRANCE      GABON
GERMANY, E   GHANA       GREECE      GUATEMALA   GUINEA      HAITI       HONDURAS    HUNGARY     INDONESIA   IRAN
IVORY COAST  JAMAICA     JAPAN       JORDAN      KOREA, N    LAOS        LEBANON     LIBERIA     LIBYA       LUXEMBOURG
MALAGASY R   MALAYA      MALI        MAURITANIA  MEXICO      MONGOLIA    MOROCCO     NEPAL       NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA    NIGER       NIGERIA     NORWAY      PAKISTAN    PANAMA      PARAGUAY    PHILIPPINES POLAND      RUMANIA
RWANDA       SENEGAL     SIERRE LEO  SWEDEN      SWITZERLAND TANGANYIKA  THAILAND    TOGO        TRINIDAD    TUNISIA
UGANDA       USSR        UK          US          UPPER VOLTA URUGUAY     VENEZUELA   VIETNAM, N  VIETNAM REP YUGOSLAVIA

       2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

PORTUGAL     SPAIN

       1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA'U ARABIA

      10 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA      BURMA       CUBA        IRAQ        KOREA REP   PERU        SUDAN       SYRIA       UAR         YEMEN

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  5  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                      1.00          5  LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE          0.53        6   10
     LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE,                  LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE,            0    9
     RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE  (18)                        RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE  (18)            X SQ=   2.62
                                                                                                         P =    0.057
                                                                                                         RV NO  (NO )

 17  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                      1.00         17  LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE               0.80        2    5
     LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN                 LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN,                         0   20
     IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR                   CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA,          X SQ=   2.71
     SOUTH AMERICA  (11)                                     RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST  (22)        P =    0.060
                                                                                                         RV YES (NO )
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29	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.75	29	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.51	9 40 3 41 X SQ= 1.82 P = 0.127 RV YES (NO)	
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.50	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.80	6 72 6 18 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.83	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.53	10 42 2 48 X SQ= 4.32 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.58	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.81	7 17 5 73 X SQ= 7.09 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.67	36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.64	8 32 4 58 X SQ= 3.09 P = 0.057 RV YES (NO)	
39	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.58	39	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.67	7 29 5 60 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.109 RV YES (NO)	
42	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.64	42	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.67	7 29 4 60 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.092 RV YES (NO)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.83	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.56	10 39 2 49 X SQ= 4.97 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	1.00	51	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.61	12 45 0 29 X SQ= 5.45 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	

54	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.58	54	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.67	7 29 5 59 X SQ= 1.95 P = 0.112 RV YES (NO)	
66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.75	66	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.54	9 38 3 44 X SQ= 2.39 P = 0.073 RV YES (NO)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.60	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.80	6 18 4 72 X SQ= 5.85 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
75	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.82	75	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.52	9 47 2 43 X SQ= 2.38 P = 0.106 RV NO (NO)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.60	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.76	6 18 4 58 X SQ= 4.13 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	
80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	1.00	80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.65	3 12 0 22 X SQ= 2.48 P = 0.059 RV YES (NO)	
85	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.75	85	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.53	9 42 3 48 X SQ= 2.36 P = 0.122 RV YES (NO)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.73	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.67	8 25 3 50 X SQ= 4.74 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)	
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.57	9 42 0 32 X SQ= 4.64 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	

101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.90	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.60	9 32 1 48 X SQ= 7.06 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.90	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.56	9 34 1 43 X SQ= 5.72 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	1.00	106	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.60	10 41 0 27 X SQ= 4.45 P = 0.013 RV NO (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.75	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.59	9 36 3 52 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
108	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	1.00	108	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.64	10 53 0 30 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.027 RV NO (NO)	
111	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.83	111	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.54	10 39 2 33 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.067 RV NO (NO)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.75	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.74	9 23 3 66 X SQ= 9.64 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.83	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.51	10 44 2 45 X SQ= 3.62 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
118	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	1.00	118	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.60	0 31 11 46 X SQ= 5.19 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	

125	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.58	125	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.67	5 51 7 25 X SQ= 1.90 P = 0.112 RV YES (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.91	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.53	10 36 1 40 X SQ= 5.67 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	1.00	129	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.55	11 42 0 34 X SQ= 6.31 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	
134	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.90	134	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.54	9 46 1 39 X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.041 RV NO (NO)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.82	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.76	9 20 2 63 X SQ= 12.58 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.82	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.55	9 38 2 47 X SQ= 3.99 P = 0.026 RV YES (NO)	
139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.64	0 30 12 54 X SQ= 4.68 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
142	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.60	142	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.71	6 23 4 56 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.072 RV YES (NO)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.75	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.79	6 16 2 59 X SQ= 8.11 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	

158	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.92	158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.53	1 36 11 41 X SQ= 4.83 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.83	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.51	2 41 10 40 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)	
164	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.91	164	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.63	1 29 10 50 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.092 RV NO (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.91	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.73	10 24 1 64 X SQ= 14.85 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	1.00	169	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.53	11 47 0 41 X SQ= 6.93 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.82	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.78	9 19 2 66 X SQ= 13.92 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.91	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.52	10 41 1 44 X SQ= 5.51 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	176	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.71	11 60 0 25 X SQ= 2.98 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.80	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.59	2 44 8 31 X SQ= 3.87 P = 0.039 RV YES (NO)	

181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.80	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.78	8 2	13 46
						X SQ=	10.97
						P =	0.001
						RV YES	(NO)
187	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.67	187	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.65	4 8	50 27
						X SQ=	3.12
						P =	0.055
						RV YES	(NO)
192	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	1.00	192	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.76	0 12	21 67
						X SQ=	2.33
						P =	0.066
						RV NO	(NO)

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172 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)

172 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

21 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	BELGIUM	BURUNOI	CANADA	CEYLON	DENMARK	GREECE	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LAOS
LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	TRINIOAD	UGANDA
UK									

88 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMEROUN
CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS
CZECHOS*KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVAOOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E
GERMAN FR	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBERIA
LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL
SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR
UAR	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA		

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CAMBODIA SPAIN

1 EXCLUDEO BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA*U ARABIA

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

IRAN THAILAND YEMEN

2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATEO IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22)	0.52	2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATEO ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.89	11 10 10 78 X SQ= 15.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	1.00	5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.50	8 9 0 9 X SQ= 4.11 P = 0.023 RV YES (NO)	

13	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	1.00	13	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.85	0 21	13 75	X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.069 RV NO (NO)
26	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.62	26	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.62	13 8	33 55	X SQ= 3.20 P = 0.051 RV YES (NO)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.81	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.55	4 17	48 39	X SQ= 7.45 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.52	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.85	10 11	75 13	X SQ= 11.86 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.71	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.70	15 6	26 62	X SQ= 10.95 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.57	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.72	12 9	24 62	X SQ= 5.22 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)
43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.71	43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.55	15 6	39 47	X SQ= 3.61 P = 0.050 RV YES (NO)
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.52	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.84	11 10	14 74	X SQ= 10.78 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.71	45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.54	15 6	38 44	X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.051 RV YES (NO)

50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.89	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.64	16 27 2 48 X SQ= 14.28 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	1.00	51	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.57	18 42 0 32 X SQ= 10.10 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.57	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.71	12 25 9 61 X SQ= 4.70 P = 0.021 RV YES (NO)	
58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.83	0 15 21 73 X SQ= 2.84 P = 0.040 RV NO (NO)	
62	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PROTESTANT, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (5)	0.60	62	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.92	3 2 2 22 X SQ= 4.54 P = 0.024 RV YES (YES)	
63	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.57	63	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.62	12 33 9 54 X SQ= 1.84 P = 0.140 RV YES (NO)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.70	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.56	6 45 14 35 X SQ= 3.42 P = 0.046 RV YES (NO)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.52	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.84	11 14 10 72 X SQ= 10.35 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
75	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.71	75	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.53	15 46 6 41 X SQ= 1.67 P = 0.147 RV NO (NO)	

76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.55	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.81	11 14 9 59 X SQ= 8.51 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.67	11 37 0 18 X SQ= 3.44 P = 0.028 RV NO (NO)
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.88	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.65	7 12 1 22 X SQ= 5.17 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)
81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED (11)	0.64	81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.90	7 4 4 35 X SQ= 11.31 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.75	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.72	12 21 4 53 X SQ= 10.39 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
93	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	1.00	93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.64	0 31 21 54 X SQ= 9.13 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.95	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.52	19 32 1 35 X SQ= 12.29 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.82	21 70 0 15 X SQ= 2.99 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)
96	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.95	96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.72	19 47 1 18 X SQ= 3.32 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)

99	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.80	99	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.55	12 36 3 30 X SQ= 2.31 P = 0.086 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.94	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.68	17 24 1 51 X SQ= 20.50 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.95	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.52	20 39 1 43 X SQ= 13.64 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.90	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.63	18 25 2 43 X SQ= 15.46 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	1.00	106	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.54	19 33 0 28 X SQ= 11.48 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.90	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.67	18 28 2 58 X SQ= 19.52 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
108	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	1.00	108	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.59	19 45 0 31 X SQ= 9.72 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.60	110	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.91	8 6 12 63 X SQ= 9.22 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
111	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.75	111	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.52	15 36 5 33 X SQ= 2.43 P = 0.079 RV NO (NO)	

115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.52	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.89	11 9 10 76 X SQ= 16.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.57	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.76	12 20 9 65 X SQ= 7.50 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.68	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.83	6 63 13 13 X SQ= 17.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.71	123	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.98	15 86 6 2 X SQ= 13.59 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.67	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.71	7 52 14 21 X SQ= 8.47 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.90	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.58	18 30 2 41 X SQ= 12.42 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.85	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.50	17 39 3 39 X SQ= 6.60 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.67	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.79	14 15 7 58 X SQ= 14.17 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.81	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.58	17 31 4 43 X SQ= 8.48 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	

139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.60	0 32 21 49 X SQ= 10.32 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.70	141	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.93	6 5 14 70 X SQ= 6.27 P = 0.010 RV NO (YES)
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.63	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.84	12 11 7 57 X SQ= 14.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
158	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.80	158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.53	4 34 16 39 X SQ= 3.55 P = 0.041 RV NO (NO)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.79	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.53	4 40 15 35 X SQ= 5.11 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)
163	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	1.00	163	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.85	0 12 17 67 X SQ= 1.73 P = 0.117 RV NO (NO)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.75	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.77	15 19 5 62 X SQ= 16.84 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.95	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.52	19 39 1 42 X SQ= 12.55 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
170	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	1.00	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.51	0 39 21 38 X SQ= 15.62 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.67	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.82	14	14
						7	62
						X SQ=	16.38
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.90	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.58	19	32
						2	44
						X SQ=	13.56
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(NO)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.71	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.57	6	46
						15	34
						X SQ=	4.47
						P =	0.026
						RV YES	(NO)
179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	1.00	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.68	0	48
						16	23
						X SQ=	21.47
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(NO)
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.62	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.81	10	11
						6	48
						X SQ=	9.93
						P =	0.001
						RV YES	(NO)
186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	1.00	186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.57	0	27
						20	36
						X SQ=	10.83
						P =	0.
						RV NO	(NO)
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.90	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.77	2	58
						18	17
						X SQ=	27.94
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
190	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS COMMON LAW, RATHER THAN CIVIL LAW (7)	0.56	190	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.93	4	26
						5	2
						X SQ=	7.49
						P =	0.005
						RV YES	(YES)
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.85	0	13
						21	74
						X SQ=	2.30
						P =	0.068
						RV NO	(NO)

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173  POLITIES                                                  173  POLITIES
     WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE                      WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
     IS PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN OR                                 IS PRESIDENTIAL-PARLIAMENTARY OR
     PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST, RATHER THAN                            MONARCHICAL-PARLIAMENTARY, RATHER THAN
     PRESIDENTIAL-PARLIAMENTARY OR                                  PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN OR
     MONARCHICAL-PARLIAMENTARY  (33)                                PARLIAMENTARY ROYALIST  (7)
                                                                                                        SUBJECT ONLY
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33 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BURUNDI	CANADA	CEYLON	CONGO(LEO)	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMAN FR
GREECE	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LAOS	LUXEMBOURG
MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	TRINIDAD
TURKEY	UGANDA	UK							

7 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	CHAD	FRANCE	JORDAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	MOROCCO

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CAMBODIA	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	TANGANYIKA

58 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CAMEROON	CEN AFR REP	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA
CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON
GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N
LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SWITZERLAND	TUNISIA
USSR	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA		

13 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ALGERIA	BURMA	CUBA	IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PERU	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND
TOGO	UAR	YEMEN							

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 2  TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE                 0.52        2  TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE                 0.86        17    1
    LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                   LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                          16    6
    NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (22)                    WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                   X SQ=   1.90
                                                           NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)         P =    0.105
                                                                                                       RV YES (NO )

13  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.94       13  TEND TO BE THOSE                        0.71         2    5
    LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR              LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR                         31    2
    THE MIDDLE EAST  (99)                                  THE MIDDLE EAST  (16)                       X SQ=  12.86
                                                                                                       P =    0.001
                                                                                                       RV YES (YES)
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14	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.94	14	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.57	2 31	3 4
						X SQ= 4.18 P = 0.030 RV NO (YES)	
31	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.52	31	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.86	16 17	6 1
						X SQ= 1.90 P = 0.105 RV YES (NO)	
34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.73	34	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.71	24 9	2 5
						X SQ= 3.20 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
35	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.52	35	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.86	17 16	1 6
						X SQ= 1.90 P = 0.105 RV YES (NO)	
36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.70	36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.71	23 10	2 5
						X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.081 RV YES (NO)	
37	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.73	37	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.71	24 9	2 5
						X SQ= 3.20 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
39	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.52	39	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.86	17 16	1 6
						X SQ= 1.90 P = 0.105 RV YES (NO)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.59	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.86	19 13	1 6
						X SQ= 3.04 P = 0.044 RV YES (NO)	
43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.76	43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.67	25 8	2 4
						X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.060 RV YES (NO)	

45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.67	45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.83	22 11	1 5
						X SQ= 3.38 P = 0.064 RV YES (NO)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.80	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.86	24 6	1 6
						X SQ= 8.39 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	1.00	51	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.71	30 0	5 2
						X SQ= 4.33 P = 0.032 RV NO (YES)	
54	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.58	54	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.86	19 14	1 6
						X SQ= 2.77 P = 0.091 RV YES (NO)	
58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.94	58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)	0.57	2 31	4 3
						X SQ= 8.15 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
63	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.55	63	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.86	18 15	1 6
						X SQ= 2.31 P = 0.095 RV YES (NO)	
64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.90	64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	0.80	18 2	1 4
						X SQ= 7.25 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
74	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.55	74	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.86	17 14	1 6
						X SQ= 2.32 P = 0.093 RV YES (NO)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.75	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.71	24 8	2 5
						X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.030 RV YES (NO)	

80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.91	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.75	10 1 1 3 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)	
82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.58	82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.83	18 1 13 5 X SQ= 1.99 P = 0.090 RV YES (NO)	
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	91	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (5)	0.67	6 1 0 2 X SQ= 2.01 P = 0.083 RV YES (YES)	
94	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.97	94	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.67	28 4 1 2 X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.070 RV NO (YES)	
96	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.97	96	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.67	28 4 1 2 X SQ= 2.49 P = 0.070 RV NO (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.93	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.60	26 2 2 3 X SQ= 5.57 P = 0.017 RV YES (YES)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.90	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.80	27 1 3 4 X SQ= 9.11 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.84	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.71	27 2 5 5 X SQ= 6.68 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
110	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.62	110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	12 0 20 7 X SQ= 2.24 P = 0.077 RV NO (NO)	

114	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.52	114	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	1.00	17 7 16 0 X SQ= 3.82 P = 0.029 RV NO (NO)	
116	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.64	116	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.71	21 2 12 5 X SQ= 1.65 P = 0.113 RV YES (NO)	
117	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.79	117	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.57	26 3 7 4 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.97	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.50	1 3 29 3 X SQ= 6.81 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)	
119	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.60	119	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.83	12 5 18 1 X SQ= 2.23 P = 0.081 RV YES (NO)	
125	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.64	125	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.83	12 5 21 1 X SQ= 2.85 P = 0.068 RV YES (NO)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.90	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTFREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.50	3 3 28 3 X SQ= 3.41 P = 0.042 RV YES (YES)	
134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.87	134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.50	26 3 4 3 X SQ= 2.27 P = 0.073 RV YES (NO)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.72	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.83	23 1 9 5 X SQ= 4.46 P = 0.018 RV YES (NO)	

138	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.81	138	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.50	26 3 6 3 X SQ= 1.27 P = 0.131 RV YES (NO)	
144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	1.00	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	0 1 7 0 X SQ= 1.47 P = 0.125 RV YES (YES)	
147	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.67	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	18 0 9 2 X SQ= 1.25 P = 0.135 RV YES (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.68	153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	1.00	19 0 9 3 X SQ= 2.79 P = 0.049 RV YES (NO)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.84	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.75	5 3 27 1 X SQ= 4.22 P = 0.028 RV YES (NO)	
160	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.94	160	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.67	2 2 29 4 X SQ= 1.50 P = 0.115 RV NO (YES)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.93	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.83	2 5 26 1 X SQ= 13.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.81	168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	25 0 6 7 X SQ= 13.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.72	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	23 0 9 7 X SQ= 9.47 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	

179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.92	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.67	2 4 24 2 X SQ= 7.60 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)	
181	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.69	181	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.75	18 1 8 3 X SQ= 1.33 P = 0.126 RV YES (NO)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.97	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.50	1 3 28 3 X SQ= 6.54 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.81	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.80	6 4 26 1 X SQ= 5.41 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.88	192	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)	0.57	4 4 29 3 X SQ= 4.77 P = 0.020 RV YES (YES)	

174 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS
FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)

174 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS
PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE,
LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR
WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)

PREDICATE ONLY

28 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMAN FR	ICELAND	INDIA
IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY
PHILIPPINES	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	UK	US	URUGUAY		

72 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	HAITI
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LADS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA
MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN
TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA'U ARABIA

14 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	DOMIN REP	GUATEMALA	IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PAKISTAN	PERU
SUDAN	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN						

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175 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS
FULLY EFFECTIVE OR
PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)

175 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS
LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR
WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

51 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE
COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DENMARK	ECUADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS
ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG
MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES
SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY
VENEZUELA									

49 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)
CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY
INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL
NICARAGUA	NIGER	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SPAIN
TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TUNISIA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA	

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA'U ARABIA

14 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	DOMIN REP	GUATEMALA	IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PAKISTAN	PERU
SUDAN	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN						

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2 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.61

2 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.96

20	2
31	47

X SQ= 15.99
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

5 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18) — 1.00

5 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9) — 0.82

16	2
0	9

X SQ= 16.13
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

6 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93) — 0.73

6 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93) — 0.92

14	4
37	45

X SQ= 5.06
P = 0.018
RV NO (YES)

10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.84	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.55	8 22 43 27 X SQ= 8.81 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
15	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.67	15	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.92	4 2 8 22 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.149 RV NO (YES)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.64	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.85	8 22 14 4 X SQ= 9.87 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.74	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.71	5 10 14 4 X SQ= 4.92 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)	
25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.75	25	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.94	13 3 38 46 X SQ= 5.61 P = 0.013 RV NO (YES)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.79	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.72	37 12 10 31 X SQ= 21.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.80	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.75	10 36 41 12 X SQ= 28.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.69	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.63	35 18 16 31 X SQ= 8.96 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.63	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.82	32 9 19 40 X SQ= 18.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.80	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.67	41 16 10 33 X SQ= 21.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.53	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.79	27 10 24 38 X SQ= 9.56 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.78	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.57	38 20 11 26 X SQ= 10.20 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.57	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.84	28 8 21 41 X SQ= 15.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.80	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.78	39 11 10 38 X SQ= 29.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.72	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.66	36 15 14 29 X SQ= 12.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)	0.77	49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)	0.67	10 9 3 18 X SQ= 5.05 P = 0.017 RV YES (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.75	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.84	36 6 12 32 X SQ= 27.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.98	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.79	47 8 1 30 X SQ= 51.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.63	49 24 0 14 X SQ= 18.87 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.55	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.83	28 8 23 39 X SQ= 13.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.84	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.60	43 27 8 18 X SQ= 5.98 P = 0.011 RV NO (YES)
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.67	57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.88	17 6 34 43 X SQ= 5.14 P = 0.017 RV NO (YES)
58	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.94	58	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.82	3 9 48 40 X SQ= 2.60 P = 0.069 RV NO (YES)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.63	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.75	32 12 19 36 X SQ= 12.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
65	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (25)	0.85	65	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (18)	0.60	17 6 3 9 X SQ= 5.84 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.59	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.65	30 17 21 31 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)
69	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.67	69	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.50	34 24 17 24 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.106 RV YES (YES)

72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.62	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.66	31 16 19 31 X SQ= 6.50 P = 0.008 RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.70	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.55	35 21 15 26 X SQ= 5.37 P = 0.014 RV YES (YES)	
74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.59	74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.88	20 6 29 43 X SQ= 8.85 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.84	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.67	42 16 8 33 X SQ= 24.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.58	76	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.83	20 6 28 30 X SQ= 4.90 P = 0.018 RV NO (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.70	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.83	19 5 8 25 X SQ= 14.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.90	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	0.50	19 5 2 5 X SQ= 4.24 P = 0.022 RV YES (YES)	
79	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.65	79	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.88	20 23 11 3 X SQ= 3.18 P = 0.062 RV NO (YES)	
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.73	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.82	11 4 4 18 X SQ= 9.08 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	

81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.67	81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	11 0 22 14 X SQ= 4.38 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.67	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.67	33 14 16 29 X SQ= 9.74 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
84	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.69	84	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.59	11 12 5 17 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.120 RV YES (NO)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.69	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.63	35 18 16 31 X SQ= 8.96 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
87	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.85	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.51	6 21 33 22 X SQ= 8.90 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.85	89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	33 0 6 44 X SQ= 58.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.63	0 18 51 30 X SQ= 20.92 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.92	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.53	4 25 47 22 X SQ= 22.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.94	48 2 0 34 X SQ= 72.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.68	50 32 0 15 X SQ= 16.51 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	1.00	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.50	48 17 0 17 X SQ= 27.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.69	98	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.90	16 5 35 44 X SQ= 5.53 P = 0.013 RV NO (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.87	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.98	39 1 6 45 X SQ= 62.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.88	51 6 0 43 X SQ= 74.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.98	105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	1.00	42 0 1 45 X SQ= 80.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	1.00	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.77	41 9 0 30 X SQ= 47.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.86	107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	1.00	44 0 7 48 X SQ= 71.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.98	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.71	48 13 1 32 X SQ= 46.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.73	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.59	35 13 13 19 X SQ= 7.05 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.63	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	32 0 19 46 X SQ= 40.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.86	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.80	44 9 7 37 X SQ= 40.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.90	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.74	5 28 44 10 X SQ= 33.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.51	119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	24 38 25 0 X SQ= 24.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.76	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.63	12 31 39 18 X SQ= 14.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.53	122	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.88	27 43 24 6 X SQ= 12.81 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.84	123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	43 49 8 0 X SQ= 6.36 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.58	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.80	19 33 26 8 X SQ= 11.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.64	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	29 41 16 0 X SQ= 15.64 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
127	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.63	127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	17 0 29 40 X SQ= 16.17 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.89	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.92	41 3 5 37 X SQ= 53.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.91	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.82	42 7 4 33 X SQ= 44.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.74	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.57	35 20 12 27 X SQ= 8.59 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.63	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	29 0 17 46 X SQ= 39.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.92	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.98	44 1 4 43 X SQ= 69.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.98	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.73	1 33 50 12 X SQ= 50.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.77	141	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	1.00	11 0 36 45 X SQ= 9.84 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	

142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.52	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.95	24 2 22 42 X SQ= 22.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	1.00	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	0 33 11 0 X SQ= 38.83 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.82	0 8 46 36 X SQ= 7.07 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.54	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	22 0 19 43 X SQ= 28.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
148	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.96	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.76	2 11 48 35 X SQ= 6.50 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.94	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.57	3 25 44 19 X SQ= 24.82 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.70	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.68	14 30 33 14 X SQ= 11.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.87	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.58	6 25 42 18 X SQ= 19.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.73	166	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	1.00	14 0 37 49 X SQ= 13.44 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.67	168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	33 0 16 49 X SQ= 46.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	1.00	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.86	49 7 0 42 X SQ= 70.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
171	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.80	171	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.98	10 1 41 44 X SQ= 5.51 P = 0.009 RV NO (YES)
172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.63	172	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.96	19 2 32 44 X SQ= 13.56 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.76	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.79	12 37 38 10 X SQ= 26.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.86	179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	6 42 38 0 X SQ= 61.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.54	181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	21 0 25 24 X SQ= 13.55 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
182	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.83	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.60	25 24 5 16 X SQ= 3.40 P = 0.040 RV NO (YES)
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.62	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.81	5 6 3 26 X SQ= 4.15 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)

186	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.93	186	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.65	3 26 41 14 X SQ= 28.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.73	187	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.95	12 41 33 2 X SQ= 40.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.57	188	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.85	22 7 29 40 X SQ= 8.06 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
189	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.86	189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	7 0 44 49 X SQ= 5.28 P = 0.013 RV NO (YES)	
192	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.88	192	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.68	6 15 45 32 X SQ= 4.76 P = 0.025 RV NO (YES)	
193	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.88	193	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.59	6 20 45 29 X SQ= 9.50 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.73	0 13 51 36 X SQ= 13.30 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

176 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS
FULLY EFFECTIVE,
PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR
LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)

176 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS
WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)

PREDICATE ONLY

72 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA
CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DENMARK
ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR	GREECE	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA
INDONESIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA
LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA
NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

28 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA
HAITI	HUNGARY	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	SPAIN	THAILAND	USSR	UAR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA		

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA'U ARABIA

14 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	DOMIN REP	GUATEMALA	IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PAKISTAN	PERU
SUDAN	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN						

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177 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS
PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, RATHER THAN
LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (23)

177 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS
LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, RATHER THAN
PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (21)

SUBJECT ONLY

****

23 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMEROUN	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	ECUADOR	FRANCE
GREECE	HONDURAS	LEBANON	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NIGERIA	PANAMA	SIERRE LED
TURKEY	UGANDA	VENEZUELA							

21 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BURUNDI	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	GABON	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST
LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA	NICARAGUA	NIGER	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA
UPPER VOLTA									

57 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CHINA, PR	CYPRUS
CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY
ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LAOS
LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	USSR
UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA			

14 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	DOMIN REP	GUATEMALA	IRAN	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PAKISTAN	PERU
SUDAN	SYRIA	TOGO	YEMEN						

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6 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93) — 0.52

6 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93) — 0.90

11	2
12	19

X SQ= 6.01
P = 0.008
RV NO (YES)

10 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82) — 0.70

10 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33) — 0.86

7	18
16	3

X SQ= 11.51
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

15 TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33) — 0.78

15 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33) — 1.00

2	0
7	18

X SQ= 1.69
P = 0.103
RV NO (YES)

19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.61	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.90	7 18 11 2 X SQ= 8.84 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.57	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.86	13 3 10 18 X SQ= 6.74 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.64	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.90	14 2 8 19 X SQ= 11.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.61	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.95	9 20 14 1 X SQ= 12.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.52	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.90	12 2 11 19 X SQ= 7.34 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
36	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.74	36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	1.00	6 0 17 21 X SQ= 4.32 P = 0.022 RV ND (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.61	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.81	14 4 9 17 X SQ= 6.31 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.61	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.85	14 3 9 17 X SQ= 7.59 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
42	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.73	42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	1.00	6 0 16 21 X SQ= 4.58 P = 0.021 RV ND (YES)

43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.52	43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	1.00	11 0 10 21 X SQ= 12.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.50	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.95	11 1 11 19 X SQ= 8.31 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.86	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.70	19 6 3 14 X SQ= 11.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
51	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.95	51	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.70	19 7 1 3 X SQ= 1.77 P = 0.095 RV NO (YES)
54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.74	54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	6 0 17 21 X SQ= 4.32 P = 0.022 RV NO (YES)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.74	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.76	17 5 6 16 X SQ= 9.11 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
56	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.70	56	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.62	16 8 7 13 X SQ= 3.21 P = 0.068 RV YES (YES)
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.57	57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.90	10 2 13 19 X SQ= 4.78 P = 0.017 RV NO (YES)
63	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.52	63	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.90	11 2 12 19 X SQ= 6.01 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)

64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.79	64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	0.75	11 2 3 6 X SQ= 4.03 P = 0.026 RV YES (YES)	
65	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (25)	0.77	65	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (18)	0.75	10 2 3 6 X SQ= 3.54 P = 0.032 RV YES (YES)	
68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.57	68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.71	13 6 10 15 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.076 RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.65	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.71	15 6 8 15 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.019 RV YES (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.61	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.86	14 3 9 18 X SQ= 8.18 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.65	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.86	15 3 8 18 X SQ= 9.77 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.70	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.86	16 3 7 18 X SQ= 11.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.65	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.85	13 3 7 17 X SQ= 8.44 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.56	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.88	8 14 10 2 X SQ= 5.12 P = 0.013 RV YES (YES)	

80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.50	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.93	4 1 4 13 X SQ= 3.16 P = 0.039 RV YES (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.59	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.90	13 2 9 19 X SQ= 9.54 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.70	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.81	16 4 7 17 X SQ= 9.35 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.71	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.95	4 18 10 1 X SQ= 13.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.71	89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	10 0 4 19 X SQ= 16.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.75	21 2 0 6 X SQ= 15.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	1.00	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.75	21 2 0 6 X SQ= 15.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.71	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.94	12 1 5 17 X SQ= 13.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.71	23 6 0 15 X SQ= 21.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.94	105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	1.00	16 0 1 20 X SQ= 29.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	1.00	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.56	15 8 0 10 X SQ= 9.47 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.74	107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	1.00	17 0 6 21 X SQ= 22.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
113	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.62	113	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.89	8 2 13 16 X SQ= 2.42 P = 0.074 RV NO (YES)
116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.61	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	9 0 14 21 X SQ= 8.07 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.70	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.76	16 5 7 16 X SQ= 7.47 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.70	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.76	7 16 16 5 X SQ= 7.47 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.65	122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	15 21 8 0 X SQ= 6.74 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)
127	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.67	127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	7 0 14 19 X SQ= 5.54 P = 0.009 RV NO (YES)

128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.90	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.84	19 3 2 16 X SQ= 19.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.95	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.68	20 6 1 13 X SQ= 15.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
130	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.94	130	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.62	1 3 17 5 X SQ= 2.23 P = 0.072 RV NO (YES)
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.73	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.75	6 15 16 5 X SQ= 7.73 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.50	134	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.80	11 16 11 4 X SQ= 2.90 P = 0.058 RV YES (YES)
137	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.80	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	4 0 16 19 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.106 RV NO (YES)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.86	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.95	18 1 3 18 X SQ= 22.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.96	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.74	1 14 22 5 X SQ= 18.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.52	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.95	11 1 10 18 X SQ= 8.42 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)

144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	1.00	144	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	1.00	0 14 3 0 X SQ= 10.82 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.76	0 5 19 16 X SQ= 3.22 P = 0.049 RV NO (YES)
147	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.82	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	3 0 14 19 X SQ= 1.71 P = 0.095 RV NO (YES)
148	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.91	148	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (14)	0.52	2 11 20 10 X SQ= 7.60 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
154	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.71	154	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.75	5 6 12 2 X SQ= 2.92 P = 0.081 RV YES (YES)
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.81	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.79	4 15 17 4 X SQ= 12.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.70	166	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	1.00	7 0 16 21 X SQ= 5.50 P = 0.009 RV NO (YES)
168	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.76	168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	5 0 16 21 X SQ= 3.63 P = 0.048 RV NO (YES)
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	1.00	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.67	21 7 0 14 X SQ= 18.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

178 TENO TO BE THOSE 0.65
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)

178 TENO TO BE THOSE 0.90
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)

8	19
15	2

X SQ= 12.11
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

179 TENO TO BE THOSE 0.78
WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)

179 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)

4	16
14	0

X SQ= 18.07
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

182 TENO TO BE THOSE 0.77
WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY
IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN
POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)

182 TENO TO BE THOSE 0.80
WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY
IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL,
RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)

17	4
5	16

X SQ= 11.55
P = 0.001
RV YES (YES)

187 TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.61
WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE
IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)

187 TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.87
WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE
IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)

11	13
7	2

X SQ= 1.56
P = 0.134
RV NO (YES)

188 TENO TO BE THOSE 0.61
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS CIVIL LAW (32)

188 TENO TO BE THOSE 0.90
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)

14	2
9	19

X SQ= 10.39
P = 0.001
RV YES (YES)

192 TENO TO BE THOSE 0.78
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN
MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)

192 TENO TO BE THOSE 0.57
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)

5	12
18	9

X SQ= 4.41
P = 0.029
RV YES (YES)

193 TENO TO BE THOSE 0.78
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)

193 TENO TO BE THOSE 0.71
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)

5	15
18	6

X SQ= 9.02
P = 0.002
RV YES (YES)

****

178 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)

178 POLITIES
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

****

53 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
COSTA RICA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GREECE
GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	KOREA, N	LEBANON
MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	POLAND
RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SPAIN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA
UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP							

51 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEYLON
CHILE	COLOMBIA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	ICELAND	INDIA	IRAN
IRELAND	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R
MALAYA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL
SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	USSR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA
YUGOSLAVIA									

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CYPRUS

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SA'U ARABIA

9 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA	CUBA	IRAQ	KOREA REP	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	UAR	YEMEN

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2 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.91

2 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.67

5	17
48	34

X SQ= 7.53
P = 0.004
RV ND (YES)

5 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9) — 0.64

5 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EURDPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18) — 0.87

4	14
7	2

X SQ= 5.54
P = 0.011
RV YES (YES)

6	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.87	6	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.73	7 14 46 37 X SQ= 2.45 P = 0.089 RV NO (YES)
7	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN CENTRAL AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN SOUTH AMERICA (7)	0.83	7	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN CENTRAL AMERICA (10)	0.82	5 2 1 9 X SQ= 4.38 P = 0.035 RV YES (YES)
10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.55	10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.86	24 7 29 44 X SQ= 10.91 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
15	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.92	15	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.64	2 4 24 7 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.051 RV NO (YES)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.77	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.67	24 7 7 14 X SQ= 8.36 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
21	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.79	21	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.65	11 18 42 33 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.127 RV NO (YES)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.62	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.65	20 33 33 18 X SQ= 6.52 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)
25	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.92	25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.76	4 12 49 39 X SQ= 3.95 P = 0.030 RV NO (YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.68	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.77	15 36 32 11 X SQ= 17.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.67	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.73	35 14 17 37 X SQ= 14.84 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.64	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.71	19 36 34 15 X SQ= 11.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.75	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.53	13 27 40 24 X SQ= 7.71 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.60	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.73	21 37 32 14 X SQ= 10.13 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	38	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.80	0 10 51 41 X SQ= 8.98 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.79	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.51	11 26 41 25 X SQ= 8.70 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.56	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.82	22 40 28 9 X SQ= 13.41 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.81	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.50	10 25 42 25 X SQ= 9.39 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.73	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.73	14 37 37 14 X SQ= 18.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.62	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.64	18 32 30 18 X SQ= 5.86 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)
49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)	0.71	49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)	0.82	8 14 20 3 X SQ= 10.19 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.64	50	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.57	14 28 25 21 X SQ= 3.12 P = 0.056 RV YES (YES)
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.56	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.82	17 40 22 9 X SQ= 12.16 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
53	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.92	53	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.80	4 10 49 41 X SQ= 2.29 P = 0.089 RV NO (YES)
55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.55	55	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.82	28 42 23 9 X SQ= 7.70 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)
56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.57	56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.82	28 42 21 9 X SQ= 6.41 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)
57	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.87	57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.67	7 17 46 34 X SQ= 4.85 P = 0.020 RV NO (YES)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.70	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.58	16 29 37 21 X SQ= 7.00 P = 0.006 RV YES (YES)

68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.63	68	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.55	19 28 33 23 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.076 RV YES (YES)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.69	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.68	16 34 35 16 X SQ= 12.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.57	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.74	22 37 29 13 X SQ= 8.67 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
74	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.83	74	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.66	9 17 43 33 X SQ= 2.91 P = 0.070 RV NO (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.60	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.76	21 38 32 12 X SQ= 12.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
76	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.80	76	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.61	9 17 36 27 X SQ= 2.89 P = 0.065 RV NO (YES)	
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.78	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.65	8 17 28 9 X SQ= 9.96 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
79	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.82	79	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.59	27 16 6 11 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.084 RV NO (YES)	
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.76	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.67	6 8 19 4 X SQ= 4.59 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)	

81	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.95	81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.68	1 10 18 21 X SQ= 3.55 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)	
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.63	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.69	19 31 32 14 X SQ= 8.36 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.69	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.86	10 12 22 2 X SQ= 9.50 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
85	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.58	85	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.61	22 31 31 20 X SQ= 3.13 P = 0.054 RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.54	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.89	25 4 21 32 X SQ= 14.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.85	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.68	7 25 41 12 X SQ= 22.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
91	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	1.00	91	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.57	25 4 0 3 X SQ= 7.32 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)	
92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.71	92	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.96	15 2 37 49 X SQ= 9.87 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.56	93	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.88	22 6 28 45 X SQ= 11.53 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.64	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.77	13 37 23 11 X SQ= 12.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.76	95	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.94	39 47 12 3 X SQ= 4.83 P = 0.023 RV NO (YES)	
97	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.57	97	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	0.73	9 8 12 3 X SQ= 1.53 P = 0.147 RV YES (NO)	
98	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.92	98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.67	4 17 49 34 X SQ= 9.18 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.80	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.66	9 31 35 16 X SQ= 17.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.65	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.80	18 40 33 10 X SQ= 18.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.78	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.75	10 33 36 11 X SQ= 23.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.60	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.87	17 34 25 5 X SQ= 16.97 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.81	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.69	10 34 42 15 X SQ= 23.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.51	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.85	23 40 24 7 X SQ= 12.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
110	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.92	110	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.79	3 10 35 37 X SQ= 1.96 P = 0.130 RV NO (NO)	
113	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.88	113	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (81)	0.64	6 17 44 30 X SQ= 6.55 P = 0.008 RV NO (YES)	
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.54	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.68	23 32 27 15 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.040 RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.88	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.53	6 26 46 23 X SQ= 18.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.71	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.82	15 40 37 9 X SQ= 26.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.54	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.78	21 11 18 40 X SQ= 8.69 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.60	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.75	32 13 21 38 X SQ= 11.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.80	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.52	35 22 9 24 X SQ= 8.43 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	

128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.68	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.74	15 32	32 11	X SQ= 14.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.60	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.81	19 28	35 8	X SQ= 14.04 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.67	131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.56	7 14	23 18	X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.112 RV YES (NO)
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.88	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.51	6 44	23 22	X SQ= 15.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.75	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.74	12 36	34 12	X SQ= 20.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.56	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.90	28 22	5 44	X SQ= 21.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
141	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.94	141	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.82	3 46	8 37	X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.110 RV NO (YES)
142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.80	142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.56	10 39	19 24	X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)
146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.86	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	7 43	0 44	X SQ= 4.78 P = 0.014 RV NO (YES)

147 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.92
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
OTHER THAN
CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)

148 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.75
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
OTHER THAN
AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)

164 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.53
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)

166 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.94
WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR
FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)

168 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.88
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)

169 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.65
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)

170 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.52
WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)

172 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.88
WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)

175 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.76
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS
LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR
WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)

147 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.51
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)

4 19
44 18
X SQ= 17.47
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

148 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.98
WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY
OTHER THAN
AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)

13 1
39 47
X SQ= 9.07
P = 0.001
RV NO (YES)

164 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.80
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)

22 9
25 37
X SQ= 6.59
P = 0.008
RV NO (YES)

166 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.76
WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR
FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)

3 12
49 39
X SQ= 5.18
P = 0.013
RV NO (YES)

168 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.55
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS SIGNIFICANT (34)

6 27
45 22
X SQ= 19.31
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

169 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.80
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)

18 39
33 10
X SQ= 18.24
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

170 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.72
WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)

24 14
26 36
X SQ= 3.44
P = 0.043
RV NO (YES)

172 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.69
WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)

6 15
46 34
X SQ= 4.47
P = 0.026
RV NO (YES)

175 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.79
WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS
FULLY EFFECTIVE OR
PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)

12 38
37 10
X SQ= 26.88
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.79	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.66	34 15 9 29 X SQ= 16.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.86	181	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.60	4 17 24 26 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.53	182	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.93	24 26 21 2 X SQ= 10.73 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.95	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.75	21 2 1 6 X SQ= 12.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
186	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.55	186	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.74	19 11 23 32 X SQ= 2.79 P = 0.072 RV NO (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.80	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.57	36 20 9 26 X SQ= 11.32 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
188	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.83	188	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.56	9 22 43 28 X SQ= 7.37 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
189	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.98	189	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.88	1 6 52 45 X SQ= 2.62 P = 0.058 RV NO (YES)	
192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.69	192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.88	16 6 36 44 X SQ= 4.26 P = 0.030 RV NO (YES)	

193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.58	193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.88	22 6 31 45 X SQ= 10.22 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.79	194	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.96	11 2 42 49 X SQ= 5.28 P = 0.015 RV NO (YES)	

179 POLITIES
WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)

179 POLITIES
WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

52 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CEN AFR REP	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CUBA	CZECHOS*KIA
DAHOMEY	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS
HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LIBERIA	MALI	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NICARAGUA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA								

39 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CAMEROUN	CANADA	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS
DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	FINLAND	GERMAN FR	ICELAND	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA
JAPAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NIGERIA	NORWAY
PANAMA	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UK	US	VENEZUELA	

4 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CEYLON	CHILE	GREECE	LAOS

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

SWITZERLAND URUGUAY

6 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BURUNDI	CHAD	NIGER	RWANDA	SOMALIA	UGANDA

12 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

ARGENTINA	BURMA	CONGO(LEO)	GUATEMALA	IRAQ	KOREA REP	PERU	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND
TOGO	YEMEN								

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2 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.94

2 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.56

	3	17
	49	22

X SQ= 16.45
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

5 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9) — 0.75

5 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18) — 1.00

	3	13
	9	0

X SQ= 12.15
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

8	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.81	8	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.92	10 3 42 36 X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.142 RV NO (NO)	
10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.63	10	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.87	19 5 33 34 X SQ= 5.29 P = 0.016 RV NO (YES)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.73	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.67	19 5 7 10 X SQ= 4.66 P = 0.021 RV YES (YES)	
20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.59	20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.77	10 3 7 10 X SQ= 2.52 P = 0.071 RV YES (YES)	
25	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.92	25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.74	4 10 48 29 X SQ= 4.22 P = 0.037 RV NO (YES)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.61	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.83	18 29 28 6 X SQ= 13.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.66	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.85	33 6 17 33 X SQ= 20.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.77	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.64	12 25 40 14 X SQ= 13.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.58	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.85	22 33 30 6 X SQ= 14.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.71	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.51	15 20 36 19 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.049 RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.78	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.57	11 21 40 16 X SQ= 10.00 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.67	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.81	17 30 34 7 X SQ= 17.77 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.64	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.76	17 29 30 9 X SQ= 12.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.88	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.79	5 31 37 8 X SQ= 34.72 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.79	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.97	9 38 33 1 X SQ= 44.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.62	52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	26 39 16 0 X SQ= 16.19 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.80	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.56	10 22 40 17 X SQ= 11.08 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.77	58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.95	12 2 40 37 X SQ= 4.22 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)	

62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	62	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.71	0 5 10 12 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.124 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.69	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.64	16 25 35 14 X SQ= 8.27 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
64	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.57	64	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.93	16 25 12 2 X SQ= 7.33 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
65	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (18)	0.55	65	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (25)	0.86	10 12 12 2 X SQ= 4.26 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.63	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.62	19 24 32 15 X SQ= 4.30 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.51	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.72	25 28 26 11 X SQ= 3.84 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)	
72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.58	72	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.61	21 23 29 15 X SQ= 2.27 P = 0.092 RV YES (YES)	
74	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.86	74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.55	7 17 44 21 X SQ= 9.12 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.59	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.85	21 33 30 6 X SQ= 15.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

76	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.82	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.53	7 17 32 19 X SQ= 6.09 P = 0.012 RV NO (YES)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.71	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.68	9 13 22 6 X SQ= 5.90 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.73	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.73	6 8 16 3 X SQ= 4.48 P = 0.024 RV YES (YES)
81	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.89	81	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.68	2 8 17 17 X SQ= 1.74 P = 0.148 RV NO (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.59	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.68	19 25 27 12 X SQ= 4.67 P = 0.027 RV YES (YES)
85	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.53	85	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.67	24 26 27 13 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.087 RV YES (YES)
87	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.61	87	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.78	16 7 25 25 X SQ= 1.72 P = 0.136 RV NO (YES)
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.91	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.78	4 25 41 7 X SQ= 35.29 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.63	92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	19 0 32 39 X SQ= 16.25 P = 0. RV NO (YES)

93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL, OR LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL (32)	0.55	93	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.92	27 3 22 36 X SQ= 19.66 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.84	94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	7 38 36 0 X SQ= 53.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.67	95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	33 39 16 0 X SQ= 13.45 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.56	96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	1.00	23 38 18 0 X SQ= 19.18 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
98	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.87	98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.64	7 14 45 25 X SQ= 5.12 P = 0.022 RV NO (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.90	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.91	5 32 47 3 X SQ= 53.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.83	102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	1.00	9 39 43 0 X SQ= 57.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.93	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.97	3 33 40 1 X SQ= 58.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.75	106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	1.00	10 32 30 0 X SQ= 38.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.92	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.90	4 35 48 4 X SQ= 57.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.66	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.97	16 37 31 1 X SQ= 33.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.54	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.76	17 29 20 9 X SQ= 6.07 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)	
116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.94	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.62	3 24 46 15 X SQ= 28.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.65	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.85	17 33 32 6 X SQ= 20.07 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.61	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.89	28 4 18 33 X SQ= 19.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.96	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.54	44 17 2 20 X SQ= 23.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.73	46 27 0 10 X SQ= 11.70 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.56	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.79	29 8 23 31 X SQ= 10.07 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	

122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.85	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.51	44 19 8 20 X SQ= 11.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.79	52 31 0 8 X SQ= 9.28 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)
124	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.84	124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	7 0 36 34 X SQ= 4.28 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.81	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.65	35 12 8 22 X SQ= 15.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.56	43 19 0 15 X SQ= 20.83 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
127	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	127	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.64	0 13 41 23 X SQ= 15.33 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.85	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.86	6 31 35 5 X SQ= 36.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.76	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.92	10 33 31 3 X SQ= 32.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.57	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.84	21 31 28 6 X SQ= 13.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

135	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.73	135	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	1.00	30 36 11 0 X SQ= 9.18 P = 0.001 RV NO (YES)	
136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.71	0 10 45 25 X SQ= 12.20 P = 0. RV ND (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.98	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.69	1 24 44 11 X SQ= 37.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.88	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.95	5 36 37 2 X SQ= 51.52 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.65	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.97	31 1 17 38 X SQ= 32.98 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
141	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.98	141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.73	1 10 45 27 X SQ= 8.96 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)	
142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.98	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.54	1 20 43 17 X SQ= 25.43 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.81	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	8 0 34 38 X SQ= 6.07 P = 0.006 RV NO (YES)	
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.53	0 19 39 17 X SQ= 24.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

160 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.58
WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS
ELITIST (30)

161 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.69
WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS
ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)

163 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.73
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)

164 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.60
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)

166 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.98
WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR
FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)

168 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.96
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)

169 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.81
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)

171 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.96
WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
IS OTHER THAN
PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)

172 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)

160 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.97
WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS
MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)

26 1
19 35
X SQ= 24.81
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

161 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.75
WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS
NON-ELITIST (50)

31 9
14 27
X SQ= 13.71
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

163 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)

13 0
35 37
X SQ= 9.83
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

164 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.92
WHERE THE REGIME S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA
IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)

29 3
19 34
X SQ= 22.18
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

166 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.72
WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR
FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)

1 11
51 28
X SQ= 11.25
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

168 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.72
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS SIGNIFICANT (34)

2 28
50 11
X SQ= 43.54
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

169 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)

10 39
42 0
X SQ= 55.30
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

171 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.79
WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
IS OTHER THAN
PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)

2 8
44 31
X SQ= 3.87
P = 0.039
RV NO (YES)

172 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.59
WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE
IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)

0 16
48 23
X SQ= 21.47
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.96	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.63	2 24 46 14 X SQ= 32.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.87	175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	1.00	6 38 42 0 X SQ= 61.53 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.54	176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	22 38 26 0 X SQ= 26.99 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.69	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.76	34 9 15 29 X SQ= 16.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.94	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.51	2 18 29 17 X SQ= 13.69 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
185	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.81	185	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.60	7 3 29 2 X SQ= 2.03 P = 0.083 RV YES (NO)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.69	186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.94	29 2 13 33 X SQ= 29.26 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.90	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.76	45 8 5 25 X SQ= 34.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
188	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.82	188	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.62	9 15 41 24 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.053 RV NO (YES)	

189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERF THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.82	0 / 52	7 / 32
						X SQ=	7.74
						P =	0.002
						RV NO	(YES)
190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	190	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.68	9 / 0	15 / 7
						X SQ=	2.10
						P =	0.077
						RV NO	(NO)
192	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.66	192	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)	0.90	17 / 33	4 / 35
						X SQ=	5.60
						P =	0.011
						RV NO	(YES)
193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.69	193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.90	16 / 36	4 / 35
						X SQ=	4.34
						P =	0.023
						RV NO	(NO)
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.75	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	13 / 38	0 / 39
						X SQ=	9.65
						P =	0.
						RV NO	(YES)

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180  POLITIES                                                    180  POLITIES
     WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS                                         WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS
     MODERN OR SEMI-MODERN  (76)                                      POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL OR
                                                                      TRADITIONAL  (34)

                                                                                                                SUBJECT ONLY
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      76 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA      ARGENTINA    AUSTRALIA    AUSTRIA      BELGIUM      BOLIVIA      BRAZIL       BULGARIA     CANADA       CEYLON
CHILE        CHINA, PR    COLOMBIA     COSTA RICA   CUBA         CYPRUS       CZECHOS'KIA  DENMARK      DOMIN REP    ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR  FINLAND      FRANCE       GERMANY, E   GERMAN FR    GHANA        GREECE       GUATEMALA    GUINEA       HAITI
HONDURAS     HUNGARY      ICELAND      INDIA        IRELAND      ISRAEL       ITALY        JAMAICA      JAPAN        KOREA, N
KOREA REP    LEBANON      LIBERIA      LIBYA        LUXEMBOURG   MALAYA       MEXICO       MONGOLIA     MOROCCO      NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND  NICARAGUA    NORWAY       PANAMA       PARAGUAY     PERU         PHILIPPINES  POLAND       PORTUGAL     RUMANIA
SO AFRICA    SPAIN        SWEDEN       SWITZERLAND  SYRIA        TRINIDAD     TUNISIA      TURKEY       USSR         UAR
UK           US           URUGUAY      VENEZUELA    VIETNAM, N   YUGOSLAVIA

      34 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN  ALGERIA      BURMA        BURUNDI      CAMBODIA     CAMEROUN     CEN AFR REP  CHAD         CONGO(BRA)   CONGO(LEO)
DAHOMEY      ETHIOPIA     GABON        IRAN         IVORY COAST  JORDAN       LAOS         MALAGASY R   MALI         MAURITANIA
NEPAL        NIGER        NIGERIA      RWANDA       SA'U ARABIA  SENEGAL      SIERRE LEO   SOMALIA      SUDAN        TANGANYIKA
THAILAND     TOGO         UGANDA       UPPER VOLTA

       3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

INDONESIA    PAKISTAN     VIETNAM REP

       2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

IRAQ         YEMEN

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  2  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.71          2  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                         1.00        22    0
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                                  LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN                           54   34
     WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                                  WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA,                     X SQ=  10.56
     NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)                        NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA  (93)           P =    0.
                                                                                                              RV NO  (NO )

  6  TEND LESS TO BE THOSE                    0.71          6  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                         1.00        22    0
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE                              LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE                       54   34
     CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,                                CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA,                   X SQ=  10.56
     OR SOUTH AMERICA  (93)                                     OR SOUTH AMERICA  (93)                        P =    0.
                                                                                                              RV NO  (NO )

 10  TEND TO BE THOSE                         0.89         10  TEND TO BE THOSE                         0.74         8   25
     LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,                    LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR                         68    9
     OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (82)                          CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA  (33)                X SQ=  41.45
                                                                                                              P =    0.
                                                                                                              RV YES (YES)
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15	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.62	15	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.86	5 4 8 25 X SQ= 1.94 P = 0.107 RV NO (YES)
17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.81	17	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	1.00	5 4 22 0 X SQ= 7.62 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.56	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.83	8 25 10 5 X SQ= 6.21 P = 0.009 RV YES (YES)
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.73	19	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	1.00	8 25 22 0 X SQ= 27.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.69	20	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	1.00	10 5 22 0 X SQ= 5.87 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)
22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS SMALL (47)	0.50	22	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.76	38 26 38 8 X SQ= 5.72 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)
24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.58	24	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.62	44 13 32 21 X SQ= 2.89 P = 0.066 RV YES (NO)
25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.78	25	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	1.00	17 0 59 34 X SQ= 7.36 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.53	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.85	40 5 36 29 X SQ= 12.45 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.79	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.94	53 2 14 32 X SQ= 45.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.72	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.94	21 31 54 2 X SQ= 37.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.68	31	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	1.00	52 33 24 0 X SQ= 11.59 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
33	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.63	33	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	1.00	28 0 48 34 X SQ= 14.92 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.66	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.76	50 8 26 26 X SQ= 15.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.55	36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	1.00	42 0 34 34 X SQ= 28.10 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.80	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.94	61 2 15 32 X SQ= 50.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
39	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.52	39	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	1.00	36 0 39 34 X SQ= 22.25 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.79	40	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.70	57 10 15 23 X SQ= 21.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

42	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.51	42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDEROEVELOPED (76)	1.00	36 0 38 33 X SQ= 22.06 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.70	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.97	52 1 22 32 X SQ= 38.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.67	44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	I.00	25 0 51 34 X SQ= 12.66 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.73	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.94	51 2 19 32 X SQ= 38.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.76	72 8 0 25 X SQ= 67.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.50	54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	37 0 37 34 X SQ= 23.69 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.96	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.88	71 4 3 30 X SQ= 73.89 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.87	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.65	63 12 9 22 X SQ= 27.95 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.67	57	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	1.00	25 0 51 34 X SQ= 12.66 P = 0. RV NO (NO)

58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.92	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.76	6 8 70 26 X SQ= 3.86 P = 0.032 RV NO (YES)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.61	63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	46 0 29 34 X SQ= 33.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.88	64	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	1.00	46 0 6 8 X SQ= 25.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.59	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	D.65	42 11 29 20 X SQ= 3.94 P = 0.033 RV YES (NO)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.60	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	D.82	45 6 30 28 X SQ= 15.20 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.72	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.76	54 8 21 26 X SQ= 20.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.73	70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.93	19 2 52 28 X SQ= 4.02 P = 0.030 RV NO (NO)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.65	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.85	47 5 25 29 X SQ= 21.65 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.79	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.82	57 6 15 28 X SQ= 33.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.65	74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	26 0 48 34 X SQ= 13.87 P = 0. RV ND (NO)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.81	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.97	61 1 14 33 X SQ= 55.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.59	76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	26 0 37 29 X SQ= 14.71 P = 0. RV ND (NO)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.75	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.97	27 1 9 28 X SQ= 30.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.55	79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	22 24 18 0 X SQ= 12.88 P = 0. RV ND (YES)
80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.63	80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.71	10 7 6 17 X SQ= 3.11 P = 0.053 RV YES (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.71	82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	51 0 21 29 X SQ= 38.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
83	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.95	83	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.85	4 5 72 29 X SQ= 1.67 P = 0.132 RV ND (YES)
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.90	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.76	19 7 2 22 X SQ= 18.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.72	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.91	55 3 21 30 X SQ= 34.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.88	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.79	67 7 9 26 X SQ= 44.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.85	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.78	9 21 51 6 X SQ= 29.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.56	89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	33 0 26 31 X SQ= 25.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.77	92	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.94	17 2 58 32 X SQ= 3.49 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.65	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.72	46 5 25 13 X SQ= 6.60 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.78	95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	58 34 16 0 X SQ= 7.00 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.89	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.72	62 5 8 13 X SQ= 25.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.67	97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	8 13 16 0 X SQ= 12.67 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.71	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.86	48 2 20 12 X SQ= 13.19 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.81	100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	0.58	57 5 13 7 X SQ= 6.76 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.57	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.92	39 2 30 24 X SQ= 16.42 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.68	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.70	49 10 23 23 X SQ= 11.61 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.63	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.88	40 3 24 21 X SQ= 15.52 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.57	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.91	43 3 32 29 X SQ= 19.14 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
108	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.71	108	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.50	51 13 21 13 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.091 RV YES (NO)
110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.76	110	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.97	14 1 45 30 X SQ= 4.76 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.54	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.77	33 24 39 7 X SQ= 7.52 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)

116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.56	116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	32 0 40 34 X SQ= 19.59 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.78	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.91	56 3 16 31 X SQ= 41.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
120	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.87	120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	66 20 10 0 X SQ= 1.70 P = 0.115 RV NO (NO)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.79	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.97	16 33 60 1 X SQ= 51.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.58	122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	44 34 32 0 X SQ= 18.20 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.52	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.91	30 30 32 3 X SQ= 14.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.74	126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	46 33 16 0 X SQ= 8.48 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.59	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.70	41 7 28 16 X SQ= 4.70 P = 0.029 RV YES (NO)
129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.67	129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.57	46 10 23 13 X SQ= 2.98 P = 0.083 RV YES (NO)

133	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.81	133	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.53	13 15 57 17 X SQ= 7.47 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	
137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.56	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	29 0 37 29 X SQ= 16.33 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.66	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.86	44 4 23 25 X SQ= 19.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.62	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.85	26 4 42 23 X SQ= 3.88 P = 0.030 RV NO (NO)	
144	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.68	144	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.93	21 13 10 1 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.132 RV NO (NO)	
147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.62	147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	23 0 38 28 X SQ= 12.34 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.55	0 14 74 17 X SQ= 34.75 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.63	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.92	41 1 24 11 X SQ= 10.14 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.75	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.58	49 5 16 7 X SQ= 4.01 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)	

158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.68	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.65	23 15 48 8 X SQ= 6.47 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.81	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.78	14 18 59 5 X SQ= 24.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
168	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.53	168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	1.00	34 0 38 31 X SQ= 19.77 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.68	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.71	49 9 23 22 X SQ= 11.87 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.60	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	28 0 42 28 X SQ= 13.78 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.66	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.82	46 5 24 23 X SQ= 16.49 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.61	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.73	28 22 43 8 X SQ= 8.38 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.53	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.82	31 18 35 4 X SQ= 6.77 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
187	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.56	187	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.82	38 23 30 5 X SQ= 4.82 P = 0.019 RV NO (NO)	

188 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.59
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)

188 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.97
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)

31	1
44	32

X SQ= 14.34
P = 0.
RV NO (NO)

189 LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.91
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)

189 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)

7	0
69	34

X SQ= 1.98
P = 0.097
RV NO (NO)

192 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.91
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN
MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)

192 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.52
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)

7	17
68	16

X SQ= 21.21
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

193 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.95
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)

193 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.67
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)

4	22
72	11

X SQ= 44.44
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

194 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.83
THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)

194 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)

13	0
62	34

X SQ= 5.14
P = 0.009
RV NO (NO)

181 POLITIES
WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY
IS MODERN, RATHER THAN
SEMI-MODERN (21)

181 POLITIES
WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY
IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN
MODERN (55)

PREDICATE ONLY

21 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	ICELAND	IRELAND
ISRAEL	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	UK
US									

55 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA
GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDIA	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON
LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU
PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SYRIA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR
UAR	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA					

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

INDONESIA	PAKISTAN	VIETNAM REP

34 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	IRAN	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	LAOS	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA
NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA
THAILAND	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA						

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

IRAQ	YEMEN

182 POLITIES
WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY
IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN
POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)

182 POLITIES
WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY
IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL,
RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)

PREDICATE ONLY

55 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA
CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS*KIA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA
GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDIA	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON
LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU
PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SPAIN	SYRIA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR
UAR	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA					

25 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	GABON
IVORY COAST	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA					

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

INDONESIA	PAKISTAN	VIETNAM REP

30 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CAMBODIA	CANADA	DENMARK	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE
GERMAN FR	ICELAND	IRAN	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JORDAN	LAOS	LUXEMBOURG	NEPAL
NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	SA'U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	UK	US

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

IRAQ	YEMEN

183 POLITIES
WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY
IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL,
RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL [25]

183 POLITIES
WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY
IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN
POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL [9]

PREDICATE ONLY

25 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	GABON
IVORY COAST	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA					

9 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	CAMBODIA	ETHIOPIA	IRAN	JORDAN	LAOS	NEPAL	SA'U ARABIA	THAILAND

3 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

INDONESIA	PAKISTAN	VIETNAM REP

76 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CEYLON
CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI
HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N
KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA
SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR
UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA				

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

IRAQ	YEMEN

****

184 POLITIES
WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY
IN POLITICS IS
INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN
NEUTRAL (21)

184 POLITIES
WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY
IN POLITICS IS
NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN
INTERVENTIVE (56)

SUBJECT ONLY

****

21 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BURMA	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	IRAQ	KOREA REP	NICARAGUA
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	TURKEY	UAR
YEMEN									

56 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD
CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	GABON
GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	UGANDA	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY				

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	FRANCE	LAOS	NEPAL	SOMALIA	VENEZUELA

31 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E
GHANA	GUINEA	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LEBANON	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	USSR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YUGOSLAVIA									

2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.66	0 19 21 37 X SQ= 7.72 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.52	6	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.84	10 9 11 47 X SQ= 6.57 P = 0.007 RV NO (YES)
10	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.86	10	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.62	3 21 18 35 X SQ= 2.83 P = 0.058 RV NO (NO)

11	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.90	11	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87)	0.68	2 18 19 38 X SQ= 2.97 P = 0.048 RV NO (NO)	
14	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.81	14	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.96	4 2 17 54 X SQ= 3.17 P = 0.044 RV NO (YES)	
15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (11)	0.57	15	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33)	0.91	4 2 3 21 X SQ= 5.14 P = 0.016 RV YES (YES)	
18	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.57	18	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.81	3 21 4 5 X SQ= 2.31 P = 0.068 RV YES (NO)	
19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.77	19	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.70	3 21 10 9 X SQ= 6.31 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
28	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.75	28	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.52	15 29 5 27 X SQ= 2.38 P = 0.112 RV NO (NO)	
30	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.62	30	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.61	13 22 8 34 X SQ= 2.31 P = 0.122 RV YES (NO)	
35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.66	0 19 21 37 X SQ= 7.72 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
36	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.95	36	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.52	1 27 20 29 X SQ= 10.65 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	

38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	38	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.86	0 8 21 48 X SQ= 1.99 P = 0.099 RV NO (NO)
41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDEROEVELOPED (94)	1.00	41	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.73	0 15 21 40 X SQ= 5.52 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)
42	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDEROEVELOPED (76)	0.90	42	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.56	2 24 19 31 X SQ= 6.41 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)
43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.67	43	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.58	7 32 14 23 X SQ= 2.83 P = 0.073 RV YES (NO)
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.68	0 18 21 38 X SQ= 7.11 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.67	45	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.57	7 32 14 24 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.077 RV YES (NO)
49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)	0.77	49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)	0.68	10 7 3 15 X SQ= 4.97 P = 0.015 RV YES (YES)
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.94	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.87	1 40 15 6 X SQ= 31.01 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.50	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.98	7 45 7 1 X SQ= 17.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.86	52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	12 47 2 0 X SQ= 3.17 P = 0.050 RV NO (YES)
53	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	1.00	53	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.77	0 13 21 43 X SQ= 4.33 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)
54	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.90	54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.55	2 25 19 31 X SQ= 6.80 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)
58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.71	58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.93	6 4 15 52 X SQ= 4.45 P = 0.021 RV NO (YES)
64	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.54	64	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.87	7 27 6 4 X SQ= 4.03 P = 0.043 RV NO (YES)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.75	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETERDGENEOUS (49)	0.55	15 24 5 29 X SQ= 4.03 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.75	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.53	15 26 5 29 X SQ= 3.50 P = 0.039 RV YES (NO)
74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.65	0 19 21 36 X SQ= 7.92 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.65	0 19 17 35 X SQ= 6.47 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)

79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.50	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.81	8 30 8 7 X SQ= 3.90 P = 0.043 RV YES (YES)		
81	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	1.00	81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.65	0 9 10 17 X SQ= 2.95 P = 0.039 RV NO (NO)		
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.89	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.62	8 11 1 18 X SQ= 5.24 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)		
86	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.86	86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.59	18 33 3 23 X SQ= 3.78 P = 0.032 RV NO (NO)		
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.85	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.57	2 27 11 20 X SQ= 5.63 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)		
92	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.90	92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	2 0 18 56 X SQ= 2.51 P = 0.067 RV NO (YES)		
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.71	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.98	4 43 10 1 X SQ= 28.70 P = 0. RV YES (YES)		
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.69	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.98	4 43 9 1 X SQ= 26.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)		
98	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	1.00	98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.73	0 15 21 41 X SQ= 5.38 P = 0.008 RV NO (NO)		

99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.94	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.82	1 28 17 6 X SQ= 25.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS ABSENT (22)	0.72	100	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.97	5 33 13 1 X SQ= 25.30 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.85	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.74	2 37 11 13 X SQ= 12.65 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.64	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.82	5 46 9 10 X SQ= 9.97 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.72	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.64	5 36 13 20 X SQ= 5.94 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.68	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.72	6 36 13 14 X SQ= 7.82 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
115	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.90	115	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.70	2 17 18 39 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.081 RV NO (NO)	
116	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.85	116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.55	3 25 17 31 X SQ= 4.36 P = 0.029 RV NO (NO)	
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.58	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.95	11 2 8 42 X SQ= 19.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.55	19 20 0 24 X SQ= 14.51 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
122	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.86	122	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.62	18 35 3 21 X SQ= 2.83 P = 0.058 RV NO (NO)	
123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	123	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.86	21 48 0 8 X SQ= 1.99 P = 0.099 RV NO (NO)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.89	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.56	17 23 2 29 X SQ= 9.81 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.69	19 36 0 16 X SQ= 5.89 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	
130	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	1.00	130	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.72	0 11 14 29 X SQ= 3.29 P = 0.028 RV NO (NO)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.92	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.62	1 25 11 15 X SQ= 8.77 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
132	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (9)	0.56	132	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.98	4 51 5 1 X SQ= 19.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.87	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.87	2 47 14 7 X SQ= 29.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	136	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.76	0 12 13 39 X SQ= 2.38 P = 0.059 RV NO (NO)
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.92	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.53	1 27 12 24 X SQ= 6.88 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
148	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.95	148	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.76	1 13 19 42 X SQ= 2.24 P = 0.095 RV NO (NO)
153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	1.00	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.71	0 24 15 10 X SQ= 18.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS UNSTABLE (25)	0.80	154	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE OR MODERATELY STABLE (55)	0.85	3 29 12 5 X SQ= 16.81 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
157	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED (14)	0.62	157	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.96	8 2 5 51 X SQ= 22.79 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.85	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.63	11 19 2 32 X SQ= 7.53 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.50	160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	6 0 6 52 X SQ= 23.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.75	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.81	9 10 3 42 X SQ= 11.98 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

164	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.87	164	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.67	2 17 14 34 X SQ= 1.68 P = 0.126 RV NO (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.86	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.56	2 31 12 24 X SQ= 6.32 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.50	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.82	7 45 7 10 X SQ= 4.49 P = 0.032 RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.83	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.62	10 21 2 34 X SQ= 6.36 P = 0.009 RV YES (ND)	
172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	172	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.64	0 20 19 36 X SQ= 7.52 P = 0.002 RV ND (NO)	
174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	174	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.51	0 27 11 28 X SQ= 7.22 P = 0.002 RV NO (ND)	
175	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.55	175	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.75	5 41 6 14 X SQ= 2.42 P = 0.076 RV YES (NO)	
176	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.64	176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	7 55 4 0 X SQ= 15.38 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.70	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.72	7 13 3 33 X SQ= 4.55 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	

181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.50	0 19 14 19 X SQ= 8.98 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
182	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.82	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.51	14 19 3 18 X SQ= 3.50 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)
187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	1.00	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	0.76	18 11 0 34 X SQ= 26.58 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW (32)	0.57	188	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)	0.73	12 15 9 41 X SQ= 4.92 P = 0.017 RV YES (NO)
190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.68	12 15 0 7 X SQ= 3.06 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)
193	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.95	193	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.70	1 17 19 39 X SQ= 3.93 P = 0.030 RV NO (NO)

185 POLITIES
WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY
IN POLITICS IS
INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN
SUPPORTIVE (21)

185 POLITIES
WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY
IN POLITICS IS
SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN
INTERVENTIVE (31)

PREDICATE ONLY

21 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BURMA	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	IRAQ	KOREA REP	NICARAGUA
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	TURKEY	UAR
YEMEN									

31 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS'KIA	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E
GHANA	GUINEA	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LEBANON	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	USSR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YUGOSLAVIA									

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	FRANCE	LAOS	NEPAL	SOMALIA	VENEZUELA

56 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD
CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	GABON
GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	UGANDA	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY				

186 POLITIES
WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY
IN POLITICS IS
SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN
NEUTRAL (31)

186 POLITIES
WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY
IN POLITICS IS
NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN
SUPPORTIVE (56)

PREDICATE ONLY

31 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS*KIA	ECUADOR	ETHIOPIA	GERMANY, E
GHANA	GUINEA	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	LEBANON	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA
POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA*U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	USSR	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP
YUGOSLAVIA									

56 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD
CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	FINLAND	GABON
GERMAN FR	GREECE	ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND
NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	RWANDA	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	UGANDA	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY				

7 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	FRANCE	LAOS	NEPAL	SOMALIA	VENEZUELA

21 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	BURMA	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	IRAQ	KOREA REP	NICARAGUA
PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	TURKEY	UAR
YEMEN									

187 POLITIES
WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE
IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)

187 POLITIES
WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE
IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

66 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	INDONESIA	IRAN
IRAQ	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
NEPAL	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL
SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR
UAR	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA				

35 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	CEYLON	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE
ICELAND	INDIA	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MAURITANIA	MEXICO	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PHILIPPINES	SIERRE LEO	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TANGANYIKA
TRINIDAD	UGANDA	UK	US	URUGUAY					

12 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINED

BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CHAD	CHILE	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	LIBYA	MALI	NIGER	PANAMA
RWANDA	UPPER VOLTA								

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

DOMIN REP PERU

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2 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93) — 0.97

2 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22) — 0.57

2	20
64	15

X SQ= 36.20
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

3 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102) — 0.97

3 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102) — 0.69

2	11
64	24

X SQ= 14.01
P = 0.
RV NO (YES)

5 TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9) — 0.82

5 ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18) — 1.00

2	16
9	0

X SQ= 16.13
P = 0.
RV YES (YES)

10	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.68	10	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.86	21 5 45 30 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.061 RV NO (NO)	
13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.80	13	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.97	13 1 53 34 X SQ= 4.11 P = 0.031 RV NO (NO)	
14	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.86	14	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.97	9 1 57 34 X SQ= 1.89 P = 0.097 RV NO (NO)	
26	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.64	26	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.57	24 20 42 15 X SQ= 3.22 P = 0.058 RV YES (NO)	
28	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.59	28	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.57	36 15 25 20 X SQ= 1.73 P = 0.142 RV YES (NO)	
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.58	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.78	25 25 35 7 X SQ= 9.76 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.67	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.83	43 6 21 29 X SQ= 20.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.95	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.57	62 15 3 20 X SQ= 32.54 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.50	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.74	33 26 33 9 X SQ= 4.60 P = 0.021 RV YES (NO)	

35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.94	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.57	4 20 62 15 X SQ= 30.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.79	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.74	14 26 52 9 X SQ= 24.76 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.56	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.80	29 28 37 7 X SQ= 10.67 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.75	39	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.57	16 20 49 15 X SQ= 9.08 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.83	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.68	11 23 53 11 X SQ= 22.78 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.67	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.83	21 29 43 6 X SQ= 20.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.91	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.54	6 19 60 16 X SQ= 22.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.65	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.80	21 28 39 7 X SQ= 16.17 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.71	47	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.68	6 19 15 9 X SQ= 5.92 P = 0.010 RV YES (YES)	

48	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (24)	0.56	48	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (30)	0.75	15 9 19 3 X SQ= 2.27 P = 0.096 RV YES (NO)
50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.93	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.94	4 31 51 2 X SQ= 61.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.70	51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	1.00	16 33 37 0 X SQ= 37.64 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.84	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.66	10 23 54 12 X SQ= 23.34 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.67	56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.89	41 31 20 4 X SQ= 4.33 P = 0.027 RV NO (NO)
58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.76	58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.97	16 1 50 34 X SQ= 6.02 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)
62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	62	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	0.64	0 5 11 9 X SQ= 2.93 P = 0.046 RV NO (YES)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.74	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.69	17 24 48 11 X SQ= 15.21 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
64	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.52	64	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.96	17 24 16 1 X SQ= 11.52 P = 0. RV NO (YES)

65	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (18)	0.59	65	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (25)	0.90	11 9 16 1 X SQ= 5.28 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.63	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.60	24 21 41 14 X SQ= 4.01 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)
70	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.87	70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.68	8 11 52 23 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.035 RV NO (YES)
71	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.84	71	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.68	10 11 53 23 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.074 RV NO (YES)
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.91	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.59	6 20 59 14 X SQ= 25.85 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.60	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.83	26 29 39 6 X SQ= 15.20 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.88	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.61	6 20 43 13 X SQ= 19.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.69	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.83	8 10 18 2 X SQ= 7.11 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)
81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.96	81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.55	1 10 22 12 X SQ= 8.18 P = 0.002 RV NO (YES)

82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.60	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.65	23 22 35 12 X SQ= 4.43 P = 0.030 RV YES (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.54	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.74	30 26 35 9 X SQ= 6.21 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
87	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.62	87	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.83	19 5 31 24 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.076 RV NO (NO)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.89	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.83	6 24 50 5 X SQ= 40.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.69	92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	20 0 44 35 X SQ= 11.84 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.52	93	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.91	29 3 32 32 X SQ= 13.50 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.80	94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	10 34 41 0 X SQ= 49.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.74	95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	46 35 16 0 X SQ= 9.02 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
96	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.53	96	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	1.00	26 34 23 0 X SQ= 19.80 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.56	99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.93	23 26 29 2 X SQ= 16.14 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.91	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.94	5 32 49 2 X SQ= 58.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.73	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.97	16 34 44 1 X SQ= 41.26 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.86	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.94	6 32 38 2 X SQ= 46.56 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	0.70	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.97	12 33 28 1 X SQ= 31.92 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.86	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.91	9 32 54 3 X SQ= 51.90 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.61	108	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	1.00	20 35 31 0 X SQ= 30.68 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.60	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.91	21 30 31 3 X SQ= 19.42 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.98	115	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.51	1 18 61 17 X SQ= 32.15 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.92	116	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.71	5	25
						57	10
						X SQ=	39.13
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.61	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.86	24	30
						38	5
						X SQ=	18.17
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.64	118	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	1.00	37	0
						21	34
						X SQ=	33.68
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.98	119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	0.71	57	10
						1	24
						X SQ=	47.94
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
120	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	1.00	120	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.71	58	24
						0	10
						X SQ=	16.22
						P =	0.
						RV NO	(YES)
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.58	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.74	38	9
						28	26
						X SQ=	8.10
						P =	0.003
						RV YES	(NO)
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.85	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.51	56	17
						10	18
						X SQ=	13.27
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)
123	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	1.00	123	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.77	66	27
						0	8
						X SQ=	13.40
						P =	0.
						RV NO	(YES)
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.87	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	0.76	48	8
						7	25
						X SQ=	32.74
						P =	0.
						RV YES	(YES)

126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.52	55 17 0 16 X SQ= 29.41 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.67	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.82	16 28 32 6 X SQ= 17.31 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.56	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.85	21 29 27 5 X SQ= 12.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.63	131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.61	10 20 17 13 X SQ= 2.42 P = 0.119 RV YES (YES)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.67	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.91	19 31 38 3 X SQ= 26.49 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
136	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	1.00	136	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (85)	0.66	0 12 52 23 X SQ= 17.90 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.96	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	0.74	2 26 50 9 X SQ= 44.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.74	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.83	13 29 37 6 X SQ= 24.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.52	139	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.94	27 2 29 33 X SQ= 16.01 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

141	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.96	141	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.73	2 9 49 24 X SQ= 7.66 P = 0.005 RV NO (YES)	
142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.82	142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.58	9 14 40 19 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.024 RV NO (YES)	
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.98	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.66	1 19 47 10 X SQ= 34.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.58	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.77	19 23 26 7 X SQ= 7.33 P = 0.004 RV YES (YES)	
157	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.79	157	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.94	11 2 41 33 X SQ= 2.80 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)	
158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.52	158	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.83	25 6 27 29 X SQ= 7.43 P = 0.003 RV NO (YES)	
160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	0.59	160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	30 0 21 34 X SQ= 28.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.69	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.79	35 7 16 27 X SQ= 16.96 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.56	164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.85	24 5 30 29 X SQ= 7.06 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	

166	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.92	166	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.77	5 8 60 27 X SQ= 3.38 P = 0.057 RV NO (YES)
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.97	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	0.79	2 27 57 7 X SQ= 54.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.75	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.97	15 33 44 1 X SQ= 41.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
170	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.55	170	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.85	25 5 30 29 X SQ= 7.57 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)
171	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.93	171	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.77	4 8 50 27 X SQ= 3.12 P = 0.055 RV NO (YES)
172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.97	172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.51	2 18 58 17 X SQ= 27.94 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.98	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	0.74	1 26 52 9 X SQ= 48.60 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.77	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.94	12 33 41 2 X SQ= 40.48 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	0.53	176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	1.00	25 35 28 0 X SQ= 24.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.64	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.74	36 9 20 26 X SQ= 11.32 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.85	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.83	45 5 8 25 X SQ= 34.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.97	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.67	1 20 37 10 X SQ= 29.28 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
183	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.61	183	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	1.00	14 5 9 0 X SQ= 1.37 P = 0.144 RV NO (NO)	
186	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	0.74	186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	1.00	31 0 11 34 X SQ= 39.38 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
189	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	1.00	189	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)	0.80	0 7 66 28 X SQ= 11.25 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
190	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	1.00	190	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN COMMON LAW (32)	0.61	15 11 0 7 X SQ= 5.26 P = 0.009 RV NO (YES)	
193	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.72	193	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)	0.89	18 4 47 31 X SQ= 2.62 P = 0.078 RV NO (NO)	
194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.80	194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	13 0 52 35 X SQ= 6.37 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	

188 POLITIES
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS CIVIL LAW (32)

188 POLITIES
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN CIVIL LAW (81)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

32 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO
NETHERLANDS	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TURKEY
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

81 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	AUSTRALIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA
CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY
DENMARK	FINLAND	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN
IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS
LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL
NEW ZEALAND	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN
YUGOSLAVIA									

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ETHIOPIA GUINEA

3	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.66	3	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE (102)	0.98
5	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN EAST EUROPE (18)	1.00	5	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST EUROPE, RATHER THAN IN SCANDINAVIA OR WEST EUROPE (9)	0.56
6	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (22)	0.59	6	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.96

11	2	
21	79	
X SQ=	19.91	
P =	0.	
RV NO	(YES)	
11	7	
0	9	
X SQ=	6.92	
P =	0.003	
RV YES	(YES)	
19	3	
13	78	
X SQ=	41.86	
P =	0.	
RV YES	(YES)	

8	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.97	8	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (97)	0.79	1 17 31 64 X SQ= 4.21 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)
10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	10	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.62	0 31 32 50 X SQ= 15.01 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
13	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.97	13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.81	1 15 31 66 X SQ= 3.30 P = 0.038 RV NO (NO)
17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.95	17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	0.77	1 10 19 3 X SQ= 15.25 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.95	20	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	0.85	1 17 19 3 X SQ= 22.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.79	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.55	23 33 6 41 X SQ= 8.77 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.78	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.59	7 47 25 32 X SQ= 11.44 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.87	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.56	28 36 4 45 X SQ= 15.61 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.68	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.57	21 34 10 45 X SQ= 4.49 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)

45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.72	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.57	23 32 9 43 X SQ= 6.54 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)
46	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	1.00	46	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.68	32 52 0 25 X SQ= 11.71 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.70	47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.56	7 18 16 14 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.099 RV YES (YES)
51	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.78	51	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.57	21 39 6 29 X SQ= 2.64 P = 0.098 RV NO (NO)
52	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.96	52	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.78	27 53 1 15 X SQ= 3.64 P = 0.034 RV NO (NO)
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.58	32 46 0 33 X SQ= 17.08 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
56	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.84	56	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.68	27 52 5 24 X SQ= 2.16 P = 0.101 RV NO (NO)
57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC (25)	0.66	57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.95	21 4 11 77 X SQ= 45.57 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.97	58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.79	1 17 31 64 X SQ= 4.21 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)

62	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC, RATHER THAN PROTESTANT (25)	1.00	62	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PROTESTANT, RATHER THAN CATHOLIC (5)	0.56	0 5 21 4 X SQ= 10.29 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.78	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.74	25 21 7 59 X SQ= 23.32 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.75	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.54	24 33 8 39 X SQ= 6.48 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.69	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.62	22 30 10 50 X SQ= 7.76 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.81	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.52	26 38 6 42 X SQ= 9.30 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
72	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	1.00	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.74	31 20 0 58 X SQ= 46.33 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.94	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.60	30 32 2 48 X SQ= 24.59 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.95	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.80	18 10 1 39 X SQ= 28.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
78	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.95	78	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.63	18 10 1 6 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.032 RV NO (YES)

79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.94	79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.98	1 47 17 1 X SQ= 51.74 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.72	30 21 0 54 X SQ= 41.63 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	1.00	86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.54	32 43 0 37 X SQ= 20.06 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
87	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.88	87	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.56	3 27 22 35 X SQ= 6.51 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)	
89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	0.74	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.77	17 16 6 54 X SQ= 17.55 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	1.00	92	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.76	0 19 31 61 X SQ= 7.29 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
93	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.94	93	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.62	2 29 29 48 X SQ= 9.05 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.76	94	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.52	22 29 7 32 X SQ= 5.32 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
95	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.94	95	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.82	29 64 2 14 X SQ= 1.51 P = 0.148 RV NO (NO)	

99	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.59	99	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.67	12 37 17 18 X SQ= 4.23 P = 0.035 RV YES (NO)
101	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.59	101	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUOO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.64	17 24 12 43 X SQ= 3.42 P = 0.045 RV YES (NO)
102	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.77	102	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUOO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.53	23 36 7 40 X SQ= 6.34 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)
105	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.78	105	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.64	21 22 6 39 X SQ= 11.42 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
107	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.68	107	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATEO IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIOE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.68	21 25 10 53 X SQ= 10.17 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
114	TILT TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.57	114	TILT TOWARO BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MOOERATE (61)	0.60	12 47 16 31 X SQ= 1.87 P = 0.126 RV YES (NO)
116	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.53	116	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.80	16 16 14 63 X SQ= 9.93 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)
117	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MOOERATE, OR LIMITEO (60)	0.87	117	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.57	26 34 4 45 X SQ= 15.01 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
118	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MOOERATE, OR LIMITEO (60)	0.78	118	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MOOERATE, OR LIMITEO (60)	0.53	7 31 25 35 X SQ= 4.71 P = 0.026 RV NO (NO)

121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.94	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.62	2 50 30 31 X SQ= 26.23 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.53	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.81	15 66 17 15 X SQ= 11.88 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
124	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	1.00	124	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS OCCASIONAL, INFREQUENT, OR VERY INFREQUENT (85)	0.80	0 14 27 56 X SQ= 4.80 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.75	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.58	21 27 7 37 X SQ= 7.14 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.89	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.52	25 31 3 33 X SQ= 11.98 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.71	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.56	7 23 17 18 X SQ= 3.40 P = 0.043 RV YES (NO)	
133	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.87	133	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.67	4 24 26 49 X SQ= 3.17 P = 0.052 RV NO (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.82	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.63	23 25 5 42 X SQ= 14.13 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
139	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.90	139	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.59	3 30 27 43 X SQ= 8.07 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)	

142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.57	142	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.79	16 14 12 52 X SQ= 10.09 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)
144	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN ONE-PARTY (11)	0.60	144	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.79	2 31 3 8 X SQ= 1.88 P = 0.091 RV YES (NO)
146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	146	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.90	0 7 29 63 X SQ= 1.78 P = 0.102 RV NO (NO)
148	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	1.00	148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.82	0 14 31 64 X SQ= 4.88 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.68	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.63	9 32 19 19 X SQ= 5.61 P = 0.011 RV YES (YES)
158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.57	158	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.65	17 23 13 42 X SQ= 2.99 P = 0.073 RV YES (NO)
163	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.97	163	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (87)	0.85	1 10 31 56 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.096 RV NO (NO)
164	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.97	164	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.52	1 31 31 34 X SQ= 17.30 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.83	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.55	25 33 5 41 X SQ= 11.46 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.55	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.70	17 21 14 48 X SQ= 4.42 P = 0.026 RV YES (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.76	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.58	22 29 7 40 X SQ= 8.06 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.71	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.61	9 43 22 28 X SQ= 7.37 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
179	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.62	179	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.63	9 41 15 24 X SQ= 3.68 P = 0.053 RV YES (NO)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.55	23 31 0 25 X SQ= 13.03 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.80	185	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.74	12 9 3 26 X SQ= 10.57 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
186	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.83	186	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.61	3 26 15 41 X SQ= 2.19 P = 0.098 RV NO (NO)	
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.84	0 13 32 67 X SQ= 4.41 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	

189	POLITIES WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS COMMON LAW (7)	189	POLITIES WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS OTHER THAN COMMON LAW (108)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

7 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	IRELAND	JAMAICA	NEW ZEALAND	TRINIDAD	UK	US

108 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS*KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA
GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ISRAEL
ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA
LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS
NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND
PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR
UAR	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA		

2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22)	0.71	2	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.84	5 17 2 91 X SQ= 9.82 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
10	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	1.00	10	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.69	0 33 7 75 X SQ= 1.69 P = 0.107 RV NO (NO)
29	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	1.00	29	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.51	6 50 0 49 X SQ= 3.76 P = 0.029 RV NO (NO)
30	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	1.00	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.53	0 56 7 50 X SQ= 5.37 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)

31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.71	31	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.82	2 88 5 19 X SQ= 8.39 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.71	35	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.82	5 19 2 89 X SQ= 8.51 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	1.00	36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.68	7 35 0 73 X SQ= 10.20 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED (19)	0.57	41	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.86	4 15 3 91 X SQ= 5.88 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.71	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.70	5 31 2 74 X SQ= 3.54 P = 0.034 RV YES (NO)	
43	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	1.00	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.54	7 48 0 57 X SQ= 5.72 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.71	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.81	5 20 2 88 X SQ= 7.93 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.53	7 48 0 54 X SQ= 5.38 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	1.00	50	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERMITTENT, INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (56)	0.61	7 36 0 56 X SQ= 7.49 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	

53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (14)	0.57	53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.91	4 10 3 98 X SQ= 9.97 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.71	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.70	5 32 2 74 X SQ= 3.37 P = 0.037 RV YES (NO)	
55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.67	7 71 0 35 X SQ= 1.98 P = 0.097 RV NO (NO)	
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.70	7 72 0 31 X SQ= 1.63 P = 0.109 RV NO (NO)	
63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.86	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.63	6 40 1 67 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.017 RV YES (NO)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.86	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.57	1 56 6 43 X SQ= 3.15 P = 0.047 RV YES (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.86	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.57	6 46 1 61 X SQ= 3.27 P = 0.046 RV YES (NO)	
69	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	1.00	69	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.53	7 57 0 50 X SQ= 4.08 P = 0.018 RV NO (NO)	
74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.71	74	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.80	5 21 2 85 X SQ= 7.18 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	

75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	1.00	75	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.51	7 55 0 52 X SQ= 4.45 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.71	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.76	5 21 2 68 X SQ= 5.29 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	1.00	80	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.60	3 16 0 24 X SQ= 2.00 P = 0.079 RV YES (NO)	
81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED (11)	0.80	81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.85	4 7 1 39 X SQ= 7.69 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS CONVENTIONAL (33)	1.00	89	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.69	5 28 0 62 X SQ= 7.11 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
93	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	1.00	93	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (78)	0.69	0 32 7 71 X SQ= 1.75 P = 0.104 RV NO (NO)	
94	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	1.00	94	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.52	7 44 0 41 X SQ= 4.29 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.71	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.84	5 17 2 91 X SQ= 9.82 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	99	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.56	5 45 0 36 X SQ= 2.21 P = 0.072 RV NO (NO)	

101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	1.00	101	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.63	7 34 0 57 X SQ= 8.06 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	1.00	105	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.57	7 36 0 47 X SQ= 6.18 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	1.00	107	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.62	7 39 0 65 X SQ= 8.14 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
110	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH (15)	0.57	110	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.87	4 11 3 77 X SQ= 6.65 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	
111	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	1.00	111	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.52	7 46 0 42 X SQ= 4.21 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
115	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (20)	0.57	115	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.85	4 16 3 88 X SQ= 5.17 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)	
116	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (32)	0.71	116	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.74	5 27 2 77 X SQ= 4.58 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	
117	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	1.00	117	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.51	7 53 0 51 X SQ= 4.53 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)	
119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	1.00	119	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.80	0 74 7 19 X SQ= 17.49 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

120	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARITUCLATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED (10)	0.57	120	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.94	3 87 4 6 X SQ= 13.38 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
121	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	1.00	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.50	0 54 7 54 X SQ= 4.74 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (32)	0.71	122	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.75	2 81 5 27 X SQ= 4.93 P = 0.017 RV YES (NO)	
125	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	1.00	125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.69	0 64 6 29 X SQ= 8.86 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.67	126	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.87	2 81 4 12 X SQ= 8.38 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.86	128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.51	6 42 1 44 X SQ= 2.20 P = 0.112 RV YES (NO)	
130	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (12)	0.57	130	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.89	4 8 3 68 X SQ= 7.81 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
131	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	1.00	131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.60	7 23 0 35 X SQ= 6.89 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	1.00	134	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.52	7 50 0 46 X SQ= 4.28 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	

137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	1.00	137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.76	7 22 0 68 X SQ= 14.27 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	1.00	139	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.65	0 34 7 64 X SQ= 2.18 P = 0.093 RV NO (NO)
141	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY (11)	0.71	141	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.93	5 6 2 85 X SQ= 21.30 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
145	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY, RATHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (11)	0.83	145	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (30)	0.83	1 29 5 6 X SQ= 8.31 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)
147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (23)	0.83	147	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.79	5 18 1 66 X SQ= 8.26 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	1.00	153	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.51	5 37 0 38 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.056 RV YES (NO)
158	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	1.00	158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.55	0 40 7 49 X SQ= 3.70 P = 0.021 RV NO (NO)
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	1.00	160	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.67	0 30 7 60 X SQ= 2.00 P = 0.095 RV NO (NO)
168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	1.00	168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.73	7 27 0 72 X SQ= 12.71 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.71	172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.84	5 16 2 86 X SQ= 9.75 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	1.00	174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.77	7 21 0 72 X SQ= 15.71 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.86	178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.54	1 52 6 45 X SQ= 2.62 P = 0.058 RV YES (NO)	
179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	1.00	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.62	0 52 7 32 X SQ= 7.74 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	
181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.71	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.77	5 16 2 53 X SQ= 5.18 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	1.00	186	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.61	0 31 7 49 X SQ= 2.69 P = 0.047 RV NO (NO)	
187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	1.00	187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.70	0 66 7 28 X SQ= 11.25 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

190 POLITIES
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS CIVIL LAW, RATHER THAN
COMMON LAW (32)

190 POLITIES
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS COMMON LAW, RATHER THAN
CIVIL LAW (7)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

32 IN LEFT COLUMN

ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	FRANCE	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO
NETHERLANDS	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TURKEY
URUGUAY	VENEZUELA								

7 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AUSTRALIA	IRELAND	JAMAICA	NEW ZEALAND	TRINIDAD	UK	US

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ETHIOPIA	GUINEA

74 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP
CEYLON	CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LED)	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK
FINLAND	GABON	GERMANY, E	GHANA	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ
ISRAEL	IVORY COAST	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA
MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY
PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA
SUDAN	SWEDEN	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UPPER VOLTA
VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA						

2	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.66	2	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (22)	0.71	11 5 21 2 X SQ= 1.91 P = 0.101 RV YES (NO)	
31	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.66	31	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS LOW OR VERY LOW (24)	0.71	21 2 11 5 X SQ= 1.91 P = 0.101 RV YES (NO)	
35	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.72	35	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH OR HIGH (24)	0.71	9 5 23 2 X SQ= 2.99 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	

36	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.56	36	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	1.00	14 7 18 0 X SQ= 5.22 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
38	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.91	38	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.57	3 3 29 4 X SQ= 2.71 P = 0.059 RV NO (YES)	
44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.78	44	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (25)	0.71	7 5 25 2 X SQ= 4.50 P = 0.020 RV YES (NO)	
47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.70	47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.71	7 5 16 2 X SQ= 2.24 P = 0.084 RV YES (NO)	
50	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	0.56	50	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE (43)	1.00	15 7 12 0 X SQ= 3.06 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)	
53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (101)	0.91	53	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS THREE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (14)	0.57	3 4 29 3 X SQ= 5.95 P = 0.012 RV YES (YES)	
57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CATHOLIC (25)	0.66	57	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.86	21 1 11 6 X SQ= 4.25 P = 0.030 RV YES (NO)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.75	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.86	24 1 8 6 X SQ= 6.75 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
72	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	1.00	72	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.57	31 4 0 3 X SQ= 9.13 P = 0.004 RV NO (YES)	

74	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.66	74	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN (26)	0.71	11 5 21 2 X SQ= 1.91 P = 0.101 RV YES (NO)	
79	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF SPAIN, RATHER THAN BRITAIN OR FRANCE (18)	0.94	79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	1 6 17 0 X SQ= 15.13 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.83	81	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED (11)	0.80	5 4 25 1 X SQ= 5.99 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	1.00	82	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.71	30 5 0 2 X SQ= 4.33 P = 0.032 RV NO (YES)	
86	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	1.00	86	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.71	32 5 0 2 X SQ= 4.66 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)	
98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.81	98	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES AT LEAST FROM THE INTERWAR PERIOD (22)	0.71	6 5 26 2 X SQ= 5.48 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
99	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.59	99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	12 5 17 0 X SQ= 3.75 P = 0.044 RV YES (NO)	
101	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.59	101	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	1.00	17 7 12 0 X SQ= 2.68 P = 0.070 RV NO (NO)	
110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.85	110	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH (15)	0.57	4 4 23 3 X SQ= 3.43 P = 0.037 RV YES (YES)	

119	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.69	119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE OR LIMITED (26)	1.00	22 0 10 7 X SQ= 8.42 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
120	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT, OR MODERATE (90)	0.97	120	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARITUCLATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED (10)	0.57	31 3 1 4 X SQ= 10.55 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	
123	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.94	123	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (107)	0.71	30 5 2 2 X SQ= 1.16 P = 0.141 RV NO (YES)	
125	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.56	125	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS INFREQUENT OR VERY INFREQUENT (35)	1.00	15 0 12 6 X SQ= 4.08 P = 0.021 RV YES (NO)	
126	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.78	126	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS VERY INFREQUENT (16)	0.67	21 2 6 4 X SQ= 2.73 P = 0.053 RV YES (NO)	
130	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (71)	0.89	130	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT (12)	0.57	3 4 24 3 X SQ= 4.66 P = 0.020 RV YES (YES)	
131	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.71	131	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	1.00	7 7 17 0 X SQ= 8.31 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.53	134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	1.00	14 7 16 0 X SQ= 4.58 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
137	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.61	137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (29)	1.00	11 7 17 0 X SQ= 6.01 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	

141	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN TWO-PARTY (87)	0.89	141	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY TWO-PARTY (11)	0.71	3 5 25 2 X SQ= 8.52 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)	
142	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY MULTI-PARTY (30)	0.57	142	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.86	16 1 12 6 X SQ= 2.58 P = 0.088 RV YES (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.68	153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	1.00	9 5 19 0 X SQ= 5.46 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.57	158	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	1.00	17 0 13 7 X SQ= 5.23 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
168	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.53	168	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT (34)	1.00	14 7 16 0 X SQ= 4.58 P = 0.012 RV YES (NO)	
170	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.55	170	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.86	17 1 14 6 X SQ= 2.32 P = 0.093 RV YES (NO)	
172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	0.87	172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.71	4 5 26 2 X SQ= 7.49 P = 0.005 RV YES (YES)	
174	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, LARGELY INEFFECTIVE, OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.72	174	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE (28)	1.00	8 7 21 0 X SQ= 9.37 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
179	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.62	179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	1.00	9 0 15 7 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.077 RV NO (NO)	

181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.74	181	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.71	8 23	5 2
						X SQ=	3.45
						P =	0.034
						RV YES	(NO)
187	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.58	187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (35)	1.00	15 11	0 7
						X SQ=	5.26
						P =	0.009
						RV YES	(NO)

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191  POLITIES                                                  191  POLITIES
     WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM                         WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
     IS MIXED CIVIL-MUSLIM-INDIGENOUS,                               IS MIXED COMMON-MUSLIM-INDIGENOUS,
     RATHER THAN                                                     RATHER THAN
     MIXED COMMON-MUSLIM-INDIGENOUS  (8)                             MIXED CIVIL-MUSLIM-INDIGENOUS  (5)

                                                                                                          SUBJECT ONLY
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8 IN LEFT COLUMN

CHAD	DAHOMEY	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	MALI	NIGER	SENEGAL	UPPER VOLTA

5 IN RIGHT COLUMN

GHANA	NIGERIA	SIERRE LEO	TANGANYIKA	UGANDA

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ETHIOPIA	GUINEA

100 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
BURMA	BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA
CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR
FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY
ICELAND	INDIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN
KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA
SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY
USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA

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24  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.87        24  TEND TO BE THOSE                          0.80        1    4
    WHOSE POPULATION IS                                       WHOSE POPULATION IS                                   7    1
    SMALL  (54)                                               VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM  (61)          X SQ=   3.41
                                                                                                          P =    0.032
                                                                                                          RV YES (YES)

28  LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE                   0.87        28  LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE                   0.75        7    1
    WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE                              WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE                          1    3
    IS HIGH  (62)                                             IS LOW  (48)                                X SQ=   2.30
                                                                                                          P =    0.067
                                                                                                          RV YES (YES)

48  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                          1.00        48  ALWAYS ARE THOSE                          1.00        1    0
    WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS                                WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS                            0    2
    BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT,                         BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT,              X SQ=   0.19
    RATHER THAN BETWEEN                                       RATHER THAN BETWEEN                         P =    0.333
    TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT  (30)                               FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT  (24)              RV YES (YES)
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80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	1.00	80	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	1.00	0 5 7 0 X SQ= 8.24 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	1.00	99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	0 1 2 0 X SQ= 0.19 P = 0.333 RV YES (YES)	
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.80	0 4 8 1 X SQ= 5.87 P = 0.007 RV YES (YES)	
105	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	1.00	105	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.50	0 2 7 2 X SQ= 1.58 P = 0.109 RV YES (YES)	
107	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	1.00	107	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.60	0 2 8 3 X SQ= 1.33 P = 0.128 RV NO (YES)	
129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	1.00	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.60	0 3 7 2 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.045 RV YES (YES)	
133	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	1.00	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.60	8 2 0 3 X SQ= 3.32 P = 0.035 RV YES (YES)	
138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	1.00	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.60	0 3 7 2 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.045 RV YES (YES)	
139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	1.00	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.60	7 2 0 3 X SQ= 2.86 P = 0.045 RV YES (YES)	

158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.87	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.80	7 1	1 4
						X SQ=	3.41
						P =	0.032
						RV YES	(YES)
161	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	1.00	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.67	0 8	2 1
						X SQ=	2.81
						P =	0.055
						RV YES	(YES)
166	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	1.00	166	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.60	0 8	2 3
						X SQ=	1.33
						P =	0.128
						RV NO	(YES)
172	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (88)	1.00	172	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PARLIAMENTARY-ROYALIST (21)	0.60	0 8	3 2
						X SQ=	3.32
						P =	0.035
						RV YES	(YES)
175	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	1.00	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.60	0 8	3 2
						X SQ=	3.32
						P =	0.035
						RV YES	(YES)
179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	179	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.50	6 0	2 2
						X SQ=	1.28
						P =	0.133
						RV YES	(YES)

192 POLITIES
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (27)

192 POLITIES
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN
MUSLIM OR PARTLY MUSLIM (86)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

27 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	CHAD	DAHOMEY	GHANA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IVORY COAST	JORDAN	LIBYA	MALAYA
MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO	NIGER	NIGERIA	PAKISTAN	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SUDAN
SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UAR	UPPER VOLTA	YEMEN			

86 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA
BURUNDI	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND
FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND
INDIA	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS
LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA
NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SOMALIA
SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	USSR	UK
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YUGOSLAVIA				

2 EXCLUDED BECAUSE AMBIGUOUS

ETHIOPIA GUINEA

2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.74	0 22 27 64 X SQ= 7.02 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
6	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	1.00	6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.74	0 22 27 64 X SQ= 7.02 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.70	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.86	19 12 8 74 X SQ= 30.08 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.63	13	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.93	10 6 17 80 X SQ= 12.90 P = 0. RV NO (YES)
17	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (11)	1.00	17	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (22)	0.79	5 6 0 22 X SQ= 8.52 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.86	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.56	19 12 3 15 X SQ= 7.45 P = 0.003 RV YES (YES)
20	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	1.00	20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.59	3 15 0 22 X SQ= 1.93 P = 0.083 RV YES (NO)
21	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE OR LARGE (32)	0.52	21	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.80	14 17 13 69 X SQ= 9.08 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
25	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	1.00	25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.80	0 17 27 69 X SQ= 4.83 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.85	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.51	4 44 23 42 X SQ= 9.67 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.77	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.51	20 41 6 42 X SQ= 5.02 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)
29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.73	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.64	7 49 19 28 X SQ= 9.13 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)

30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.81	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.61	21 33 5 52 X SQ= 12.39 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
31	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	1.00	31	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.72	26 62 0 24 X SQ= 7.65 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	32	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.88	0 10 27 76 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.114 RV NO (NO)	
33	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.93	33	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.67	2 28 25 58 X SQ= 5.44 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.67	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.60	9 52 18 34 X SQ= 5.05 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.72	0 24 27 62 X SQ= 7.97 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
36	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.96	36	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.52	1 41 26 45 X SQ= 15.18 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.78	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.67	6 58 21 28 X SQ= 15.32 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	38	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.88	0 10 27 74 X SQ= 2.23 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)	

39	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.89	39	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.59	3 35 24 50 X SQ= 6.98 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
40	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.50	40	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.70	13 57 13 25 X SQ= 2.50 P = 0.098 RV YES (ND)	
42	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	1.00	42	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.57	0 36 26 48 X SQ= 14.67 P = 0. RV NO (ND)	
43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.88	43	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.62	3 52 23 32 X SQ= 18.18 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	44	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.71	0 25 27 61 X SQ= 8.46 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.96	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.67	1 54 26 26 X SQ= 30.39 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.52	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.86	12 72 13 12 X SQ= 13.44 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.56	0 37 27 47 X SQ= 15.91 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.67	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.82	9 69 18 15 X SQ= 21.02 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

57	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	1.00	57	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN CATHOLIC (90)	0.71	0 25 27 61 X SQ= 8.46 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM (18)	0.52	58	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.95	14 4 13 82 X SQ= 30.75 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.54	0 46 27 39 X SQ= 22.61 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.78	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.54	6 46 21 39 X SQ= 7.15 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.74	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.67	7 57 20 28 X SQ= 12.53 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.96	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.61	1 50 26 32 X SQ= 24.51 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.85	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.73	4 60 23 22 X SQ= 26.18 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
74	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	1.00	74	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN (87)	0.69	0 26 27 58 X SQ= 9.26 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	0.93	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.71	2 60 25 25 X SQ= 30.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.63	0 26 25 44 X SQ= 10.98 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.92	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.60	2 26 23 17 X SQ= 15.86 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.59	22 26 0 18 X SQ= 10.40 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
82	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	1.00	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.65	0 51 26 28 X SQ= 30.10 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.69	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.60	8 52 18 34 X SQ= 5.93 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)
86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.65	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.77	9 66 17 20 X SQ= 14.17 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.85	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.81	17 13 3 54 X SQ= 26.50 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
89	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	1.00	89	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.53	0 33 23 37 X SQ= 14.81 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.81	26 67 0 16 X SQ= 4.44 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)

96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.53	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.83	8 59 9 12 X SQ= 7.92 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.57	9 12 0 16 X SQ= 6.88 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	
98	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.96	98	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.76	1 21 26 65 X SQ= 4.38 P = 0.023 RV NO (NO)	
101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.82	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.50	4 37 18 37 X SQ= 5.78 P = 0.013 RV YES (NO)	
102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.68	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.63	8 51 17 30 X SQ= 6.22 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.83	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.57	3 40 15 30 X SQ= 7.84 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.88	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.52	3 43 23 40 X SQ= 11.56 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.78	0 15 25 53 X SQ= 5.05 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)	
114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.76	114	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.51	19 40 6 41 X SQ= 4.46 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)	

116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.61	0 / 27	32 / 50
						X SQ= 13.09	
						P = D.	
						RV ND (ND)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.70	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.63	8 / 19	52 / 30
						X SQ= 8.05	
						P = 0.003	
						RV YES (NO)	
119	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	1.00	119	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT OR SIGNIFICANT (74)	0.67	20 / 0	52 / 26
						X SQ= 7.44	
						P = 0.001	
						RV NO (NO)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.81	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.65	22 / 5	30 / 56
						X SQ= 16.13	
						P = D.	
						RV YES (NO)	
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.63	27 / 0	54 / 32
						X SQ= 12.24	
						P = D.	
						RV ND (NO)	
125	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.84	125	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.57	21 / 4	41 / 31
						X SQ= 4.78	
						P = 0.017	
						RV NO (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.78	25 / 0	56 / 16
						X SQ= 5.14	
						P = 0.010	
						RV NO (NO)	
128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.67	128	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.57	6 / 12	42 / 32
						X SQ= 2.31	
						P = 0.113	
						RV YES (NO)	
129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.61	129	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.66	7 / 11	49 / 25
						X SQ= 3.46	
						P = 0.057	
						RV YES (NO)	

132	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	1.00	132	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (67)	0.84	18 48 0 9 X SQ= 1.91 P = 0.103 RV NO (NO)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.62	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.84	15 13 9 66 X SQ= 17.46 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.62	0 29 18 48 X SQ= 8.06 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.76	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.56	4 44 13 34 X SQ= 4.79 P = 0.017 RV YES (NO)	
139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	0.57	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.75	13 20 10 60 X SQ= 6.77 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
140	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	1.00	140	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE PARTY DOMINANT (87)	0.83	0 13 20 65 X SQ= 2.53 P = 0.064 RV NO (NO)	
142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.89	142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.63	2 28 16 48 X SQ= 3.33 P = 0.048 RV NO (NO)	
144	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.93	144	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.67	13 20 1 10 X SQ= 2.23 P = 0.076 RV NO (NO)	
146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.68	146	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	1.00	7 0 15 77 X SQ= 21.74 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	

147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.68	0 23 18 48 X SQ= 6.26 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	
153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.80	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.57	2 39 8 30 X SQ= 3.32 P = 0.043 RV YES (NO)	
160	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.89	160	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.65	2 27 16 50 X SQ= 2.90 P = 0.052 RV NO (NO)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.86	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.83	19 13 3 62 X SQ= 33.61 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.71	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.64	7 51 17 29 X SQ= 7.60 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)	
171	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	1.00	171	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY-REPUBLICAN (90)	0.85	0 12 21 67 X SQ= 2.33 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.71	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.58	6 45 15 32 X SQ= 4.76 P = 0.025 RV YES (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.73	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.55	16 36 6 44 X SQ= 4.26 P = 0.030 RV YES (NO)	
179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.81	179	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.51	17 33 4 35 X SQ= 5.60 P = 0.011 RV YES (NO)	

181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	181	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.69	0 21 7 47 X SQ= 1.67 P = 0.105 RV NO (NO)
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.67	182	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.81	7 47 14 11 X SQ= 14.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.85	0 13 27 72 X SQ= 3.30 P = 0.036 RV NO (NO)

193 POLITIES
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS PARTLY INDIGENOUS (28)

193 POLITIES
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

28 IN LEFT COLUMN

BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	GABON	GHANA
GUINEA	INDONESIA	IVORY COAST	LAOS	LIBERIA	MALAGASY R	MALI	NIGER	NIGERIA	RWANDA
SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	UGANDA	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP		

86 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA
CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS*KIA
DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GREECE	GUATEMALA
HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY
JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAYA	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA
PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SA*U ARABIA	SOMALIA	SPAIN	SUDAN
SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND	TRINIDAD	TUNISIA	TURKEY	USSR	UAR	UK
US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA				

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE UNASCERTAINABLE

BURMA

2	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	1.00	2	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN WEST EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, NORTH AMERICA, OR AUSTRALASIA (93)	0.74	0 22 28 64 X SQ= 7.31 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
6	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	1.00	6	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (93)	0.74	0 22 28 64 X SQ= 7.31 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)	0.89	10	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA, OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)	0.91	25 8 3 78 X SQ= 61.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

13	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	1.00	13	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99)	0.81	0 16 28 70 X SQ= 4.62 P = 0.011 RV NO (NO)
14	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	1.00	14	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104)	0.87	0 11 28 75 X SQ= 2.63 P = 0.063 RV NO (NO)
18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)	0.89	18	TEND TO BE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (18)	0.64	25 8 3 14 X SQ= 13.11 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
20	ALWAYS ARE THOSE LOCATED IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (18)	1.00	20	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR SOUTHEAST ASIA (22)	0.61	3 14 0 22 X SQ= 2.09 P = 0.074 RV YES (NO)
22	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.75	22	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (68)	0.53	21 46 7 40 X SQ= 3.20 P = 0.050 RV NO (NO)
23	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.93	23	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)	0.72	2 24 26 62 X SQ= 4.06 P = 0.022 RV NO (NO)
24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.68	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.59	9 51 19 35 X SQ= 5.21 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)
25	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	1.00	25	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.80	0 17 28 69 X SQ= 5.04 P = 0.006 RV NO (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.82	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.50	5 43 23 43 X SQ= 7.68 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)

29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS LOW (49)	0.96	29	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IS HIGH (56)	0.71	1 55 26 22 X SQ= 34.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH (56)	0.93	30	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (57)	0.65	26 29 2 55 X SQ= 26.31 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
32	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	1.00	32	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.88	0 10 28 76 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.066 RV NO (NO)	
33	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.93	33	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.67	2 28 26 58 X SQ= 5.79 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (53)	0.79	34	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (62)	0.64	6 55 22 31 X SQ= 13.69 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
35	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	1.00	35	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (91)	0.72	0 24 28 62 X SQ= 8.29 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
36	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.96	36	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.52	1 41 27 45 X SQ= 15.81 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.96	37	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.73	1 63 27 23 X SQ= 38.87 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
38	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	1.00	38	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.88	0 10 28 74 X SQ= 2.34 P = 0.064 RV NO (NO)	

39	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.93	39	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.58	2 36 26 49 X SQ= 10.17 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
40	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.71	40	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.77	8 62 20 19 X SQ= 18.80 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
41	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	1.00	41	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS INTERMEDIATE, UNDERDEVELOPED, OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (94)	0.77	0 19 28 65 X SQ= 6.11 P = 0.003 RV NO (NO)	
42	TENO MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.96	42	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.58	1 35 27 48 X SQ= 12.53 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
43	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.96	43	TENO TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.64	1 53 27 30 X SQ= 28.09 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
44	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	1.00	44	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.71	0 25 28 61 X SQ= 8.80 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
45	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.93	45	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	0.64	2 52 25 29 X SQ= 23.90 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
46	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.74	46	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.93	7 76 20 6 X SQ= 46.23 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
52	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	1.00	52	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.80	18 63 0 16 X SQ= 3.02 P = 0.037 RV NO (NO)	

54	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	1.00	54	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.56	0 37 28 47 X SQ= 16.48 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.86	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.87	4 73 24 11 X SQ= 48.22 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.93	56	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.93	2 76 25 6 X SQ= 68.45 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
63	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	1.00	63	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY SOME KIND OF CHRISTIAN (46)	0.54	0 46 28 39 X SQ= 23.36 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.92	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.67	2 54 22 27 X SQ= 23.02 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.89	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.58	3 49 25 36 X SQ= 16.83 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.86	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.71	4 60 24 25 X SQ= 24.94 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
70	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	1.00	70	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY, RACIALLY, OR LINGUISTICALLY HETEROGENEOUS (85)	0.73	0 21 25 58 X SQ= 6.76 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)
72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914 (59)	0.89	72	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1914 (52)	0.60	3 49 25 33 X SQ= 18.22 P = 0. RV YES (NO)

73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.89	73	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.76	3 62 25 20 X SQ= 33.73 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
75	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NOT HISTORICALLY WESTERN AND ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (52)	1.00	75	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN OR SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED (62)	0.72	0 62 27 24 X SQ= 40.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
76	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	1.00	76	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.62	0 26 26 43 X SQ= 11.66 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
77	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	1.00	77	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.65	0 28 25 15 X SQ= 25.05 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
79	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	1.00	79	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RATHER THAN SPAIN (49)	0.59	22 26 0 18 X SQ= 10.40 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF FRANCE, RATHER THAN BRITAIN (24)	0.76	80	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1914, AND THAT WERE FORMERLY DEPENDENCIES OF BRITAIN, RATHER THAN FRANCE (19)	0.62	5 13 16 8 X SQ= 4.76 P = 0.028 RV YES (YES)
82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.96	82	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.64	1 50 26 28 X SQ= 26.92 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.85	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.93	4 26 22 2 X SQ= 29.71 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
85	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	1.00	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.71	0 60 28 25 X SQ= 39.35 P = 0. RV YES (YES)

86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.93	86	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.87	2 74 26 11 X SQ= 57.51 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.87	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.83	20 11 3 55 X SQ= 34.09 P = 0. RV YES (YES)
89	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.96	89	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN CONVENTIONAL (62)	0.54	1 32 23 38 X SQ= 11.78 P = 0. RV NO (NO)
91	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.95	91	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.73	20 11 1 4 X SQ= 1.92 P = 0.138 RV NO (YES)
94	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN (41)	0.67	94	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL (51)	0.59	4 47 8 32 X SQ= 1.93 P = 0.121 RV YES (NO)
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	1.00	95	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.81	26 68 0 16 X SQ= 4.36 P = 0.012 RV NO (NO)
96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN (23)	0.64	96	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR TOTALITARIAN (67)	0.81	4 63 7 15 X SQ= 7.97 P = 0.004 RV YES (NO)
97	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS AUTHORITARIAN, RATHER THAN TOTALITARIAN (23)	1.00	97	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN, RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN (16)	0.52	7 15 0 16 X SQ= 4.30 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)
98	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.93	98	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (93)	0.77	2 20 26 66 X SQ= 2.56 P = 0.095 RV NO (NO)

101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS LIMITED POLYARCHIC, PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC, OR NON-POLYARCHIC (57)	0.90	101	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC (41)	0.51	2 39 19 37 X SQ= 10.13 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
102	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	0.59	102	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.60	11 48 16 32 X SQ= 2.30 P = 0.117 RV YES (NO)
105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE OR NON-COMPETITIVE (47)	0.86	105	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE (43)	0.59	3 40 19 28 X SQ= 11.85 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.88	107	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (46)	0.51	3 43 23 41 X SQ= 11.25 P = 0. RV YES (NO)
108	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	0.50	108	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.69	11 54 11 24 X SQ= 2.01 P = 0.129 RV YES (NO)
110	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	1.00	110	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.78	0 15 25 54 X SQ= 4.95 P = 0.009 RV NO (NO)
111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS LOW (42)	0.64	111	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (53)	0.62	9 43 16 26 X SQ= 4.13 P = 0.034 RV YES (NO)
114	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.73	114	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.51	19 41 7 40 X SQ= 3.17 P = 0.068 RV NO (NO)
115	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	1.00	115	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (91)	0.76	0 20 28 62 X SQ= 6.79 P = 0.002 RV NO (NO)

116	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.96	116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.62	1 31 27 51 X SQ= 10.26 P = D. RV NO (NO)	
117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.93	117	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	D.70	2 57 26 25 X SQ= 30.19 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT (54)	0.96	121	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (61)	0.70	27 26 1 60 X SQ= 34.59 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
122	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	1.00	122	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.63	28 54 0 32 X SQ= 12.70 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
125	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.86	125	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT OR OCCASIONAL (64)	0.56	24 39 4 31 X SQ= 6.59 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
126	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	1.00	126	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS IS FREQUENT, OCCASIONAL, OR INFREQUENT (83)	0.77	28 54 0 16 X SQ= 6.07 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (45)	0.71	128	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (48)	0.59	7 41 17 28 X SQ= 5.37 P = 0.017 RV YES (NO)	
129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	0.62	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.68	9 47 15 22 X SQ= 5.75 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT (29)	0.62	133	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (76)	0.83	16 13 10 65 X SQ= 17.36 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	

134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.76	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.51	19 38 6 39 X SQ= 4.41 P = 0.022 RV YES (NO)	
137	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	1.00	137	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (68)	0.59	0 29 26 42 X SQ= 13.26 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	0.85	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.62	4 44 22 27 X SQ= 14.71 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
142	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.84	142	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.63	4 26 21 45 X SQ= 2.76 P = 0.079 RV NO (NO)	
144	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.93	144	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY, RATHER THAN TWO-PARTY (34)	0.68	13 21 1 10 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.132 RV NO (NO)	
146	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.81	146	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN MASS-BASED TERRITORIAL (92)	0.96	5 3 21 70 X SQ= 4.04 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)	
147	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	1.00	147	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN CLASS-ORIENTED OR MULTI-IDEOLOGICAL (67)	0.65	0 23 24 43 X SQ= 9.48 P = 0. RV NO (NO)	
148	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.52	148	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.99	13 1 14 81 X SQ= 35.88 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (40)	0.67	158	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.67	16 24 8 48 X SQ= 6.91 P = 0.008 RV YES (NO)	

161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.68	161	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.54	8 39 17 33 X SQ= 2.82 P = 0.066 RV YES (NO)	
164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS PRONOUNCED OR MODERATE (34)	0.76	164	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP CHARISMA IS NEGLIGIBLE (65)	0.77	16 18 5 60 X SQ= 18.41 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	0.69	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.62	8 50 18 30 X SQ= 6.74 P = 0.006 RV YES (NO)	
170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS PRESIDENTIAL (39)	0.62	170	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STRUCTURE IS OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL (63)	0.70	16 23 10 53 X SQ= 6.75 P = 0.009 RV YES (NO)	
175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OR WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (49)	0.77	175	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE OR PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (51)	0.61	6 45 20 29 X SQ= 9.50 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.79	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.59	22 31 6 45 X SQ= 10.22 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
179	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.80	179	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	0.51	16 36 4 35 X SQ= 4.34 P = 0.023 RV NO (NO)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.87	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.93	3 52 20 4 X SQ= 45.40 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.91	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.64	20 4 2 7 X SQ= 8.42 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	

185	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.89	185	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	0.55	1 8 X SQ= P = RV NO	19 23 2.33 0.072 (NO)
187	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.82	187	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.60	18 4 X SQ= P = RV NO	47 31 2.62 0.078 (NO)
194	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	1.00	194	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)	0.85	0 28 X SQ= P = RV NO	13 72 3.45 0.036 (NO)

194 POLITIES
THAT ARE COMMUNIST (13)

194 POLITIES
THAT ARE NON-COMMUNIST (101)

BOTH SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

13 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALBANIA	BULGARIA	CHINA, PR	CZECHOS*KIA	GERMANY, E	HUNGARY	KOREA, N	MONGOLIA	POLAND	RUMANIA
USSR	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA							

101 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURMA	BURUNDI
CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE
GABON	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA
INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN
KOREA REP	LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA
MEXICO	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PHILIPPINES	PORTUGAL	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP
YEMEN									

1 EXCLUDED BECAUSE IRRELEVANT

CUBA

24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS VERY LARGE, LARGE, OR MEDIUM (61)	0.85	24	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION IS SMALL (54)	0.51	11 49 2 52 X SQ= 4.66 P = 0.018 RV YES (NO)
26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (48)	0.85	26	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS LOW (67)	0.64	11 36 2 65 X SQ= 9.47 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)
28	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.73	28	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.59	3 58 8 40 X SQ= 2.89 P = 0.057 RV YES (NO)

33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (30)	0.54	33	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.77	7 23 6 78 X SQ= 4.24 P = 0.038 RV YES (NO)	
36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (42)	0.62	36	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.67	8 33 5 68 X SQ= 3.01 P = 0.063 RV YES (NO)	
39	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, OR MEDIUM (38)	0.58	39	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.69	7 31 5 70 X SQ= 2.54 P = 0.102 RV YES (NO)	
42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED OR INTERMEDIATE (36)	0.62	42	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS UNDERDEVELOPED OR VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (76)	0.71	8 28 5 70 X SQ= 4.29 P = 0.026 RV YES (NO)	
43	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS DEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, OR UNDERDEVELOPED (55)	0.69	43	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATUS IS VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (57)	0.54	9 45 4 53 X SQ= 1.65 P = 0.145 RV YES (NO)	
45	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS FIFTY PERCENT OR ABOVE (55)	1.00	45	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW FIFTY PERCENT (54)	0.55	9 45 0 54 X SQ= 7.76 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
51	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	1.00	51	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.72	0 60 13 23 X SQ= 22.07 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (16)	0.77	52	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE, INTERMITTENT, OR INTERNALLY ABSENT (82)	0.94	3 79 10 5 X SQ= 38.12 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS ONE HUNDRED OR MORE PER THOUSAND (37)	0.73	54	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED PER THOUSAND (76)	0.72	8 28 3 73 X SQ= 7.26 P = 0.005 RV YES (NO)	

55	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	1.00	55	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.65	11 66 0 35 X SQ= 4.05 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)	
56	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	1.00	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.69	10 68 0 31 X SQ= 2.97 P = 0.035 RV NO (NO)	
58	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	1.00	58	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.82	0 18 13 83 X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.125 RV NO (NO)	
67	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	1.00	67	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS (82)	0.71	13 67 0 28 X SQ= 3.75 P = 0.020 RV NO (NO)	
73	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.91	73	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.55	10 54 1 45 X SQ= 3.99 P = 0.024 RV NO (NO)	
76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE HISTORICALLY WESTERN, RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (26)	0.80	76	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY OR PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN BEING HISTORICALLY WESTERN (70)	0.76	4 22 1 68 X SQ= 4.83 P = 0.019 RV YES (NO)	
78	ALWAYS ARE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED WITHOUT A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (7)	1.00	78	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.93	0 27 5 2 X SQ= 17.27 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
82	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.73	82	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.55	8 42 3 52 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.111 RV YES (NO)	
85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.92	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.53	12 47 1 53 X SQ= 7.74 P = 0.002 RV YES (NO)	

92	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS MOBILIZATIONAL (20)	1.00	92	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE SYSTEM STYLE IS LIMITED MOBILIZATIONAL, OR NON-MOBILIZATIONAL (93)	0.94	13 6 0 93 X SQ= 65.47 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
95	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS TOTALITARIAN (16)	1.00	95	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STATUS OF THE REGIME IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR AUTHORITARIAN (95)	0.98	0 95 13 2 X SQ= 85.24 P = 0. RV YES (YES)	
99	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	1.00	99	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.51	12 38 0 36 X SQ= 8.14 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
102	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC OR NON-POLYARCHIC (49)	1.00	102	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME IS POLYARCHIC OR LIMITED POLYARCHIC (59)	0.63	0 59 13 35 X SQ= 15.74 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
106	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS NON-COMPETITIVE (30)	1.00	106	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS COMPETITIVE OR PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (52)	0.75	0 51 13 17 X SQ= 23.21 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
108	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (35)	1.00	108	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE FULLY OR PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS (65)	0.74	0 64 13 22 X SQ= 24.21 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
116	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	1.00	116	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (79)	0.67	0 32 12 66 X SQ= 4.06 P = 0.017 RV NO (NO)	
117	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.75	117	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.57	3 56 9 42 X SQ= 3.24 P = 0.062 RV YES (NO)	
118	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	1.00	118	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.69	13 27 0 59 X SQ= 19.32 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

129	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS NEGLIGIBLE (37)	1.00	129	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (56)	0.70	0 55 13 24 X SQ= 19.70 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
134	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	1.00	134	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.63	0 56 13 33 X SQ= 15.69 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
138	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS NEGLIGIBLE (49)	1.00	138	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE LEGISLATURE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (48)	0.57	0 47 13 36 X SQ= 12.25 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
139	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY ONE-PARTY (34)	1.00	139	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN ONE-PARTY (71)	0.77	13 21 0 70 X SQ= 27.19 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
153	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	1.00	153	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.57	13 29 0 38 X SQ= 11.86 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
158	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	1.00	158	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS NEGLIGIBLE (56)	0.51	0 40 13 42 X SQ= 9.04 P = 0.001 RV NO (NO)	
160	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST (30)	1.00	160	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS MODERATELY ELITIST OR NON-ELITIST (67)	0.80	13 17 0 67 X SQ= 29.90 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
169	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE (48)	1.00	169	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS SIGNIFICANT OR LIMITED (58)	0.63	0 58 13 34 X SQ= 15.85 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
176	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (28)	1.00	176	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE, PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE, OR LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (72)	0.83	0 72 13 15 X SQ= 34.43 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	

178	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.85	178	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.54	11 42 2 49 X SQ= 5.28 P = 0.015 RV YES (NO)	
179	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS DOMINANT (52)	1.00	179	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE THE EXECUTIVE IS STRONG (39)	0.51	13 38 0 39 X SQ= 9.65 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
181	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	1.00	181	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.66	0 21 13 41 X SQ= 4.55 P = 0.015 RV NO (NO)	
182	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	1.00	182	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.62	13 41 0 25 X SQ= 5.56 P = 0.007 RV NO (NO)	
185	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN INTERVENTIVE (31)	1.00	185	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS INTERVENTIVE, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (21)	0.54	0 21 13 18 X SQ= 9.61 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
186	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN NEUTRAL (31)	1.00	186	TENO TO BE THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.76	13 18 0 56 X SQ= 24.41 P = 0. RV YES (NO)	
187	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	1.00	187	TENO LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (66)	0.60	13 52 0 35 X SQ= 6.37 P = 0.004 RV NO (NO)	

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195 POLITIES
BELONGING TO THE FIFTY PERCENT THAT
HAVE PURPLE WHISKERS (58)

195 POLITIES
BELONGING TO THE FIFTY PERCENT THAT
DO NOT HAVE PURPLE WHISKERS (57)

SUBJECT ONLY

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58 IN LEFT COLUMN

ALGERIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)
COSTA RICA	CUBA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	FINLAND	GERMANY, E	GHANA	GREECE
GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDONESIA	ISRAEL	ITALY	JAMAICA	JORDAN
LAOS	LEBANON	MALAYA	MALI	MONGOLIA	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PARAGUAY
PHILIPPINES	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND
TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA		

57 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BURMA	BURUNDI	CEN AFR REP
CHAD	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ETHIOPIA	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR
HONDURAS	INDIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	IVORY COAST	JAPAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LIBERIA
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NIGER	NIGERIA
PANAMA	PERU	POLAND	PORTUGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SWEDEN	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD
USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN			

19	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA, RATHER THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (22)	0.52	19	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR SOUTH AMERICA (33)	0.71	13 20 14 8 X SQ= 2.21 P = 0.102 RV YES (YES)	
21	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.79	21	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIAL SIZE IS MEDIUM OR SMALL (83)	0.65	12 20 46 37 X SQ= 2.29 P = 0.099 RV NO (YES)	
32	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.97	32	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (105)	0.86	2 8 56 49 X SQ= 2.83 P = 0.053 RV NO (YES)	
38	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.96	38	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS MEDIUM, LOW, OR VERY LOW (103)	0.86	2 8 55 48 X SQ= 2.84 P = 0.053 RV NO (YES)	

47	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.66	47	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.58	10 15 19 11 X SQ= 2.12 P = 0.108 RV YES (YES)	
51	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.53	51	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.71	26 34 23 14 X SQ= 2.54 P = 0.095 RV NO (YES)	
71	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.89	71	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1800 (90)	0.72	6 15 51 39 X SQ= 4.31 P = 0.028 RV NO (YES)	
81	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.89	81	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS LATER EUROPEAN OR LATER EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN EARLY EUROPEAN OR EARLY EUROPEAN DERIVED (40)	0.65	3 8 25 15 X SQ= 3.02 P = 0.048 RV NO (YES)	
83	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.97	83	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS OTHER THAN NON-EUROPEAN AUTOCHTHONOUS (106)	0.88	2 7 56 50 X SQ= 2.01 P = 0.094 RV NO (YES)	
99	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS MODERATELY PRESENT AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD, OR IS ABSENT (36)	0.50	99	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (50)	0.67	23 27 23 13 X SQ= 2.02 P = 0.127 RV YES (YES)	
127	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.70	127	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS MODERATE, LIMITED, OR NEGLIGIBLE (72)	0.85	14 7 33 39 X SQ= 2.05 P = 0.136 RV NO (YES)	
131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.63	131	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.57	13 17 22 13 X SQ= 1.75 P = 0.140 RV YES (YES)	
142	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.57	142	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUANTITATIVELY OTHER THAN MULTI-PARTY (66)	0.80	20 10 27 39 X SQ= 4.49 P = 0.027 RV NO (YES)	

148	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL [96]	0.93	148	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS QUALITATIVELY OTHER THAN AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL (96)	0.81	4 10 52 44 X SQ= 2.26 P = 0.091 RV NO (YES)	
153	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS MODERATELY STABLE OR UNSTABLE (38)	0.56	153	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE PARTY SYSTEM IS STABLE (42)	0.62	19 23 24 14 X SQ= 1.91 P = 0.122 RV YES (YES)	
157	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE [84]	0.78	157	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE PERSONALISMO IS MODERATE OR NEGLIGIBLE (84)	0.94	11 3 40 44 X SQ= 3.45 P = 0.043 RV NO (YES)	
178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.60	178	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.59	32 21 21 30 X SQ= 3.10 P = 0.077 RV YES (YES)	

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196 POLITIES
BELONGING TO THE FORTY PERCENT THAT
HAVE BLUE WHISKERS (46)

196 POLITIES
BELONGING TO THE SIXTY PERCENT THAT
DO NOT HAVE BLUE WHISKERS (69)

SUBJECT ONLY

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46 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEYLON	CHILE	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
DOMIN REP	EL SALVADOR	GERMANY, E	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HONDURAS	ICELAND	INDIA	IRAN	IRAQ
ISRAEL	ITALY	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALI	MAURITANIA	MOROCCO
NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PORTUGAL	RWANDA
SA'U ARABIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	TRINIDAD	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY				

69 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	CAMEROUN	CEN AFR REP
CHAD	CHINA, PR	CONGO(LEO)	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	ECUADOR
ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GREECE	HAITI	HUNGARY	INDONESIA
IRELAND	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	LAOS	LIBERIA	LIBYA	MALAYA	MEXICO
MONGOLIA	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	RUMANIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SOMALIA
SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA
USSR	UAR	UK	US	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA	

25	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.78	25	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE POPULATION DENSITY IS MEDIUM OR LOW (98)	0.90	10 7 36 62 X SQ= 2.10 P = 0.110 RV NO (YES)
28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS HIGH (62)	0.69	28	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS LOW (48)	0.52	31 31 14 34 X SQ= 4.03 P = 0.033 RV YES (YES)
33	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.85	33	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (85)	0.67	7 23 39 46 X SQ= 3.81 P = 0.033 RV NO (NO)
39	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.80	39	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.58	9 29 36 40 X SQ= 5.00 P = 0.016 RV NO (NO)

44	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.87	44	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW NINETY PERCENT (90)	0.72	6 19 40 50 X SQ= 2.61 P = 0.070 RV NO (NO)	
47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT, RATHER THAN NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE (30)	0.71	47	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS NINETY PERCENT OR ABOVE, RATHER THAN BETWEEN FIFTY AND NINETY PERCENT (25)	0.56	6 19 15 15 X SQ= 2.88 P = 0.057 RV YES (YES)	
77	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.52	77	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.67	15 13 14 27 X SQ= 1.84 P = 0.139 RV YES (YES)	
78	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.94	78	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN WITHOUT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP (28)	0.68	15 13 1 6 X SQ= 2.08 P = 0.096 RV NO (YES)	
100	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.66	100	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IS GENERALLY PRESENT AND DATES FROM AT LEAST THE INTER-WAR PERIOD, OR IS GENERALLY OR MODERATELY PRESENT, AND DATES FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD (64)	0.80	23 41 12 10 X SQ= 1.64 P = 0.140 RV NO (YES)	
110	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.92	110	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE POLITICAL ENCULTURATION IS MEDIUM OR LOW (80)	0.79	3 12 35 45 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.096 RV NO (NO)	
131	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (35)	0.68	131	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (30)	0.57	9 21 19 16 X SQ= 2.96 P = 0.078 RV YES (YES)	
135	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.78	135	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (77)	0.91	29 48 8 5 X SQ= 1.73 P = 0.133 RV NO (YES)	
166	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.96	166	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IS THAT OF FORMAL FEDERALISM OR FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM (99)	0.81	2 13 44 55 X SQ= 4.03 P = 0.025 RV NO (NO)	

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197 POLITIES
BELONGING TO THE THIRTY PERCENT THAT
HAVE GREEN WHISKERS (35)

197 POLITIES
BELONGING TO THE SEVENTY PERCENT THAT
DO NOT HAVE GREEN WHISKERS (80)

SUBJECT ONLY

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35 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALGERIA	BRAZIL	BURUNDI	COSTA RICA	CYPRUS	GERMAN FR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	INDIA
IRAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP	LAOS	LIBYA	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MONGOLIA	MOROCCO
NETHERLANDS	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	SA'U ARABIA	SOMALIA	SPAIN	TUNISIA	USSR
UAR	UK	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM REP	YEMEN					

80 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BULGARIA	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN
CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CUBA
CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON
GERMANY, E	GHANA	GREECE	GUINEA	HAITI	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDONESIA	IRAQ	IRELAND
ISRAEL	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA
MALI	NEPAL	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO	SO AFRICA	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA
THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD	TURKEY	UGANDA	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VIETNAM, N	YUGOSLAVIA

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11 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87) — 0.91

11 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (87) — 0.69

3 25
32 55
X SQ= 5.62
P = 0.009
RV NO (NO)

13 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99) — 0.69

13 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA OR THE MIDDLE EAST (99) — 0.94

11 5
24 75
X SQ= 10.87
P = 0.001
RV NO (YES)

14 LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104) — 0.83

14 LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (104) — 0.94

6 5
29 75
X SQ= 2.20
P = 0.088
RV NO (YES)

15 TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33) — 0.57

15 TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST (33) — 0.83

6 5
8 25
X SQ= 2.23
P = 0.132
RV NO (YES)

31	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.88	31	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IS HIGH OR MEDIUM (90)	0.75	30 60 4 20 X SQ= 1.78 P = 0.137 RV NO (NO)	
36	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.74	36	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS LOW OR VERY LOW (73)	0.59	9 33 26 47 X SQ= 1.91 P = 0.142 RV NO (NO)	
51	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS INTERNALLY ABSENT, OR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (37)	0.52	51	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS COMPLETE OR INTERMITTENT (60)	0.68	15 45 16 21 X SQ= 2.71 P = 0.075 RV YES (NO)	
56	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.91	56	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.64	29 50 3 28 X SQ= 6.63 P = 0.005 RV NO (NO)	
58	TEND LESS TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.63	58	TEND MORE TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS OTHER THAN MUSLIM (97)	0.94	13 5 22 75 X SQ= 15.34 P = 0. RV NO (YES)	
64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS MUSLIM, RATHER THAN CHRISTIAN (18)	0.52	64	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS CHRISTIAN, RATHER THAN MUSLIM (46)	0.87	12 34 13 5 X SQ= 9.71 P = 0.001 RV YES (YES)	
66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGENEOUS (57)	0.80	66	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE RELIGIOUSLY HETEROGENEOUS (49)	0.57	24 33 6 43 X SQ= 10.15 P = 0.001 RV YES (NO)	
68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS (52)	0.60	68	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS OR STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (62)	0.61	21 31 14 48 X SQ= 3.42 P = 0.044 RV YES (NO)	
84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.85	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.60	17 14 3 21 X SQ= 8.73 P = 0.002 RV YES (YES)	

85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED, RATHER THAN MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL (60)	0.71	85	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS MID- OR EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED (54)	0.55	24 36 10 44 X SQ= 5.28 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
91	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.70	91	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (31)	0.92	7 24 3 2 X SQ= 1.43 P = 0.119 RV NO (YES)	
107	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSF WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.70	107	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ARE PARTIALLY TOLERATED IN POLITICS, ARE TOLERATED ONLY OUTSIDE POLITICS, OR ARE NOT TOLERATED AT ALL (65)	0.54	10 36 23 42 X SQ= 1.79 P = 0.143 RV NO (NO)	
118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS VERY SIGNIFICANT (40)	0.53	118	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.66	17 23 15 45 X SQ= 2.62 P = 0.082 RV YES (NO)	
122	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.83	122	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY NON-ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (83)	0.67	29 54 6 26 X SQ= 2.15 P = 0.115 RV NO (NO)	
134	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS LIMITED OR NEGLIGIBLE (46)	0.57	134	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST AGGREGATION BY THE EXECUTIVE IS SIGNIFICANT OR MODERATE (57)	0.60	13 44 17 29 X SQ= 1.83 P = 0.132 RV YES (NO)	
161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.68	161	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.59	19 28 9 41 X SQ= 4.89 P = 0.024 RV YES (NO)	
182	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.83	182	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.63	19 36 4 21 X SQ= 2.05 P = 0.114 RV NO (NO)	
183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS TRADITIONAL, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (9)	0.56	183	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL (25)	0.84	4 21 5 4 X SQ= 3.48 P = 0.034 RV YES (YES)	

193 TEND MORE TO BE THOSE 0.91
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)

193 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.68
WHERE THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IS OTHER THAN PARTLY INDIGENOUS (86)

	3	25
	32	54

X SQ= 5.78
P = 0.009
RV NO (NO)

198 POLITIES BELONGING TO THE TWENTY PERCENT THAT HAVE PINK WHISKERS (23)	198 POLITIES BELONGING TO THE EIGHTY PERCENT THAT DO NOT HAVE PINK WHISKERS (92)

SUBJECT ONLY

23 IN LEFT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	AUSTRALIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DAHOMEY	FRANCE	GREECE	ISRAEL	JAPAN	KOREA, N
KOREA REP	LAOS	MONGOLIA	NIGER	PERU	SA'U ARABIA	SIERRE LEO	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	TURKEY	VIETNAM REP							

92 IN RIGHT COLUMN

ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI
CAMBODIA	CAMEROUN	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	CONGO(BRA)
CONGO(LEO)	CYPRUS	CZECHOS*KIA	DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	GABON
GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR	GHANA	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA
INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JORDAN	LEBANON	LIBERIA
LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL
RUMANIA	RWANDA	SENEGAL	SOMALIA	SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	THAILAND
TOGO	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US	UPPER VOLTA	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N
YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA								

39	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.83	39	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS LOW OR VERY LOW (76)	0.63	4 34 19 57 X SQ= 2.46 P = 0.085 RV NO (NO)	
63	LEAN MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.78	63	LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY OTHER THAN CHRISTIAN (68)	0.55	5 41 18 50 X SQ= 3.23 P = 0.057 RV NO (NO)	
82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED (55)	0.70	82	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY OR LATER EUROPEAN OR EUROPEAN DERIVED, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY OR UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (51)	0.52	6 45 14 41 X SQ= 2.41 P = 0.086 RV YES (NO)	
114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS NEGLIGIBLE (47)	0.64	114	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE SECTIONALISM IS EXTREME OR MODERATE (61)	0.62	8 53 14 33 X SQ= 3.58 P = 0.052 RV YES (NO)	

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199 POLITIES
BELONGING TO THE TEN PERCENT THAT
HAVE YELLOW WHISKERS (12)

199 POLITIES
BELONGING TO THE NINETY PERCENT
THAT DO NOT HAVE YELLOW WHISKERS (103)

SUBJECT ONLY

****

12 IN LEFT COLUMN

AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CAMEROUN	CHAD	CONGO(BRA)	CONGO(LEO)	CZECHOS'KIA	DAHOMEY	ISRAEL	PARAGUAY
SOMALIA	UPPER VOLTA								

103 IN RIGHT COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN	ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	BURMA	BURUNDI
CAMBODIA	CANADA	CEN AFR REP	CEYLON	CHILE	CHINA, PR	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	CYPRUS
DENMARK	DOMIN REP	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	FINLAND	FRANCE	GABON	GERMANY, E	GERMAN FR
GHANA	GREECE	GUATEMALA	GUINEA	HAITI	HONDURAS	HUNGARY	ICELAND	INDIA	INDONESIA
IRAN	IRAQ	IRELAND	ITALY	IVORY COAST	JAMAICA	JAPAN	JORDAN	KOREA, N	KOREA REP
LAOS	LEBANON	LIBERIA	LIBYA	LUXEMBOURG	MALAGASY R	MALAYA	MALI	MAURITANIA	MEXICO
MONGOLIA	MOROCCO	NEPAL	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NICARAGUA	NIGER	NIGERIA	NORWAY	PAKISTAN
PANAMA	PERU	PHILIPPINES	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	RWANDA	SA'U ARABIA	SENEGAL	SIERRE LEO
SO AFRICA	SPAIN	SUDAN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TANGANYIKA	THAILAND	TOGO	TRINIDAD
TUNISIA	TURKEY	UGANDA	USSR	UAR	UK	US	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	VIETNAM, N
VIETNAM REP	YEMEN	YUGOSLAVIA							

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10 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.58
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA, OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (33)

10 TEND TO BE THOSE 0.75
LOCATED ELSEWHERE THAN IN NORTH AFRICA,
OR CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA (82)

	7 26
	5 77
X SQ=	4.25
P =	0.037
RV YES	(NO)

18 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN
IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR
SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)

18 TEND LESS TO BE THOSE 0.59
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN
IN EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, OR
SOUTHEAST ASIA (33)

	7 26
	0 18
X SQ=	2.82
P =	0.042
RV NO	(NO)

19 TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.87
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN
IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR
SOUTH AMERICA (33)

19 TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.55
LOCATED IN NORTH AFRICA OR
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA, RATHER THAN
IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR
SOUTH AMERICA (33)

	7 26
	1 21
X SQ=	1.76
P =	0.126
RV NO	(NO)

23 ALWAYS ARE THOSE 1.00
WHOSE POPULATION IS
MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)

23 LEAN LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE 0.74
WHOSE POPULATION IS
MEDIUM OR SMALL (88)

	0 27
	12 76
X SQ=	2.78
P =	0.066
RV NO	(NO)

37	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY LOW (51)	0.67	37	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (64)	0.58	4 60 8 43 X SQ= 1.79 P = 0.129 RV YES (NO)	
40	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY LOW (39)	0.58	40	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATUS IS VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW (71)	0.67	5 66 7 32 X SQ= 2.06 P = 0.110 RV YES (NO)	
46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT (26)	0.58	46	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS TEN PERCENT OR ABOVE (84)	0.81	5 79 7 19 X SQ= 6.96 P = 0.007 RV YES (NO)	
49	ALWAYS ARE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BELOW TEN PERCENT, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT (26)	1.00	49	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LITERACY RATE IS BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTY PERCENT, RATHER THAN BELOW TEN PERCENT (24)	0.56	0 24 7 19 X SQ= 5.44 P = 0.010 RV YES (NO)	
55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS LESS THAN TEN PER THOUSAND (35)	0.58	55	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION IS TEN OR MORE PER THOUSAND (78)	0.72	5 73 7 28 X SQ= 3.38 P = 0.046 RV YES (NO)	
56	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY OR PARTLY NON-LITERATE (31)	0.50	56	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE RELIGION IS PREDOMINANTLY LITERATE (79)	0.74	6 73 6 25 X SQ= 2.07 P = 0.093 RV YES (NO)	
69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (50)	0.75	69	TEND TO BE THOSE THAT ARE LINGUISTICALLY HOMOGENEOUS OR WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (64)	0.60	3 61 9 41 X SQ= 3.96 P = 0.030 RV YES (NO)	
73	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS AFTER 1945 (46)	0.67	73	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHOSE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IS BEFORE 1945 (65)	0.62	4 61 8 38 X SQ= 2.46 P = 0.118 RV YES (NO)	
77	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.88	77	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY WESTERNIZED, RATHER THAN SIGNIFICANTLY WESTERNIZED, THROUGH A COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP (41)	0.56	1 27 7 34 X SQ= 1.79 P = 0.130 RV NO (NO)	

84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN DEVELOPED TUTELARY (24)	0.88	84	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE TYPE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS DEVELOPED TUTELARY, RATHER THAN UNDEVELOPED TUTELARY (31)	0.64	1 30 7 17 X SQ= 5.39 P = 0.016 RV YES (NO)	
86	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS EARLY TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL (38)	0.58	86	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE STAGE OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IS ADVANCED OR MID-TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN EARLY TRANSITIONAL (76)	0.70	5 71 7 31 X SQ= 2.62 P = 0.101 RV YES (NO)	
87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS DEVELOPMENTAL (31)	0.73	87	TEND TO BE THOSE WHOSE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS OTHER THAN DEVELOPMENTAL (58)	0.71	8 23 3 55 X SQ= 6.15 P = 0.014 RV YES (NO)	
117	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS NEGLIGIBLE (51)	0.75	117	LEAN TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ASSOCIATIONAL GROUPS IS SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE, OR LIMITED (60)	0.58	3 57 9 42 X SQ= 3.36 P = 0.062 RV YES (NO)	
161	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS NON-ELITIST (50)	0.75	161	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS ELITIST OR MODERATELY ELITIST (47)	0.52	3 44 9 41 X SQ= 2.04 P = 0.123 RV YES (NO)	
178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS UNICAMERAL (53)	0.83	178	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE IS BICAMERAL (51)	0.53	10 43 2 49 X SQ= 4.32 P = 0.029 RV YES (NO)	
181	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS MODERN, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (21)	0.60	181	TILT TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN MODERN (55)	0.75	3 18 2 53 X SQ= 1.34 P = 0.126 RV YES (NO)	
182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL, RATHER THAN SEMI-MODERN (25)	0.78	182	TEND TO BE THOSE WHERE THE BUREAUCRACY IS SEMI-MODERN, RATHER THAN POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONAL (55)	0.75	2 53 7 18 X SQ= 7.92 P = 0.003 RV YES (NO)	
186	TILT MORE TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.89	186	TILT LESS TOWARD BEING THOSE WHERE PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY IN POLITICS IS NEUTRAL, RATHER THAN SUPPORTIVE (56)	0.62	1 30 8 48 X SQ= 1.57 P = 0.149 RV NO (NO)	

Appendices

A. Raw Characteristic Code Sheet

	10	20	30	40	50
AFGHANISTAN	KGGHBBAIIHHHHHKABGAH4GBIGBAG3GBBHAAB44HHJ444A3HGJHBAHBAZG21112				
ALBANIA	JHHGABAIH1HBHGRBAABH4BAAAGBGGH5BHAB5H55HAAAGAGHGPHAABBAYA22222				
ALGERIA	PBGHABAHH5HGGGKAAGHGBHABAB6GG6BBGAB66666ABGG6BHG6GAAGBAPG11122				
ARGENTINA	SBBHBAGGGGBBBBBAAABGGBA3G3H3AAG3AAG3B3GGIKGBGGB6ABB6BAAAG22222				
AUSTRALIA	AAGHAAHGABAAAAHBAABAAAAHGAAAAAABAHHHBABBHKAGGGAAIABBAGBGG22212				
AUSTRIA	ZHGGBAGGBGBAABBAAAAA4BAHGABAAAAGBGHHBABBHKAGGGBAGABBAGBAG22221				
BELGIUM	ZHGABAHGAGAAABBAAGBA4AAHGAAAAAGAAGBHAGBAIKAGGGHAIABBAGBAG22221				
BOLIVIA	SBHHABAIIHGBGXBBGBGBBBBAGAAAGGGBBBABAGBRGBGGHBABBBBGAAG22222				
BRAZIL	SABHAABGHGBBBGBABABGHBA3GAHBAAGAAABBBGGGIKGBBGAAABBBBA5AGI2122				
BULGARIA	JHGGBABHGHBBHBGAABBB4BAAAGBGGH5BHAG5H55HAAAGAGHGPHAABBAYA11222				
BURMA	YGBHBBAHIHGBBGJAAGHIAHG3ABHH66BAGAAB66666666666G66666GAA6G21222				
BURUNDI	HHHGBBAIIHH5H55AAHIHIGBG565BB5GH6AGH5AHB56G5H8IGA5GG5BG22122				
CAMBODIA	YHHHBBAIIHGGHJAABHIBHG3BBGGGBBHBABHBAHA3BA3AHG3HBAHBAZG11222				
CAMEROUN	HGHHBBAIIHHAHZBAGHIBIGBG6636RBBH6ABBBAGBG6BGBABABABGGABG12221				
CANADA	QABHAABABAAABHBAGBAAAAHGAAAAABAAGBHHABBHJAGGGAAIABBAGBIG11222				
CEN AFR REP	HGHHBBAIIHH5H53AGHIBIGBGB6GGGGGH6ABH5AHA56BGBHGAGAAGGABG22222				
CEYLON	XHGBABBHIHHB6GQBAGHGAHG3GAHAAABBGBAAAGHHI3GBBGHB1BB3BGBZG11222				
CHAD	HBHHABAIIHHAHYRBGHIBIGBG56GBBGBH6ABH5AHA56BGBHGBGA5GG5RG22221				
CHILE	SGGHAAGHGGGBABBA3ABGGBAHGABAAGGBGGGAGGBIKGBBGHAABB3BG5AG11222				
CHINA, PR	IAAGA5ABI5G5HG55A3AB4GAAAGBGGH5BHAAAH55HAAAGAAHGPHAABBAYA22222				
COLOMBIA	SBGHAABHHGBBAGBABABGGBBHGAGB3ABAGBGBB3B3HQ3BBGHBABBBBGAAG21222				
CONGO(BRA)	HGHHABAIIHH5HXBAGHIBIGBG56GBBGBH6ABH5AHB56BGBHGAGAAGGABG11221				
CONGO(LEO)	HBGHBBAHIHHHBHXBAGHIHIGBG6H666GAHBAAA66HIGGBG366G6A6G3ABG12221				
COSTA RICA	GHHHA3BIHI3BABBAAABGGBAHGAGAAAAGGGGGGGBGIRBBGGHAABABBG5AG12112				
CUBA	BHGGAABHGHGBHBBABABGGBA3AG6G6H5GHAG66656A66G6AHG666AB3A6B12212				
CYPRUS	KHHGBBBIGIBBABRBAGHGAHAHGA6A3AGGGAA33333IH6533HAAA3BBG5ZG22122				
CZECHOS'KIA	JHGGBABGBGAABHBAGGA4BAAAGBGGH5AHAGGH55HAAAGAGHGPHAABBAYA22221				
DAHOMEY	HHHHBBAIIHH5HZBAGHIBIGBG56GGGGBH6ABH5AHA56BGBHGAGAAGGARG22211				
DENMARK	RHHGBAGGBGAAAAAAAAA4BAHGAAAAAAGAHHHAGBAIKAGGGHAIAABAGBXG12222				
DOMIN REP	BHHGAABIHHHBAGBABABGGBBBGA6AAABGGBG6GGB6IR66GGHAA6BBBG6AG11222				
ECUADOR	SGHHAABIHHGGAXBBGBGGBBHGAHBAAGAGBBBBGGGIQGAAGHBABBBBBAAG12222				
EL SALVADOR	GHHBABBIHIHG5GBABABGGBBGGBHGGBGGGBBBBHHHIPGAAGHBAGAABAAAG11222				
ETHIOPIA	HBGH5BAHIHHHGHZBBGAH4GBIGBGG3GGBHAAB44HHJ444AHGKHBAHBA3G22222				
FINLAND	RGHHBABHBGAAAAAAABGA4BAHGAAAAABGAHGHAGBAIKAGGGHAGAABAGBXG12222				
FRANCE	ZGBGBAGBABAABBBAAAAA4AAHGABAAABBAGG3B3AGB3BBGAHBBBBAA3BAG22212				
GABON	HGHHBBAIIHH5HXBAGHIBIGBG56GGBGBH6ABH5AHA56BGBHGAGAAGGABG22222				
GERMANY, E	JHGBBAGGB5AAHAHBAA3A4BAAAGBGGH5GHAGAH5HHAAAGAGHGPHAABBAYA11222				
GERMAN FR	ZGBBBAHBBBAAAAHBAA3A4BAHGABAAABBAGGHBBBBGKAGGGAAGABBAGBAG22122				
GHANA	HGGH5BAIIHHGGGZBAGHIAIGBABBGGGBBHAABH5AHABBBBAHGAABBASG12222				
GREECE	ZHGGBABHGHBB3BGAAABA4BAHGAGAAABGBGGGB3BBB3GAGGHAIBA3BGBAG12212				
GUATEMALA	GHHHABAIHHHG5GXBBGBGGBA3G6H666GGGBBBAHGGI3GAAGHBA6A6BAAAG11122				
GUINEA	HGHHABAIIH5GHYBAGHIBIGBABBGGGBBHAABH5AHABAGBAHGAHAABBA3G11222				
HAITI	BHHBBBAIIHGGGXBBABIBBBGG33GGGGGHBAB44HHJ4443GHGAHAABAAAG12222				
HONDURAS	GHHHABAIHIHG5GBABABGGBBHGAHBAABGGBBBBGGGHQGAAGHBABAABAAAG21122				
HUNGARY	JHGGBABHGGBAHBHBAAGA4BAAAG3GGG5GGAG3H55HAAAGAGHGPHAABBAYA12222				
ICELAND	RHHHAAGIBIBAAAAAAAGA4BAHGAAAAAAGBHHHAGBBIKAGGGHAGABBAGBXG11222				
INDIA	XBABABABIBGGAGIAAGHGAHA3GABAAABAGBABBBABB3AGGAGAGABABGBZG21122				
INDONESIA	YBBGABAGIGHRGGKAAGHIHHGBBBGG6BGAGAAB33A3333BGAHGAGAA3BARG12222				
IRAN	KBBHAAAHIHHGGHKAAGAI4GB3GBHH6BGAGAAA66G6666633HG66BAHBAPG21122				
IRAQ	KGGHAAAHHHGG6GKAAGGIAHAGG6H666GAHAAA666666G666H666666AAZG21222				
IRELAND	ZHHGBABHBHBAABBAAAGAABAHGAAAAAAGBGGHBBBAI3AGGGHAGABBAGBGG22222				
ISRAEL	KHHGAAHHBH3BBBPAAGH3AHABBABAAABGBBBGAHBAIKAGGGHAGAABAGBZG11211				
ITALY	ZGBBBAGBBHABABBAAABA4BAHGABAAABBABGGBGBBIKBGGGHAGABBAGBAG11222				
IVORY COAST	HGHHABAIIHH5HZBAGHIBIGBB36GGGBGHBABH5AHABBBGAHGAAGGARG22222				
JAMAICA	BHHBAABIG5GBAGHBBAHGAHG3GA6AAABGGGBGBBBBHKGGGBHAIABBBGBGG12222				

A. Raw Characteristic Code Sheet (*cont.*)

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                10        20        30        40        50        60
JAPAN           IGBABABBGBBAAAQBAAB4GAHGABAAAAGABBBBBBBGKABGGHAIABBBGBZG22212
JORDAN          KHHHAABIIHGHGKAAAHIAHAIGBHG33GAHAAA66GH66G6ABHGJHBAHBAPG12122
KOREA, N        IHGG55AI5H5H555AA3H4HAAAGBGGH5GHAA5H55HAAAGABHGPHAABBAYA21112
KOREA REP       IHBAAAAHIHHBGG33AA3H4HA66BH666GG6AAB666666G66GH66666BAAZG21112
LAOS            YGHHABAIIHHBHYBAGHIBHGGGBHG33GAHAAA3H3HIPGAA5HGIHB3H3ABG12112
LEBANON         KHHBAABIGH35BGRBAAGGBHAHGAH33AGBBAABAH3BIPGA3GHBBBABBBAZG11222
LIBERIA         HHHHBBAIIH5BHXBAGBH4HG3GBABGGGBHABGBBGHA3ABAGHGAGBABBAHG22222
LIBYA           PBHHAAAIIGGBHKAAAHIHHG3GAB33BBAHBBG44GGJ444BBBBJBBBBG5PG22122
LUXEMBOURG      ZHHBBAGIAHAAABAAAAA4AAHGAAAAAAGAHHHAGBAIKAGGGHAIABBAGBAG21222
MALAGASY R      HGHHABAIIHGAHXB3AHIBIG3GA6AAABAHGAGBBBHBSBGGGBABBBGGBBG21222
MALAYA          YHGGA3BHGHGGAGQBBGHIAHGBGABAAAGBGBABBBAH3HBGGGBAIABBBGBQG12222
MALI            HBHHABAIIHHAHYBBGHIBIGBG56GGG55H6ABH5AHAS6BGBHBHGAAGG5RG11222
MAURITANIA      HBHHABAIIH5AHKABGHIBIGBBA6GGBBBHBABGBAHAS6BBBHBAGAAGGBPG21122
MEXICO          GBBHAABGHGBBAGBABABGGBAHGABA3BB3BBBHAAHBJAGBGGBABBABGBAG22122
MONGOLIA        IBHHABAIIH5HBJAAAGH4HAAAGBGGH5GHAA5H55HAAAGAGHGPHAABBAYA12112
MOROCCO         PGGHAAAHIHH5BGKAAGHIBHA3BABA6BBAGBBBBBA6336GGBHBJBBABGAPG21122
NEPAL           XHGGABAIIHHGHQB3GAJ4GG36BHH6GG5HBAB66HH66G6A5HGKHAAH3AZG21222
NETHERLANDS     ZHGABAGGBGAAABHBAAAA4AAHGAAAAABBAGGHAGBAIKAGGGHAIABBAGBAG21122
NEW ZEALAND     AGHHAAGHAGAAAAHBAABAAAAHGAAAAAAGAHHHBABBHKAGGGHAIAABAGBGG12222
NICARAGUA       GHHHAAAIHIHG5GBABABGGBB3GBGGBBG5GBBGGHHG3QBAAGHBAGBABAAAG12222
NIGER           HBHHABAIIHHAHYBBGHIBIGBG56G6GG5H6ABH5AHAS6BGBHGAGA5GG5RG21212
NIGERIA         HBBGBBBHIHHGBHZBAGHIAIG3GA6366GAHBABABGGIG6G33BBIBBBGGASG21222
NORWAY          RGHHBAGHAGAAAAAAAAAA4BAHGAAAAAAGAHHHAGBAIKAGGGHAIABBAGBXG11122
PAKISTAN        XBBGABBGIGGGGHKAAGHIAHA36BHG36GAHAAA666666G63BBGA6AA3AAQG12122
PANAMA          GHHHAABIHIHBABBABBBGGBB3GAHAAAGGGBGBBHGGIPGABGHBABABBA5AG21222
PARAGUAY        SGHHA3BIIHBHGBA3ABGGBB3GB3GBB5GHAGBGHHHBQBGAGHGAHAABAAAG11221
PERU            SBGHAABHHGGBGXBBGBGBB6G6H666GBGBBBA666IKGBBGH666B6BA6AG21212
PHILIPPINES     YGBGA3BHHGGBAGBAAGHGHHAHGABAAABBAGAGHAABHJAGBGHAAABBBBGBIG12122
POLAND          JGBGBABGGGBAGBBAAAGA4BAAAGBGGGAGGABBH5GHAAAGAGHGPHAABBAYA22122
PORTUGAL        ZHGGB3BHHHGBGGBAAAAA4BA3GGAGGG5G3AGGH5H3AIAGAGHG3HBABBAAG21222
RUMANIA         JGBGBAAGGGBAHBGAABBB4BAAAGBGGH5GHAB5H55HAAAGAGHGPHAABBAYA12222
RWANDA          HHHGBBAIIHH5H55AAHIHIGBG5656B5GH6AAG5BHBSC535HBAGA5GG5BG11222
SA'U ARABIA     KBGHAB5HHH3HHHKA5AGJ4HHIGBAH4GGGHBAB44H4J444ABHG444AHBAKG11112
SENEGAL         HGHHABAIIHHH5HKAAGHIBIGBB66GB6BBHBAHAAHABBGGBHGAGAAGBARG12222
SIERRE LEO      HHHHABAIIHHAHZBAGHIAIGBGA6AAABBH6ABBGBGHSGGBGHBIBABGGBSG22212
SOMALIA         HGHHBBAIIHHAHKAAAHIHIGBG563BBBAH6ABBGGHBGGGBGHBGGA5G3AZG22121
SO AFRICA       HBGHAAGGGGBGBGXBBGB3AABHG3AB33GBBBAA333333AGAGHAGABAABAJG21222
SPAIN           ZGBGBABGGGGBGGBAABAA4BA33GAGGGGB3ABBH5G3AIAGAGHG3HAABBAAG11122
SUDAN           HBGHBBAIIHHHGHYBBGHIAHABBBHH6GBAHAAA666666666GHG6666GAAQG12212
SWEDEN          RGGHBAGGAGAAAAAAAAAA4BAHGAAAAAAGAHHHAGBAIKAGGGHAIABBAGBXG22222
SWITZERLAND     ZHHBBAGGAGAAAAHBAGAA4AAHGAAAAA3AAGBHAGGAIKAGGGAAQABGAGBAG12222
SYRIA           KHHHAAAIHHH5BGKAABGIBHAGG6H666GBGAAAA66666GA66H66666BAAPG12222
TANGANYIKA      HBGHBBAIIHHHAHZBAGHIAIGBB56BBBBGHBAGHAAHABAGGAHG3GAAGGBSG22212
THAILAND        YGBGABAHIHHBGGJAABAH4GBIGBGH6GABHAAB66HH66GAAGHG6H66HAAAG12222
TOGO            HHHH5BAIIIHH6HXBAGHIBIGBG66666BBH6ABG66H6S66G6HG66A6GAABG12222
TRINIDAD        BHHBA3GIG5GBAGRBBBHGAHG3GA6AAABGGBGBBBBGK6GGGHAIABBBGBGG21212
TUNISIA         PHHHAAAIHHHGGGKAAAHIBHABBABAGBBGGBBGHAAHABAGGBHGAGAABGAPG12112
TURKEY          KBBHAAAGHGGGBGKAABAB4GAHGA6AAAAGBBBBGBBB3BGGGHAGBBBBAAAG12212
UGANDA          HGGHBBAIIIHHAHXBAGHIAIG3GA63AAGAHBABABGGIG6G33A51BA5GGBSG12222
USSR            JAAH5ABABAAAGB55AGAB4GAAAGAGGH5AGABBH55HAAAGA3GGPHBABBAYA22122
UAR             PBBHAABHHGHGHGKAAAHGAHABABBG6G5GGABGH5A6AB6A3AHG6H6ABAAPG22122
UK              ZGBBBAHBABAAAAHBAAAA4AAHGAAAAAAAAHGHBABBHKAGBGHAIABBAGBGG22122
US              QAAHBAHAAAAAAAHBBAAAAAHGAAA4ABBAHG3HAAAHJAGBGAAAABBAGBGG22222
UPPER VOLTA     MGHHABAIIHH5HYBAGHIBIGBG56GBGGGH6ABH5AHAS6BGBHGAGAAGG5RG21221
URUGUAY         SHHHBAGHGHBBABBAAABGGBAHGABAAA33BGGG3A3A333AGGHAQABGBGBAG11222
VENEZUELA       SBGHAABHBG3BGGBABABGGBABBAHAAABGBBG3ABAGIRGGGBBABBBB3AAG12122
VIETNAM, N      YHGGB55H5H5H555ABHIBHGAAGBGGH5GHAA5H55HAAAGAAHGPHAABBAYA12222
VIETNAM REP     YHGGA3AHIHHBGG33ABHIBHG3A3GGGGGHAAAHHHHB3BBBGHGAHAA3BABG22112
YEMEN           KGHHBBAIIHH6HKA5AG64HG6666666GAH6A66666666666H666666AAKG22122
YUGOSLAVIA      JGBGBBAGGGBBGGHBAGGB4BAAAGBGGGGA3ABBH5GHAAAGABGGPHBABBAYA12222
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B. Finished Characteristic Code Sheet

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ALBANIA	1222224222222244444422221112112222	2122222221121422222112222242442111 2	1112244444212411222241122122112212 2
ALGERIA	2222424221211224411411212221211212	2122522222142122122112122242222112 2	2222121112422111122211122121266221 22
ARGENTINA	2222412222222244242211112222122112	1121121121121421121111222221111111	2112121124212411333232231332223141
AUSTRALIA	2122424222222244444411212221122211	1111111111111441111111222224114211 2	2111114414112411221242211141111141 1
AUSTRIA	2112124222222244444422212112222111	1121121111111441112111122222111111 1	1111114444212411221242211142111411
BELGIUM	2112124222222244444422211122122211	1121111111111441112111122222111112 2	2111114444112411221242211141111141 1
BOLIVIA	2222412222222244242211222221121222	2222222222142121122122242442222	2112121124212412211222211142211141
BRAZIL	2222412222222244242211112221121212	2121121121121421122111222221111212	2112121144212411333232211142222141 1
BULGARIA	1222224222222244444422212112121212	1122121121121422221112222241141212	2112144242412411222241122221121222
BURMA	2222424112222242424211122222112212	2222122121121421122122222424411222	2222222411422122332231121212222266
BURUNDI	2222424221122244114222221122112222	2222222222224425552222225224451115	2222222444222221222122515526651442
CAMBODIA	2222424112222242424122222222112222	2222222222214212122122222424411212	2222222412422122232233212121222122
CAMEROUN	2222424221122244114212222222112222	2222222222244211222222214244421222	2222222412422222122222122616626631466
CANADA	2122424222222244444411122221122111	1111111111114411121122222411421222	2111114414112411221242211141111141 1
CEN AFR REP	2222424221122244114212222222112222	2222222222244255522222222424431222	2222222412422222122222122121266221 22
CEYLON	2222424122222242424122211122122212	2222122221121466622112222242442222	2222121111422122333232211142221141 1
CHAD	2222424221122244114112222211122222	2222222222244211222222214244422222	2222222412422222122222122515526662142
CHILE	2222412222222244242221212221122212	1121122121121411121112222211113113	2112121124212411221242211142212141 1
CHINA, PR	2222424122222242424111121111511112	2251122125155522222132225242451335	1112144244441411221242211221122122
COLOMBIA	2222412222222244242211212221122212	2121121121121411121112222211112112	2112121124212412212242211142212143 3
CONGO(BRA)	2222424221122244114212222221122222	2222222222244255522222212244421222	2222222412422222122222122515526662142
CONGO(LEO)	2222424221122244114112222221122212	2222122222244221122222212244421222	2222222444422222122222122616622261466
COSTA RICA	2222412222222244242222222213212222	2122222321121411121111222221111111	2112121124212411221242211142211141 1
CUBA	2222414222222244242222221211112212	1127122121121422221112222211112112	2112121124212411322231122266622166
CYPRUS	2222424222221111144422222112212222	1122221121121411121112222242442222	2222121111422111222241122112266611433
CZECHOS'KIA	1222224222222244444422212112121211	1121111111114422221112222411421222	2211114444212411222241122122112122
DAHOMEY	2222424221122244114222222221122222	2222222222244255522222212424421222	2222222412422222122222122515526622122
DENMARK	2121124222222244444422222112122211	1121111111114411111112222211141111	1111114444212411221242211141111141 1
DOMIN REP	2222414222222244242222222111212222	2122122221121411122111222221111212	2112121124212411221242211142661141 1
ECUADOR	2222412222222244242222222211212222	2122122221214211112122212242442222	2112121124212411221242211142222141 1
EL SALVADOR	2222411222222244242222221121212222	2122222222142155522112222211112212	2112121124212411221242221212222122
ETHIOPIA	2222424221122244114112122252112212	2222122222244221222222221424422222	1112244444441411221242211221122132
FINLAND	2121124222222244444422222221212211	1121111111114411111112222211141212	2211114444212411221242211141111141
FRANCE	2112124222222244444421112121221111	1111111111114421121112222211111111	1111114444112411221242211142111141
GABON	2222424221122244114212222222112222	2222222222244255522222212424421222	2222222412422222122222122515526622122
GERMANY, E	1222224222222244444422211122122111	1155111111114422221112222241142112	3331114444212411221242211221122122
GERMAN FR	2112124222222244444421111221221111	1111111111114411111112222241142112	3331114444212411221242211142111141
GHANA	2222424221122244114212122252112222	2222122222214212122122222424421222	2222222411422221222111212121122122
GREECE	2112124222222244444422212112121212	1122121121121433121112222241141111	2111114444212411221242211142211141
GUATEMALA	2222411222222244242222222221212222	2122122222142155522122212242442222	2112121124212411333232266622266666
GUINEA	2222424221122244114212222221212222	2222222222254552212222222124244221222	2222222412422222122211121212122122
HAITI	2222412222222244242222221122112222	2222222222142122122122212242442212	2112222412422122122422233323122122
HONDURAS	2222411222222244242222222221212222	2122222222142155522111222221111212	2112121124212412212242211142222141
HUNGARY	1222224222222244444422212112121212	1121121111114422221112222241142112	2211114444212411222241122223122122
ICELAND	2121124222222244444422222211222221	1122221111114411111112222211141111	2211114444212411221242211141111141
INDIA	2222424122222242424111111212111212	2211122121214211112212222424411222	2222121111422111323232211142111141
INDONESIA	2222424112222242424111111212112112	2221122221121422122112212242222112	2222222444422122122122121212122166
IRAN	2222424222221111144411112221111212	2222122222142122122122122422221222	1112222444441421322332222122222266
IRAQ	2222424222221111144421212222211212	2122122122142126622112122242222112	2212222411422111212242266622266666
IRELAND	2112124222222244444422222112121211	1122121111114411121112222211111111	2211114411212411221242211141111141
ISRAEL	2222424222221111144422222211122211	1122133312112142112111222224244112	2223133311422111122211142111141 1
ITALY	2112124222222244444421111221221111	1111111112112141112111222221111111	2111114444212411221242211142111141
IVORY COAST	2222424221122244114212222221212222	2222222222244255522222222124244221	2222222412422222122212131332622122
JAMAICA	2222414222222244242222221121212222	1122522121121411121122222411422112	2222121111422122323232211142661141 1

B. Finished Characteristic Code Sheet (*cont.*)

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                    10        20        30        40        50        60        70        80        90       100
JAPAN               22224241222224242412111112212111 2 11111211111144111111222224244211 2 11121442444414122124221114211114 1
JORDAN              22224242222211114442222221121212 2 22222222214212222211212242221111 2 22222241422111222212221212222132
KOREA, N            22224241222224242412221215511222 2 22225222251555222255322252424551 5 33322444444221112222411221221222
KOREA REP           22224241222224242412211111211212 2 22221222211214221223222334243113 3 33322444444211166626262122266666
LAOS                22224241222224242412122221211222 2 22222222222442211222222212424212 2 22222224142221221242221212222132
LEBANON             22224242222211114442221121121212 2 11221232515552112211222224242112 2 22121211124221112212421114222313 3
LIBERIA             22224242211222244142222222211222 2 22222222251555211222221224242122 2 21122444444221232323222121112122
LIBYA               22224242121122441141122221111222 2 22222221224121221121222422211111 2 22222224424221232333221114211313 2
LUXEMBOURG          21121242222222444444222211221222 2 11221111111144111111122222111111 1 11111144441124112212422111411111 1
MALAGASY R          22224242211222244114212222121222 2 22222222224121111222221224242312 2 22222224142222232322211142661141 1
MALAYA              22224241222224242412221211312212 2 11221212221421111221122224242222 2 22222224142212212221221114211111 1
MALI                22224242211222244114112222121222 2 22222222224442111222222124242222 2 22222224142222221221225515526622122
MAURITANIA          22224242211222244114112222121222 2 22222222225455111222121224222122 2 22222224142222221221211114266221 2
MEXICO              22224112222224442421112211212112 2 21211211211214111221112222111112 2 21121212421241121242211142111433
MONGOLIA            22224241222224242411122221212222 2 22222222255555222211122224244111 1 22122444444221112224112212122122
MOROCCO             22224242121122441142122221111212 2 22221222225455211221121224222112 2 22222224124221113233321114211111466
NEPAL               22224241222224242412221211121222 2 22222222224442221221222224242332 2 11122444444414223233262122222266
NETHERLANDS         21121242222222444444222111221221 1 11211111111144111211122224114211 2 11111144441124112212422111411111 1
NEW ZEALAND         21224242222222444444212222112221 1 11211111111144111111122224114211 2 21111144141124112212422111411111 1
NICARAGUA           22224112222224442422222221111222 2 21222222221421555221112222111112 2 21121211242124213332422212122142
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NIGERIA             22224242211222441141121122212212 2 22221222221421211222222124242122 2 22222224114222223233322111426631466
NORWAY              21211242222222444444212222221221 1 11211111111144111111122221114111 1 11111144442124112212422111411111 1
PAKISTAN            22224241222224242411112112212112 2 22211121221421221221222422211222 2 22222224114221113322326212122222132
PANAMA              22224112222224442422222222111222 2 21222222211214111221111222221112 2 21121211242124213332422111422111 1
PARAGUAY            22224122222224424221222213212222 2 22222222211214222221112222211113 3 21121211242124213332422212132242
PERU                22224122222224424221121222121212 2 21221212211421211221222124242222 2 21121211242124216662627261622266666
PHILIPPINES         22224241222224242412111211312212 2 21211121211214111221112222111112 2 22221211444221112212422111421111 1
POLAND              12222242222222444444211121121212 2 11211211111144221211122221111111 2 22111144442124112224112212211122
PORTUGAL            21121242222222444444222121123212 2 21221221211214221221112222111111 2 11111144442124113324222212111222
RUMANIA             12222242222222444444211121121212 2 11211211111144222211122224141212 2 21121442442124112224112212211222
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SA*U ARABIA         22224242222211114441121222122222 2 21221233322442222221212224221515 2 22122444444221442221222212111222
SENEGAL             22224242211222441142222221211222 2 22221222222442555222121222422112 2 22222224142222212221216166226221 2
SIERRE LEO          22224242211222441142222222211222 2 22222222222442111222222212424212 2 22222224114222212221221114266114 1
SOMALIA             22224242211222441142122222211222 2 22222222222442111222121222422111 1 22222224444222221222125515526631442
SO AFRICA           22224242211222441141121222211222 2 11211211221421211221221224242222 2 21133233141124212212422333311121433
SPAIN               21121242222222444444211211211212 2 11211221211214221221112222111112 2 11111144442124113324332212111222122
SUDAN               22224242211222441141121222211222 2 22221222222442221222222212424222 2 22222224114221111222121212122222266
SWEDEN              21211242222222444444211212221221 1 11211111111144111111122221114111 1 11111144442124112212422111411111 1
SWITZERLAND         21121242222222444444222111221221 1 11211111111144111111122221141212 2 11111144441124112212422111411111 1
SYRIA               22224242222211114442222221211222 2 21221222221455211221121222422112 2 22122224142221112212422661622266666
TANGANYIKA          22224242211222441141121222211222 2 22222222222442111222222212424212 2 22222224114222221222121515526621442
THAILAND            22224241222224242412111211212212 2 22221222211214221221112222424412 2 11122444444414212221222121212122266
TOGO                22224242211222441142222222521222 2 22222222222442666222221222424212 2 22222224142222212221226166226666666
TRINIDAD            22224142222222424242222221213222 2 11225221211214111221112222424222 2 22221211114422123232322111426611411
TUNISIA             22224242211122441142222222111222 2 21221222221421221221121222422111 1 22222224142221111222121111421111422
TURKEY              22224242222211114441112222111212 2 21211221221421211221121222422112 2 11121442444414112212422111422611411
UGANDA              22224242211222441141121222211222 2 22222222222442111222221224242222 2 22222224114222223233322111426631411
USSR                12222242222222444444111222512111 1 11111111111144221211122224544512 2 11121442444414112224112212111122122
UAR                 22224242211122441141111221121212 2 21211222221421222221121222422111 1 22221211114221111221112121121122166
UK                  21121242222222444444211111221221 1 11111111111144111111122224114211 2 11111144441124112212422111411111 1
US                  21224242222222444444111122221221 1 11111111111144111111122224114221 2 11111144141124112212422111411111 1
UPPER VOLTA         22224242211222441142122221211222 2 22222222224425552222221224242122 2 22222224124222221222125515526622142
URUGUAY             22224122222224424222222221222212 2 11221211211214111221111222221111 1 21121211242124112212422111421111 1
VENEZUELA           22224122222224424211212221111212 1 11211331211214221221111222211112 2 21121211242124111222121111422211 1
VIETNAM, N          22224241122224242412221211255512212 2 22225222555552222553225542445121 2 22222224124221222224411221221122122
VIETNAM REP         22224241122224242122121113112212 2 22221222211214221221322233424431212 2 22222224124221223323211233322122122
YEMEN               22224242222211114442122222221122 2 22222222222442266222121222422215115 2 22122444444221266266666666266666666
YUGOSLAVIA          12222242222222444444211121122112 2 11211211211214221221112222241142122 2 22121442442124112222411221221122122
```

B. Finished Characteristic Code Sheet (*cont.*)

	110	120	130	140	150	160	170	180	190
AFGHANISTAN	3224214212221111121144444422222222	2214444444444444411133322222222222	2421244242112244222211112						
ALBANIA	2225554212221112115552222552522212	2221422244411142221112222222222422	2411121442112244222122222						
ALGERIA	2264214212211112116666666616616662	2221412244666642226664212222262622	1211242142112244121112 2						
ARGENTINA	1112223331111112213332112332122122	2124121244422224212222221666122421	1126121411411212422222222						
AUSTRALIA	1111114211112222222221111121121122	1222221244411422222222211112221111	1422114424222124222222212						
AUSTRIA	1111112221121221222221111121121122	1222221244411142222222221111212111	1422114424221214222222221						
BELGIUM	1112221111112211222112221111122	2124121244411112222222222211122111	1422114424221214222222221						
BOLIVIA	1112222222212112112111211111122121	2224422424222442122222222421122421	1122121424211214222222222						
BRAZIL	1112221111111112112112122122122122	2124121244422224214212221111122421	1122121411451214222121222						
BULGARIA	2225554212221112215552222552522212	2221422244411142221112222222222422	2411121442112244221112222						
BURMA	6264211112211111112116666662766662	6666626264666466666666262666662666	6666242111412244262212222						
BURUNDI	1215552222266611122122551112222121	2224422144266645252225552242122122	1215242124252244212222122						
CAMBODIA	2224214212222111112122221111122212	2221432234442141113331122222223322	2421244242112244222112222						
CAMEROUN	6214214212226661112112112111122121	2224422244166644212242112421122421	1112242124212244212212221						
CANADA	1114211111122121122222211121121122	1222222214411142222222221111221111	1422114424222244222112222						
CEN AFR REP	2222222222266611121122255111122212	2221422144266644212242122222122422	1211242124212244212222222						
CEYLON	1114214212212111111111122122222222	2124123234422242142122224212211211	1123121424222244222112222						
CHAO	1212224212226661112122255111122212	2221422144266644212242122222222222	1215242124252244111222221						
CHILE	1112222222112212212211122122121122	2124121244422224214212222211112421	1123121424251214222112222						
CHINA, PR	2225554212221111111112222552522212	2221422244411142221111112222222422	2411121442112244221222222						
COLOMBIA	3114211112212112211211333211133122	1222222214433344214212222242112421	1122121424211214222212222						
CONGO(BRA)	1212224212226661112122255111122212	2224422144266644212242122222122422	1211242124212244212112221						
CONGO(LEO)	6262221112221111111111126126622222	2124122244122224212223336666621216	6616242133312244212212221						
CUBA	6225552222211112216666666612566612	2124122242442144212222222211112421	1112121424251214222121112						
COSTA RICA	1111112222212212212221221121122122	2221462246666642226661112222262666	6661121433312244224122112						
CYPRUS	3112222222211111113333333333333122	2124122244466645553333332211122411	1432121424252244222222122						
CZECHOS'KIA	2225551112221112212222552522212	2221422244411142221112222222222422	2411121442112244221222221						
DAHOMEY	2222224212226661112122255111122212	2221422144266644212242122222122422	1211242124212244111222211						
DENMARK	1111112221112222222221112212111122	2124121244411112222222222211121111	1412114424222244222122222						
DOMIN REP	1114212222212112216662212212116612	2124122242466664666222222221111122466	6622121424261214222112222						
ECUADOR	1112221112212121121121121221122122	2124122241422221111112222242112421	1122121442111214222122222						
EL SALVADOR	2212222222212112112112112222222222	2124122244222211111112222242112422	1211121411411214222112222						
ETHIOPIA	3222224212221111112114444442222222	2214444444244444441111112222222422	2421244242112333312222222						
FINLAND	1114212221112222212211122121111122	2124121244411112222222222211121111	1412114424222244222122222						
FRANCE	1114214211112212213332113331122121	2224433234442144212221112242122221	1121114433321214222222212						
GABON	2212224212226661112122255111122212	2221422144266644212242122222122422	1211242124212244212222222						
GERMANY, E	2225552222211122211122255222222212	2221422244411142221112222222222422	2411121442112244221111222						
GERMAN FR	1114214211112212212221121121121122	2224422144411142222222221111212111	1422114424221214222222122						
GHANA	2224214212221111112122255111122212	2221412244242142142111122222122422	2411121442112242112122222						
GREECE	1114212222112212212211333211121121	2224433234422241112222222211122121	1113121424221214222122212						
GUATEMALA	6262222222212112112111112222212122	2124123234422221111112222242112246	6616121411411214222111222						
GUINEA	2224214212221111112122255111122212	2221412244211142224211112222212422	2411121442113233312112222						
HAITI	2222222222221111211444442222222222	2214444444444444433322222222122422	2411121411411214222122222						
HONDURAS	1114212222212112112112212212212122	1222222241422241111112222242112421	1111121411411214222112222						
HUNGARY	2225552222211112213332225522522212	2221422244411142221112222222222422	2411121442112244221122222						
ICELAND	1111112222112222222221112212121122	2124121244411112222222222211121111	1422114424222244222112222						
INDIA	1114211112212111112112112111121121	2224433234411142222221112211121111	1421121424222244222221122						
INDONESIA	6212221112211111112113333331133333	3333323234433344212221112222212422	1211333342112241112212222						
IRAN	6212221112211111111116662262216666	6666626264666466663333322222226666	6621242421214412221122222						
IRAQ	6262221112221111111116666666666666	6626666264422246666666662666662666	6666666611412244222212222						
IRELAND	1111112222112212212221121121111122	2124123234411112222222222211121111	1422114424222124222222222						
ISRAEL	1114212222112112112211112221111122	2124121244411112222222222211121111	1412114424222244222112221						
ITALY	1114214211112112212211212112121122	2124121244442142222222222211121111	1422114424221214222112222						
IVORY COAST	2224212222222211112122255111122212	2221412244242142122211122222122422	1211242124212241112222222						
JAMAICA	1114212222212212112212112112121122	1222221244466642222224212211221111	1422121424222124222212222						

B. Finished Characteristic Code Sheet (*cont.*)

	110	120	130	140	150	160	170	180	190
JAPAN	111111222111211211211211211211122				222442124441114421222222221112211111				142212142422224422222212
JORDAN	323222111222111111111666226221222222				266462626442224666111421222222222222				242124424211224412212122
KOREA, N	222555222222111111555222255252222212				222142222444111422211142122222222422				241112142112224422121112
KOREA REP	626222222666111112116662262266666				666662626442224666666222222666662666				666612141141122442221112
LAOS	333222111222211111111333222333222222				212412222442222211111555222222221122				242324423331224421212112
LEBANON	311222421211111111211111222333211222				212412222442222211133322222421222221				111212142112224422211222
LIBERIA	222222421222111211221211211222212212				222142324421114421112222222221224222				122112142112224422122222
LIBYA	321421111222211212214444442212212222				221444444444444444214212142122222221				112212142425224412222122
LUXEMBOURG	111111222111222222221112121111122				212412124441112222222222211221111				142211442422124212222122
MALAGASY R	111421111222221111221211211211222221				222442214424214222222222224212242221				112224212422224412212222
MALAYA	111222421221211111211211211111222233				332332224444214222222222211112211111				142212142422224412212222
MALI	222555555222666111211222551112222212				222142214426664421222421224212224222				121124212425224111212222
MAURITANIA	221421421222211111211221211111222212				222142214426664421421421224212224222				121124212422224412221122
MEXICO	321421333211211211221211111122221				222442221441114224212222242112242221				112112142422121422222122
MONGOLIA	222555222222111111555222255222212				222142224441114222111222222222422				241112142112224421112112
MOROCCO	621421111221211211211211211111666623				232333332444664222222421224212222221				112112142421224412221122
NEPAL	622222555222211111211666226222222666				666662226442224666111555222222222422				241124423331224422212222
NETHERLANDS	111421421111221221221111221211111122				212412124441111222222222211122111111				142211442422121422221122
NEW ZEALAND	111111222111222222221111111211211122				122222124441114222222222211122111111				141211442422212422212222
NICARAGUA	121222555221211211221221222222222133				332332224144214111112222224212242222				122112141141121422212222
NIGER	622222555222666111211222551111222212				222142214426664421222421222212224222				121524212425224111221212
NIGERIA	626222111222211111211111211221222122				212412224441666422333333214212211221				112224212421224211221222
NORWAY	111111222111222222221111221211111122				212412124441111222222222211122111111				142211442422224422211122
PAKISTAN	326222111222111111111666226261222626				666462626442224666333421221221224666				661133331141224412212122
PANAMA	111222222221211221211211222221222122				212412222442222111421222224212224221				111212141145121422212222
PARAGUAY	121555222222211122121211221222222221				222442224414421422211122222221224222				241112141141121422211221
PERU	661222421221211211211112266666666222				212412124442224214212222266666262666				662612141146121422221212
PHILIPPINES	111421421111221111221221221111121122				122222221441114222421222221111224411				142212142422224422212122
POLAND	222111222221111221211222225522122212				222142224441114222111222222222224222				241112142112224422122122
PORTUGAL	222555222333111221221222255222223212				222142224441114222111222222222323222				242112142111121422221222
RUMANIA	222555222222111211555222255252222212				222142224441114222111222222222224222				241112142112224422112222
RWANDA	621555222222666111111221551211272221				222442214426664525333555224212224222				121524212425224422121222
SAUDI ARABIA	422222222222211112114444442224442				221444444444444444111421222224444444				444124424212224412211112
SENEGAL	126421421222211111221221221111122212				222141224424214222222421222221224222				121124214211224111221222
SIERRE LEO	111421421222666111211211221221222221				122222214422224222421222224212211221				111224212422224211222212
SOMALIA	121421111222666111211211221221222221				222442224441222422421222224212212222				121524213331224422222121
SOUTH AFRICA	323222421211211111111333331333333323				332332323421114222111222221111212111				142111442112224212221222
SPAIN	222222421333111211211222255221223312				222142224441114222111222222222333222				241112142111121422211122
SUDAN	622421111222111111111666226622666622				666662226466666466666622222222662666				666624211141122442212212
SWEDEN	111111222111222222221111221211111222				212412124441111222222222211122111111				142211442422224422222222
SWITZERLAND	111333111111221221221111221221111222				212412124441111222222222211111222411				142411442422121422212222
SYRIA	626222421221111111111111666666666666				662666626442224111666666226666662666				666612141141122442212222
TANGANYIKA	121421227222211111221222111111222212				222142224421114222222211222223223222				121124212422224211222212
THAILAND	622111421222111111211666226222226				666662226442224111111222222222226622				246624421141121422212222
TOGO	666421421222666111211221666226222266				662662214426664666222666222222622666				661624211141122442212222
TRINIDAD	111421222221211221221211211211211122				222442124444666422222222222211221111				142211424222212422221212
TUNISIA	221421222221211211221222111111222212				222142124441114222222421222221222422				121112142421224412221112
TURKEY	111111222211211211211221211211211123				332332323444214222222222221112112121				112212141141121422221212
UGANDA	111222111222211111211111211221221122				212412224441666422333333111555221121				111524212422224211212222
USSR	222555111221111211211221222555222212				222142224441114222111333222222222422				242112144211224422122122
UAR	622555222221111211221222551111666112				222142224446664111333111222222662622				246112141141224412222122
UK	111111111111222221222211111211211122				122222224441114222421222221111221111				142211442422212422222122
US	111421421111222221333222111111111122				122222224414114222421222211111222411				142211442422212422222222
UPPER VOLTA	122222222222666111211222551111222212				222142214426664421222421222212222422				121124212425224111221221
URUGUAY	111333333211221221221333111333111222				332332323343331111222222221112222411				142412142422121422211222
VENEZUELA	111421222211211221333111211111122222				212412224242222222222222221112222421				122212143331121422212222
VIETNAM, N	222555222222111111555222255252222212				222142224441114222111111222222222422				241112144211224422112222
VIETNAM REP	222222222221111111111222222222222221				222443223444214421421222222222122422				241133334211224422122212
YEMEN	666222111222666111666666666666666666				666666626446664666666666227666666666				666666661141224412222122
YUGOSLAVIA	222222111333111211211222255221222212				222142224441114222111421222222222422				242112144211224422112222

C. Check List of Deletions

ALL HAND WINNOWED PREDICATE DELETIONS INCLUDED

CELL ORDER IS TOP LEFT, TOP RIGHT, BOTTOM LEFT, BOTTOM RIGHT

SO = 'SUBJECT ONLY' DELETION

RD = REDUNDANT DELETION

1	5	0	18	9	0	RD	2	14	0	11	22	82	RD	3	6	0	22	13	80	RD	4	82	5	46	0	55	RD
1	10	0	33	9	73	RD	2	31	5	85	17	7	RD	3	8	0	18	13	84	RD	4	99	5	45	0	36	RD
1	11	0	28	9	78	RD	2	32	6	4	16	89	RD	3	10	0	33	13	69	RD	4	102	5	54	0	49	RD
1	27	7	24	2	82	SO	2	38	7	3	15	88	RD	3	11	0	28	13	74	RD	4	104	5	38	0	30	SO
1	34	8	54	1	52	RD	2	40	21	50	1	38	RD	3	46	13	71	0	26	RD	4	109	4	11	0	42	SO
1	43	8	47	1	56	RD	2	46	22	62	0	26	RD	3	47	9	16	4	26	RD	4	117	5	55	0	51	RD
1	46	9	75	0	26	RD	2	47	18	7	4	26	RD	3	48	4	26	0	24	RD	4	118	0	40	5	55	RD
1	50	0	43	9	47	RD	2	48	4	26	0	24	RD	3	57	8	17	5	85	RD	4	119	0	74	5	21	RD
1	78	0	28	4	3	RD	2	58	0	18	22	75	RD	3	58	0	18	13	84	RD	4	121	0	54	5	56	RD
1	86	9	67	0	38	RD	2	59	0	13	22	78	SO	3	64	13	33	0	18	RD	4	125	0	64	5	30	RD
1	93	9	23	0	78	RD	2	64	22	24	0	18	RD	3	65	8	17	0	18	RD	4	128	5	43	0	45	RD
1	94	0	51	9	32	RD	2	65	8	17	0	18	RD	3	74	13	13	0	87	RD	4	129	5	51	0	37	RD
1	96	9	58	0	23	RD	2	75	22	40	0	52	RD	3	75	13	49	0	52	RD	4	138	5	43	0	49	RD
1	97	0	23	9	7	RD	2	76	22	4	0	70	RD	3	76	13	13	0	70	RD	4	152	5	37	0	25	SO
1	100	9	55	0	22	RD	2	82	22	29	0	55	RD	3	81	6	5	7	33	RD	4	155	5	6	0	13	SO
1	101	0	41	9	48	RD	2	86	22	54	0	38	RD	3	82	13	38	0	55	RD	4	167	5	29	0	48	SO
1	104	0	43	9	21	SO	2	87	0	31	22	36	RD	3	86	13	63	0	38	RD	4	169	5	53	0	48	RD
1	105	0	43	9	38	RD	2	92	0	20	21	72	RD	3	87	0	31	13	45	RD	4	175	5	46	0	49	RD
1	107	0	46	9	56	RD	2	104	20	23	2	28	SO	3	92	0	20	12	81	RD	5	1	0	9	18	0	SO
1	119	9	65	0	26	RD	2	108	20	45	2	33	RD	3	102	11	48	2	47	RD	5	2	18	0	0	9	RD
1	127	0	21	9	63	RD	2	109	10	5	2	40	SO	3	104	11	32	2	28	SO	5	3	13	0	5	9	RD
1	128	0	48	9	36	RD	2	117	20	40	0	51	RD	3	106	11	41	2	28	RD	5	4	5	0	13	9	SO
1	133	0	29	9	67	RD	2	118	2	38	20	40	RD	3	108	11	54	2	33	RD	5	27	7	7	11	2	SO
1	137	0	29	9	59	RD	2	123	14	93	8	0	RD	3	109	4	11	2	40	SO	5	92	0	9	17	0	RD
1	142	0	30	9	57	RD	2	129	18	38	4	33	RD	3	117	11	49	0	51	RD	5	104	16	0	2	9	SO
1	144	9	25	0	11	RD	2	133	2	27	20	56	RD	3	129	11	45	2	35	RD	5	120	11	9	7	0	RD
1	152	9	33	0	25	SO	2	136	10	2	12	73	RD	3	152	10	32	1	24	SO	5	159	2	9	15	0	SO
1	154	9	46	0	25	RD	2	139	2	32	20	51	RD	3	154	12	43	1	24	RD	5	167	15	0	2	9	SO
1	159	9	21	0	50	SO	2	141	6	5	16	71	RD	3	155	5	6	0	13	SO	6	2	0	22	22	71	RD
1	161	9	38	0	50	RD	2	148	0	14	22	74	RD	3	159	2	28	10	40	SO	6	3	0	13	22	80	RD
1	167	0	34	9	39	SO	2	152	19	23	1	24	SO	3	167	10	24	2	46	SO	6	8	0	18	22	75	RD
1	168	0	34	9	63	RD	2	154	21	34	1	24	RD	3	169	11	47	2	46	RD	6	10	0	33	22	60	RD
1	174	0	28	9	63	RD	2	155	10	1	0	13	SO	3	180	13	63	0	34	SO	6	11	0	28	22	65	RD
1	175	0	51	9	40	RD	2	156	1	13	20	36	SO	3	184	0	21	10	46	SO	6	13	0	16	22	77	RD
1	180	9	67	0	34	SO	2	159	2	28	18	32	SO	3	192	0	27	13	73	RD	6	14	0	11	22	82	RD
1	188	0	32	9	72	RD	2	160	2	28	20	47	RD	4	2	5	17	0	93	RD	6	17	0	11	22	0	RD
1	192	0	27	9	77	RD	2	162	1	12	21	44	SO	4	5	5	13	0	9	RD	6	19	0	33	22	0	RD
1	193	0	28	9	77	RD	2	165	5	3	17	89	SO	4	36	5	37	0	73	RD	6	20	0	18	22	0	RD
2	3	13	0	9	93	RD	2	167	19	15	2	46	SO	4	37	5	59	0	51	RD	6	27	2	29	20	64	SO
2	4	5	0	17	93	SO	2	173	17	16	1	6	SO	4	43	5	50	0	57	RD	6	35	1	23	21	70	RD
2	5	18	0	0	9	RD	2	176	20	52	2	26	RD	4	45	5	50	0	54	RD	6	47	0	25	14	16	RD
2	6	0	22	22	71	RD	2	180	22	54	0	34	SO	4	47	5	20	0	30	RD	6	49	8	16	0	26	RD
2	8	0	18	22	75	RD	2	184	0	21	19	37	SO	4	54	5	32	0	76	RD	6	58	0	18	22	75	RD
2	10	0	33	22	60	RD	2	192	0	27	22	64	RD	4	74	5	21	0	87	RD	6	63	16	30	6	62	RD
2	11	0	28	22	65	RD	3	2	13	9	0	93	RD	4	75	5	57	0	52	RD	6	64	16	30	0	18	RD
2	13	0	16	22	77	RD	3	5	13	5	0	9	RD	4	76	5	21	0	70	RD	6	65	15	10	0	18	RD

6	74	0	26	22	65	RD
6	104	13	30	2	28	SD
6	106	15	37	2	28	RD
6	108	19	46	2	33	RD
6	112	3	24	14	33	SD
6	129	18	38	1	36	RD
6	139	1	33	20	51	RD
6	148	0	14	21	75	RD
6	152	1	41	11	14	SD
6	155	0	11	9	4	SD
6	156	7	7	6	50	SD
6	162	1	12	20	45	SD
6	167	7	27	3	45	SD
6	176	16	56	2	26	RD
6	177	11	12	2	19	SD
6	180	22	54	0	34	SD
6	184	10	11	9	47	SD
6	192	0	27	22	64	RD
8	2	0	22	18	75	RD
8	3	0	13	18	84	RD
8	6	0	22	18	75	RD
8	9	9	0	9	97	RD
8	10	0	33	18	64	RD
8	11	0	28	18	69	RD
8	13	0	16	18	81	RD
8	16	0	11	18	0	RD
8	18	0	33	18	0	RD
8	20	18	0	0	22	RD
8	27	10	21	8	76	SD
8	50	4	39	13	43	RD
8	57	1	24	17	73	RD
8	59	0	13	18	82	SD
8	74	0	26	18	69	RD
8	76	0	26	11	59	RD
8	119	17	57	1	25	RD
8	125	14	50	1	34	RD
8	148	0	14	18	78	RD
8	159	7	23	4	46	SD
9	8	9	9	0	97	RD
9	10	0	33	9	73	RD
9	11	0	28	9	78	RD
9	16	0	11	9	9	RD
9	18	0	33	9	9	RD
9	20	9	9	0	22	RD
9	27	6	25	3	81	SD
9	47	0	25	5	25	RD
9	74	0	26	9	78	RD
9	77	1	27	7	34	RD
10	1	0	9	33	73	SD
10	2	0	22	33	60	RD
10	3	0	13	33	69	RD
10	6	0	22	33	60	RD
10	8	0	18	33	64	RD
10	9	0	9	33	73	RD
10	11	28	0	5	82	RD
10	12	5	0	28	82	SD
10	14	0	11	33	71	RD
10	15	0	11	33	0	RD
10	18	33	0	0	18	RD
10	19	33	0	0	22	RD
10	23	2	25	31	57	RD
10	27	3	28	30	54	SD
10	32	0	10	33	72	RD
10	33	1	29	32	53	RD
10	38	0	10	33	70	RD
10	39	2	36	31	45	RD
10	41	0	19	33	61	RD
10	42	1	35	32	44	RD
10	44	0	25	33	57	RD
10	48	0	30	8	16	RD
10	49	8	16	21	5	RD
10	53	0	14	33	68	RD
10	57	0	25	33	57	RD
10	59	8	5	23	77	SD
10	60	6	1	27	76	SD
10	61	8	0	25	79	SD
10	63	0	46	33	35	RD
10	65	0	25	8	10	RD
10	71	1	20	32	58	RD
10	74	0	26	32	55	RD
10	75	2	60	30	22	RD
10	89	1	32	26	36	RD
10	91	25	6	1	4	RD
10	104	3	40	11	19	SD
10	109	0	15	13	29	SD
10	123	33	74	0	8	RD
10	127	3	18	25	47	RD
10	135	28	49	1	12	RD
10	136	0	12	28	57	RD
10	142	3	27	26	40	RD
10	144	17	17	1	10	RD
10	157	1	13	28	56	RD
10	159	3	27	18	32	SD
10	160	3	27	24	43	RD
10	167	1	33	19	29	SD
10	168	1	33	30	42	RD
10	177	7	16	18	3	SD
10	180	8	68	25	9	SD
10	184	3	18	21	35	SD
10	199	7	5	26	77	SD
11	1	0	9	28	78	SD
11	2	0	22	28	65	RD
11	3	0	13	28	74	RD
11	6	0	22	28	65	RD
11	8	0	18	28	69	RD
11	9	0	9	28	78	RD
11	10	28	5	0	82	RD
11	13	0	16	28	71	RD
11	14	0	11	28	76	RD
11	15	0	11	28	5	RD
11	18	28	5	0	18	RD
11	19	28	5	0	22	RD
11	23	1	26	27	61	RD
11	27	3	28	25	59	SD
11	31	27	63	1	23	RD
11	32	0	10	28	77	RD
11	33	1	29	27	58	RD
11	35	0	24	28	63	RD
11	36	1	41	27	46	RD
11	38	0	10	28	75	RD
11	39	1	37	27	49	RD
11	41	0	19	28	66	RD
11	42	1	35	27	49	RD
11	44	0	25	28	62	RD
11	48	0	30	4	20	RD
11	49	4	20	21	5	RD
11	53	0	14	28	73	RD
11	57	0	25	28	62	RD
11	59	8	5	18	82	SD
11	60	6	1	22	81	SD
11	61	8	0	20	84	SD
11	63	0	46	28	40	RD
11	65	0	25	3	15	RD
11	71	1	20	27	63	RD
11	74	0	26	27	60	RD
11	75	0	62	27	25	RD
11	89	1	32	23	39	RD
11	91	22	9	1	4	RD
11	104	3	40	9	21	SD
11	109	0	15	13	29	SD
11	115	0	20	28	63	RD
11	116	1	31	27	52	RD
11	135	23	54	1	12	RD
11	136	0	12	26	59	RD
11	142	3	27	22	44	RD
11	144	14	20	1	10	RD
11	159	3	27	16	34	SD
11	160	3	27	21	46	RD
11	167	1	33	16	32	SD
11	168	1	33	25	47	RD
11	177	5	18	16	5	SD
11	180	4	72	24	10	SD
11	184	2	19	18	38	SD
11	197	3	32	25	55	SD
11	199	7	5	21	82	SD
12	10	5	28	0	82	RD
12	13	5	11	0	99	RD
12	18	5	28	0	18	RD
12	19	5	28	0	22	RD
12	48	0	30	4	20	RD
12	63	0	46	5	63	RD
12	64	0	46	5	13	RD
12	65	0	25	5	13	RD
12	72	0	52	5	54	RD
12	173	0	33	2	5	SD
12	197	5	30	0	80	SD
13	2	0	22	16	77	RD
13	6	0	22	16	77	RD
13	8	0	18	16	81	RD
13	11	0	28	16	71	RD
13	12	5	0	11	99	SD
13	14	11	0	5	99	RD
13	15	11	0	5	28	RD
13	16	11	0	0	18	RD
13	17	11	0	0	22	RD
13	18	5	28	0	18	RD
13	19	5	28	0	22	RD
13	48	2	28	8	16	RD
13	49	8	16	3	23	RD
13	57	0	25	16	74	RD
13	65	0	25	13	5	RD
13	74	0	26	15	72	RD
13	86	13	63	2	36	RD
13	90	3	2	9	93	SD
13	143	3	2	10	90	SD
13	173	2	31	5	2	SD
13	188	1	31	15	66	RD
13	197	11	24	5	75	SD
14	2	0	22	11	82	RD
14	6	0	22	11	82	RD
14	10	0	33	11	71	RD
14	11	0	28	11	76	RD
14	13	11	5	0	99	RD
14	15	11	0	0	33	RD
14	16	11	0	0	18	RD
14	17	11	0	0	22	RD
14	57	0	25	11	79	RD
14	64	0	46	8	10	RD
14	65	0	25	8	10	RD
14	74	0	26	10	77	RD
14	90	3	2	6	96	SD
14	103	2	41	2	4	SD
14	152	1	41	4	21	SD
14	173	2	31	3	4	SD
14	184	4	17	2	54	SD
14	197	6	29	5	75	SD
15	10	0	33	11	0	RD
15	11	0	28	11	5	RD
15	13	11	5	0	28	RD
15	14	11	0	0	33	RD
15	36	3	1	8	32	RD
15	59	0	8	11	23	SD
15	61	0	8	11	25	SD
15	71	3	1	8	32	RD
15	88	2	0	8	33	SD
15	90	3	1	6	28	SD
15	103	2	16	2	1	SD
15	104	2	3	0	11	SD
15	116	3	1	8	32	RD
15	135	4	28	2	1	RD
15	156	2	1	2	12	SD
15	159	3	3	2	18	SD
15	167	3	1	4	19	SD
15	174	2	1	4	29	RD
15	177	2	7	0	18	SD
15	180	5	8	4	25	SD
15	184	4	3	2	21	SD
15	197	6	8	5	25	SD
16	8	0	18	11	0	RD
16	9	0	9	11	9	RD
16	13	11	0	0	18	RD
16	14	11	0	0	18	RD
16	27	2	10	9	8	SD
16	90	3	1	6	15	SD
16	143	2	0	6	12	SD
17	6	0	22	11	0	RD
17	13	11	0	0	22	RD
17	14	11	0	0	22	RD
17	49	4	8	3	0	RD
17	59	0	5	11	17	SD
17	64	0	16	8	0	RD
17	65	0	15	8	0	RD
17	71	3	0	8	22	RD
17	90	3	0	6	22	SD

17	180	5	22	4	0	SD
18	8	0	18	33	0	RD
18	9	0	9	33	9	RD
18	10	33	0	0	18	RD
18	11	28	0	5	18	RD
18	12	5	0	28	18	SD
18	13	5	0	28	18	RD
18	27	3	10	30	8	SD
18	32	0	3	33	15	RD
18	33	1	5	32	13	RD
18	38	0	2	33	15	RD
18	39	2	6	31	12	RD
18	48	0	7	8	4	RD
18	52	22	13	1	4	RD
18	59	8	0	23	18	SD
18	61	8	0	25	15	SD
18	135	28	7	1	4	RD
18	148	14	0	17	18	RD
18	159	3	7	18	4	SD
18	167	1	4	19	11	SD
18	180	8	10	25	5	SD
18	184	3	4	21	5	SD
18	199	7	0	26	18	SD
19	6	0	22	33	0	RD
19	10	33	0	D	22	RD
19	11	28	0	5	22	RD
19	12	5	0	28	22	SD
19	13	5	0	28	22	RD
19	31	32	18	1	4	RD
19	36	1	7	32	15	RD
19	39	2	6	31	16	RD
19	42	1	5	32	16	RD
19	48	0	14	8	8	RD
19	49	8	8	21	0	RD
19	6D	6	0	27	22	SD
19	61	8	0	25	22	SD
19	64	0	16	8	0	RD
19	65	0	15	8	0	RD
19	85	5	9	28	13	RD
19	88	0	2	33	13	SD
19	1D1	4	9	20	10	RD
19	104	3	13	11	2	SD
19	108	15	19	12	2	RD
19	112	8	3	8	14	SD
19	116	1	6	32	16	RD
19	135	28	15	1	4	RD
19	148	14	0	17	21	RD
19	152	5	1	3	11	SD
19	153	5	1	7	14	RD
19	156	1	7	12	6	SD
19	159	3	6	18	8	SD
19	160	3	6	24	14	RD
19	162	6	1	6	20	SD
19	163	6	1	21	21	RD
19	167	1	7	19	3	SD
19	168	1	7	30	13	RD
19	177	7	11	18	2	SD
19	18D	8	22	25	0	SD
19	184	3	10	21	9	SD
19	195	13	14	20	8	SD
19	199	7	1	26	21	SD

20	6	0	22	18	0	RD
20	8	18	0	0	22	RD
20	9	9	0	9	22	RD
20	27	10	2	8	20	SD
20	32	3	0	15	22	RD
20	36	2	7	16	15	RD
20	59	0	5	18	17	SD
20	64	1	16	2	0	RD
20	71	4	0	12	22	RD
2D	92	6	1	12	21	RD
20	1D4	5	13	6	2	SD
20	152	7	1	6	11	SD
20	153	7	1	9	14	RD
20	162	5	1	8	20	SD
20	167	4	7	11	3	SD
20	18D	10	22	5	0	SD
21	12	3	2	29	81	SD
21	22	32	36	0	47	RD
21	23	14	13	18	70	RD
21	25	1	16	31	67	RD
21	27	4	27	28	56	SD
21	48	6	24	11	13	RD
21	112	12	15	7	40	SD
21	143	3	2	25	75	SD
21	149	3	1	D	4	SD
21	155	0	11	5	8	SD
21	195	12	46	20	37	SD
22	27	11	20	57	27	SD
22	60	7	0	60	43	SD
22	112	23	4	19	28	SD
22	149	4	0	1	3	SD
22	155	3	8	8	5	SD
22	156	4	10	33	23	SD
22	162	10	3	32	33	SD
22	165	7	1	60	46	SD
22	180	38	38	26	8	SD
23	11	1	27	26	61	RD
23	24	27	34	0	54	RD
23	32	10	0	17	88	RD
23	38	9	1	17	86	RD
23	49	6	18	0	26	RD
23	59	0	13	27	73	SD
23	86	24	52	3	35	RD
23	112	11	16	6	41	SD
23	149	4	0	0	4	SD
23	177	6	17	1	20	SD
23	180	21	55	4	30	SD
23	199	0	12	27	76	SD
24	1	8	1	53	53	SD
24	27	23	8	38	46	SD
24	59	4	9	57	43	SD
24	6D	1	6	55	48	SD
24	103	22	21	6	0	SD
24	112	19	8	20	27	SD
24	149	4	0	0	4	SD
24	151	3	2	4	18	SD
24	156	3	11	36	20	SD
24	159	19	11	20	30	SD
24	177	13	10	3	18	SD
24	180	44	32	13	21	SD
24	191	1	7	4	1	SD

25	27	0	31	17	67	SD
25	104	12	31	3	27	SD
25	159	2	28	10	40	SD
25	167	11	23	2	46	SD
25	180	17	59	0	34	SD
26	1	8	1	4D	66	SD
26	11	3	25	45	42	RD
26	12	0	5	48	62	SD
26	21	5	27	43	40	RD
26	23	17	10	31	57	RD
26	25	17	0	31	67	RD
26	27	31	0	17	67	SD
26	32	7	3	41	64	RD
26	33	20	10	28	57	RD
26	35	14	10	34	57	RD
26	41	11	8	36	58	RD
26	42	21	15	26	50	RD
26	44	16	9	32	58	RD
26	46	44	40	3	23	RD
26	48	19	11	6	18	RD
26	59	1	12	45	55	SD
26	60	0	7	43	60	SD
26	61	1	7	44	6D	SD
26	64	26	20	2	16	RD
26	65	13	12	2	16	RD
26	86	37	39	11	27	RD
26	100	34	30	6	16	RD
26	109	9	6	14	28	SD
26	112	9	18	25	22	SD
26	115	11	9	33	58	RD
26	152	26	16	8	17	SD
26	154	3D	25	8	17	RD
26	155	7	4	3	1D	SD
26	156	4	10	31	25	SD
26	180	40	36	5	29	SD
27	1	7	2	24	82	SD
27	9	6	3	25	81	RD
27	11	3	25	28	59	RD
27	21	4	28	27	56	RD
27	26	31	17	0	67	RD
27	46	27	57	3	23	RD
27	48	14	16	3	21	RD
27	52	20	62	9	7	RD
27	59	0	13	29	71	SD
27	95	17	78	13	3	RD
27	96	24	43	4	19	RD
27	104	9	34	13	17	SD
27	112	5	22	17	30	SD
27	152	17	25	4	21	SD
27	154	20	35	4	21	RD
27	155	3	8	0	13	SD
27	159	14	16	10	40	SD
27	165	0	8	31	75	SD
27	180	23	53	5	29	SD
28	1	1	7	61	41	SD
28	12	5	0	57	48	SD
28	27	12	18	50	30	SD
28	33	10	19	52	29	RD
28	35	6	17	56	31	RD
28	41	3	15	57	33	RD
28	44	4	20	58	28	RD

28	47	4	20	20	1D	RD
28	53	3	11	59	37	RD
28	60	6	1	53	46	SD
28	64	19	27	15	3	RD
28	98	6	15	56	33	RD
28	100	28	32	18	4	RD
28	109	6	9	27	14	SD
28	126	52	27	4	12	RD
28	151	0	5	12	7	SD
28	152	14	26	21	4	SD
28	154	23	29	21	4	RD
28	155	2	9	11	2	SD
28	156	11	3	26	28	SD
28	157	11	3	42	39	RD
28	184	15	5	29	27	SD
28	191	7	1	1	3	SD
28	196	31	14	31	34	SD
29	3	12	0	44	49	RD
29	4	5	0	51	49	SD
29	11	1	27	55	22	RD
29	23	18	7	38	42	RD
29	32	8	1	48	48	RD
29	33	25	4	31	45	RD
29	38	9	1	46	48	RD
29	41	19	0	35	49	RD
29	47	25	0	17	7	RD
29	48	17	7	11	12	RD
29	49	11	12	0	26	RD
29	57	19	2	37	47	RD
29	59	3	1D	53	37	SD
29	6D	0	7	55	42	SD
29	61	0	8	55	41	SD
29	64	39	3	9	9	RD
29	65	19	2	9	9	RD
29	71	15	4	38	45	RD
29	95	46	44	9	3	RD
29	98	18	3	38	46	RD
29	104	32	7	9	16	SD
29	109	14	1	16	24	SD
29	110	14	1	33	43	RD
29	115	19	0	35	48	RD
29	123	48	49	8	0	RD
29	126	32	44	16	0	RD
29	136	12	0	34	42	RD
29	152	30	7	13	12	SD
29	155	11	0	8	5	SD
29	162	3	8	44	14	SD
29	163	3	8	49	30	RD
29	167	28	2	13	29	SD
29	174	23	2	26	39	RD
29	177	14	8	2	19	SD
29	180	53	14	2	32	SD
30	3	0	13	56	44	RD
30	4	0	5	56	52	SD
30	25	3	14	53	43	RD
30	27	11	19	45	38	SD
30	31	56	33	0	24	RD
30	32	2	8	54	49	RD
30	33	6	24	5D	33	RD
30	38	1	9	54	47	RD
30	44	1	24	55	33	RD

30	46	27	57	25	0	RD
30	59	10	3	44	54	SO
30	60	7	0	45	57	SO
30	61	7	1	47	56	SO
30	64	4	42	14	3	RD
30	65	2	23	14	3	RD
30	71	7	14	47	41	RD
30	98	2	19	54	38	RD
30	104	7	36	20	9	SO
30	109	2	13	25	16	SO
30	110	2	13	46	33	RD
30	119	40	32	1	25	RD
30	120	41	47	0	10	RD
30	123	56	49	0	8	RD
30	127	5	16	36	35	RD
30	143	4	0	44	55	SO
30	144	23	10	2	9	RD
30	152	11	30	12	13	SO
30	162	9	3	17	48	SO
30	163	9	3	35	51	RD
30	167	2	32	33	13	SO
30	177	9	14	20	1	SO
30	180	21	54	31	2	SO
30	184	13	8	22	34	SO
31	4	1	4	89	20	SO
31	104	21	22	29	1	SO
31	109	6	9	37	4	SO
31	152	24	18	23	2	SO
31	155	2	9	11	2	SO
31	156	13	1	36	20	SO
31	159	27	2	31	19	SO
31	162	12	1	42	23	SO
31	165	3	5	86	19	SO
31	167	13	21	46	1	SO
31	173	16	17	6	1	SO
31	180	52	24	33	0	SO
31	184	20	1	36	20	SO
32	109	2	13	0	42	SO
32	112	4	23	1	46	SO
32	152	8	34	0	25	SO
32	167	7	27	2	46	SO
32	180	10	66	0	34	SO
33	1	6	3	24	82	SO
33	3	9	4	21	81	RD
33	11	1	27	29	58	RD
33	25	9	8	21	77	RD
33	32	10	0	20	85	RD
33	34	30	32	0	53	RD
33	47	18	7	7	23	RD
33	49	4	20	0	26	RD
33	53	9	5	21	80	RD
33	55	29	49	1	34	RD
33	61	0	8	30	74	SO
33	64	22	24	3	15	RD
33	71	13	8	15	75	RD
33	86	29	47	1	37	RD
33	98	12	10	18	75	RD
33	100	26	38	3	19	RD
33	109	8	7	8	34	SO
33	112	11	16	8	39	SO
33	149	3	1	0	4	SO

33	152	23	19	3	22	SO
33	154	26	29	3	22	RD
33	156	0	14	24	32	SO
33	165	6	2	24	82	SO
33	167	17	17	10	38	SO
33	180	28	48	0	34	SO
33	196	7	39	23	46	SO
34	1	8	1	54	52	SO
34	27	24	7	38	46	SO
34	59	3	10	59	41	SO
34	60	0	7	58	45	SO
34	61	2	6	57	47	SO
34	104	30	13	14	16	SO
34	109	13	2	19	23	SO
34	149	4	0	0	4	SO
34	152	33	9	12	13	SO
34	156	4	10	40	16	SO
34	167	27	7	22	26	SO
34	173	24	9	2	5	SO
34	177	12	11	2	19	SO
34	180	50	26	8	26	SO
35	4	5	0	19	91	SO
35	59	0	13	24	76	SO
35	104	21	22	3	27	SO
35	109	10	5	1	41	SO
35	152	21	21	1	24	SO
35	155	11	0	1	12	SO
35	156	0	14	23	33	SO
35	159	3	27	19	31	SO
35	162	1	12	22	43	SO
35	165	5	3	19	87	SO
35	167	19	15	3	45	SO
35	173	17	16	1	6	SO
35	180	24	52	0	34	SO
35	184	0	21	19	37	SO
36	1	8	1	34	72	SO
36	3	12	1	30	72	RD
36	4	5	0	37	73	SO
36	11	1	27	41	46	RD
36	25	12	5	30	68	RD
36	27	16	15	26	58	SO
36	32	8	2	34	71	RD
36	35	24	0	18	73	RD
36	37	42	22	0	51	RD
36	38	9	1	32	71	RD
36	47	25	0	14	16	RD
36	48	14	16	2	22	RD
36	59	1	12	41	59	SO
36	60	0	7	42	61	SO
36	61	0	8	42	62	SO
36	64	34	12	0	18	RD
36	65	13	12	0	18	RD
36	71	13	8	27	63	RD
36	86	39	37	3	35	RD
36	88	0	5	40	55	SO
36	98	18	4	24	69	RD
36	100	35	29	3	19	RD
36	104	29	14	9	21	SO
36	106	30	22	9	21	RD
36	108	32	33	9	26	RD
36	109	13	2	9	33	SO

36	110	13	2	21	59	RD
36	112	7	20	22	25	SO
36	115	18	2	22	69	RD
36	118	12	28	30	30	RD
36	124	2	12	32	53	RD
36	127	13	8	26	46	RD
36	129	28	28	11	26	RD
36	143	0	5	42	58	SO
36	144	10	24	7	4	RD
36	152	29	13	5	20	SO
36	154	32	23	5	20	RD
36	155	11	0	4	9	SO
36	156	3	11	34	22	SO
36	157	3	11	38	46	RD
36	159	10	20	26	24	SO
36	162	2	11	36	29	SO
36	163	2	11	38	49	RD
36	165	5	3	37	69	SO
36	167	28	6	10	38	SO
36	173	23	10	2	5	SO
36	177	6	17	0	21	SO
36	180	42	34	0	34	SO
36	184	1	20	27	29	SO
36	197	9	26	33	47	SO
37	1	9	0	55	51	SO
37	4	5	0	59	51	SO
37	59	4	9	60	40	SO
37	60	0	7	64	39	SO
37	61	0	8	64	40	SO
37	104	37	6	14	16	SO
37	109	14	1	19	23	SO
37	112	11	16	33	14	SO
37	143	1	4	63	37	SO
37	152	34	8	14	11	SO
37	162	3	10	52	13	SO
37	167	33	1	16	32	SO
37	173	24	9	2	5	SO
37	177	14	9	4	17	SO
37	180	61	15	2	32	SO
38	104	9	34	1	27	SO
38	109	3	12	0	42	SO
38	112	4	23	1	45	SO
38	152	8	32	0	25	SO
38	167	8	26	1	45	SO
38	180	10	64	0	34	SO
38	184	0	21	8	48	SO
39	1	6	2	32	74	SO
39	3	9	4	29	72	RD
39	4	4	1	34	75	SO
39	11	1	27	37	49	RD
39	14	1	10	37	66	RD
39	31	20	70	18	5	RD
39	38	10	0	27	76	RD
39	40	38	32	0	39	RD
39	41	17	1	20	74	RD
39	47	21	3	11	19	RD
39	49	5	19	0	26	RD
39	53	11	2	27	74	RD
39	55	37	40	1	34	RD
39	57	13	12	25	64	RD
39	59	1	12	37	62	SO

39	60	0	7	37	65	SO
39	61	0	8	38	65	SO
39	64	29	16	4	14	RD
39	65	13	12	4	14	RD
39	71	14	7	23	67	RD
39	86	37	38	1	37	RD
39	98	15	7	23	69	RD
39	100	33	30	4	18	RD
39	104	24	19	8	21	SO
39	109	10	5	9	33	SO
39	110	10	5	21	59	RD
39	123	32	74	6	2	RD
39	126	19	63	13	3	RD
39	136	8	4	26	58	RD
39	149	4	0	0	4	SO
39	152	27	14	5	20	SO
39	154	30	24	5	20	RD
39	156	1	13	29	26	SO
39	157	1	13	36	47	RD
39	165	6	2	32	73	SO
39	167	22	12	11	36	SO
39	173	17	16	1	6	SO
39	177	8	15	1	20	SO
39	180	36	39	0	34	SO
39	196	9	36	29	40	SO
39	198	4	19	34	57	SO
40	27	24	5	47	34	SO
40	59	5	8	66	29	SO
40	60	1	6	67	33	SO
40	61	3	5	66	34	SO
40	104	33	8	14	13	SO
40	109	14	1	23	19	SO
40	149	4	0	1	3	SO
40	152	34	6	16	9	SO
40	167	29	3	25	20	SO
40	177	14	9	3	17	SO
40	180	57	15	10	23	SO
41	4	4	1	15	93	SO
41	11	0	28	19	66	RD
41	32	7	3	12	91	RD
41	38	8	2	10	91	RD
41	42	19	17	0	76	RD
41	43	19	34	0	57	RD
41	46	19	63	0	26	RD
41	47	18	7	1	27	RD
41	51	16	43	3	33	RD
41	55	19	57	0	35	RD
41	59	0	13	19	79	SO
41	64	18	27	0	18	RD
41	65	4	20	0	18	RD
41	69	14	49	5	44	RD
41	76	18	8	0	69	RD
41	86	19	55	0	38	RD
41	100	19	44	0	21	RD
41	104	16	25	3	27	SO
41	106	16	34	3	27	RD
41	108	16	47	3	32	RD
41	109	7	8	1	41	SO
41	118	3	37	16	42	RD
41	120	10	78	9	1	RD
41	123	13	92	6	2	RD

41	136	9	2	10	74	RD
41	152	17	24	0	24	SO
41	155	8	2	0	12	SO
41	156	0	14	18	36	SO
41	159	3	27	14	34	SO
41	160	3	27	16	49	RD
41	165	5	3	14	90	SO
41	167	15	18	3	45	SO
41	180	19	55	0	34	SO
41	184	0	21	15	40	SO
42	1	8	1	28	75	SO
42	4	5	0	31	76	SO
42	59	1	12	35	62	SO
42	60	0	7	36	64	SO
42	61	0	8	36	65	SO
42	104	24	17	8	22	SO
42	109	12	3	6	35	SO
42	149	3	1	0	4	SO
42	152	28	13	3	21	SO
42	155	10	0	2	10	SO
42	156	2	12	28	26	SO
42	162	1	12	32	31	SO
42	165	6	2	30	73	SO
42	167	24	9	8	39	SO
42	173	19	13	1	6	SO
42	177	6	16	0	21	SO
42	180	36	38	0	33	SO
42	184	2	19	24	31	SO
43	1	8	1	47	56	SO
43	3	13	0	42	57	RD
43	4	5	0	50	57	SO
43	23	21	6	34	51	RD
43	25	12	4	43	53	RD
43	27	20	11	35	46	SO
43	35	24	0	31	57	RD
43	41	19	0	34	57	RD
43	42	36	0	17	57	RD
43	47	25	0	20	9	RD
43	48	20	9	9	15	RD
43	49	9	15	0	25	RD
43	57	18	6	37	51	RD
43	58	4	13	51	44	RD
43	59	3	10	52	45	SO
43	60	0	7	54	46	SO
43	61	0	8	55	46	SO
43	65	18	6	4	13	RD
43	71	16	5	37	50	RD
43	90	0	4	54	46	SO
43	95	42	50	12	4	RD
43	98	19	2	36	55	RD
43	100	42	20	8	13	RD
43	104	34	8	11	19	SO
43	108	40	24	11	22	RD
43	109	14	1	13	27	SO
43	110	14	1	31	47	RD
43	136	12	0	37	47	RD
43	144	12	22	9	2	RD
43	149	4	0	0	3	SO
43	152	34	8	9	15	SO
43	154	38	16	9	15	RD
43	155	11	0	6	6	SO

43	156	3	10	40	16	SO
43	157	3	10	47	36	RD
43	162	4	9	43	20	SO
43	163	4	9	48	36	RD
43	167	32	1	13	34	SO
43	173	25	8	2	4	SO
43	177	11	10	0	21	SO
43	180	52	22	1	32	SO
43	184	7	14	32	23	SO
44	1	6	3	19	87	SO
44	4	5	0	20	90	SO
44	59	0	13	25	75	SO
44	104	19	24	6	24	SO
44	109	12	3	1	41	SO
44	152	24	18	0	25	SO
44	155	10	1	0	13	SO
44	156	0	14	23	33	SO
44	162	1	12	23	42	SO
44	165	5	3	20	86	SO
44	167	18	16	6	42	SO
44	180	25	51	0	34	SO
44	184	0	21	18	38	SO
45	1	9	0	46	54	SO
45	3	13	0	42	54	RD
45	4	5	0	50	54	SO
45	11	0	27	55	27	RD
45	12	0	5	55	49	SO
45	15	2	8	0	32	RD
45	18	0	32	8	6	RD
45	19	0	32	14	8	RD
45	23	20	6	35	48	RD
45	25	13	3	42	51	RD
45	27	22	6	33	48	SO
45	31	32	52	23	1	RD
45	32	8	1	47	53	RD
45	33	25	4	30	50	RD
45	38	9	1	45	53	RD
45	44	25	0	30	54	RD
45	46	55	25	0	26	RD
45	48	30	0	0	24	RD
45	53	14	0	41	54	RD
45	57	22	3	33	51	RD
45	58	1	17	54	37	RD
45	59	0	12	55	40	SO
45	60	0	7	53	47	SO
45	61	0	8	53	46	SO
45	65	22	3	1	17	RD
45	71	15	5	37	49	RD
45	88	0	5	45	44	SO
45	98	18	3	37	51	RD
45	100	43	16	7	14	RD
45	104	34	9	12	13	SO
45	106	35	17	12	13	RD
45	109	14	1	11	29	SO
45	110	14	1	29	49	RD
45	112	11	16	29	15	SO
45	123	47	54	8	0	RD
45	124	3	10	41	42	RD
45	126	28	52	16	0	RD
45	143	0	5	51	43	SO
45	149	4	0	1	2	SO

45	152	32	5	9	15	SO
45	155	11	0	6	6	SO
45	156	4	9	37	15	SO
45	157	4	9	47	32	RD
45	162	3	8	47	15	SO
45	163	3	8	50	33	RD
45	167	30	4	16	27	SO
45	173	22	11	1	5	SO
45	174	25	3	26	40	RD
45	177	11	11	1	19	SO
45	180	51	19	2	32	SO
45	184	7	14	32	24	SO
46	1	9	0	75	26	SO
46	27	27	3	57	23	SO
46	60	0	6	80	20	SO
46	61	2	6	80	20	SO
46	90	2	3	78	20	SO
46	104	41	2	21	5	SO
46	109	15	0	28	14	SO
46	143	2	3	75	20	SO
46	152	38	1	20	5	SO
46	167	34	0	28	17	SO
46	177	19	3	6	14	SO
46	180	72	0	8	25	SO
47	4	5	0	20	30	SO
47	109	12	2	1	10	SO
47	152	24	8	0	9	SO
47	155	10	1	0	6	SO
47	156	0	4	23	14	SO
47	165	5	1	20	29	SO
47	184	0	7	18	14	SO
48	12	0	4	30	20	SO
48	27	14	3	16	21	SO
48	59	0	7	30	17	SO
48	112	5	9	15	8	SO
48	180	26	16	2	6	SO
49	12	4	0	20	26	SO
49	60	0	6	24	20	SO
49	159	7	5	6	15	SO
49	167	4	0	9	17	SO
49	177	7	3	4	14	SO
49	180	16	0	6	25	SO
49	184	10	3	7	15	SO
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50	3	9	3	34	53	RD
50	4	5	0	38	56	SO
50	12	0	5	43	51	SO
50	14	1	10	42	46	RD
50	27	7	21	36	35	SO
50	31	24	50	19	5	RD
50	35	18	6	25	50	RD
50	41	15	4	28	50	RD
50	44	18	7	25	49	RD
50	51	43	17	0	37	RD
50	52	43	38	0	16	RD
50	53	13	1	30	55	RD
50	64	27	15	2	15	RD
50	65	13	9	2	15	RD
50	74	18	7	25	47	RD
50	88	0	4	42	41	SO
50	90	0	5	42	44	SO

50	95	43	36	0	16	RD
50	96	37	27	0	20	RD
50	104	33	7	2	23	SO
50	109	11	4	9	25	SO
50	110	11	4	28	38	RD
50	115	17	3	26	49	RD
50	120	27	55	10	0	RD
50	136	11	1	28	41	RD
50	143	0	5	43	41	SO
50	144	5	23	10	0	RD
50	145	18	9	10	0	RD
50	149	4	0	1	2	SO
50	152	22	20	5	15	SO
50	154	26	26	5	15	RD
50	155	10	1	3	7	SO
50	159	1	25	30	10	SO
50	162	2	10	33	26	SO
50	165	7	1	36	54	SO
50	167	29	4	3	37	SO
50	173	24	6	1	6	SO
50	184	1	15	40	6	SO
50	189	7	0	36	56	RD
51	1	0	9	60	28	SO
51	27	10	18	50	19	SO
51	59	8	1	52	36	SO
51	90	0	5	56	29	SO
51	104	39	1	3	22	SO
51	143	1	4	58	25	SO
51	159	4	22	37	3	SO
51	162	3	9	42	17	SO
51	165	8	0	51	37	SO
51	167	33	0	5	35	SO
51	173	30	0	5	2	SO
51	177	19	1	7	3	SO
51	184	7	7	45	1	SO
52	1	3	6	79	10	SO
52	27	20	9	62	7	SO
52	90	2	3	73	13	SO
52	104	41	0	15	10	SO
52	112	23	2	29	10	SO
52	152	32	10	19	1	SO
52	159	12	14	41	0	SO
52	167	34	0	24	16	SO
52	173	31	0	5	2	SO
52	184	12	2	47	0	SO
53	4	5	0	9	101	SO
53	27	1	30	13	71	SO
53	104	13	30	1	29	SO
53	109	9	6	0	42	SO
53	152	14	28	0	25	SO
53	155	7	4	0	13	SO
53	156	0	14	13	43	SO
53	159	1	29	11	39	SO
53	162	0	13	14	51	SO
53	167	13	21	1	47	SO
53	180	14	62	0	34	SO
53	184	0	21	13	43	SO
54	1	7	2	30	74	SO
54	4	5	0	32	76	SO
54	15	2	9	0	33	RD
54	18	0	33	2	14	RD

54	19	0	33	6	16	RD
54	21	6	26	31	50	RD
54	25	9	8	28	68	RD
54	32	8	2	29	74	RD
54	38	9	1	27	74	RD
54	40	32	39	5	34	RD
54	46	36	47	0	26	RD
54	47	25	0	11	19	RD
54	48	11	19	0	24	RD
54	51	27	33	9	26	RD
54	53	14	0	23	76	RD
54	55	37	41	0	35	RD
54	59	0	13	37	61	SO
54	60	0	7	37	66	SO
54	61	0	8	37	66	SO
54	64	32	14	0	18	RD
54	65	13	12	0	18	RD
54	71	12	9	23	66	RD
54	98	16	6	21	70	RD
54	100	33	29	2	20	RD
54	104	27	16	8	20	SO
54	106	27	25	8	20	RO
54	109	13	2	5	37	SO
54	110	13	2	14	66	RD
54	112	6	21	22	23	SO
54	115	18	2	19	70	RD
54	124	1	13	27	58	RD
54	127	11	10	23	47	RD
54	152	27	13	4	21	SO
54	154	30	23	4	21	RD
54	155	11	0	3	10	SO
54	156	3	11	28	26	SO
54	162	2	10	33	32	SO
54	165	5	3	32	72	SO
54	167	25	9	9	37	SO
54	173	19	14	1	6	SO
54	177	6	17	0	21	SO
54	180	37	37	0	34	SO
54	184	2	19	25	31	SO
55	1	9	0	69	35	SO
55	27	24	5	54	30	SO
55	59	6	7	72	26	SO
55	60	0	7	75	28	SO
55	61	1	7	75	28	SO
55	90	2	3	75	25	SO
55	104	40	3	19	9	SO
55	109	15	0	24	18	SO
55	112	16	11	38	7	SO
55	143	1	4	72	26	SO
55	152	37	3	19	6	SO
55	167	34	0	24	22	SO
55	177	17	6	5	16	SO
55	180	71	3	4	30	SO
56	1	9	0	70	31	SO
56	3	13	0	66	31	RD
56	11	3	25	76	6	RD
56	14	11	0	68	31	RD
56	23	24	1	55	30	RD
56	27	24	3	55	28	SO
56	31	55	30	23	1	RD
56	44	25	0	54	31	RD

56	48	28	0	15	9	RD
56	49	15	9	6	20	RD
56	53	14	0	65	31	RD
56	59	0	13	79	16	SO
56	60	0	7	79	24	SO
56	61	0	8	79	23	SO
56	71	19	1	58	30	RD
56	98	20	2	59	29	RD
56	104	38	5	17	9	SO
56	109	15	0	21	19	SO
56	110	15	0	50	28	RD
56	123	71	31	8	0	RD
56	136	12	0	53	28	RD
56	152	35	4	17	7	SO
56	155	11	0	8	5	SO
56	167	33	1	27	17	SO
56	168	33	1	41	27	RD
56	174	27	1	43	25	RD
56	177	16	7	8	13	SO
56	180	63	9	12	22	SO
56	197	29	3	50	28	SO
56	199	6	6	73	25	SO
57	11	0	28	25	62	RD
57	17	0	11	15	7	RD
57	19	0	33	15	7	RD
57	49	3	21	0	26	RD
57	56	25	54	0	31	RD
57	58	0	18	25	72	RD
57	59	0	13	25	75	SO
57	62	0	5	25	0	RD
57	63	25	21	0	68	RD
57	64	25	21	0	18	RD
57	65	25	0	0	18	RD
57	66	25	32	0	49	RO
57	77	16	12	0	41	RD
57	104	16	27	4	26	SO
57	106	18	34	4	26	RD
57	108	21	44	4	31	RD
57	112	3	24	14	33	SO
57	167	11	23	5	43	SO
57	177	10	13	2	19	SO
57	180	25	51	0	34	SO
58	3	0	13	18	84	RD
58	12	5	0	13	97	SO
58	17	8	3	0	22	RD
58	19	8	25	0	22	RD
58	27	2	29	16	68	SO
58	35	0	24	18	73	RD
58	41	0	19	18	76	RD
58	48	1	29	9	15	RD
58	53	0	14	18	83	RD
58	56	18	61	0	31	RD
58	57	0	25	18	72	RD
58	59	0	13	18	82	SO
58	63	0	46	18	50	RD
58	64	0	46	18	0	RD
58	65	0	25	18	0	RD
58	66	18	39	0	49	RD
58	90	3	2	11	91	SO
58	112	9	18	4	43	SO
58	143	3	2	10	90	SO

58	152	1	41	5	20	SO
58	167	1	33	10	38	SO
58	168	1	33	14	58	RD
58	173	2	31	4	3	SO
58	180	6	70	8	26	SO
58	184	6	15	4	52	SO
58	197	13	22	5	75	SO
59	11	8	18	5	82	RD
59	18	8	23	0	18	RD
59	20	0	18	5	17	RD
59	27	0	29	13	71	SO
59	39	1	37	12	62	RD
59	44	0	25	13	75	RD
59	48	0	30	7	17	RD
59	56	0	79	13	16	RD
59	57	0	25	13	75	RD
59	58	0	18	13	82	RD
59	63	0	46	13	53	RD
59	66	0	57	13	36	RD
59	68	2	48	11	51	RD
59	109	0	15	11	31	SO
59	152	2	40	5	20	SO
59	155	0	11	4	9	SO
59	197	1	33	12	67	SO
60	11	6	22	1	81	RD
60	36	0	42	7	61	RD
60	42	0	36	7	64	RD
60	45	0	53	7	47	RD
60	49	0	24	6	20	RD
60	54	0	37	7	66	RD
60	56	0	79	7	24	RD
60	63	0	46	7	56	RD
60	66	0	57	7	42	RD
60	68	0	50	7	53	RD
60	72	0	51	7	50	RD
60	94	0	51	3	33	RO
60	101	0	41	7	46	RD
60	104	0	43	2	24	SO
60	116	0	32	7	68	RD
60	122	7	71	0	32	RD
60	128	0	48	5	36	RD
60	167	0	34	6	38	SO
60	177	0	23	4	17	SO
60	180	1	71	6	28	SO
60	191	4	4	0	5	SO
61	11	8	20	0	84	RD
61	15	0	11	8	25	RD
61	18	8	25	0	15	RD
61	19	8	25	0	22	RD
61	36	0	42	8	62	RD
61	42	0	36	8	65	RD
61	56	0	79	8	23	RD
61	63	0	46	8	57	RD
61	66	0	57	8	41	RD
61	68	0	51	8	52	RD
61	116	0	32	8	69	RD
61	122	8	72	0	32	RD
61	162	4	8	1	62	SO
61	167	0	34	5	41	SO
61	180	1	73	7	27	SO
61	191	2	6	4	1	SO

61	196	1	44	7	60	SO
61	197	0	33	8	71	SO
62	4	5	0	0	25	SO
62	36	5	13	0	12	RD
62	47	5	6	0	16	RD
62	54	5	13	0	12	RD
62	57	0	25	5	0	RD
62	99	5	12	0	10	RD
62	109	4	5	0	8	SO
62	119	0	16	5	9	RD
62	125	0	9	5	11	RD
62	128	5	14	0	9	RD
62	152	5	9	0	7	SO
62	155	5	3	0	6	SO
62	159	0	7	5	11	SO
63	1	7	1	39	67	SO
63	3	13	0	33	68	RD
63	4	5	0	41	68	SO
63	11	0	28	46	40	RD
63	12	0	5	46	63	SO
63	14	0	11	46	57	RD
63	17	0	11	16	6	RD
63	19	0	33	16	6	RD
63	20	1	17	16	6	RD
63	21	8	23	38	45	RD
63	25	10	7	36	61	RD
63	31	25	64	21	3	RD
63	33	22	7	24	61	RD
63	35	22	1	24	67	RD
63	38	7	2	38	65	RD
63	47	23	1	20	10	RD
63	48	20	10	3	21	RD
63	49	3	21	0	26	RD
63	51	30	30	12	24	RD
63	53	13	1	33	67	RO
63	56	46	32	0	31	RD
63	58	0	18	46	50	RD
63	59	0	13	46	53	SO
63	60	0	7	46	56	SO
63	61	0	8	46	57	SO
63	64	46	0	0	18	RD
63	65	25	0	0	18	RD
63	71	12	8	32	58	RD
63	90	0	5	46	55	SO
63	98	17	4	29	64	RD
63	100	37	26	6	16	RD
63	104	31	12	10	19	SO
63	108	36	29	10	24	RD
63	109	12	3	9	33	SO
63	110	12	3	24	56	RD
63	112	8	18	25	22	SO
63	115	19	1	24	66	RD
63	118	13	26	33	27	RD
63	120	36	53	10	0	RD
63	123	38	68	8	0	RD
63	124	1	13	36	48	RD
63	126	21	61	16	0	RD
63	129	31	25	13	23	RD
63	136	11	1	32	52	RD
63	143	0	5	46	53	SO
63	144	10	23	10	1	RD

63	152	28	13	8	17	SO
63	154	33	21	8	17	RD
63	155	10	1	6	7	SO
63	162	2	11	42	23	SO
63	163	2	11	44	43	RD
63	165	6	2	40	65	SO
63	167	26	8	11	36	SO
63	173	18	15	1	6	SO
63	174	21	7	23	48	RD
63	177	11	12	2	19	SO
63	180	46	29	0	34	SO
63	198	5	18	41	50	SO
64	1	7	0	39	18	SO
64	3	13	0	33	18	RD
64	11	0	3	46	15	RD
64	12	0	5	46	13	SO
64	17	0	8	16	0	RD
64	19	0	8	16	0	RD
64	27	16	2	30	16	SO
64	31	25	17	21	0	RD
64	33	22	3	24	15	RD
64	35	22	0	24	18	RD
64	41	18	0	27	18	RD
64	48	20	1	3	9	RD
64	53	13	0	33	18	RD
64	57	25	0	21	18	RD
64	58	0	18	46	0	RD
64	63	46	0	0	18	RD
64	65	25	0	0	18	RD
64	66	33	18	13	0	RD
64	90	0	3	46	11	SO
64	98	17	2	29	16	RD
64	104	31	1	10	3	SO
64	109	12	1	9	8	SO
64	112	8	9	25	4	SO
64	120	36	16	10	0	RD
64	123	38	18	8	0	RD
64	124	1	5	36	11	RD
64	143	0	3	46	10	SO
64	152	28	1	8	5	SO
64	162	2	2	42	2	SO
64	167	26	1	11	10	SO
64	173	18	2	1	4	SO
64	177	11	3	2	6	SO
64	180	46	6	0	8	SO
64	184	7	6	27	4	SO
64	197	12	13	34	5	SO
65	12	0	5	25	13	SO
65	27	9	2	16	16	SO
65	90	0	3	25	11	SO
65	104	16	1	4	3	SO
65	112	3	9	14	4	SO
65	143	0	3	25	10	SO
65	162	2	2	23	2	SO
65	167	11	1	5	10	SO
65	177	10	3	2	6	SO
65	180	25	6	0	8	SO
66	4	5	0	52	49	SO
66	11	3	22	54	27	RD
66	12	5	0	52	49	SO
66	27	17	8	40	41	SO
66	46	49	30	5	18	RD
66	59	0	13	57	36	SO
66	60	0	7	57	42	SO
66	61	0	8	57	41	SO
66	70	21	0	32	48	RD
66	109	11	4	16	23	SO
66	110	11	4	38	39	RD
66	116	21	11	34	37	RD
66	122	34	40	23	9	RD
66	136	9	3	35	42	RD
66	155	9	2	6	7	SO
66	165	1	7	56	41	SO
66	180	42	29	11	20	SO
66	184	15	5	24	29	SO
66	197	24	6	33	43	SO
67	1	9	0	71	29	SO
67	27	27	3	53	26	SO
67	33	26	4	54	25	RD
67	44	24	1	56	28	RD
67	59	5	7	73	22	SO
67	60	3	4	72	25	SO
67	109	14	1	23	15	SO
67	143	1	3	72	25	SO
67	152	38	4	14	9	SO
67	155	11	0	5	7	SO
68	3	10	3	42	59	RD
68	11	4	24	48	38	RD
68	25	12	5	40	57	RD
68	31	33	56	18	6	RD
68	35	17	7	35	55	RD
68	41	13	6	38	55	RD
68	44	18	7	34	55	RD
68	46	46	37	5	21	RD
68	53	12	2	40	60	RD
68	55	44	33	7	28	RD
68	59	2	11	48	51	SO
68	60	0	7	50	53	SO
68	61	0	8	51	52	SO
68	64	35	11	7	11	RD
68	65	21	4	7	11	RD
68	69	52	12	0	50	RD
68	100	36	27	8	14	RD
68	104	27	16	10	19	SO
68	106	31	21	10	19	RD
68	108	38	27	11	23	RD
68	109	13	2	11	31	SO
68	110	13	2	27	53	RD
68	112	8	19	32	15	SO
68	113	8	19	40	40	RD
68	115	15	5	35	55	RD
68	116	24	8	26	52	RD
68	126	29	53	12	4	RD
68	137	20	9	25	42	RD
68	144	10	23	8	3	RD
68	162	3	9	40	25	SO
68	167	22	12	14	33	SO
68	168	22	12	27	44	RD
68	174	17	11	30	41	RD
68	177	13	10	6	15	SO
68	180	45	30	6	28	SO
68	197	21	14	31	48	SO
69	4	5	0	59	50	SO
69	59	2	11	60	39	SO
69	60	0	7	60	43	SO
69	61	0	8	61	42	SO
69	109	15	0	15	27	SO
69	112	8	19	39	8	SO
69	162	5	7	49	16	SO
69	167	25	9	21	26	SO
69	177	15	8	6	15	SO
69	180	54	21	8	26	SO
70	4	4	1	17	83	SO
70	12	3	2	18	82	SO
70	37	17	45	4	39	RD
70	46	19	59	1	21	RD
70	55	19	55	2	28	RD
70	59	0	12	21	72	SO
70	66	21	32	0	48	RD
70	67	21	54	0	29	RD
70	68	21	22	0	62	RD
70	69	21	34	0	50	RD
70	86	19	52	2	32	RD
70	109	8	7	2	36	SO
70	111	14	38	2	36	RD
70	112	3	22	14	26	SO
70	117	15	44	5	38	RD
70	123	15	82	6	2	RD
70	155	6	5	1	11	SO
70	167	11	22	6	38	SO
70	180	19	52	2	28	SO
71	4	3	2	18	88	SO
71	11	1	27	20	63	RD
71	17	3	8	0	22	RD
71	32	6	3	15	87	RD
71	37	15	47	6	43	RD
71	38	5	4	15	86	RD
71	40	20	48	1	38	RD
71	41	10	7	11	81	RD
71	47	12	11	3	26	RD
71	53	8	4	13	86	RD
71	59	0	13	21	75	SO
71	72	21	31	0	59	RD
71	73	21	44	0	46	RD
71	86	20	52	1	37	RD
71	90	3	2	16	82	SO
71	99	16	31	5	30	RD
71	100	18	43	2	19	RD
71	109	9	6	4	37	SO
71	117	14	45	5	44	RD
71	123	16	87	5	3	RD
71	136	7	5	13	69	RD
71	152	14	25	2	22	SO
71	154	16	36	2	22	RD
71	155	6	5	0	13	SO
71	195	6	51	15	39	SO
72	3	11	1	41	58	RD
72	12	0	5	52	54	SO
72	23	16	9	36	50	RD
72	31	33	55	19	3	RD
72	32	8	1	44	58	RD
72	33	22	6	30	53	RD
72	34	36	23	16	36	RD
72	35	17	5	35	54	RD
72	38	8	1	43	58	RD
72	41	15	2	36	56	RD
72	44	17	6	35	53	RD
72	46	49	31	3	23	RD
72	53	10	2	42	57	RD
72	57	22	3	30	56	RD
72	58	3	15	49	44	RD
72	60	0	7	51	50	SO
72	61	1	7	51	50	SO
72	64	35	9	3	15	RD
72	65	22	3	3	15	RD
72	71	21	0	31	59	RD
72	73	52	13	0	46	RD
72	74	18	6	33	52	RD
72	104	29	13	10	18	SO
72	106	31	20	10	18	RD
72	109	12	3	18	23	SO
72	112	9	18	23	21	SO
72	115	17	2	33	56	RD
72	118	16	21	36	23	RD
72	122	27	54	25	5	RD
72	123	45	58	7	1	RD
72	133	5	24	44	28	RD
72	135	34	42	9	3	RD
72	136	9	3	37	45	RD
72	137	19	9	27	39	RD
72	144	9	23	8	3	RD
72	159	19	9	22	27	SO
72	162	4	9	44	18	SO
72	167	23	10	16	30	SO
72	168	23	10	27	43	RD
72	174	17	10	30	40	RD
72	177	14	9	3	18	SO
72	180	47	25	5	29	SO
72	199	3	9	49	50	SO
73	1	8	0	57	46	SO
73	3	12	0	53	46	RD
73	4	5	0	60	46	SO
73	9	1	8	64	38	RD
73	11	3	25	62	21	RD
73	12	0	5	65	41	SO
73	31	44	44	20	2	RD
73	32	8	1	57	45	RD
73	33	25	3	40	43	RD
73	35	21	1	44	45	RD
73	38	8	1	56	45	RD
73	39	32	5	33	41	RD
73	47	23	0	20	9	RD
73	49	12	12	5	21	RD
73	60	0	7	64	37	SO
73	61	1	7	64	37	SO
73	64	42	2	7	11	RD
73	65	24	1	7	11	RD
73	71	21	0	44	46	RD
73	72	52	0	13	46	RD
73	104	32	10	15	13	SO
73	109	15	0	24	17	SO
73	112	13	14	30	14	SO
73	115	18	1	44	45	RD
73	116	29	2	33	44	RD

73	123	57	46	8	0	RD
73	127	16	5	37	32	RD
73	135	39	37	10	2	RD
73	136	11	1	44	38	RD
73	137	23	5	32	34	RD
73	159	25	3	25	24	SO
73	160	25	3	33	33	RD
73	162	4	9	52	10	SO
73	163	4	9	54	29	RD
73	167	26	7	22	24	SO
73	168	26	7	34	36	RD
73	174	20	7	36	34	RD
73	177	15	8	3	18	SO
73	180	57	15	6	28	SO
73	184	15	5	26	29	SO
73	199	4	8	61	38	SO
74	3	13	0	13	87	RD
74	4	5	0	21	87	SO
74	9	0	9	26	78	RD
74	11	0	27	26	60	RD
74	14	0	10	26	77	RD
74	32	6	4	20	83	RD
74	38	7	3	18	83	RD
74	40	25	44	1	38	RD
74	46	26	56	0	26	RD
74	47	22	3	4	25	RD
74	48	4	25	0	23	RD
74	51	19	39	6	31	RD
74	58	0	18	26	69	RD
74	59	0	12	26	73	SO
74	64	26	20	0	18	RD
74	65	9	16	0	18	RD
74	75	26	35	0	52	RD
74	76	26	0	0	69	RD
74	86	26	48	0	38	RD
74	104	20	22	6	24	SO
74	106	20	31	6	24	RD
74	109	11	4	2	39	SO
74	118	6	34	20	38	RD
74	133	2	27	24	51	RD
74	136	10	1	16	69	RD
74	148	0	14	26	68	RD
74	152	23	17	1	24	SO
74	154	25	28	1	24	RD
74	155	10	0	0	13	SO
74	156	1	13	24	30	SO
74	157	1	13	25	57	RD
74	162	1	12	25	38	SO
74	165	5	3	21	83	SO
74	167	19	13	6	42	SO
74	173	17	14	1	6	SO
74	180	26	48	0	34	SO
74	184	0	21	19	36	SO
75	1	8	1	54	51	SO
75	3	13	0	49	52	RD
75	4	5	0	57	52	SO
75	9	1	8	61	44	RD
75	23	20	7	42	45	RD
75	25	15	2	47	50	RD
75	41	19	0	41	52	RD
75	47	25	0	24	6	RD

75	48	24	6	11	12	RD
75	49	11	12	0	26	RD
75	57	25	0	37	52	RD
75	58	3	15	59	37	RD
75	59	4	8	58	42	SO
75	60	0	7	61	41	SO
75	61	0	8	62	41	SO
75	64	46	0	3	15	RD
75	65	25	0	3	15	RD
75	71	16	5	44	45	RD
75	74	26	0	35	52	RD
75	76	26	0	28	41	RD
75	77	28	0	0	41	RD
75	90	0	5	62	39	SO
75	98	18	3	44	49	RD
75	100	44	19	11	11	RD
75	103	17	26	0	6	SO
75	104	39	4	13	17	SO
75	109	14	1	15	26	SO
75	110	14	1	35	44	RD
75	112	11	16	33	14	SO
75	113	11	16	47	33	RD
75	123	54	52	8	0	RD
75	124	3	10	48	37	RD
75	127	17	4	41	31	RD
75	143	0	5	62	37	SO
75	144	14	20	10	1	RD
75	148	0	14	62	33	RD
75	152	33	8	14	11	SO
75	162	5	8	52	12	SO
75	163	5	8	55	31	RD
75	167	32	1	15	33	SO
75	173	24	8	2	5	SO
75	174	26	1	32	40	RD
75	177	16	7	3	18	SO
75	180	61	14	1	33	SO
76	1	4	0	22	70	SO
76	4	5	0	21	70	SO
76	59	0	12	26	56	SO
76	109	11	1	2	33	SO
76	152	23	8	1	21	SO
76	155	10	0	0	13	SO
76	156	1	12	24	22	SO
76	162	1	10	25	30	SO
76	165	5	3	21	66	SO
76	167	19	12	6	28	SO
76	180	26	37	0	29	SO
76	184	0	17	19	35	SO
77	60	0	7	28	32	SO
77	61	0	7	28	32	SO
77	104	16	4	2	13	SO
77	112	4	15	15	10	SO
77	156	9	3	9	12	SO
77	159	6	3	9	20	SO
77	162	3	7	22	7	SO
77	167	10	1	4	24	SO
77	177	13	7	3	17	SO
77	180	27	9	1	28	SO
78	1	0	4	28	3	SO
78	27	4	4	24	3	SO
78	32	1	3	27	4	RD

78	38	1	2	27	4	RD
78	51	18	2	5	5	RD
78	104	16	2	2	5	SO
78	109	1	2	12	1	SO
78	152	3	6	13	0	SO
78	156	9	0	9	6	SO
78	196	15	1	13	6	SO
79	19	26	0	3	18	RD
79	20	9	0	3	18	RD
79	48	7	11	14	7	RD
79	65	1	14	10	0	RD
79	104	14	10	14	1	SO
79	106	19	12	14	1	RD
79	108	24	16	14	1	RD
79	112	12	2	15	11	SO
79	132	35	10	4	5	RD
79	152	12	1	8	10	SO
79	153	12	1	15	13	RD
79	155	2	0	3	8	SO
79	156	5	7	22	4	SO
79	157	5	7	36	10	RD
79	159	4	6	25	6	SO
79	160	4	6	32	11	RD
79	162	8	1	16	17	SO
79	177	8	10	14	2	SO
79	180	22	18	24	0	SO
79	184	8	8	30	7	SO
80	27	6	2	13	22	SO
80	45	7	1	12	21	RD
80	49	8	4	4	13	RD
80	60	1	6	18	16	SO
80	103	4	17	2	0	SO
80	104	9	1	1	12	SO
80	137	5	1	9	20	RD
80	151	2	1	3	14	SO
80	167	7	0	6	17	SO
80	173	10	1	1	3	SO
80	177	4	4	1	13	SO
80	180	10	6	7	17	SO
80	191	0	7	5	0	SO
81	3	6	7	5	33	RD
81	19	1	0	0	20	RD
81	27	1	15	10	25	SO
81	32	4	2	7	38	RD
81	38	5	2	6	37	RD
81	43	11	29	0	10	RD
81	47	10	13	0	19	RD
81	54	10	22	1	18	RD
81	74	10	16	0	24	RD
81	76	10	16	1	20	RD
81	92	0	9	11	30	RD
81	95	10	28	0	11	RD
81	100	11	29	0	9	RD
81	104	10	21	0	12	SO
81	106	10	23	0	12	RD
81	112	4	5	2	25	SO
81	144	0	11	5	3	RD
81	152	10	19	0	12	SO
81	155	4	6	0	9	SO
81	159	1	16	8	16	SO
81	160	1	16	10	22	RD

81	165	4	2	7	38	SO
81	167	10	15	0	13	SO
81	176	11	24	0	12	RD
81	184	0	10	9	17	SO
81	195	3	25	8	15	SO
82	1	8	0	43	55	SO
82	3	13	0	38	55	RD
82	4	5	0	46	55	SO
82	9	0	8	51	47	RD
82	12	0	5	51	50	SO
82	14	0	8	51	47	RD
82	17	0	8	20	2	RD
82	20	0	14	20	2	RD
82	31	29	52	22	2	RD
82	32	6	1	45	54	RD
82	33	23	3	28	52	RD
82	35	22	1	29	54	RD
82	38	7	1	43	54	RD
82	47	23	0	19	10	RD
82	48	19	10	9	13	RD
82	49	9	13	0	23	RD
82	60	0	7	51	44	SO
82	61	0	7	51	45	SO
82	64	44	2	0	15	RD
82	65	24	1	0	15	RD
82	74	26	0	24	54	RD
82	75	48	10	2	45	RD
82	76	26	0	21	48	RD
82	77	19	9	1	39	RD
82	98	18	2	33	53	RD
82	100	40	18	9	11	RD
82	104	31	10	12	16	SO
82	106	33	17	12	16	RD
82	108	37	25	12	17	RD
82	109	12	0	15	24	SO
82	112	9	16	27	18	SO
82	115	18	1	30	53	RD
82	123	43	55	8	0	RD
82	124	2	10	39	39	RD
82	136	11	1	35	42	RD
82	137	21	6	25	37	RD
82	144	11	21	8	3	RD
82	152	29	10	12	11	SO
82	159	17	7	24	24	SO
82	162	2	9	48	14	SO
82	163	2	9	49	35	RD
82	167	25	7	13	28	SO
82	173	18	13	1	5	SO
82	174	20	7	27	38	RD
82	177	13	9	2	19	SO
82	180	51	21	0	29	SO
82	198	6	14	45	41	SO
83	22	8	60	1	46	RD
83	50	1	42	8	48	RD
83	57	0	25	9	81	RD
83	64	0	46	3	15	RD
83	65	0	25	3	15	RD
83	72	9	43	0	59	RD
83	73	9	56	0	46	RD
83	74	0	26	9	78	RD
83	78	0	28	4	3	RD

83	90	3	2	4	98	SO
83	91	0	31	3	2	RD
83	159	6	24	2	48	SO
83	180	4	72	5	29	SO
83	195	2	56	7	50	SO
84	9	8	0	23	24	RD
84	11	2	24	29	0	RD
84	12	5	0	26	24	SO
84	14	8	0	23	24	RD
84	23	7	1	24	23	RD
84	49	10	3	4	19	RD
84	59	1	6	30	16	SO
84	61	0	7	28	17	SO
84	68	11	4	20	20	RD
84	75	10	0	21	24	RD
84	77	9	0	15	24	RD
84	156	5	0	12	8	SO
84	159	7	0	8	16	SO
84	167	7	0	15	13	SO
84	176	15	20	8	2	RD
84	180	19	2	7	22	SO
84	184	8	1	11	18	SO
84	197	17	3	14	21	SO
84	199	1	7	30	17	SO
85	1	9	0	51	54	SO
85	3	13	0	47	54	RD
85	4	5	0	55	54	SO
85	11	1	27	59	27	RD
85	23	22	5	38	49	RD
85	25	12	5	48	49	RD
85	27	21	10	39	44	SO
85	31	38	52	22	2	RD
85	47	25	0	19	11	RD
85	48	19	11	9	15	RD
85	49	9	15	1	24	RD
85	57	18	7	42	47	RD
85	59	1	12	59	40	SO
85	60	1	6	56	46	SO
85	61	0	8	59	44	SO
85	64	38	8	9	8	RD
85	71	16	5	40	49	RD
85	86	60	16	0	38	RD
85	98	18	3	42	51	RD
85	100	45	18	11	11	RD
85	104	31	12	16	14	SO
85	109	14	1	14	27	SO
85	110	14	1	31	48	RD
85	143	0	4	56	44	SO
85	149	4	0	1	3	SO
85	152	37	5	12	13	SO
85	154	41	14	12	13	RD
85	155	11	0	6	7	SO
85	156	6	8	42	14	SO
85	162	5	8	44	21	SO
85	167	29	5	21	26	SO
85	174	24	4	29	43	RD
85	177	11	12	2	19	SO
85	180	55	21	3	30	SO
85	197	24	10	36	44	SO
86	1	9	0	67	38	SO
86	3	13	0	63	38	RD

86	11	3	25	73	13	RD
86	23	24	3	52	35	RD
86	31	53	37	23	1	RD
86	41	19	0	55	38	RD
86	47	25	0	24	6	RD
86	49	18	6	3	22	RD
86	53	14	0	62	38	RD
86	59	6	7	70	29	SO
86	60	1	6	72	30	SO
86	61	1	7	74	29	SO
86	64	45	1	11	6	RD
86	65	25	0	11	6	RD
86	71	20	1	52	37	RD
86	85	60	0	16	38	RD
86	98	20	1	56	37	RD
86	104	36	7	18	12	SO
86	109	15	0	24	17	SO
86	115	20	0	52	38	RD
86	123	68	38	8	0	RD
86	127	17	4	44	28	RD
86	157	12	2	53	31	RD
86	159	25	4	30	20	SO
86	162	6	7	57	8	SO
86	163	6	7	64	22	RD
86	167	31	3	27	20	SO
86	168	31	3	40	31	RD
86	174	25	3	41	31	RD
86	177	16	7	4	17	SO
86	180	67	9	7	26	SO
86	184	18	3	33	23	SO
86	197	27	7	49	31	SO
86	199	5	7	71	31	SO
87	1	0	9	31	49	SO
87	3	0	13	31	45	RD
87	11	22	2	9	56	RD
87	12	3	0	28	58	SO
87	23	2	17	29	41	RD
87	31	30	36	1	21	RD
87	35	2	22	29	36	RD
87	41	0	19	29	39	RD
87	47	0	25	4	15	RD
87	49	6	8	19	4	RD
87	57	2	17	29	41	RD
87	59	5	3	24	55	SO
87	60	6	1	25	54	SO
87	61	6	1	25	56	SO
87	64	2	37	7	6	RD
87	65	2	17	7	6	RD
87	89	0	33	31	23	RD
87	91	31	0	0	5	RD
87	104	6	28	10	17	SO
87	109	0	14	11	16	SO
87	120	17	48	0	10	RD
87	136	1	11	25	40	RD
87	137	1	25	25	26	RD
87	150	0	3	3	1	SO
87	152	4	36	5	11	SO
87	157	1	9	27	42	RD
87	159	0	25	22	22	SO
87	162	6	4	8	44	SO
87	163	6	4	21	48	RD

87	167	3	27	18	22	SO
87	168	3	27	27	29	RD
87	177	4	10	18	1	SO
87	180	9	51	21	6	SO
87	199	8	3	23	55	SO
88	94	0	48	3	30	RD
88	134	0	57	2	32	RD
88	149	0	4	2	1	SO
88	152	0	40	4	13	SO
88	153	0	40	4	23	RD
88	155	0	11	2	5	SO
88	156	3	8	0	53	SO
88	158	3	29	0	53	RD
88	159	2	23	0	49	SO
88	184	4	6	0	55	SO
89	1	0	9	33	53	SO
89	4	5	0	28	62	SO
89	11	1	23	32	39	RD
89	32	7	2	26	60	RD
89	38	8	1	25	59	RD
89	40	29	31	4	28	RD
89	41	16	3	17	57	RD
89	47	19	6	9	11	RD
89	49	4	13	0	25	RD
89	52	32	34	0	15	RD
89	53	13	1	20	61	RD
89	57	13	5	20	57	RD
89	58	1	15	32	47	RD
89	60	0	7	33	51	SO
89	61	0	7	33	53	SO
89	64	27	11	1	15	RD
89	65	13	5	1	15	RD
89	71	12	7	20	53	RD
89	87	0	31	33	23	RD
89	92	0	20	33	41	RD
89	95	32	45	0	14	RD
89	96	32	22	0	19	RD
89	98	16	3	17	59	RD
89	100	28	28	3	12	RD
89	104	28	6	0	27	SO
89	106	27	14	0	27	RD
89	109	12	3	6	25	SO
89	110	12	3	18	44	RD
89	124	1	12	28	39	RD
89	127	11	5	18	41	RD
89	133	4	23	25	34	RD
89	136	11	1	18	50	RD
89	149	4	0	1	2	SO
89	150	3	0	1	3	SO
89	152	21	17	5	13	SO
89	154	25	23	5	13	RD
89	155	10	1	3	4	SO
89	159	3	21	22	22	SO
89	160	3	21	28	28	RD
89	162	1	11	31	20	SO
89	163	1	11	31	39	RD
89	165	5	1	28	60	SO
89	167	27	3	0	44	SO
89	176	33	25	0	25	RD
89	177	10	4	0	19	SO
89	180	33	26	0	31	SO

89	184	2	11	27	20	SO
90	14	3	6	2	96	RO
90	50	0	42	5	44	RD
90	64	0	46	3	11	RD
90	65	0	25	3	11	RD
90	91	0	31	5	0	RD
90	94	0	47	5	33	RD
90	97	5	15	0	16	RD
90	101	0	40	5	49	RD
90	107	0	45	5	54	RD
90	143	3	1	0	96	SO
90	152	0	42	2	22	SO
90	159	5	24	0	49	SO
90	161	5	40	0	49	RD
90	167	0	34	5	40	SO
90	173	0	31	2	3	SO
90	175	0	47	4	43	RD
90	180	0	74	5	24	SO
90	197	3	28	2	74	SO
91	11	22	1	9	4	RD
91	14	1	3	30	2	RD
91	50	10	0	11	5	RD
91	87	31	0	0	5	RD
91	90	0	5	31	0	SO
91	103	16	3	1	2	SO
91	133	22	0	8	5	RD
91	143	0	3	29	0	SO
91	159	0	5	22	0	SO
91	173	6	0	1	2	SO
91	197	7	3	24	2	SO
92	1	9	0	11	93	SO
92	3	0	12	20	81	RD
92	27	12	18	8	75	SO
92	49	3	21	0	25	RD
92	59	0	13	20	78	SO
92	93	20	12	0	78	RD
92	98	1	20	19	73	RD
92	100	17	46	1	21	RD
92	101	0	41	20	36	RD
92	104	0	43	17	12	SO
92	115	0	20	19	71	RD
92	127	0	21	18	53	RD
92	136	0	12	17	67	RD
92	144	18	15	0	11	RD
92	152	14	27	0	25	SO
92	159	13	16	0	50	SO
92	167	0	34	19	28	SO
92	168	0	34	19	52	RD
92	174	0	28	18	53	RD
92	180	17	58	2	32	SO
92	184	2	18	0	56	SO
93	1	9	0	23	78	SO
93	3	0	12	32	66	RD
93	12	4	1	28	77	SO
93	31	30	55	2	22	RD
93	52	18	60	12	4	RD
93	57	3	21	29	57	RD
93	59	1	12	31	64	SO
93	71	2	17	28	60	RD
93	92	20	0	12	78	RD
93	104	3	40	21	8	SO

93	127	3	18	25	46	RD
93	137	1	28	25	40	RD
93	144	24	9	0	11	RD
93	152	17	24	2	20	SO
93	154	22	32	2	20	RD
93	156	2	12	22	33	SO
93	159	13	15	9	41	SO
93	162	10	3	13	50	SO
93	163	10	3	21	63	RD
93	165	0	8	32	69	SO
93	167	1	33	26	19	SO
93	168	1	33	30	39	RD
93	174	1	27	28	42	RD
94	1	0	9	51	32	SO
94	3	11	2	40	39	RD
94	4	5	0	46	41	SO
94	27	11	18	40	23	SO
94	31	30	39	21	1	RD
94	35	21	3	30	38	RD
94	41	16	3	33	38	RD
94	44	19	6	32	35	RD
94	53	13	1	38	40	RD
94	55	45	27	6	12	RD
94	57	17	7	34	34	RD
94	60	0	3	51	33	SO
94	65	17	7	5	8	RD
94	88	0	3	48	30	SO
94	90	0	5	47	33	SO
94	95	51	23	0	16	RD
94	96	51	16	0	23	RD
94	104	42	0	2	24	SO
94	109	12	3	11	17	SO
94	124	1	8	44	25	RD
94	132	43	8	3	5	RD
94	135	46	15	1	12	RD
94	136	12	0	34	33	RD
94	143	1	4	50	28	SO
94	144	2	23	11	0	RD
94	159	2	26	33	2	SO
94	162	2	9	41	19	SO
94	165	7	0	44	41	SO
94	167	33	0	1	37	SO
94	173	28	1	4	2	SO
94	177	21	0	2	6	SO
94	180	46	25	5	13	SO
94	184	4	10	43	1	SO
95	1	0	9	95	7	SO
95	11	27	0	68	16	RD
95	27	17	13	78	3	SO
95	40	57	12	35	2	RD
95	48	23	6	22	0	RD
95	65	21	4	17	0	RD
95	73	49	13	44	1	RD
95	75	50	12	45	4	RD
95	86	59	15	35	1	RD
95	94	51	0	23	16	RD
95	96	51	16	23	0	RD
95	97	23	0	0	16	RD
95	100	46	15	22	0	RD
95	103	25	16	6	0	SO
95	104	43	0	13	15	SO

95	107	45	1	47	15	RD
95	119	56	15	25	1	RD
95	136	12	0	67	16	RD
95	152	26	15	25	0	SO
95	154	38	15	25	0	RD
95	156	14	0	39	16	SO
95	157	14	0	66	16	RD
95	159	14	15	50	0	SO
95	167	33	0	30	16	SO
95	168	33	0	54	16	RD
95	174	27	0	55	15	RD
95	180	58	16	34	0	SO
96	1	9	0	58	23	SO
96	3	13	0	54	23	RD
96	11	5	6	62	17	RD
96	27	24	4	43	19	SO
96	33	26	2	41	21	RD
96	35	24	0	43	23	RD
96	41	19	0	46	23	RD
96	47	25	0	23	5	RD
96	48	23	5	10	9	RD
96	53	14	0	53	23	RD
96	60	0	3	64	19	SO
96	64	42	3	5	8	RD
96	65	21	3	5	8	RD
96	88	0	2	62	16	SO
96	90	0	5	63	15	SO
96	94	51	0	16	23	RD
96	95	51	23	16	0	RD
96	97	0	23	16	0	RD
96	100	49	12	7	9	RD
96	103	17	15	0	6	SO
96	104	42	0	17	7	SO
96	109	14	1	13	13	SO
96	110	14	1	38	20	RD
96	115	19	0	45	22	RD
96	120	56	22	10	0	RD
96	122	37	22	30	1	RD
96	124	3	5	51	17	RD
96	132	44	7	3	4	RD
96	135	50	11	3	8	RD
96	136	12	0	50	15	RD
96	143	1	3	66	11	SO
96	152	38	2	11	7	SO
96	156	6	6	49	3	SO
96	157	6	6	58	7	RD
96	159	17	11	33	2	SO
96	162	5	6	51	7	SO
96	163	5	6	58	13	RD
96	167	33	0	17	19	SO
96	173	28	1	4	2	SO
96	174	27	0	38	17	RD
96	177	21	0	2	6	SO
96	180	62	8	5	13	SO
96	184	4	9	43	1	SO
97	1	0	9	23	7	SO
97	11	6	0	17	16	RD
97	27	4	13	19	3	SO
97	35	0	3	23	13	RD
97	40	12	12	10	2	RD
97	41	0	3	23	13	RD

97	47	0	6	5	6	RD
97	48	5	6	9	0	RD
97	58	8	0	15	16	RD
97	65	3	4	8	0	RD
97	86	13	15	9	1	RD
97	90	5	0	15	16	SO
97	95	23	0	0	16	RD
97	96	0	16	23	0	RD
97	100	12	15	9	0	RD
97	103	15	16	6	0	SO
97	109	1	2	13	2	SO
97	122	22	10	1	6	RD
97	143	3	0	11	16	SO
97	152	2	15	7	0	SO
97	156	6	0	3	16	SO
97	157	6	0	7	16	RD
97	180	8	16	13	0	SO
98	4	5	0	17	93	SO
98	40	20	51	2	37	RD
98	47	16	9	2	28	RD
98	51	17	43	5	32	RD
98	55	19	59	3	32	RD
98	86	20	56	1	37	RD
98	99	22	28	0	36	RD
98	100	22	42	0	22	RD
98	104	15	28	4	26	SO
98	109	9	6	5	37	SO
98	118	5	35	17	43	RD
98	123	15	92	7	1	RD
98	152	20	22	0	25	SO
98	155	10	1	0	13	SO
98	156	0	14	19	37	SO
98	162	0	13	19	46	SO
98	167	16	18	6	42	SO
98	180	20	56	2	32	SO
98	184	0	21	15	41	SO
99	1	8	0	42	36	SO
99	3	12	1	38	35	RD
99	4	5	0	45	36	SO
99	12	4	0	46	36	SO
99	27	18	6	32	30	SO
99	31	28	34	21	2	RD
99	34	39	19	11	17	RD
99	35	23	1	27	35	RD
99	40	42	25	6	11	RD
99	47	24	0	10	14	RD
99	50	24	5	26	23	RD
99	55	43	26	5	10	RD
99	59	2	6	48	30	SO
99	86	43	26	6	10	RD
99	88	0	4	48	21	SO
99	98	22	0	28	36	RD
99	100	50	11	0	22	RD
99	103	18	10	1	5	SO
99	109	12	2	7	23	SO
99	110	12	2	24	33	RD
99	115	18	2	29	33	RD
99	124	3	10	39	23	RD
99	130	10	1	32	26	RD
99	132	31	12	1	7	RD
99	135	35	18	4	7	RD

99	149	4	0	0	4	SO
99	152	40	0	0	23	SO
99	155	11	0	0	13	SO
99	156	2	12	41	3	SO
99	157	2	12	45	14	RD
99	167	25	5	21	13	SO
99	180	48	20	2	12	SO
99	184	1	17	28	6	SO
99	195	23	23	27	13	SO
100	1	9	0	55	22	SO
100	3	13	0	51	22	RD
100	14	3	5	61	17	RD
100	27	23	2	41	20	SO
100	35	23	1	41	21	RD
100	47	25	0	18	7	RD
100	88	1	4	58	9	SO
100	98	22	0	42	22	RD
100	99	50	0	11	22	RD
100	103	26	4	2	4	SO
100	104	29	7	22	1	SO
100	109	13	0	14	17	SO
100	112	12	10	29	6	SO
100	120	54	22	10	0	RD
100	124	4	9	50	11	RD
100	126	38	20	16	0	RD
100	129	29	13	25	0	RD
100	132	35	6	4	5	RD
100	149	4	0	0	4	SO
100	152	41	0	4	19	SO
100	155	11	0	1	12	SO
100	156	6	8	43	1	SO
100	167	28	1	29	6	SO
100	180	57	13	5	7	SO
100	184	5	13	33	1	SO
100	196	23	12	41	10	SO
101	1	0	9	41	48	SO
101	4	5	0	36	57	SO
101	60	0	7	41	46	SO
101	90	0	5	40	49	SO
101	104	37	4	1	29	SO
101	109	12	3	5	26	SO
101	143	0	4	41	45	SO
101	149	4	0	1	2	SO
101	150	0	5	4	0	SO
101	155	11	0	3	5	SO
101	156	3	8	31	22	SO
101	159	0	29	33	12	SO
101	162	2	11	35	24	SO
101	165	5	1	36	56	SO
101	167	31	3	1	46	SO
101	173	26	2	2	3	SO
101	177	12	5	1	17	SO
101	180	39	30	2	24	SO
101	184	2	11	37	13	SO
102	1	0	9	59	40	SO
102	4	5	0	54	49	SO
102	27	13	18	46	31	SO
102	60	0	7	59	38	SO
102	88	0	3	55	39	SO
102	90	0	5	55	41	SO
102	104	43	0	2	28	SO

102	151	5	0	7	14	SO
102	159	4	25	38	11	SO
102	162	3	10	45	17	SO
102	165	8	0	50	49	SO
102	167	34	0	3	44	SO
102	173	32	1	4	3	SO
102	177	23	0	6	15	SO
102	180	49	23	10	23	SO
102	184	5	9	46	10	SO
102	191	0	8	4	1	SO
103	112	7	3	17	1	SO
103	133	16	0	25	6	RD
103	143	3	1	37	0	SO
103	152	16	0	4	2	SO
103	180	23	0	17	6	SO
103	184	6	3	10	0	SO
104	1	0	9	43	21	SO
104	4	5	0	38	30	SO
104	11	3	9	40	21	RD
104	27	9	13	34	17	SO
104	35	21	3	22	27	RD
104	38	9	1	34	27	RD
104	40	33	14	8	13	RO
104	41	16	3	25	27	RD
104	44	19	6	24	24	RD
104	46	41	21	2	5	RD
104	53	13	1	30	29	RD
104	55	40	19	3	9	RD
104	60	0	2	43	24	SO
104	64	31	10	1	3	RO
104	65	16	4	1	3	RO
104	73	32	15	10	13	RD
104	74	20	6	22	24	RD
104	95	43	13	0	15	RD
104	96	42	17	0	7	RD
104	105	43	0	0	30	RD
104	106	42	0	0	30	RD
104	109	12	1	9	9	SO
104	110	12	1	28	16	RD
104	115	20	0	23	27	RD
104	120	32	26	10	0	RD
104	124	1	3	36	19	RD
104	133	7	10	35	19	RD
104	135	40	15	1	5	RD
104	136	12	0	29	29	RD
104	152	21	18	11	1	SO
104	159	2	17	32	6	SO
104	162	2	6	39	14	SO
104	163	2	6	40	23	RD
104	165	7	0	36	30	SO
104	167	32	0	0	27	SO
104	174	26	0	16	30	RD
104	176	42	10	0	20	RD
104	177	16	0	0	10	SO
104	180	40	21	3	8	SO
105	1	0	9	43	38	SO
105	4	5	0	38	47	SO
105	60	0	6	43	37	SO
105	104	43	0	0	30	SO
105	109	12	1	9	18	SO
105	143	0	4	43	41	SO

105	159	2	23	32	13	SO
105	162	2	8	39	17	SO
105	165	7	0	36	47	SO
105	167	32	0	0	39	SO
105	173	27	3	1	4	SO
105	177	16	1	0	20	SO
105	180	40	24	3	21	SO
105	191	0	7	2	2	SO
106	1	0	9	52	21	SO
106	12	0	2	52	28	SO
106	27	11	13	41	17	SO
106	88	0	2	46	25	SO
106	104	42	0	0	30	SO
106	109	13	1	13	9	SO
106	152	22	18	12	1	SO
106	159	4	17	37	6	SO
106	162	4	6	41	14	SO
106	165	7	0	45	30	SO
106	167	31	0	7	27	SO
106	173	29	0	2	0	SO
106	177	15	0	8	10	SO
107	1	0	9	46	56	SO
107	4	5	0	41	65	SO
107	12	0	5	46	60	SO
107	60	0	6	46	54	SO
107	61	1	7	45	55	SO
107	88	0	4	42	52	SO
107	90	0	5	45	54	SO
107	104	42	1	0	30	SO
107	109	13	2	11	28	SO
107	143	0	5	46	51	SO
107	159	2	27	31	18	SO
107	162	3	10	40	24	SO
107	165	7	1	39	63	SO
107	167	32	2	1	45	SO
107	173	27	5	2	5	SO
107	177	17	6	0	21	SO
107	180	43	32	3	29	SO
107	184	5	13	36	20	SO
107	191	0	8	2	3	SO
108	1	0	9	65	26	SO
108	27	14	15	51	20	SO
108	60	1	5	64	26	SO
108	90	0	4	61	29	SO
108	104	42	1	4	25	SO
108	109	13	2	19	12	SO
108	143	1	4	62	28	SO
108	152	24	17	15	2	SO
108	155	11	0	10	0	SO
108	159	5	21	40	7	SO
108	162	5	8	46	16	SO
108	165	8	0	57	35	SO
108	167	32	1	9	33	SO
108	177	21	1	12	7	SO
108	180	51	21	13	13	SO
109	4	4	0	11	42	SO
109	11	0	13	15	29	RD
109	40	14	23	1	19	RO
109	41	7	1	8	41	RD
109	47	12	1	2	10	RD
109	59	0	11	15	31	SO

109	104	12	9	1	9	SO
109	106	13	13	1	9	RO
109	108	13	19	2	12	RO
109	110	15	0	0	42	RD
109	111	15	0	0	42	RO
109	112	1	14	12	12	SO
109	113	1	14	14	24	RD
109	136	5	1	10	31	RD
109	152	12	5	1	18	SO
109	155	6	1	0	11	SO
109	156	1	8	13	7	SO
109	159	2	13	11	13	SO
109	160	2	13	12	18	RD
109	167	12	6	3	20	SO
109	173	12	7	0	3	SO
109	180	14	21	1	16	SO
109	184	2	13	11	14	SO
110	4	4	1	11	79	SO
110	59	0	13	15	67	SO
110	104	12	28	1	16	SO
110	109	15	0	0	42	SO
110	112	1	23	12	23	SO
110	152	12	17	1	24	SO
110	155	6	4	0	13	SO
110	167	12	19	3	31	SO
110	173	12	20	0	7	SO
110	180	14	45	1	30	SO
111	4	5	0	48	42	SO
111	12	4	0	49	42	SO
111	59	2	11	51	31	SO
111	88	0	5	51	26	SO
111	104	31	9	8	9	SO
111	109	15	0	0	42	SO
111	112	10	14	23	12	SO
111	149	4	0	0	4	SO
111	152	24	5	7	18	SO
111	155	9	1	2	11	SO
111	156	4	8	35	7	SO
111	159	4	13	32	13	SO
111	167	25	6	14	20	SO
111	184	6	13	36	14	SO
112	21	12	7	15	40	RO
112	23	11	6	16	41	RD
112	27	5	17	22	30	SO
112	36	7	22	20	25	RO
112	48	5	15	9	8	RO
112	57	3	14	24	33	RD
112	58	9	4	18	43	RD
112	64	8	25	9	4	RD
112	103	7	17	3	1	SO
112	109	1	12	14	12	SO
112	110	1	12	23	23	RD
112	113	27	0	0	47	RD
112	114	27	0	0	47	RD
112	124	7	3	19	35	RD
112	151	4	0	1	6	SO
112	165	4	0	22	47	SO
112	173	9	16	3	0	SO
112	180	13	39	10	7	SO
112	198	2	14	25	33	SO
113	103	7	33	3	2	SO

113	109	1	14	14	24	SO
113	112	27	0	0	47	SO
113	151	4	1	1	19	SO
113	177	8	13	2	16	SO
114	4	0	5	61	42	SO
114	27	13	17	48	30	SO
114	59	10	3	51	42	SO
114	109	3	12	26	12	SO
114	112	27	0	0	47	SO
114	165	8	0	52	47	SO
114	173	17	16	7	0	SO
114	180	33	39	24	7	SO
115	4	4	1	16	90	SO
115	59	0	13	20	76	SO
115	104	20	23	0	27	SO
115	109	8	7	3	36	SO
115	149	3	1	0	4	SO
115	152	16	23	2	22	SO
115	155	8	3	2	11	SO
115	156	0	14	16	37	SO
115	159	0	27	16	34	SO
115	162	1	12	19	43	SO
115	165	6	2	14	88	SO
115	167	18	16	0	45	SO
115	180	20	52	0	34	SO
115	184	2	18	17	39	SO
116	1	0	8	32	71	SO
116	4	5	0	27	79	SO
116	11	1	27	31	52	RO
116	32	7	3	25	76	RD
116	38	8	2	24	75	RD
116	47	19	6	10	16	RD
116	48	10	16	2	22	RD
116	53	13	1	19	78	RO
116	59	1	12	31	65	SO
116	60	0	7	32	68	SO
116	61	0	8	32	69	SO
116	64	27	16	1	17	RD
116	65	13	10	1	17	RO
116	71	12	7	19	70	RO
116	95	31	63	0	13	RO
116	96	30	34	0	22	RD
116	100	27	34	4	17	RD
116	104	29	14	0	27	SO
116	109	12	3	6	33	SO
116	110	12	3	18	59	RD
116	115	20	0	12	79	RO
116	117	32	28	0	51	RO
116	124	1	13	27	54	RO
116	127	13	8	17	52	RD
116	130	9	3	20	47	RD
116	133	5	24	24	48	RD
116	149	4	0	1	3	SO
116	152	22	17	6	18	SO
116	154	25	27	6	18	RD
116	155	11	0	5	8	SO
116	156	3	11	24	29	SO
116	159	1	26	24	26	SO
116	160	1	26	30	37	RO
116	162	1	12	31	31	SO
116	163	1	12	31	52	RD

116	165	6	2	26	76	SO
116	167	27	7	0	45	SO
116	173	21	12	2	5	SO
116	176	32	40	0	25	RD
116	177	9	14	0	21	SO
116	180	32	40	0	34	SO
116	184	3	17	25	31	SO
117	4	5	0	55	51	SO
117	60	0	7	60	40	SO
117	61	0	8	60	41	SO
117	90	0	5	58	40	SO
117	104	39	4	6	21	SO
117	109	14	1	18	21	SO
117	143	0	5	57	40	SO
117	159	9	18	33	17	SO
117	162	5	8	46	16	SO
117	167	33	1	9	36	SO
117	173	26	7	3	4	SO
117	177	16	7	5	16	SO
117	180	56	16	3	31	SO
118	1	9	0	31	60	SO
118	4	0	5	40	55	SO
118	27	17	12	23	48	SO
118	59	1	9	39	51	SO
118	60	3	0	32	60	SO
118	104	3	39	20	6	SO
118	109	2	13	17	17	SO
118	155	0	11	4	9	SO
118	159	22	8	3	36	SO
118	167	3	31	31	9	SO
118	173	1	29	3	3	SO
118	184	11	8	2	42	SO
119	1	9	0	65	26	SO
119	4	0	5	74	21	SO
119	37	39	25	35	1	RD
119	38	4	6	68	20	RD
119	40	49	22	22	2	RD
119	47	7	18	23	7	RD
119	48	23	7	23	1	RD
119	52	51	25	15	1	RD
119	53	2	12	72	14	RD
119	55	53	25	19	1	RD
119	64	22	24	16	0	RD
119	65	16	9	16	0	RD
119	69	38	22	35	4	RD
119	73	43	21	28	4	RD
119	104	17	25	26	0	SO
119	108	31	26	30	0	RD
119	109	4	11	32	2	SO
119	110	4	11	55	13	RD
119	118	40	0	34	26	RD
119	120	74	16	0	10	RD
119	124	13	0	48	24	RD
119	129	29	22	25	3	RD
119	136	1	11	56	15	RD
119	144	26	1	2	8	RD
119	149	1	3	4	0	SO
119	152	24	18	21	2	SO
119	154	35	20	21	2	RD
119	155	1	10	12	1	SO
119	156	12	2	32	22	SO

119	159	30	0	18	21	SO
119	165	2	5	71	21	SO
119	167	11	23	39	1	SO
119	173	12	18	5	1	SO
119	176	34	25	28	0	RD
119	180	51	25	19	1	SO
119	184	19	0	20	24	SO
119	197	27	5	47	21	SO
120	4	0	5	90	5	SO
120	104	32	10	26	0	SO
120	109	7	8	34	0	SO
120	152	32	10	23	0	SO
120	155	5	6	13	0	SO
120	156	14	0	44	10	SO
120	159	30	0	31	8	SO
120	167	24	10	40	0	SO
120	180	66	10	20	0	SO
120	184	19	0	34	10	SO
121	1	0	9	54	52	SO
121	4	0	5	54	56	SO
121	12	0	5	54	56	SO
121	60	7	0	42	61	SO
121	61	8	0	43	61	SO
121	90	5	0	43	59	SO
121	103	26	17	6	0	SO
121	104	7	36	15	15	SO
121	109	1	14	28	14	SO
121	112	15	12	14	33	SO
121	152	9	33	13	12	SO
121	155	0	11	4	9	SO
121	162	10	3	14	51	SO
121	167	5	29	31	17	SO
121	177	7	16	16	5	SO
121	180	16	60	33	1	SO
122	4	0	5	83	27	SO
122	11	28	0	55	32	RD
122	14	11	0	72	32	RD
122	21	27	5	56	27	RD
122	32	5	5	78	27	RD
122	38	4	6	78	25	RD
122	40	43	28	35	4	RD
122	41	4	15	78	16	RD
122	46	52	32	26	0	RD
122	47	7	18	16	14	RD
122	48	16	14	24	0	RD
122	51	37	23	29	8	RD
122	53	2	12	81	20	RD
122	59	13	0	68	32	SO
122	60	7	0	71	32	SO
122	61	8	0	72	32	SO
122	64	14	32	18	0	RD
122	65	9	16	18	0	RD
122	98	9	13	74	19	RD
122	100	37	27	19	3	RD
122	104	19	24	25	5	SO
122	106	27	25	25	5	RD
122	108	39	26	29	6	RD
122	109	4	11	39	3	SO
122	110	4	11	67	13	RD
122	112	24	3	27	20	SO
122	113	24	3	54	27	RD

122	115	6	14	74	17	RD
122	118	32	8	36	24	RD
122	121	54	0	29	32	RD
122	123	83	24	0	8	RD
122	129	32	24	31	6	RD
122	133	26	3	48	28	RD
122	136	3	9	65	20	RD
122	152	23	19	20	5	SO
122	154	32	23	20	5	RD
122	155	3	8	9	4	SO
122	159	24	6	30	20	SO
122	160	24	6	42	25	RD
122	162	11	2	35	30	SO
122	167	14	20	41	7	SO
122	177	15	8	21	0	SO
122	180	44	32	34	0	SO
122	184	18	3	35	21	SO
122	197	29	6	54	26	SO
123	4	1	4	106	4	SO
123	104	35	8	30	0	SO
123	109	7	8	42	0	SO
123	112	27	0	40	7	SO
123	152	34	8	25	0	SO
123	155	6	5	13	0	SO
123	159	30	0	42	8	SO
123	167	26	8	48	0	SO
123	180	68	8	34	0	SO
123	184	21	0	48	8	SO
124	88	3	2	8	73	SO
124	104	1	36	3	19	SO
124	109	0	15	9	30	SO
124	112	7	19	3	35	SO
124	152	3	31	7	16	SO
124	159	5	18	1	44	SO
124	167	1	29	8	32	SO
124	184	4	15	2	50	SO
125	4	0	5	64	30	SO
125	12	1	3	63	32	SO
125	21	22	5	42	30	RD
125	38	3	5	59	30	RD
125	40	37	26	27	7	RD
125	41	2	15	62	19	RD
125	44	4	17	60	18	RD
125	46	38	33	23	2	RD
125	51	27	27	23	5	RD
125	53	2	11	62	24	RD
125	55	35	30	29	5	RD
125	59	11	2	52	32	SO
125	60	7	0	54	35	SO
125	65	9	11	13	3	RD
125	86	34	28	29	7	RD
125	98	5	16	59	19	RD
125	104	12	25	18	4	SO
125	108	28	31	23	4	RD
125	109	4	11	35	4	SO
125	110	4	11	54	18	RD
125	112	19	7	18	20	SO
125	115	2	15	59	19	RD
125	118	25	4	26	30	RD
125	120	51	25	0	9	RD
125	124	14	0	50	35	RD

125	126	64	19	0	16	RD
125	129	27	25	21	8	RD
125	135	40	31	11	2	RD
125	144	19	7	3	7	RD
125	149	1	2	4	0	SO
125	152	11	23	21	2	SO
125	155	0	11	10	1	SO
125	156	10	4	19	27	SO
125	159	19	4	20	25	SO
125	160	19	4	32	29	RD
125	167	6	24	33	7	SO
125	173	12	21	5	1	SO
125	176	34	31	18	3	RD
125	180	30	32	30	3	SO
125	184	17	2	23	29	SO
126	4	0	5	83	11	SO
126	59	13	0	68	16	SO
126	104	21	16	22	0	SO
126	109	5	10	38	1	SO
126	152	18	16	23	0	SO
126	155	1	10	11	0	SO
126	156	14	0	30	16	SO
126	159	23	0	30	15	SO
126	162	11	0	39	16	SO
126	165	3	4	79	12	SO
126	167	14	16	40	0	SO
126	173	18	15	6	0	SO
126	180	46	16	33	0	SO
126	184	19	0	36	16	SO
127	1	0	9	21	63	SO
127	4	5	0	16	72	SO
127	104	15	26	0	28	SO
127	150	0	5	2	1	SO
127	151	3	2	0	20	SO
127	159	1	21	13	34	SO
127	162	0	11	17	41	SO
127	167	11	19	0	35	SO
127	177	7	14	0	19	SO
128	1	0	9	48	36	SO
128	3	11	2	37	43	RD
128	4	5	0	43	45	SO
128	11	8	17	40	28	RD
128	25	14	1	34	44	RD
128	27	8	18	40	27	SO
128	31	29	42	19	3	RD
128	35	19	5	29	40	RD
128	44	17	8	31	37	RD
128	49	10	6	5	14	RD
128	60	0	5	48	36	SO
128	104	36	5	2	26	SO
128	112	13	4	21	21	SO
128	115	17	3	31	39	RD
128	119	24	30	21	4	RD
128	120	36	33	9	1	RD
128	126	30	35	15	1	RD
128	127	21	0	27	45	RD
128	129	48	8	0	37	RD
128	136	10	1	34	42	RD
128	149	0	4	3	0	SO
128	151	5	0	3	17	SO
128	152	19	22	18	0	SO

128	159	5	17	30	17	SO
128	160	5	17	39	24	RO
128	162	2	9	39	19	SO
128	163	2	9	42	32	RD
128	167	25	5	1	34	SO
128	177	19	2	3	16	SO
128	180	41	28	7	16	SO
128	191	0	7	3	2	SO
129	1	0	9	56	28	SO
129	4	5	0	51	37	SO
129	27	11	15	45	22	SO
129	60	0	5	56	28	SO
129	104	38	3	3	25	SO
129	109	13	1	18	10	SO
129	149	0	4	3	0	SO
129	151	5	0	6	14	SO
129	152	19	22	18	0	SO
129	159	7	15	33	14	SO
129	162	3	8	43	15	SO
129	167	27	3	4	31	SO
129	177	20	1	6	13	SO
129	180	46	23	10	13	SO
129	191	0	7	3	2	SO
130	104	8	32	1	20	SO
130	109	4	11	0	26	SO
130	149	4	0	0	4	SO
130	152	10	30	0	22	SO
130	159	0	26	8	27	SO
130	177	1	17	3	5	SO
130	184	0	14	11	29	SO
131	4	0	5	30	30	SO
131	11	8	2	22	33	RD
131	21	11	4	19	31	RO
131	100	19	16	1	15	RD
131	109	7	7	5	17	SO
131	129	21	27	8	1	RD
131	130	12	0	18	35	RO
131	132	30	19	0	9	RO
131	149	4	0	0	4	SO
131	150	0	4	2	1	SO
131	152	15	10	2	18	SO
131	156	2	9	23	15	SO
131	159	1	10	21	12	SO
131	160	1	10	26	20	RD
131	165	6	2	24	33	SO
131	184	1	11	25	15	SO
131	188	7	17	23	18	RD
131	189	7	0	23	35	RD
131	195	13	22	17	13	SO
131	196	9	19	21	16	SO
132	88	0	2	65	2	SO
132	109	13	0	18	7	SO
132	149	4	0	0	4	SO
132	152	26	1	10	5	SO
132	155	10	1	6	5	SO
132	156	5	6	39	2	SO
132	159	4	5	44	1	SO
132	184	4	5	51	1	SO
133	1	0	9	29	67	SO
133	12	3	1	26	75	SO
133	27	5	25	24	51	SO

133	60	5	1	24	70	SO
133	61	5	3	24	70	SO
133	103	16	25	0	6	SO
133	104	7	35	10	19	SO
133	109	0	15	10	24	SO
133	151	1	4	15	6	SO
133	159	0	28	21	28	SO
133	162	9	4	6	55	SO
133	167	4	27	16	30	SO
133	173	3	28	3	3	SO
133	177	6	16	15	5	SO
133	180	13	57	15	17	SO
133	184	1	16	21	33	SO
133	191	8	0	2	3	SO
134	1	0	9	57	37	SO
134	4	5	0	52	46	SO
134	11	19	7	38	39	RD
134	88	0	2	57	32	SO
134	90	0	5	55	36	SO
134	100	34	28	1	14	RD
134	103	17	23	0	6	SO
134	104	32	10	10	19	SO
134	109	13	2	11	21	SO
134	110	13	2	40	29	RD
134	112	8	14	27	19	SO
134	115	17	3	40	39	RD
134	116	25	4	32	38	RD
134	124	1	7	52	30	RD
134	126	38	36	15	1	RD
134	132	52	11	1	6	RO
134	133	29	0	28	46	RO
134	135	57	18	0	13	RD
134	136	10	1	42	39	RD
134	137	25	2	27	38	RD
134	143	0	5	56	34	SO
134	149	4	0	0	2	SO
134	151	1	3	18	3	SO
134	152	24	17	4	14	SO
134	155	10	1	1	8	SO
134	156	3	7	34	20	SO
134	159	0	28	44	4	SO
134	162	10	3	31	30	SO
134	167	27	4	17	28	SO
134	168	27	4	30	38	RD
134	173	26	4	3	3	SO
134	174	24	1	31	38	RD
134	177	11	11	16	4	SO
134	184	2	14	47	7	SO
134	189	7	0	50	46	RD
134	191	8	0	3	2	SO
134	197	13	17	44	29	SO
135	88	0	2	71	6	SO
135	90	1	4	70	8	SO
135	103	23	9	1	3	SO
135	104	40	1	15	5	SO
135	112	19	0	32	7	SO
135	143	1	4	72	7	SO
135	159	8	10	46	0	SO
135	167	30	0	25	10	SO
135	184	8	5	52	1	SO
136	4	4	1	8	84	SO

136	104	12	29	0	29	SO
136	109	5	10	1	31	SO
136	152	11	30	0	21	SO
136	155	10	1	0	12	SO
136	159	0	28	11	35	SO
136	167	12	18	0	42	SO
136	180	12	54	0	29	SO
136	184	0	13	12	39	SO
137	1	0	9	29	59	SO
137	4	5	0	24	68	SO
137	11	0	26	29	42	RD
137	25	12	4	17	64	RD
137	32	7	3	22	65	RD
137	38	8	2	21	64	RD
137	47	18	7	8	15	RD
137	48	8	15	2	16	RD
137	53	13	1	16	67	RD
137	59	0	11	29	55	SO
137	61	0	8	29	58	SO
137	71	11	9	17	57	RD
137	86	27	35	2	33	RD
137	95	29	50	0	16	RD
137	96	29	33	0	15	RD
137	99	23	23	4	22	RD
137	100	25	32	1	14	RD
137	104	28	13	0	29	SO
137	108	29	29	0	31	RD
137	109	12	3	3	29	SO
137	110	12	3	15	49	RD
137	127	12	7	16	52	RD
137	133	3	23	24	44	RD
137	136	12	0	17	68	RD
137	138	29	16	0	49	RD
137	144	0	32	8	2	RD
137	152	21	20	3	18	SO
137	154	23	30	3	18	RD
137	155	11	0	2	10	SO
137	159	0	28	24	22	SO
137	162	1	10	27	31	SO
137	165	5	3	24	64	SO
137	167	28	2	0	42	SO
137	173	23	9	1	5	SO
137	176	29	36	0	27	RD
137	177	4	16	0	19	SO
137	180	29	37	0	29	SO
137	184	1	12	27	24	SO
138	1	0	9	48	40	SO
138	4	5	0	43	49	SO
138	60	0	6	48	39	SO
138	90	0	4	45	43	SO
138	104	39	3	0	27	SO
138	109	13	2	13	18	SO
138	151	3	2	1	20	SO
138	155	11	0	8	4	SO
138	159	4	22	30	17	SO
138	162	3	8	39	19	SO
138	165	8	0	40	48	SO
138	167	31	1	1	38	SO
138	173	26	6	3	3	SO
138	177	18	3	1	18	SO
138	180	44	23	4	25	SO

138	191	0	7	3	2	SO
139	1	9	0	25	71	SO
139	31	33	47	1	23	RO
139	35	3	21	31	50	RD
139	36	9	33	25	38	RD
139	41	3	16	31	53	RD
139	42	8	28	26	40	RD
139	52	17	59	11	5	RO
139	60	5	2	26	68	SO
139	103	30	11	0	3	SO
139	104	1	42	27	3	SO
139	112	3	20	15	31	SO
139	115	0	20	31	51	RD
139	120	27	55	0	10	RO
139	132	19	48	0	8	RD
139	136	0	12	31	50	RD
139	137	0	29	31	33	RD
139	140	0	13	34	53	RD
139	141	0	11	34	53	RD
139	142	1	29	33	33	RD
139	144	33	1	0	11	RD
139	151	0	5	14	7	SO
139	152	19	23	0	20	SO
139	159	16	11	12	36	SO
139	162	8	4	12	50	SO
139	163	8	4	25	59	RD
139	165	0	8	34	62	SO
139	167	1	33	31	12	SO
139	177	1	22	14	5	SO
139	191	7	0	2	3	SO
140	36	2	38	11	49	RO
140	134	10	43	3	37	RO
140	139	0	34	13	53	RO
140	142	0	30	13	53	RO
140	159	1	25	8	37	SO
141	30	2	41	9	44	RD
141	37	10	47	1	40	RD
141	51	10	44	0	30	RD
141	92	0	19	11	67	RD
141	96	11	53	0	14	RD
141	104	10	30	0	30	SO
141	106	10	38	0	30	RD
141	108	11	48	0	32	RD
141	109	4	9	0	31	SO
141	139	0	34	11	53	RD
141	142	0	30	11	55	RD
141	144	0	34	11	0	RD
141	145	0	30	11	0	RD
141	149	3	1	0	4	SO
141	167	8	22	0	41	SO
141	176	11	55	0	26	RD
142	1	0	9	30	57	SO
142	4	5	0	25	66	SO
142	11	3	22	27	44	RD
142	31	18	55	12	10	RD
142	35	13	11	17	55	RD
142	55	26	39	4	25	RD
142	64	19	25	0	9	RO
142	65	12	11	0	9	RD
142	73	23	32	7	31	RD
142	86	25	38	5	27	RD

142	93	2	26	28	39	RD
142	100	14	43	12	1	RD
142	104	22	18	1	29	SO
142	108	25	33	1	31	RD
142	115	11	9	19	54	RD
142	121	7	32	23	34	RD
142	123	25	63	5	3	RD
142	132	21	41	6	2	RD
142	136	10	1	16	61	RD
142	139	1	33	29	33	RD
142	140	0	13	30	53	RD
142	141	0	11	30	55	RD
142	145	30	0	0	11	RD
142	149	0	4	4	0	SO
142	151	3	2	0	20	SO
142	152	11	30	13	5	SO
142	156	6	4	15	37	SO
142	159	4	21	17	27	SO
142	160	4	21	22	39	RD
142	162	0	12	25	32	SO
142	163	0	12	25	50	RD
142	167	17	13	1	39	SO
142	176	25	40	1	24	RD
142	177	11	10	1	18	SO
142	180	26	42	4	23	SO
142	195	20	27	10	39	SO
143	64	0	46	3	10	RD
143	65	0	25	3	10	RD
143	90	3	0	1	96	SO
143	103	3	37	1	0	SO
143	159	3	24	0	49	SO
143	167	0	34	4	37	SO
143	173	0	33	2	4	SO
143	180	2	73	3	25	SO
143	197	3	27	2	73	SO
144	1	9	0	25	11	SO
144	104	0	10	27	0	SO
144	109	2	4	9	0	SO
144	152	19	7	0	2	SO
144	159	16	1	11	5	SO
144	162	9	0	11	10	SO
144	165	0	3	34	8	SO
144	167	0	8	32	0	SO
144	173	0	7	1	0	SO
144	177	0	3	14	0	SO
144	180	21	10	13	1	SO
145	109	6	4	15	0	SO
145	149	0	3	4	0	SO
145	152	11	7	13	2	SO
146	12	3	0	5	92	SO
146	27	0	27	8	65	SO
146	42	0	34	8	56	RD
146	48	0	27	4	15	RD
146	65	0	23	4	7	RD
146	72	0	46	8	42	RD
146	89	0	31	8	44	RD
146	104	0	40	5	22	SO
146	109	0	14	0	35	SO
146	128	0	43	7	35	RD
146	131	3	24	0	33	RD
146	134	7	44	0	40	RD

146	142	0	30	8	47	RD
146	144	8	24	0	11	RD
146	147	0	23	8	56	RD
146	162	5	3	0	62	SO
146	167	0	32	8	33	SO
146	168	0	32	8	54	RD
146	174	0	27	8	55	RD
146	177	0	19	5	16	SO
147	1	0	9	23	58	SO
147	4	5	0	18	67	SO
147	11	0	25	23	42	RD
147	27	3	23	20	44	SO
147	38	5	3	18	62	RD
147	47	15	8	7	17	RD
147	52	23	41	0	13	RD
147	71	9	7	13	58	RD
147	86	21	37	2	30	RD
147	95	23	50	0	16	RD
147	96	21	37	0	13	RD
147	99	17	23	4	19	RD
147	104	22	14	0	28	SO
147	106	22	23	0	28	RD
147	108	23	31	0	30	RD
147	109	10	3	5	23	SO
147	120	14	52	9	1	RD
147	123	15	67	8	0	RD
147	129	23	23	0	37	RD
147	136	9	1	13	59	RD
147	139	0	33	23	30	RD
147	146	0	8	23	56	RD
147	148	0	14	23	53	RD
147	155	10	0	4	7	SO
147	156	0	10	18	33	SO
147	158	5	27	18	33	RD
147	159	0	23	19	23	SO
147	162	0	9	22	33	SO
147	164	1	24	22	33	RD
147	167	21	7	0	39	SO
147	169	21	26	0	39	RD
147	173	18	9	0	2	SO
147	176	22	38	0	24	RD
147	177	3	14	0	19	SO
147	180	23	38	0	28	SO
148	2	0	22	14	74	RD
148	6	0	21	14	75	RD
148	8	0	18	14	78	RD
148	11	14	13	0	83	RD
148	15	0	9	14	17	RD
148	18	14	17	0	18	RD
148	19	14	17	0	21	RD
148	23	0	27	14	69	RD
148	31	14	72	0	24	RD
148	33	0	30	14	66	RD
148	35	0	24	14	72	RD
148	36	0	42	14	54	RD
148	39	0	38	14	57	RD
148	41	0	19	14	75	RD
148	42	0	36	14	58	RD
148	44	0	25	14	71	RD
148	49	1	21	12	11	RD
148	51	6	53	0	33	RD

148	54	0	37	14	57	RD
148	57	0	25	14	71	RD
148	60	4	3	10	88	SO
148	68	3	46	11	49	RD
148	71	0	19	14	73	RD
148	72	0	49	14	43	RD
148	74	0	26	14	68	RD
148	85	0	60	14	36	RD
148	89	0	33	13	45	RD
148	101	2	39	9	44	RD
148	104	2	41	5	24	SO
148	115	0	20	14	72	RD
148	116	0	32	14	60	RD
148	122	14	64	0	32	RD
148	134	13	44	1	40	RD
148	147	0	23	14	53	RD
148	151	0	5	14	7	SO
148	159	0	27	11	39	SO
148	167	0	34	8	36	SO
148	174	0	28	13	55	RD
148	177	2	20	11	10	SO
148	180	0	74	14	17	SO
148	184	1	19	13	42	SO
148	195	4	52	10	44	SO
149	88	0	2	4	1	SO
149	131	4	0	0	4	RD
149	141	3	0	1	4	RD
149	142	0	4	4	0	RD
149	152	4	0	0	4	SO
149	156	0	4	4	0	SO
149	184	0	2	4	0	SO
150	159	4	0	0	4	SO
150	184	3	0	1	3	SO
151	112	4	1	0	6	SO
151	129	5	6	0	14	RD
151	139	0	14	5	7	RD
151	148	0	14	5	7	RD
151	152	0	4	2	1	SO
151	165	2	0	2	22	SO
151	177	3	2	1	15	SO
151	199	3	4	2	18	SO
152	1	9	0	33	25	SO
152	3	10	1	32	24	RD
152	4	5	0	37	25	SO
152	27	17	4	25	21	SO
152	37	34	14	8	11	RD
152	40	34	16	6	9	RD
152	47	24	0	8	9	RD
152	52	32	19	10	1	RD
152	55	37	19	3	6	RD
152	59	2	5	40	20	SO
152	64	28	8	1	5	RD
152	88	0	4	40	13	SO
152	90	0	2	42	22	SO
152	98	20	0	22	25	RD
152	103	16	4	0	2	SO
152	104	21	11	18	1	SO
152	109	12	1	5	18	SO
152	110	12	1	17	24	RD
152	115	16	2	23	22	RD
152	124	3	7	31	16	RD

152	129	19	18	22	0	RD
152	132	26	10	1	5	RD
152	139	19	0	23	20	RD
152	142	11	13	30	5	RD
152	149	4	0	0	4	SO
152	151	0	2	4	1	SO
152	153	42	0	0	25	RD
152	154	42	0	0	25	RD
152	155	11	0	0	13	SO
152	156	0	10	40	3	SO
152	173	19	6	0	2	SO
152	177	1	12	3	2	SO
152	180	41	16	1	7	SO
152	184	0	12	24	5	SO
153	1	9	0	33	38	SO
153	4	5	0	37	38	SO
153	27	17	7	25	31	SO
153	59	2	6	40	32	SO
153	88	0	4	40	23	SO
153	104	21	17	18	5	SO
153	109	12	2	5	21	SO
153	149	4	0	0	4	SO
153	152	42	0	0	25	SO
153	155	11	0	0	13	SO
153	156	0	12	40	9	SO
153	173	19	9	0	3	SO
153	177	1	16	3	5	SO
153	180	41	24	1	11	SO
153	184	0	15	24	10	SO
154	1	9	0	46	25	SO
154	27	20	4	35	21	SO
154	59	3	5	52	20	SO
154	88	0	4	50	13	SO
154	90	0	2	54	22	SO
154	103	23	4	0	2	SO
154	104	27	11	22	1	SO
154	109	13	1	8	18	SO
154	149	4	0	0	4	SO
154	151	0	2	8	1	SO
154	152	42	0	0	25	SO
154	155	11	0	0	13	SO
154	156	2	10	46	3	SO
154	162	9	0	41	18	SO
154	177	5	12	6	2	SO
154	180	49	16	5	7	SO
154	184	3	12	29	5	SO
155	4	5	0	6	13	SO
155	27	3	0	8	13	SO
155	36	11	4	0	9	RD
155	47	10	0	1	6	RD
155	59	0	4	11	9	SO
155	88	0	2	11	5	SO
155	100	11	1	0	12	RD
155	109	6	0	1	11	SO
155	138	11	8	0	4	RD
155	152	11	0	0	13	SO
155	153	11	0	0	13	RD
155	154	11	0	0	13	RD
155	156	0	6	11	1	SO
155	157	0	6	11	7	RD
155	159	0	4	11	3	SO

155	160	0	4	11	8	RD	159	174	1	23	27	24	RD	164	167	2	31	26	16	SO	167	173	25	1	0	3	SO
155	184	0	6	11	2	SO	159	184	6	3	0	42	SO	164	173	2	26	5	1	SO	167	174	28	0	5	42	RD
156	47	0	23	4	14	RD	159	197	11	9	19	41	SO	164	177	4	17	15	4	SO	167	176	33	14	0	28	RD
156	88	3	0	8	53	SO	160	1	9	0	21	67	SO	164	180	14	59	18	5	SO	167	177	5	0	0	14	SO
156	109	1	13	8	7	SO	160	27	14	12	16	55	SO	164	184	2	14	17	34	SO	167	180	34	23	0	22	SO
156	119	12	32	2	22	RD	160	88	2	0	23	61	SO	165	27	0	31	8	75	SO	167	184	2	7	31	10	SO
156	149	0	4	4	0	SO	160	90	5	0	24	65	SO	165	47	5	20	1	29	RD	168	1	0	9	34	63	SO
156	152	0	40	10	3	SO	160	104	2	40	17	10	SO	165	104	7	36	0	30	SO	168	4	5	0	29	72	SO
156	155	0	11	6	1	SO	160	109	2	12	13	18	SO	165	106	7	45	0	30	RD	168	60	0	7	34	61	SO
156	157	14	0	0	56	RD	160	143	3	1	24	65	SO	165	112	4	22	0	47	SO	168	61	0	8	34	62	SO
156	158	14	0	0	56	RD	160	149	0	4	2	1	SO	165	144	0	34	3	8	RD	168	104	32	9	0	30	SO
156	159	7	17	2	28	SO	160	150	4	1	0	4	SO	165	151	2	2	0	22	SO	168	109	12	3	6	28	SO
156	184	8	2	2	32	SO	160	155	0	11	4	8	SO	165	166	8	7	0	99	RD	168	149	3	1	0	4	SO
156	195	11	29	3	27	SO	160	156	7	3	17	35	SO	165	167	6	28	0	48	SO	168	152	22	20	3	16	SO
157	88	3	0	8	76	SO	160	159	30	0	0	50	SO	165	176	8	64	0	28	RD	168	155	11	0	2	8	SO
157	90	1	0	12	81	SO	160	165	0	7	30	59	SO	165	196	1	45	7	61	SO	168	156	2	11	26	29	SO
157	149	0	4	4	0	SO	160	167	1	32	24	16	SO	166	22	12	55	3	44	RD	168	159	1	29	27	21	SO
157	152	0	42	10	10	SO	160	173	2	29	2	4	SO	166	104	11	32	0	30	SO	168	162	1	12	31	31	SO
157	155	0	11	6	7	SO	160	184	6	6	0	52	SO	166	112	7	19	2	45	SO	168	165	6	1	28	71	SO
157	156	14	0	0	56	SO	161	1	9	0	38	50	SO	166	129	11	44	2	35	RD	168	167	34	0	0	48	SO
157	159	7	18	2	46	SO	161	4	0	5	47	45	SO	166	144	0	34	4	7	RD	168	173	25	6	0	7	SO
157	184	8	5	2	51	SO	161	90	5	0	40	49	SO	166	151	3	1	0	22	SO	168	177	5	16	0	21	SO
158	1	0	9	40	47	SO	161	104	10	32	21	6	SO	166	156	0	14	10	46	SO	168	180	34	38	0	31	SO
158	4	0	5	40	51	SO	161	109	3	11	18	13	SO	166	159	0	30	9	40	SO	168	184	2	12	31	24	SO
158	27	5	20	35	36	SO	161	143	4	0	40	49	SO	166	165	8	0	7	99	SO	169	1	0	9	58	39	SO
158	59	8	3	32	53	SO	161	150	5	0	0	4	SO	166	167	8	26	1	47	SO	169	4	5	0	53	48	SO
158	60	5	1	34	52	SO	161	152	22	20	15	5	SO	166	176	14	58	0	28	RD	169	27	13	18	45	30	SO
158	88	3	0	29	53	SO	161	155	0	11	9	3	SO	166	177	7	16	0	21	SO	169	60	1	6	57	38	SO
158	109	2	13	24	7	SO	161	156	8	2	24	28	SO	166	191	0	8	2	3	SO	169	90	0	5	55	40	SO
158	149	0	4	4	0	SO	161	159	30	0	0	50	SO	166	196	2	44	13	55	SO	169	104	41	0	3	27	SO
158	152	2	40	17	3	SO	161	167	6	27	27	13	SO	167	1	0	9	34	39	SO	169	109	12	3	14	20	SO
158	155	0	11	12	1	SO	161	184	9	3	10	42	SO	167	4	5	0	29	48	SO	169	151	3	0	7	15	SO
158	156	14	0	0	56	SO	161	191	0	8	2	1	SO	167	11	1	16	33	32	RD	169	159	6	24	35	13	SO
158	167	6	26	16	22	SO	162	31	12	42	1	23	RD	167	32	7	2	27	46	RD	169	162	2	11	46	16	SO
158	173	5	27	3	1	SO	162	35	1	22	12	43	RD	167	38	8	1	26	45	RD	169	165	7	0	51	48	SO
158	180	23	48	15	8	SO	162	44	1	23	12	42	RD	167	40	29	25	3	20	RD	169	167	34	0	0	48	SO
158	184	11	2	19	32	SO	162	61	4	1	8	62	SO	167	41	15	3	18	45	RD	169	173	30	1	4	3	SO
158	191	7	1	1	4	SO	162	65	2	23	2	2	RD	167	49	4	9	0	17	RD	169	177	21	0	7	14	SO
159	1	9	0	21	50	SO	162	104	2	39	6	14	SO	167	52	34	24	0	16	RD	169	180	49	23	9	22	SO
159	11	3	16	27	34	RD	162	115	1	19	12	43	RD	167	53	13	1	21	47	RD	169	184	7	7	45	10	SO
159	27	14	10	16	40	SO	162	122	11	35	2	30	RD	167	60	0	6	34	38	SO	170	1	0	9	39	54	SO
159	35	3	19	27	31	RD	162	134	10	31	3	30	RD	167	61	0	5	34	41	SO	170	11	15	10	24	53	RD
159	73	25	25	3	24	RD	162	137	1	27	10	31	RD	167	64	26	11	1	10	RD	170	25	2	14	37	49	RD
159	88	2	0	23	49	SO	162	163	13	0	0	65	RD	167	65	11	5	1	10	RD	170	27	7	23	32	40	SO
159	90	5	0	24	49	SO	162	164	13	0	0	65	RD	167	86	31	27	3	20	RD	170	31	36	42	3	21	RD
159	93	13	9	15	41	RD	162	167	1	31	11	16	SO	167	90	0	5	34	40	SO	170	32	1	9	38	54	RD
159	104	2	32	17	6	SO	162	173	1	26	1	1	SO	167	95	33	30	0	16	RD	170	33	6	24	33	39	RD
159	109	2	11	13	13	SO	162	174	1	25	11	35	RD	167	96	33	17	0	19	RD	170	35	2	22	37	41	RD
159	120	30	31	0	8	RD	162	177	1	17	3	4	SO	167	104	32	0	0	27	SO	170	38	1	9	38	52	RD
159	124	5	1	18	44	RD	163	61	4	3	8	82	SO	167	109	12	3	6	20	SO	170	39	10	27	29	35	RD
159	127	1	13	21	34	RD	163	104	2	40	6	23	SO	167	110	12	3	19	31	RD	170	41	1	18	37	44	RD
159	133	0	21	28	28	RD	163	162	13	0	0	65	SO	167	124	1	8	29	32	RD	170	42	6	30	32	32	RD
159	136	0	11	28	35	RD	163	167	1	32	11	31	SO	167	133	4	16	27	30	RD	170	44	1	24	38	39	RD
159	143	3	0	24	49	SO	164	12	5	0	29	65	SO	167	136	12	0	18	42	RD	170	59	8	3	30	59	SO
159	150	4	0	0	4	SO	164	60	5	1	26	62	SO	167	143	0	4	34	37	SO	170	71	1	20	38	40	RD
159	155	0	11	4	3	SO	164	61	6	1	27	62	SO	167	159	1	24	27	13	SO	170	90	0	4	39	52	SO
159	156	7	2	17	28	SO	164	90	3	1	28	64	SO	167	162	1	11	31	16	SO	170	98	2	19	37	44	RD
159	160	30	0	0	50	RD	164	104	3	39	15	14	SO	167	163	1	11	32	31	RD	170	100	16	46	9	7	RD
159	161	30	0	0	50	RD	164	109	1	14	13	19	SO	167	165	6	0	28	48	SO	170	109	0	14	21	15	SO
159	167	1	27	24	13	SO	164	143	3	1	28	61	SO	167	168	34	0	0	48	RD	170	127	4	15	30	38	RD
159	173	2	25	2	3	SO	164	162	13	0	0	65	SO	167	169	34	0	0	48	RD	170	151	1	4	14	6	SO

170	152	6	35	11	10	SO
170	154	14	40	11	10	RD
170	155	0	11	8	4	SO
170	167	7	27	17	24	SO
170	171	0	12	39	49	RD
170	172	0	21	39	38	RD
170	184	10	2	21	34	SO
171	6	0	20	12	70	RD
171	37	9	46	3	44	RD
171	40	10	50	2	36	RD
171	102	12	47	0	41	RD
171	104	9	34	0	27	SO
171	109	4	10	2	33	SO
171	151	2	3	1	21	SO
171	156	0	12	11	41	SO
171	159	1	26	10	40	SO
171	160	1	26	11	55	RD
171	167	10	24	0	41	SO
171	170	0	39	12	49	RD
171	172	0	21	12	66	RD
171	173	12	21	0	7	SO
172	4	3	2	18	86	SO
172	41	10	9	11	77	RD
172	47	11	14	4	24	RD
172	52	19	59	0	15	RD
172	53	8	6	13	82	RD
172	64	12	33	0	15	RD
172	92	0	20	21	68	RD
172	104	18	25	0	28	SO
172	109	8	6	5	33	SO
172	117	16	43	5	42	RD
172	118	1	36	18	40	RD
172	120	12	73	7	3	RD
172	126	11	67	10	6	RD
172	129	18	38	2	33	RD
172	133	2	26	18	54	RD
172	144	0	32	6	5	RD
172	155	6	5	2	11	SO
172	159	1	26	15	35	SO
172	160	1	26	18	49	RD
172	162	0	12	16	47	SO
172	164	1	31	16	47	RD
172	167	15	19	1	42	SO
172	171	0	12	21	66	RD
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172	184	0	19	20	36	SO
172	189	5	2	16	86	RD
172	191	0	8	3	2	SO
173	12	0	2	33	5	SO
173	52	31	5	0	2	RD
173	90	0	2	31	3	SO
173	102	32	4	1	3	RD
173	109	12	0	7	3	SO
173	112	9	3	16	0	SO
173	126	18	6	15	0	RD
173	143	0	2	33	4	SO
173	152	19	0	6	2	SO
173	159	2	2	25	3	SO
173	162	1	1	26	1	SO
173	167	25	0	1	3	SO
173	169	30	4	1	3	RD
173	171	12	0	21	7	RD
173	172	21	0	12	7	RD
173	175	29	4	3	3	RD
173	176	31	5	1	2	RD
174	1	0	9	28	63	SO
174	3	9	4	19	68	SO
174	4	5	0	23	72	SO
174	5	14	4	0	9	SO
174	10	1	29	27	43	SO
174	11	1	24	27	48	SO
174	15	2	4	1	29	SO
174	18	1	29	4	11	SO
174	25	11	5	17	67	SO
174	26	18	26	10	46	SO
174	28	11	41	17	27	SO
174	29	23	26	2	39	SO
174	30	1	45	27	26	SO
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174	35	19	5	9	67	SO
174	36	26	15	2	57	SO
174	37	27	30	1	42	SO
174	38	8	2	20	68	SO
174	39	19	18	9	53	SO
174	40	24	34	2	35	SO
174	41	15	4	12	67	SO
174	42	22	14	5	57	SO
174	43	28	22	0	48	SO
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174	76	18	8	8	50	SO
174	77	6	18	1	32	SO
174	80	7	8	0	22	SO
174	81	10	1	10	26	SO
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174	84	7	16	0	22	SO
174	85	24	29	4	43	SO
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174	87	2	25	23	32	SO
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174	104	26	16	0	30	SO
174	105	26	16	0	46	SO
174	106	26	24	0	30	SO
174	107	27	17	1	54	SO
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174	109	11	3	4	28	SO
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174	111	22	26	4	28	SO
174	115	17	3	11	66	SO
174	116	23	9	5	60	SO
174	117	28	25	0	44	SO
174	118	1	32	27	27	SO
174	119	7	55	21	4	SO
174	120	18	59	10	0	SO
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174	122	12	58	16	14	SO
174	123	20	72	8	0	SO
174	125	4	48	22	12	SO
174	126	10	60	16	0	SO
174	127	10	7	15	54	SO
174	128	22	22	3	39	SO
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174	130	8	4	18	44	SO
174	132	26	38	1	7	SO
174	133	4	25	21	44	SO
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174	135	25	47	0	12	SO
174	136	12	0	14	66	SO
174	137	25	4	1	62	SO
174	138	26	19	1	46	SO
174	139	0	34	28	34	SO
174	140	1	12	25	54	SO
174	141	8	3	17	64	SO
174	142	13	13	12	52	SO
174	144	0	33	8	3	SO
174	146	0	8	27	55	SO
174	147	19	3	5	57	SO
174	148	0	13	28	55	SO
174	149	3	1	0	4	SO
174	152	22	20	0	18	SO
174	153	22	20	2	29	SO
174	154	24	31	0	18	SO
174	155	11	0	0	10	SO
174	156	1	11	25	30	SO
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174	159	1	27	23	24	SO
174	160	1	27	26	37	SO
174	161	4	40	23	24	SO
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174	163	1	11	26	53	SO
174	164	2	29	25	35	SO
174	165	5	3	23	69	SO
174	167	28	5	0	42	SO
174	168	28	5	0	65	SO
174	169	28	28	0	42	SO
174	170	3	33	25	36	SO
174	171	9	2	19	66	SO
174	172	14	7	14	62	SO
174	173	23	9	0	7	SO
174	175	28	23	0	49	SO
174	176	28	44	0	28	SO
174	178	4	45	23	25	SO
174	179	2	46	24	14	SO
174	180	28	42	0	28	SO
174	181	20	1	8	41	SO
174	182	8	41	0	21	SO
174	184	0	11	27	28	SO
174	186	1	28	27	28	SO
174	187	1	52	26	9	SO
174	189	7	0	21	72	SO
174	190	8	21	7	0	SO
174	192	1	20	27	50	SO
174	193	1	25	27	47	SO
174	194	0	13	28	59	SO
175	1	0	9	51	40	SO
175	3	11	2	40	47	RD
175	4	5	0	46	49	SO
175	11	6	19	45	30	RD
175	27	10	18	41	31	SO
175	31	28	48	23	1	RD
175	32	8	2	43	47	RD
175	33	20	9	31	40	RD
175	35	21	3	30	46	RD
175	38	9	1	42	46	RD
175	41	16	3	33	46	RD
175	44	19	6	32	43	RD
175	46	47	27	3	18	RD
175	53	13	1	38	48	RD
175	55	45	25	6	22	RD
175	60	0	6	51	39	SO
175	64	32	12	3	9	RD
175	86	41	25	10	24	RD
175	88	0	3	47	41	SO
175	90	0	4	47	43	SO
175	104	42	0	0	30	SO
175	109	12	2	13	19	SO
175	110	12	2	36	30	RD
175	115	20	0	31	46	RD
175	120	39	38	10	0	RD
175	124	2	6	43	35	RD
175	133	10	19	37	28	RD
175	135	45	27	1	11	RD
175	136	12	0	34	46	RD
175	151	3	1	3	18	SO
175	159	3	25	33	14	SO
175	162	2	10	42	18	SO
175	163	2	10	46	33	RD
175	165	8	0	43	49	SO

175	167	33	0	0	42	SD
175	173	29	3	4	3	SD
175	174	28	0	23	49	RD
175	176	51	21	0	28	RD
175	177	23	0	0	21	SD
175	180	46	24	5	23	SD
175	184	5	6	41	14	SD
175	191	0	8	3	2	SD
176	1	0	9	72	19	SD
176	2	20	2	52	26	SD
176	5	16	2	0	9	SD
176	6	16	2	56	26	SD
176	8	6	9	66	19	SD
176	9	3	5	69	23	SD
176	10	26	4	46	24	SD
176	11	22	3	50	25	SD
176	18	26	4	6	9	SD
176	20	6	9	16	2	SD
176	24	31	20	41	8	SD
176	25	14	2	58	26	SD
176	26	27	17	45	11	SD
176	27	13	15	59	13	SD
176	31	49	27	23	1	SD
176	35	21	3	51	25	SD
176	37	45	12	27	16	SD
176	50	42	0	16	28	SD
176	51	54	1	4	27	SD
176	52	59	14	0	14	SD
176	53	13	1	59	27	SD
176	67	49	23	21	3	SD
176	78	22	2	2	5	SD
176	81	11	0	24	12	SD
176	83	2	6	70	22	SD
176	84	15	8	20	2	SD
176	87	24	3	34	21	SD
176	89	33	0	25	25	SD
176	90	0	4	68	22	SD
176	91	24	3	0	4	SD
176	92	1	17	71	10	SD
176	93	11	18	61	8	SD
176	94	50	0	6	28	SD
176	95	71	11	0	15	SD
176	96	50	15	6	11	SD
176	97	6	11	0	15	SD
176	101	40	0	23	28	SD
176	102	57	0	15	28	SD
176	104	42	0	10	20	SD
176	105	42	0	21	25	SD
176	106	49	1	10	20	SD
176	107	44	0	28	27	SD
176	108	60	1	8	25	SD
176	115	20	0	52	25	SD
176	116	32	0	40	25	SD
176	117	49	4	23	21	SD
176	118	8	25	51	3	SD
176	119	34	28	25	0	SD
176	120	49	28	10	0	SD
176	123	64	28	8	0	SD
176	124	3	5	62	16	SD
176	125	34	18	31	3	SD
176	126	49	21	16	0	SD
176	127	17	0	48	21	SD
176	128	44	0	21	21	SD
176	129	48	1	17	20	SD
176	130	12	0	40	22	SD
176	131	29	1	22	6	SD
176	133	25	4	42	23	SD
176	134	51	4	16	23	SD
176	135	64	8	3	9	SD
176	136	12	0	53	27	SD
176	137	29	0	36	27	SD
176	138	45	0	22	25	SD
176	139	15	19	55	7	SD
176	141	11	0	55	26	SD
176	142	25	1	40	24	SD
176	143	1	3	70	22	SD
176	144	14	19	11	0	SD
176	147	22	0	38	24	SD
176	148	13	0	58	25	SD
176	158	30	6	38	17	SD
176	159	6	22	47	0	SD
176	160	6	22	60	3	SD
176	161	19	25	47	0	SD
176	162	5	7	46	14	SD
176	163	5	7	62	17	SD
176	165	8	0	64	28	SD
176	166	14	0	58	28	SD
176	167	33	0	14	28	SD
176	168	33	0	37	28	SD
176	169	56	0	14	28	SD
176	170	31	5	39	22	SD
176	171	11	0	60	25	SD
176	172	20	1	52	24	SD
176	173	31	1	5	2	SD
176	174	28	0	44	28	SD
176	175	51	0	21	28	SD
176	178	31	18	40	8	SD
176	179	22	26	38	0	SD
176	181	21	0	29	20	SD
176	182	29	20	21	0	SD
176	183	21	0	0	7	SD
176	184	7	4	55	0	SD
176	185	7	4	7	22	SD
176	186	7	22	55	0	SD
176	187	25	28	35	0	SD
176	189	7	0	65	28	SD
176	194	0	13	72	15	SD
177	11	5	16	18	5	RD
177	23	6	1	17	20	RD
177	39	8	1	15	20	RD
177	49	7	4	3	14	RD
177	60	0	4	23	17	SD
177	85	11	2	12	19	RD
177	104	16	0	0	10	SD
177	108	21	12	1	7	RD
177	151	3	1	2	15	SD
177	152	1	3	12	2	SD
177	153	1	3	16	5	RD
177	162	1	3	17	4	SD
177	167	5	0	0	14	SD
177	175	23	0	0	21	RD
177	180	18	4	5	16	SD
177	191	0	8	3	1	SD
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178	23	6	17	47	34	RD
178	27	19	9	34	42	SD
178	31	49	31	4	20	RD
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186	159	22	0	2	42	SO
186	160	22	0	5	52	SO
186	161	25	10	2	42	SO
186	162	7	3	15	34	SO
186	163	7	3	21	48	SO
186	165	0	7	31	49	SO

186	166	0	11	31	45	SO
186	167	1	31	28	10	SO
186	168	1	31	30	24	SO
186	169	3	45	28	10	SO
186	172	0	20	27	36	SO
186	173	1	28	3	3	SO
186	174	1	27	28	28	SO
186	175	3	41	26	14	SO
186	176	7	55	22	0	SO
186	178	19	23	11	32	SO
186	179	29	13	2	33	SO
186	181	1	19	20	19	SO
186	182	20	19	2	18	SO
186	183	2	18	6	0	SO
186	187	31	11	0	34	SO
186	188	3	15	26	41	SO
186	189	0	7	31	49	SO
186	194	13	0	18	56	SO
186	199	1	8	30	48	SO
187	1	9	0	57	35	SO
187	4	0	5	66	30	SO
187	25	5	12	61	23	RO
187	32	2	8	64	27	RO
187	33	13	16	53	19	RO
187	38	1	9	63	26	RO
187	40	40	27	23	6	RO
187	41	3	16	62	18	RO
187	46	45	31	17	3	RO
187	52	37	34	16	0	RO
187	53	1	13	65	22	RO
187	55	41	30	23	5	RO
187	98	7	15	59	20	RO
187	100	34	27	18	1	RO
187	104	6	32	28	1	SO
187	109	4	11	31	3	SO
187	110	4	11	48	22	RO
187	124	12	1	43	32	RO
187	127	7	12	41	22	RO
187	130	2	10	43	23	RO
187	132	25	32	7	1	RO
187	135	33	33	12	1	RO
187	144	28	2	2	9	RO
187	149	0	4	3	0	SO
187	152	19	23	18	3	SO
187	154	27	27	18	3	RO
187	155	0	11	8	1	SO
187	156	11	2	27	29	SO
187	159	30	0	16	27	SO
187	162	10	3	30	29	SO
187	165	1	6	64	29	SO
187	167	2	27	44	1	SO
187	173	6	26	4	1	SO
187	177	11	7	13	2	SO
187	180	38	30	23	5	SO
187	184	18	0	11	34	SO
188	1	0	9	32	72	SO
188	11	0	26	32	55	RO
188	19	0	31	19	3	RO
188	49	9	15	0	25	RO
188	61	0	7	32	71	SO
188	64	25	21	1	17	RO

188	65	21	4	1	17	RD	192	53	0	14	27	72	RD
188	73	31	33	0	45	RD	192	60	5	1	22	80	SO
188	104	21	22	4	25	SO	192	61	6	1	21	82	SO
188	106	22	30	4	25	RD	192	64	0	46	14	4	RD
188	108	26	39	5	28	RD	192	65	0	25	14	4	RD
188	132	18	48	5	4	RD	192	71	1	19	26	63	RD
188	152	9	32	13	12	SO	192	104	3	40	7	22	SO
188	154	15	39	13	12	RD	192	109	0	15	14	27	SO
188	156	9	5	13	42	SO	192	112	10	17	6	41	SO
188	157	9	5	21	62	RD	192	115	0	20	27	62	RD
188	162	1	10	31	34	SO	192	120	20	68	0	10	RD
188	167	14	20	5	41	SO	192	136	0	12	18	65	RD
188	177	14	9	2	19	SO	192	159	2	27	12	38	SO
188	180	31	44	1	32	SO	192	162	5	6	3	62	SO
188	184	12	9	15	41	SO	192	167	1	33	17	29	SO
188	189	0	7	32	74	RD	192	168	1	33	23	47	RD
188	190	32	0	0	7	RD	192	173	4	29	4	3	SO
188	192	0	27	32	54	RO	192	174	1	27	20	50	RD
188	193	0	26	32	54	RD	192	177	5	18	12	9	SO
189	37	7	57	0	51	RD	192	180	7	68	17	16	SO
189	51	7	53	0	37	RO	192	188	0	32	27	54	RD
189	102	7	52	0	49	RD	193	1	0	9	28	77	SO
189	104	7	36	0	30	SO	193	3	0	13	28	73	RD
189	106	7	45	0	30	RD	193	11	25	3	3	83	RD
189	108	7	58	0	35	RD	193	15	0	11	25	8	RD
189	109	4	11	0	42	SO	193	19	25	8	0	22	RD
189	118	0	40	7	53	RO	193	31	27	62	1	23	RD
189	138	7	41	0	49	RD	193	49	4	20	20	6	RD
189	144	0	34	5	6	RO	193	53	0	14	28	72	RD
189	152	5	37	0	25	SO	193	57	0	25	28	61	RD
189	167	7	27	0	48	SO	193	59	8	5	18	81	SO
189	169	7	51	0	48	RD	193	60	6	1	21	81	SO
189	175	7	44	0	49	RD	193	61	8	0	19	84	SC
189	176	7	65	0	28	RD	193	64	0	46	2	16	RD
189	180	7	69	0	34	SO	193	71	1	20	27	62	RD
189	188	0	32	7	74	RD	193	74	0	26	27	59	RD
189	190	0	32	7	0	RD	193	104	3	40	9	21	SO
190	73	31	5	0	2	RD	193	109	0	15	16	26	SO
190	109	4	4	13	0	SO	193	119	14	59	1	25	RD
190	111	14	7	13	0	RD	193	123	28	78	0	8	RD
190	145	16	1	3	5	RO	193	136	0	12	26	59	RD
190	152	9	5	13	0	SO	193	157	1	13	25	59	RD
190	154	15	5	13	0	RD	193	159	4	26	17	33	SO
190	156	9	0	13	7	SO	193	160	4	26	21	46	RD
190	184	12	0	15	7	SO	193	162	6	7	5	60	SO
190	188	32	0	0	7	RD	193	167	1	33	18	30	SO
190	189	0	7	32	0	RD	193	168	1	33	25	47	RD
191	60	4	0	4	5	SO	193	174	1	27	25	47	RD
191	61	2	4	6	1	SO	193	177	5	18	15	6	SO
191	128	0	3	7	2	RD	193	180	4	72	22	11	SO
191	134	8	3	0	2	RD	193	184	1	19	17	39	SO
191	177	0	3	8	1	SO	193	188	0	32	26	54	RD
192	1	0	9	27	77	SO	193	197	3	32	25	54	SO
192	3	0	13	27	73	RD	194	1	9	0	4	101	SO
192	11	14	12	13	74	RD	194	2	0	22	13	79	RD
192	12	5	0	22	86	SO	194	5	0	18	9	0	RD
192	19	19	12	0	22	RD	194	6	0	21	13	80	RD
192	22	21	45	6	41	RD	194	10	0	33	13	68	RD
192	27	4	27	23	59	SD	194	11	0	28	13	73	RD
192	41	0	19	27	65	RD	194	16	0	11	4	14	RD
192	48	1	29	10	14	RD	194	18	0	33	4	14	RD
194	20	4	14	0	21	RD							
194	27	10	20	3	81	SO							
194	34	10	51	3	50	RD							
194	46	11	72	0	26	RD							
194	50	0	43	13	42	RD							
194	64	7	38	0	18	RD							
194	86	12	63	1	37	RD							
194	87	0	31	13	45	RD							
194	89	0	33	13	48	RD							
194	93	13	18	0	78	RD							
194	94	0	51	13	27	RD							
194	96	13	53	0	23	RD							
194	97	0	23	13	2	RD							
194	100	13	51	0	22	RD							
194	101	0	41	13	43	RD							
194	104	0	43	13	17	SO							
194	105	0	43	13	34	RD							
194	107	0	45	13	52	RD							
194	115	0	20	12	78	RD							
194	119	13	61	0	25	RD							
194	127	0	21	13	58	RD							
194	128	0	48	13	31	RD							
194	133	0	29	13	62	RD							
194	137	0	29	13	54	RD							
194	142	0	30	13	52	RD							
194	144	13	20	0	11	RD							
194	147	0	23	13	53	RD							
194	152	13	29	0	25	SO							
194	154	13	42	0	25	RD							
194	156	0	14	13	42	SO							
194	159	13	17	0	50	SO							
194	161	13	34	0	50	RD							
194	167	0	34	13	34	SO							
194	168	0	34	13	58	RD							
194	170	0	39	13	50	RD							
194	172	0	21	13	74	RD							
194	174	0	28	13	59	RD							
194	175	0	51	13	36	RD							
194	180	13	62	0	34	SO							
194	188	0	32	13	67	RD							
194	192	0	27	13	72	RD							
194	193	0	28	13	72	RD							
195	156	11	3	29	27	SO							
196	61	1	7	44	60	SO							
196	130	2	10	31	40	RD							
196	165	1	7	45	61	SO							
197	12	5	0	30	80	SO							
197	59	1	12	33	67	SO							
197	61	0	8	33	71	SO							
197	65	8	17	13	5	RD							
197	86	27	49	7	31	RD							
197	90	3	2	28	74	SO							
197	119	27	47	5	21	RD							
197	143	3	2	27	73	SO							
197	159	11	19	9	41	SO							
197	199	1	11	34	69	RD							
198	112	2	25	14	33	SO							
198	113	2	25	20	61	RD							
199	11	7	21	5	82	RD							
199	72	3	49	9	50	RD							
199	151	3	2	4	18	SO							
199	177	1	22	5	16	SO							
199	180	5	71	7	27	SO							
199	197	1	34	11	69	RD							

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